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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the determinants of capital structure and seeks to establish the 
degree to which cross-country differences affect capital structure. The theoretical 
foundations of this research derive from various theories of capital structure, including 
the trade-off theory, agency cost theory and pecking order theory. The problem 
encountered with this type of research, and the cross-sectional models associated with 
it, is that the theories are not sufficiently precise to produce a limited set of determining 
variables, which invariably leads to data mining. To overcome this problem, this thesis 
employs extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to distinguish between robust and fragile 
determinants of capital structure.  
 
The empirical analysis is based on a large and diverse data set collected from 
Datastream and the World Bank. The size, complexity and detail of the data set pose a 
unique advantage for the analysis intended in this thesis (information at the firm and 
country levels on 28 variables covering 17 countries from 2003 until 2013). The 
objective of the study is to show that a large number of variables that have been 
reported as statistically significant determinants of capital structure are, in fact, fragile 
and only appear significant because of a particular selection of explanatory variables.  
 
Through the application of EBA and running almost 2 million regressions throughout 
two phases of the analysis, the results reveal important findings pertaining to the 
determinants of capital structure. The results confirm the consistency and robustness of 
several firm-specific determinants across several countries; with respect to country-
specific determinants, it appears that they do not have a substantial effect on the 
leverage choice of firms.  Additionally, the similarity of the robust determinants of 
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capital structure within and across countries increases when using either the book value 
or market value measures of leverage, which means that the determinants of leverage 
vary, depending on which component of debt is analysed. Most importantly, proper 
inference requires full reporting and transparency, which means that p-values and 
related statistics should not be reported selectively. 
Keywords: Capital structure, leverage, extreme bounds analysis, trade-off theory, pecking 
order theory, agency theory. 
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CHAPTER 1 
   INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
The topic of capital structure is considered crucial in corporate finance. Since the 
publication of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) pioneering work, finance theorists 
have concentrated on studying the theory of capital structure. In previous decades, 
alternative theories of capital structure have emerged, including Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) trade-off theory and agency cost theory, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order 
theory and Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory of capital structure.  
 
This study investigates the determinants of capital structure, and an attempt is made to 
establish whether or not cross-country differences affect the leverage choice of firms. 
Researchers usually rely on existing theories and literature in determining variables that are 
relevant to include in a regression. However, the existing literature does not provide a clear 
path to direct empirical work on capital structure. Frydenberg (2011) argues that neither the 
trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory specifies a set of explanatory variables to be 
used in empirical models. 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted to identify the determinants of capital structure, but 
no specific set of variables has emerged, which means that there is no widely accepted set 
of explanatory variables that can be regarded as the true determinants of capital structure. 
Researchers usually try various model specifications and run hundreds of regressions, but 
they only report the estimates that support their favoured theories. They typically report 
only selective inference, leading to a surplus of false published results that compromise the 
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valid interpretation. Furthermore, there is no theoretical reason for different model 
specifications to produce coefficients of a certain sign. Moosa et al. (2009) report that 
selective results with particular signs represent reduced form models and cannot clearly 
define the true relationship between a variable and another. Thus, an important question 
arises on the reliability of existing studies and their inference, especially the sensitivity of 
results to model specification. Accordingly, emphasis is placed on using extreme bounds 
analysis (EBA) to reveal the robustness or fragility of various determinants of capital 
structure. EBA also provides a trustworthy analysis of the country and firm determinants of 
capital structure. 
 
This study intends to investigate and compare the determinants of the capital structure of 
firms operating in developed and emerging economies around the world with different 
institutional set-ups (such as financial markets, bankruptcy codes and country ownership 
structures) to determine if cross-country differences affect capital structure. The objective is 
to show that a large number of variables, found to be statistically significant determinants 
of capital structure, are in fact fragile and only appear significant because of the use of a 
particular set of explanatory variables. The original version of EBA, introduced by Leamer 
(1983, 1985), is employed and more insight is provided to the modifications introduced by 
Granger and Uhlig (1990) and Sala-i-Martin (1997).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an appropriate background for the topic of this thesis, 
as well as to provide a summary of the relevant literature. This chapter introduces a general 
overview of the theoretical basis linked to capital structure, together with objectives, 
methodological underpinnings, research questions and contribution. A summary of the 
thesis structure is presented towards the end of this chapter. 
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1.2 Capital Structure Literature  
There was no generally accepted theory of debt-equity choice before the introduction of 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory, which led to the development of the theoretical 
foundations of capital structure. Modigliani and Miller’s theory states that a firm’s market 
value is not affected by financial leverage under the assumption of a world with perfect 
capital markets where there are no transaction costs, no default risk, no taxation, 
equivalence in borrowing costs for companies and investors and symmetry of market 
information.  
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) contend that firms have expected cash flows, which are 
divided between debt and equity holders depending on the chosen proportion of debt and 
equity by the firm to finance its assets.
1
 They assume equal access to financial markets for 
both investors and firms, which permits homemade leverage. The investor can create or get 
rid of any leverage, implying that it does not matter whether a firm finances itself by 
issuing stocks or by selling debt. 
 
Since the introduction of Modigliani and Miller’s theory, many financial economists have 
presented their own theories of capital structure. The original trade-off theory emerged 
when taxes were added to Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) irrelevance proposition, which 
created a tax benefit arising from the use of debt. Myers (1984) finds that firms following 
the trade-off theory set a target debt level and then gradually move towards it. Although the 
use of debt is associated with the advantage of paying taxes, it is risky for a firm to rely 
heavily on debt due to the risk of default and the subsequent cost of bankruptcy. The theory 
asserts that firms should increase their debt level until the marginal tax advantage of 
                                                          
1
 Cash flows refer to the amount of cash left for a company after it has paid all its expenses, including 
investments. 
4 
 
additional debt offsets the cost of bankruptcy risk. Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) static 
trade-off theory anticipates the optimal capital structure for a firm by trading off the costs 
and benefits of debt and equity while accounting for market imperfections, such as taxes, 
agency costs and bankruptcy costs. Incorporating agency costs in the static trade-off theory 
means that firms should increase their debt level until the marginal tax advantage of 
additional debt offsets the costs of financial distress that arise from bankruptcy risks and 
agency costs.  
 
The dynamic trade-off theory mainly recognises the role of expectation and adjustment 
costs to construct a model that acknowledges the role of time, which is ignored in single-
period models. This theory states that firms must depend on the financing margin predicted 
in the next period to make the right financing decisions. Kane et al. (1984) and Brennan and 
Schwartz (1984) were among the first to analyse continuous time models and to consider 
tax against bankruptcy as a cost, excluding the transaction cost. Since firms react to adverse 
financial shocks without incurring costs while rebalancing, they keep debt high to benefit 
from tax savings. 
 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory focuses on information costs and 
signalling effects. This theory is a consequence of Myers’ (1984) asymmetric information 
proposition, which means that managers have more information about the rate of internal 
cash flow, investment opportunities and value of the company compared with investors, 
thus affecting the choice between internal and external financing. According to the pecking 
order theory, firms do not attempt to reach an optimal capital structure, and the need for 
external funds determines the debt ratios. Firms prefer internal financing (such as retained 
earnings and depreciation expenses) to external financing as a way of funding their projects 
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because it does not have any issuing costs and is less expensive. However, if internal funds 
are insufficient, firms prefer to use debt rather than equity to minimise the problem of 
information asymmetry between firms’ managers and external investors.  
 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory assumes that an optimal capital structure 
can be determined by reducing conflicts of interest between the stakeholders (managers, 
shareholders and holders of debt securities). Jensen and Meckling state that debt motivates 
managers to be efficient in operating their firms and maximising their shareholders’ wealth. 
For example, if a firm experiences financial distress, management is pressured by 
shareholders to take debt from creditors. Managers have to make interest payments to 
creditors because they have to make legal redress, and if they fail, they could lose their 
jobs, which will make them operate the firm more efficiently. Hence, debt and interest 
payments reduce the agency costs between managers and shareholders. 
 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory of capital structure implies that firms try 
to time the equity market by issuing new stocks when they seem to be overvalued and 
repurchasing them when they seem to be undervalued. However, the instability of stock 
prices may affect the capital structure of firms. There are two versions of equity market 
timing, the first of which assumes that economic agents are rational. In this case, equity is 
issued after a positive information release, which reduces the information asymmetry 
problem between managers and stakeholders. In the second version, it is assumed that 
economic agents are irrational and that managers believe they can time the market, which 
causes the time mispricing of stocks. Managers of diverse firms consider issuing equity 
when the cost of equity is low, whereas a repurchase of equity is considered wise in the 
event in which the cost of stock is perceived to be high. 
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1.3 Research Objectives and Approach   
Significant empirical research has tested the determinants of capital structure. Prior studies 
relied predominantly on firm-level ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, with leverage 
as the dependent variable and firm-specific determinants as the explanatory variables. The 
problem with this type of research and the cross-sectional models associated with it is that 
the theories are not precise enough to produce a limited set of determining variables, which 
invariably leads to data mining. According to Sturm and Haan (2005), OLS regression is 
sensitive to outlying observation, and one country (or firm) might drive all the results. 
Therefore, presenting only the results of a single preferred model can be misleading.  
 
A recent study by Wasserstein and Lazar (2016) on behalf of the American Statistical 
Association raises concerns about research findings of quantitative studies, stating that 
proper inference requires full reporting and transparency and that p-values and related 
analyses should not be reported selectively. Hence, the legitimacy of conclusions on 
quantitative studies depends on more than the statistical methods themselves. Well-selected 
techniques, correctly conducted analyses, interpretation of statistical results and (most 
importantly) full reporting play a significant part in ensuring that the research conclusions 
and findings are sound. 
 
The main objective of this study is to fill gaps in the knowledge on this subject by 
conducting a sensitivity analysis of the variables used in the existing literature and separate 
the robust determinants of capital structure from the fragile ones by applying EBA to a 
large sample of firms. Use of international data provides a unique opportunity for this 
analysis because each country has a different structure, which helps in distinguishing 
between robust and fragile determinants of capital structure within and across countries. 
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The approach taken here involves dividing the explanatory variables into two groups: (i) 
firm-specific variables and (ii) and country-specific variables. Their effect on the leverage 
ratio is tested using two steps: (i) running separate regressions including only firm-specific 
variables and (ii) running regressions including only robust firm-specific variables, together 
with country-specific variables.  
 
The application of EBA involves running almost 2,000,000 regression models, specifically 
1,976,930 regressions in the first phase and 12,439 regressions in the second phase. By 
applying Leamer’s (1983, 1985) original EBA method, this study provides a reliable 
examination of the determinants of capital structure and helps in selecting a set of 
explanatory variables to appear in the final model when there is model uncertainty. EBA 
helps to sidestep problems such as bias and data mining by providing results over the full 
range of potential specifications. This makes it possible to test the sensitivity of the results 
to any changes in the model specifications of explanatory variables.  
 
1.4 Research Questions and Contribution  
Firms consider a number of factors when choosing a capital structure that is perceived to be 
ideal. On the other hand, several theories of capital structure suggest diverse factors that 
influence decision making with reference to debt-equity choice. Booth et al. (2001) observe 
that an optimal capital structure is usually affected by a firm’s and country’s specific 
factors. It has been established that besides a firm’s specific features, a country’s 
characteristics can affect choice with respect to the leverage of a firm. In an attempt to 
differentiate the fragile factors from robust ones, there is a need to investigate the 
sensitivity of various factors across diverse firms in both developed and emerging 
economies. Specifically, the research questions under consideration are the following:  
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I. Are the predictions of conventional capital structure theories valid? 
II. Do corporate financial leverage decisions differ significantly across countries? 
III. Are the factors that influence capital structure decisions similar between developed 
and emerging countries? 
IV. Which variables are robust determinants of capital structure? 
 
This study contributes significantly to the literature. Given that the aim of this study is to 
assess capital structure in relation to its determinants, this research sheds light on, and 
offers suggestions about, existing capital structure theories. The significance of this study 
lies in the fact that few previous studies have employed EBA to reveal fragile and 
significant determinants of capital structure (such as Moosa et al., 2011). The current 
investigation extends this line of research using a large set of explanatory variables to study 
these determinants. The aim of this study is to analyse information at the firm and country 
levels. The data set incorporates information on 17 countries, which enables a comparison 
of the determinants of capital structure across countries. In conclusion, this work represents 
an important contribution to the research on capital structure and its determinants. 
 
1.5 Data Description  
This research analyses information at the firm and country levels. The data set incorporates 
information on 17 nations, which makes it possible to compare the determinants of capital 
structure. The process of country selection includes the following criteria: (i) economies 
operating in different parts of the world (the sample covers countries in Europe, North and 
South America, Africa, Asia and Australia); (ii) different sizes, levels of economic 
development and economic growth rates; (iii) different institutional setups to identify 
whether cross-country differences affect capital structure; and, finally and most 
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importantly, (iv) the availability of necessary data. This study investigates firms operating 
in developed and emerging economies. Specifically, the countries investigated are 
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, China, Austria, France, 
Germany, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Singapore and 
Hong Kong.
2
  
 
Due to the nature of the research problem and research design, this study primarily relies on 
historical data. The data for leverage and firm-specific determinants of capital structure 
have been collected from Datastream, which contains balance sheets, profits and losses and 
cash flow statement information for companies. Country variables have been collected from 
World Development Indicators and the Financial Structure Database of the World Bank, 
over the period between 2003 and 2013. Finance firms have been excluded for a number of 
reasons, such as the high level of leverage in relation to non-finance firms. 
 
1.6      Thesis Structure 
This thesis contains seven chapters and they are explained in more detail below. Chapter 2 
reviews the literature on the major theories of capital structure, in particular Modigliani and 
Miller (1958, 1963) and Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) trade-off theory and agency cost 
theory, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory and Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) 
market timing theory. Moreover, Chapter 2 reviews previous empirical studies of capital 
structure in order to identify gaps in the literature. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Note that Hong Kong is actually a ‘special economic zone’ of China and not a country in its own right. For 
the purpose of this thesis, we consider Hong Kong as a country specifically in terms of its autonomy in 
governing the economy, influential stock exchange and currency. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical predictions of the capital structure factors used in this 
study and the institutional differences across countries such as in bankruptcy laws, legal 
entities, economic systems and concentration of ownership. The chapter then looks at the 
development of the hypotheses to answer the first research question of this study.  
 
Chapter 4 covers the data collecting procedure, sources of data and the distribution and 
structure of data. Then, it describes the adopted measures of leverage and the measures of 
both firm- and country-specific variables. Moreover, descriptive statistics for firms, 
industries and countries are discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 explains EBA and justifies the use of this method. This study adopts a 
quantitative research design to explore corporate behaviour and to test existing theories of 
capital structure while assessing results reported in the empirical research. The research 
design used in this study is also explained.  
 
The objectives of Chapter 6 are to discuss the empirical results of the robustness analysis 
using EBA. It then presents and discusses the results for all countries. The validity of the 
predictions of conventional capital structure theories is evaluated, together with a 
discussion of the effects of firm- and country-specific determinants on the leverage choice 
of firms. Moreover, the chapter provides confirmation (or otherwise) of the hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 7 summarises the research, draws conclusions and establishes the key findings. 
Recommendations are provided, and the implications for future studies are outlined. A 
review is conducted on what this research has added to existing studies on the topic of 
capital structure.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1    Introduction 
Firms encounter many challenges, particularly with respect to financing decisions. They 
have to pay for various operating expenses, acquire assets and provide more funds for 
various future projects. All activities need funds and firms must choose what capital 
structure to have and what type of security to issue when raising funds from outside 
investors. They can source funds from debt, earnings or from equity. If firms decide to 
issue securities, they must consider if the securities issued are fairly priced in the market, 
have tax consequences, involve transactions costs, and if they affect future investment 
opportunities. 
 
In the area of corporate finance, capital structure is a crucial issue for corporate managers 
and investors. Answers are needed for the following questions: Do firms use a model 
capital structure and what advantage can it have for them? Why is it important? How do 
firms obtain their finance sources? What are their financing strategies? What perspectives 
do they use? How do their strategies impact their firms’ business and underlying 
economies? 
 
Financial economists have presented theories of capital structure, and a large number of 
empirical studies have been conducted to establish the best capital structure. However, 
when Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) pioneering work was published, modern 
finance had only just begun. Since then, alternative theories of capital structure have 
emerged, including Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) trade-off theory and agency cost theory, 
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Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory and Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market 
timing theory. The objective of this chapter is to survey the most significant literature on 
capital structure. Later, this chapter reviews the empirical studies of capital structure. 
 
2.2    Early Capital Structure Literature 
Capital structure refers to the combination of equity and debt used by businesses to 
emphasise their value. Equity is capital from shareholders, and debt is money borrowed 
from creditors. Firms vary in their capital structure; some are dominated by equity, while 
others have high debt and low equity. Theorists verify their theories through empirical 
studies, and many theories have been developed to explain capital structure and financing 
decisions. In the 1950s, economic and financial research focused on examining the 
relationship between capital structure and the value of the firm. Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1958) theory focused on irrelevance, but prior to that, there was Durand’s (1952) relevance 
theory. David Durand’s relevance theory is very different from Modigliani and Miller’s 
theory in that he argued that capital structure influences the value of the firm. Furthermore, 
the Durand theory is based on certain approaches that are explained in more detail below. 
 
The Net Income (NI) Approach 
David Durand (1952) suggested that the value of the firm can be increased by reducing the 
cost of capital or equity, which means that a firm’s value relies on its capital structure. 
Moreover, increasing debt, which is cheaper than equity, creates a lower weighted average 
cost of capital with the combination of more debt and less equity, thus boosting the value of 
the firm. This approach states that there is no optimal capital structure for a firm. 
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The Net Operating Income (NOI) Approach 
According to this approach, there is a negative relationship between capital structure and 
the firm’s value. Increasing debt produce a higher cost of equity because of the risk 
premium demanded by shareholders for higher debt financing. This creates a higher 
weighted average cost of capital and subsequently reduces the value of the firm. In 
addition, this approach states that there is no optimal capital structure for a firm. 
 
The Traditional Approach 
In this approach, there is an optimal capital structure for a firm. The traditional approach is 
a combination of previous approaches (NI and NOI), in which a balance is sought between 
the benefit of debt financing and the increased cost of equity (risk premium). 
 
2.3    Modigliani and Miller’s Theory  
There was no generally accepted theory of debt-equity choice before the introduction of 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory, which led to the development of the theoretical 
foundations of capital structure. Beginning with Modigliani and Miller’s study on capital 
structure, economists have focused on firms’ capital structure and financing strategies 
(Morellec, 2004). Modigliani and Miller’s original theory contends that a firm’s market 
value is not affected by financial leverage under the assumption of a world with perfect 
capital markets. This refers to a situation in which (i) there are no transaction costs, no 
default risks and no taxation; (ii) all firms operate in the same risk class; (iii) equivalence in 
borrowing costs for companies and investors is axiomatic; (iv) symmetry of market 
information exists across insider and outsider investors; (v) investment cash flows are 
independent of financing choices, while securities are fairly priced; and (vi) managers 
attempt to maximise stockholders’ wealth. 
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Modigliani and Miller’s arguments were based on the following propositions. First, an 
entity’s worth (market value) does not rely on the capital structure but on its anticipated 
return at an exact rate corresponding to its risk class of assets. Second, the total worth of an 
entity is independent of the amount of debt and can be computed by focusing on the 
anticipated flow of profits with the correct discount price (expected return must be the same 
for all classes). Third, the average cost of capital is independent of its capital structure; that 
is, it is not related to the capital structure. Therefore, Modigliani and Miller’s proposition 
can be written as an equation:  
           ,                                                           (2.1) 
where     represents the value of a levered firm,  
  represents the value of an unlevered 
firm,   represents a firm’s fraction of equity, and   represents the fraction of debt. 
Therefore, according to Modigliani and Miller, firms have expected cash flows divided 
between debt and equity holders depending on the chosen proportion of debt and equity by 
the firm to finance its assets. They assume equal access to financial markets for both 
investors and firms, which permits homemade leverage.
3
 Therefore, it does not matter 
whether a firm finances itself by issuing stocks or selling debt. However, when there is 
uncertainty, using debt instead of equity to finance projects ‘may increase the expected 
return to the owners but only at the cost of increased dispersion of the outcomes’ 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958, p. 262) 
 
There are two types of irrelevance propositions: (i) the classic arbitrage-based context, 
wherein arbitrage allows the firm’s value free of the leverage and (ii) another where neither 
capital structure choices nor dividend policies matter in perfect markets. Frank and Goyal 
                                                          
3
 Home-made leverage occurs when individuals can borrow or lend on the same terms as large firms. They 
can duplicate leverage on their own through financing options. Individuals can simply borrow on personal 
accounts to buy shares in unlevered firms if their shares are overpriced in highly levered firms. 
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(2005) argue that the theorem fails to consider some circumstances including the use of 
taxes, contractual costs, expenses for bankruptcy, agency costs, unfavourable choice, 
insufficient assortment between financing and operations and shareholder-investor 
conflicts. Imperfections must be present in order for capital structure to be relevant. 
Concerned with various reactions in academia and the business world, Modigliani and 
Miller modified their propositions by adding income tax. Tax payments affect cash flows 
that can be given in the form of shares, and thus they add value to the firm (Fabich et al., 
2012). 
 
2.4    Trade-Off Theories 
‘Trade-off’ is a term used to describe a group of related theories involving a balance 
between marginal costs and marginal benefits. These theories constitute the original trade-
off theory, static trade-off theory and dynamic trade-off theory. One criticism of these 
theories is that they do not provide ideas about debt structure. Hart and Moore (1995) 
indicate that a trade-off provides no clarification for debt claims. While trade-off theories 
help conduct analysis of debt that can be incurred by firms, they cannot explain how debt 
should be structured.  
 
The Original Trade-Off Theory 
The original trade-off theory emerged when taxes were added to Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1963) irrelevance proposition, which created a tax benefit arising from the use of debt. 
With regard to capital financing, it has been established that due to lack of debt offsetting 
and linearity with respect to a firm’s objective, a firm is believed to be 100% debt financed. 
However, debt has costs, and therefore bankruptcy cost is used as an offsetting cost of debt. 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) suggest balancing between the cost of bankruptcy and the 
tax benefit of debt. The inclusion of bankruptcy cost produced the bankruptcy theory of 
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capital structure, which states that the use of debt is associated with the advantage of paying 
taxes and that tax-deductible debts can boost a firm’s current funds. Bankruptcy expenses 
are greater than the purported tax savings. The theory contends that firms should increase 
their debt level until the marginal tax advantage of additional debt offsets the cost of 
bankruptcy risk. Consequently, firms tend to use more debt when the tax rate is higher, 
although it is very risky for a business to rely heavily on debt due to the very real dangers 
of defaulting and bankruptcy costs (Baxter, 1967).  
 
Myers (1984) finds that firms that follow the trade off-theory set a target debt level and 
then gradually move towards it. The target debt level is determined by attempting to trade-
off between costs of bankruptcy and benefits of tax. The trade-off theory assumes that firms 
that are more likely to get into financial distress do not borrow to finance their projects. 
Nonetheless, the trade-off theory appears to form the best possible leverage in which the 
measured standard cost of capital is reduced to the minimum while maximising the share 
price.  
 
A few points from Myers’ (1984) suggestion have been put up for discussion. First, the 
target debt level assumed by Myers (1984) is not observable and a structure should be 
provided. Second, the theory has not clarified exactly what aspects of the complex tax code 
are included. Third, further discussion on the nature of costs that arise with bankruptcy is 
necessary. Finally, detailed transaction costs must be provided. Thus, Frank and Goyal 
(2005) divide Myers’ definition into two parts: (i) static trade-off theory whereby leverage 
is determined by a single-period trade-off between the tax advantage of debt and cost of 
bankruptcy and (ii) target adjustment behaviour when a firm has a target debt level and that 
target deviation is removed over time. 
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The Static Trade-Off Theory 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) static trade-off theory states that the optimal capital structure 
for a firm can be achieved by trading off the costs and benefits of debt and equity while 
accounting for market imperfections, such as taxes, agency costs and bankruptcy costs. 
Involving agency costs in the static trade-off theory means that firms regulate the optimal 
capital structure by increasing their debt level until the marginal tax advantage of additional 
debt offsets the costs of financial distress of too much debt and agency costs of debt against 
the agency costs of equity.  
 
Agency costs arise from conflicts of interest between shareholders, managers and creditors 
because of information asymmetry.
4
  At the end of certain specified periods, investors must 
pay taxes on income from bonds, and they will keep paying more taxes as long as taxable 
amounts increase. Hence, risk-neutral investors are more likely to invest in a security that 
offers the best deal after tax. Firms must pay taxes on their taxable income at the end of any 
period. Interest and principal payments are deducted from a firm’s taxable income, but the 
investor who receives the payment must pay taxes on it. In cases wherein firms fail to make 
interest payments to their creditors, businesses are more likely to descend into financial 
distress. 
 
Nonetheless, the main predictions emerging from this theory, according to Frank and Goyal 
(2005), are that (i) when the costs of financial distress increase, the  optimal debt levels 
decline; (ii) if non-debt tax shield for a particular firm goes up, its optimal debt level 
declines; (iii) when the personal tax rate on equity for a particular firm rises, the optimal 
debt level rises as well; and (iv) if the marginal bondholder tax rate goes up, their optimal 
debt level goes down. Frank and Goyal find that the impact of risk on the optimal capital 
                                                          
4
 Note that the agency cost theory is discussed thoroughly in section 2.5. 
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structure is uncertain, although Bradley et al. (1984) suggest that volatility has an inverse 
relationship with leverage. Finally, despite the concept of static trade-off over time, in the 
real world, firms operate over many periods when there is stability. Thus, the concept of 
dynamic trade-off was introduced. Another argument against the static trade-off model is 
the unavailability of retained earnings, which makes the model inappropriate. Furthermore, 
the model has no room for target adjustment and says nothing about mean reversion.  
 
The Dynamic Trade-Off Theory 
The dynamic trade-off theory (Frank and Goyal, 2005) recognises the role of expectation 
and adjustment costs to construct a model where the role of time, which is ignored in 
single-period models, is acknowledged. This theory states that firms must depend on the 
financing margin predicted in the next period to make the right financing decisions. Firms 
can make diverse choices, such as payment of funds and raising of funds via debt and 
equity. Some companies consider paying out and raising funds concurrently. The best 
choice depends on what is optimal in the next period, raising either debt or equity.  
 
Firms usually combine equity and debt (Frank and Goyal, 2005). A number of firms make 
changes to their current capital structure by assessing the best strategy to pursue in the 
future. Kane et al. (1984) and Brennan and Schwartz (1984) were among the first to analyse 
continuous time models and to consider tax against bankruptcy as a cost, excluding the 
transaction cost. Since firms react to adverse financial shocks without incurring costs while 
rebalancing, they keep debt at high level to benefit from tax savings. The trade-off theory 
can be well explained with a situational example set by Frank and Goyal (2005). For 
example, the management of a profitable firm can choose to either distribute dividends to 
its shareholders in the current period or hold the funds and distribute them in the next 
period. Frank and Goyal (2005, p. 13) provide a logical answer, saying that the action 
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depends on ‘the tax rates and on rates of return that the firm can earn relative to the returns 
that the shareholders can obtain directly’. Thus, profitable firms might have investment 
opportunities that cannot be overlooked, and it may be better to hold on to the funds even if 
a higher tax rate is incurred. This suggests that profitable firms retain more earnings and 
have a lower leverage rate, where retained earnings are equity.  
 
A second example is also provided by Frank and Goyal (2005) to explain the trade-off 
theory. A situation stems from the decision to invest the money earned by a business. It is 
supposed that a firm has more money than it needs and wishes to retain it today because it 
has plans of spending it after a year or two. In a perfect market with no taxes, a firm can 
distribute the extra funds to shareholders, and when the firm needs new funds, it could draw 
from new equity. However, in imperfect markets, there is a problem in that payments to 
shareholders involve costs in the form of taxes. Thus, distributing funds and raising equity 
respectively represent sources for more taxes that could be saved if the firm retained the 
funds from the start. In other words, if the firm retained the funds, the shareholders would 
not be required to pay taxes. Hence, taxes might inspire firms directly to keep hold of their 
earnings. 
 
The General Trade-Off Theory 
In the more general trade-off theory, an argument is raised concerning decisions to adjust 
capital structure to a certain target. Diamond (1989) argues that older firms are less likely to 
fall into bankruptcy and might have lower agency costs than more recently established 
firms, in which case they tend to use more debt. In addition, debt depends on a firm’s 
management reputation. Frydenberg (2004) argues that construction of a positive debt 
financing theory in corporate finance is dependent on the advantages and disadvantages of 
using debt. Debt issuance has many advantages for firms. To start with, debt adds discipline 
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to management in that managers have to ensure earnings are adequate to cover interest 
expenses. Moreover, debt limits the control on common stocks, as bond sales are 
responsible for raising the rest of the capital, leading to a reduction in agency costs. Debt is 
used by managers as a signalling device to announce that the firm is in excellent condition, 
because by using debt, the firm sends signals to investors that managers are not concerned 
about financial distress.  
 
Furthermore, debt reduces complacency and the extreme consumption of extra cash flows.  
On the other hand, debt has its disadvantages. Issuing debt might increase the agency cost, 
which incorporates under-investment and risk substitution, and boosts the possibility of 
business bankruptcy. Reasoning for using debt (advantages and disadvantages) is discussed, 
and a more comprehensive explanation in regard to tax incentive, bankruptcy incentive, 
dividend payments, claim dilution, asset substitution, under investment and free cash flow 
problem is provided below. 
 
The tax incentive theory suggests that an increase in the tax rate raises a firm’s tax-shield 
value. Deducting interest payments on debt from a firm’s taxable income leads to reduction 
in a firm’s tax liabilities. The theory assumes that the optimal debt ratio enhances the value 
of the firm. Frydenberg (2004) argues that in a classical system, dividends and interest 
payments are deductible at the personal level, which reduces taxable income, while at the 
corporate level, only interest payments but not dividends are deducted from a firm’s 
income.  According to Miller (1977), if both personal and corporate taxes are considered, 
the debt level might not depend on the tax rate. Some tax laws provide tax exemptions for 
debt issuance, and that is a benefit. However, a complication occurs in the presence of 
personal taxes and non-tax shields. This effect of tax advantage (of using more debt 
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financing) is offset in many countries by personal taxes on interest income. Hence, the tax 
incentive for debt in firms with taxable income depends on the corporation size and 
personal tax rate. 
 
Bankruptcy incentive - The value of a firm would not change if bankruptcy has no costs. 
An increase in leverage level increases the likelihood of bankruptcy. Payments for financial 
distress may differ amongst firms, but this relies on how easy it is to transfer the collateral. 
Costs of financial distress are divided into direct costs and indirect costs. The direct costs of 
bankruptcy vary from one country to another as each country has a code to help in the 
process of settling a firm’s debts. Direct costs of bankruptcy include the costs of 
transferring assets, costs of lawyers and court costs. Creditors may also incur costs during 
the process; for instance in the United States, creditors might wait for years to receive 
payments in the event of reorganization. The indirect costs of bankruptcy are more difficult 
to measure, and they are often higher than direct costs. Indirect costs may arise from the 
process of declaring bankruptcy. If a firm is bankrupt, its management may lose control of 
it. Moreover, firms may incur indirect costs before they default if they face a substantial 
likelihood that (bankruptcy) may occur in the future. 
 
Dividend payments – Bond prices are influenced by dividends. Bonds are priced under the 
assumption that the dividend policy will remain the same. From the bondholders’ 
perspective, dividend payments to shareholders reduce the value of the firm and increase 
credit risk. Hence, increasing dividend prices will have a negative effect on the investment 
and firm value. It will also increase the risk of outstanding debt and, at the same time, harm 
bondholders. In a firm that is nearing bankruptcy, stockholders can take all the valuable 
assets if they choose, while leaving the creditors with nothing. 
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Claim dilution is a decrease in the possibility of repaying a creditor. Near bankrupt 
stockholders can use many strategies, and firms might issue new debts with higher 
priorities. This reduces the chance of the old debt holder being paid. Usually, prices of 
bonds depend on the assumption that no new debts will be issued. 
 
Asset substitution (risk shifting) takes place when management makes risky decisions to 
maximise shareholders’ value but, at the same time, harm debt holders. Risk shifting is an 
agency problem mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Jensen and Meckling suggest 
that shareholders can transfer wealth from bondholders by engaging in risky projects. This 
concept arises when the firm is run on equity wherein cash flows are important. The firm 
tends to run projects that have many risks but big ‘payoffs’. This is a common occurrence 
when a firm is in a desperate situation. Thus, the added profit can only benefit shareholders 
since bondholders receive only a fixed amount, while the increase in the risk level might 
have an effect on bondholders because of the increased chance that the company might 
default.  
 
The under-investment hypothesis was introduced by Myers (1977), suggesting that if 
additional investments create extra value for the firm, stockholders might have to share 
them with the creditors. Companies with a higher percentage of debt and outstanding bond 
issues are more likely to shy away from profitable opportunities with low risk assets in 
order to maximise their shareholders’ wealth at the cost of debt holders.Managers do have 
some leeway in wasting cash flows (free cash flow problem), but debt financing reduces the 
opportunity for management to indulge in spending excess free cash flows, which solves 
the problem of agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Debt financing gives managers 
less control over excess cash flows since they have to repay creditors by using the available 
cash. 
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2.5    The Agency Cost Theory 
The agency cost theory was devised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) to examine the 
relationship between the principal and agent. Information asymmetry has been a common 
subject when talking about agency cost. The manager has more information about what is 
happening inside the firm than do the shareholders. Agency costs refer to costs of conflict 
between shareholders and creditors or to those between shareholders and managers.  
 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory assumes that an optimal capital structure 
can be determined by reducing conflicts of interest between the beneficiaries (managers, 
shareholders and holders of debt securities), specifically by trading off benefits of debt 
against the agency cost of debt. The agency theory focuses on optimal capital structure, 
which supports shareholders’ investment so that shareholders can receive their dividends or 
income derived from their capital. Within the scope of this theory, sub-theories have 
evolved, such as the normative agency and positive agency theories (Abosede, 2012).  
 
The normative agency theory provides the best ‘debt equity ratio’ to boost the share price 
for shareholders, while the positive agency theory predicts managers’ profits within the 
limitations of shareholders’ wealth. Conflicts between shareholders and managers occur 
because the latter may have objectives different from maximising shareholders’ value. 
Managers endure all the costs associated with business activities to enhance profit, but they 
do not claim the entire profit. As a result, they overindulge in consuming perquisites and 
spend less time on managing resources and business processes properly. For instance, 
managers are able to use firms’ resources for their own benefit. To reduce this problem, it is 
more efficient for a manager to own a fraction of the firm’s equity.   
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Jensen and Meckling (1986) state that debt motivates managers to be efficient in operating 
their firms and maximising shareholders’ wealth. It might be best for shareholders to add 
debt if they find that managers prefer personal aims over the firm’s value. Further, more 
debt encourages managers to strive to pay the debts, while at the same time it restrains 
managers from financing unwanted projects. Hence, debts oblige the firm to pay cash to 
creditors and reduce the amount of free cash flow available to managers. Debt creates an 
incentive for managers to make interest payments to creditors because they have legal 
redress, in the sense that if they fail, they could lose their jobs, which means that they are 
forced to run the firm more efficiently. Hence, debt and interest payments reduce agency 
costs between managers and shareholders and encourage managers to make better 
investment decisions.  
 
On the other hand, conflicts between debt holders and shareholders arise because those who 
handle debt financing are more likely to take more risks that yield higher returns. In 
particular, they prefer high-risk projects that are more beneficial for shareholders when the 
project is successful but yields more losses to bondholders when the project is a failure. 
More specifically, if the project yields a high return, shareholders will claim all the profit. 
However, if the project fails, then debt holders will endure all the loss, because the firm 
will face bankruptcy, and, in turn, the value of debt will decline.  
 
Firms are managed by well-paid, self-interested individuals who do not take the initiative of 
reorganising assets to boost the value of a business. The so-called asset reorganisation can 
take the form of liquidating some of the firm’s non-performing assets. Sometimes, 
management and shareholders do not agree when it comes to reorganisation. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) assume that managers prefer keeping businesses as they are, without 
liquidation or reorganisation, even if this would be beneficial to investors.  
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According to the Harris and Raviv (1991) model, investors have the option to force 
managers into liquidation if the cash flow is poor or non-existent. Problems between 
management and shareholders affect the capital structure because both have distinct 
objectives in mind. Managers treat investment differently from shareholders. High risk may 
cause managers to avoid projects deemed highly profitable due to consideration of their 
reputation. According to Harris and Raviv (1991), managers have an incentive to invest in 
safe and successful projects, while shareholders prefer higher returns.  
 
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) hypothesise that if a manager has to choose between two 
projects, both projects are restricted to only two outcomes: failure or success. From the 
perspective of managers’ reputation, success of both projects is the same. Hence, if a 
manager must choose between two projects, one with higher probability of success and the 
other with higher return, the manager will choose the former over the latter. On the other 
hand, from the shareholders’ point of view, if the outcome of both projects is success, 
shareholders are expected to favour the project with high return even if it has higher risk, 
while failure for both projects is equivalent.  
 
The agency cost theory emphasises the asymmetric information provided by borrowers and 
lenders on the results of investments and the information provided by shareholders. For 
example, managers may acquire funds for a project or spend funds to buy other 
corporations without giving adequate information to shareholders. Firms cannot solely 
finance the entire project from their recent earnings, and they have to draw funds from 
external sources, such as financial institutions. The traditional concept is that external 
financing requires managers to describe in detail the facts about the project to new 
investors, which will allow these external investors to monitor the project. Certainly, 
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managers do not like this situation. With this in mind, managers prefer retained earnings 
instead of external financing.  
 
2.6    The Pecking Order Theory 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory focuses on information costs and 
signalling effects.
5
 This theory is a consequence of Myers’ (1984) asymmetric information, 
which means that managers have more information about the rate of internal cash flow, 
investment opportunities and value of the company compared with investors, thus affecting 
the choice between internal and external financing. According to the pecking order theory, 
firms do not attempt to reach an optimal capital structure, and the need for external funds 
determines the debt ratios. This theory suggests that firms follow a particular hierarchy 
when financing their projects. There may be three sources of firm financing that managers 
and shareholders can choose: earnings, debt and equity. There is no question about retained 
earnings, as this can be selected to fund projects anytime and involves lower transaction 
costs. There are doubts about equity since there is less adverse selection on debt.
6
 Issuing 
debt also has lower transaction costs than issuing equity, and debt reduces a firm’s taxable 
income. 
 
Firm insiders (managers, shareholders and board members) prefer internal financing 
(retained earnings and depreciation expenses) to external financing as a way of funding 
their projects, because it does not have any issuing costs and is less expensive. However, if 
internal funds are insufficient, firms prefer to use debt rather than equity to minimise the 
problem of information asymmetry between business managers and external investors. 
                                                          
5
 Signalling effects are signals sent between managers and investors to compensate for information 
asymmetry. 
6
 Adverse selection costs are more associated with equity than debt. Furthermore, adverse selection refers to 
the probability of loss due to risk not being factored in at the time of sale. 
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According to Myers and Majluf (1984), firms that use only retained earnings to fund their 
projects circumvent the problem of information asymmetry. Hence, issuing equity is not 
only more costly but also leads to accentuation of the problem of information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders.  
 
If information asymmetry is significant, a firm must issue debt to avoid the cost of selling 
under-priced stocks. If equity is used under these circumstances, under-investment will 
occur.
7
 According to the notion of adverse selection, firms issue equity only when stocks 
are overpriced. The singling effect begins between new and old investors and managers due 
to the problem of information asymmetry. The amount and timing of debt issued are 
perceived as signals of a firm’s performance. Issuing debt sends signals to the capital 
market that a firm is functioning well as management is not afraid of financial default, 
implying that the possibility of bankruptcy is slim. Such signals reduce the problem of 
information asymmetry in the market. 
 
On the other hand, the singling model suggests that when a firm issues equity, it sends 
signals that its profits are low. Investors might ask for a discount, which is the cost of 
issuing equity, that is borne by shareholders. If managers consider the interests of old 
shareholders, they may avoid new investment and refrain from providing shares at a lower 
price. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that managers have more inside information than 
investors have and usually tend to act in favour of old shareholders. Investors consider the 
not-issuing scenario as a good sign, but issuing new shares sends negative signals to 
investors. The theory predicts that firms requiring large financing tend to have large debts 
because managers do not want to issue equity.  
                                                          
7
 Under-investment is an agency problem that occurs when firms choose not to invest in low-risk assets to 
maximise their wealth at the cost of the debt holders. 
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In their survey of 157 firms, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) show that firms conducting 
business from 1971 to 1989 had strong support for the pecking order theory, which is an 
interesting result. Nevertheless, 157 firms is a small sample from all publicly traded 
American businesses, and it might be biased in favour of large firms with conservative debt 
ratios, implying that the theory might not be broadly applicable. However, Abosede (2012) 
argues that the theory can be explained from the behavioural perspective. Corporate 
managers tend to act according to their experiences and talents by choosing methods where 
no conflicts with shareholders erupt. Small firms with opportunities for high growth differ 
from larger firms, and their behaviour is the same as that predicted by the pecking order 
theory. Large firms are not like small firms, as the former have more access than the latter 
to external financing. Hence, smaller businesses are more likely to incur less debt and 
equity.  
 
Managers in small firms are typically owners who do not want to give up their ownership 
or control, and thus they prefer internal financing. If internal financing is insufficient, they 
prefer debt to equity because debt places fewer restrictions on the owner. Moreover, most 
small firms are not listed on the stock exchange. Another assumption is that profitable firms 
can accept more debt because they have the ability to service it, and consequently they gain 
favour from financing institutions. Cosh and Hughes (1994) suggest that within the pecking 
order context and when comparing small firms to large firms, small firms would (i) more 
likely rely on liquid assets to fund their investment projects; (ii) tend to rely on short-term 
debt rather than long-term-debt, including overdrafts and trade credit; (iii) avoid 
shareholder equity and debt when raising funds; and (iv) tend to rely on leasing and hire 
purchase arrangements. 
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2.7   The Market Timing Theory 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory of capital structure implies that firms try 
to time the equity market by issuing new stocks when their stocks seem to be overvalued 
and repurchase them when the stocks are undervalued. In short, it involves buying equity 
when it is cheap and selling equity when it becomes expensive, which means that firms 
tend to exploit market fluctuation. Managers might have incentives to time the equity 
market if they think about benefiting existing shareholders. Market timing is about 
benefiting existing shareholders at the expense of new (entering) and old (exiting) 
shareholders. In this sense, capital structure is explained as the collective result of the 
firm’s effort to find the right timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). However, instability of 
stock prices may affect the capital structure of firms. 
 
There are two versions of equity market timing. The first theory is the dynamic version, 
which assumes that economic agents (managers and investors) are rational, tending to issue 
equity after a positive information release, which reduces the information asymmetry 
problem between managers and stakeholders. The extent of adverse selection varies and has 
an inverse relationship with market-to-book ratio. The second version assumes that 
managers perceive investors to be irrational and that managers believe they can time the 
market, which causes the time mispricing of stocks. Managers of diverse firms consider 
issuing equity when the cost of equity is low. However, a repurchase of equity is 
considered wise in the event that the cost of stock is perceived to be high. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) discuss the effect of equity market timing on the capital structure of a firm, 
provide an in-depth analysis of the market timing concept, and present their own 
perspectives on it.  
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Baker and Wurgler (2002) use the weighted average of a firm’s past market-to-book ratio to 
measure the market timing opportunities perceived by managers and determine when the 
market-to-book ratio would influence the capital structure. They find that leverage is 
strongly and negatively affected by market timing and that firms with low gearing raise 
funds when they have high market valuation, as represented by their market-to-book ratio. 
On the other hand, firms with high leverage raise funds when they have low market 
valuations. Baker and Wurgler argue later that variations in market value have long-term 
effects on the capital structure, but they posit that it is difficult to provide arguments for this 
trend using traditional theories. They conclude that capital structure is strongly affected by 
past market valuations.  
 
Empirical studies have been conducted to examine the firm’s capital structure. It has also 
been revealed that market timing plays a significant role in providing financing benefits and 
aggravates the departure from leverage in the short run (Leary and Roberts, 2005). This 
explains the fact that firms that have constant market-to-book ratios are considered growth 
firms. Survey results show that managers confess to having conducted market timing. The 
Graham and Harvey (2001) survey, which will be discussed in the following section, 
reports that two-thirds of the surveyed CFOs admitted that they took special consideration 
in looking at their stock values regarding how much they were undervalued or overvalued. 
This is significant in determining the stock price and encourages managers to sell at a high 
price (Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  
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2.8    The Empirical Evidence 
Myers’ (1984) paper made a huge contribution to the literature on capital structure, and his 
opinions influenced many other writers. Graham’s (2003) paper provides a review on tax 
shield effects, while Haugen and Senbet (1978) discuss bankruptcy costs. Leary and 
Roberts (2005) discuss the assumption of alternative adjustment costs. Stiglitz (1973) 
inspects the results of taxes from the public financing perspective. Kane et al. (1984) and 
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) were the first to consider the trade-off between tax saving 
and bankruptcy. Miller (1977) opined that the trade-off theory proposes a higher leverage 
fraction than the leverage observed in firms. Fischer et al. (1989) introduced the notion of 
transaction costs that inspired future studies, and, as a result, the trade-off and pecking 
order models appear more promising. Kim and Sorensen (1986) examine the relationship 
between the leverage choice of firms and the presence of agency costs. They report that 
firms with a high concentration of ownership tend to have higher debt ratios. Allen (1991) 
reports that firms tend to follow the pecking order theory suggestion when deciding on 
funding sources.  
 
The Graham and Harvey (2001) Evidence 
A survey of finance officers working in U.S. firms was conducted by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) with the aim of determining the relationship between corporate decisions and capital 
structure theories. They asked 4,000 participants about the circumstances surrounding their 
financing decisions. Of this number, only 392 chief finance officers (CFOs) provided their 
responses, and the common answer was that they would usually use practical and informal 
principles in making capital structure decisions. The survey included questions about debt, 
equity, debt maturity, convertible debt, foreign debt, target debt ratios, credit ratings and 
actual debt ratios.  
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The trade-off theory generated questions about whether or not firms have target debt ratios. 
The CFOs in Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey state that the tax advantage of debt is 
relatively important in capital structure choice of firms, especially for businesses with tax 
incentives to use debt (for example firms that have to pay high corporate tax rates, firms 
that pay dividends and large regulated firms). Moreover, they found that neither personal 
taxes nor potential costs of distress have a direct effect on firms when deciding to use either 
debt or equity.  
 
When participants were asked about the effects of bankruptcy and financial distress costs 
with regard to their financing decisions, a few (20%) asserted that the issue was significant. 
However, they found credit rating to be another significant factor, as it is the second most 
important variable that determines debt policy, especially in large firms. If credit rating is 
considered a substitute for possible financial distress expenses, this is quite supportive of 
the trade-off theory. CFOs consider earning volatility when making decisions on debt as 
well, which is in line with the predictions of the trade-off theory.  
 
In Graham and Harvey’s (2001) work, CFOs were asked whether firms have a target debt 
ratio. Only 10% of the firms (particularly large ones) do have target ratios, whereas the rest 
of the firms’ debt ratios range from flexible to tight targets. Overall, they found moderate 
support for the trade-off theory and sufficient support for the proposition that firms 
consider transaction costs. On the other hand, Graham and Harvey asked questions related 
to the pecking order theory. CFOs were asked about the factors influencing their financing 
decisions, the type of debt issued if internal funds are insufficient and whether or not they 
issued equity when debt is unavailable. When asked about the importance of financial 
flexibility, the majority (59%) saw ‘financial flexibility’ as significant. However, flexibility 
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is not associated with information asymmetry as suggested by the pecking order theory. 
The importance of financial flexibility is for dividend-paying firms, which does not 
coincide with the pecking order theory assumptions. Thus, the desire for financial 
flexibility in the investigated firms is not associated with the factors suggested by the 
pecking order theory. 
 
One issue brought to light by the survey is that lack of internal funds has a significant 
influence on firms by increasing the debt fraction, particularly in small firms, which 
supports the pecking order theory. In contrast, less support is found for firms issuing equity 
to finance their projects or because debt is not available. Although, firms tend to avoid 
issuing common equity because they see it as undervalued, they are more likely to issue 
convertible debts, particularly when growth opportunities are evident.  
 
Overall, financial flexibility and equity undervaluation wield an important influence on 
debt decisions, which is consistent with the hierarchical proposition of the pecking order 
theory. However, asymmetric information does not influence the importance of financial 
flexibility and equity undervaluation. A question posed in the survey concerned common 
stock. Two variables emerged: earnings per share (EPS) dilution and equity under- or over-
valuation. Most participants considered these two factors as important while another group 
considered the factors as very important. EPS dilution and stock price appreciation have a 
substantial effect on equity issuance, which supports the pecking order theory. Other factors 
were seen as irrelevant by the participants or had mixed results: transaction costs, under-
investment costs, asset substitution and free cash flows.   
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External and Internal Determinants of Corporate Capital Structure 
Many studies have attempted to shed light on the relationship between capital structure and 
its determinants (firm characteristics and country characteristics). These studies 
investigated the capital structure choice of firms for developed and emerging markets. 
Based on the literature review, particular firm determinants have a significant effect on 
firms’ financing choices. Table 2.1 summarises the firm variables used in previous studies. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Relationships between Leverage and its Determinants in Prior Studies 
Note that (+) significantly positive; (-) significantly negative; (NS) insignificant 
Firm-Specifics Reported sign Empirical Studies 
Size  
 (+) 
De Jong et al. (2008), Huang and Song (2006), Hong Yan (2008), 
Bhabra et al. (2008), Liu and Ren (2009), Qian, Tian and 
Wirjanto(2009), Pandey (2001), Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-
Sanz (2008), Bevan and Danbolt (2000), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Feidakisa and Rovolisb (2007), Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed 
(2009), Yu and Aquino (2011), Antoniou et al.(2008), Frank and 
Goyal (2004) 
(-) Chen (2004). 
Profitability 
(+) Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Roden and 
Lewellen (1995), Taub (1975) and Abor (2005). 
(-) 
De Jong et al. (2008), Huang and Song (2006), Chen (2004), Hong 
Yan (2008), Bhabra et al. (2008), Liu and Ren (2009), Qian et al. 
(2009), Pandey (2001), Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz 
(2008), Bevan and Danbolt (2002), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Feidakisa et al. (2007), Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed (2009), Yu and 
Aquino (2011), Antoniou et al. (2008), Antoniou et al.(2002) and 
Frank and Goyal (2004) 
Liquidity 
(+) Feidakisa and Rovolisb (2007) 
(-) Liu and Ren (2009) 
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Table 2.1(Continued) 
Note that (+) significantly positive; (-) significantly negative; (NS) insignificant 
Firm-Specifics Reported sign Empirical Studies 
Tangibility  
(+) 
De Jong et al. (2008), Huang and Song (2006), Chen (2004), 
Bhabra et al. (2008), Qian et al. (2009), Lopez-Iturriaga and 
Rodriguez-Sanz (2008), Bevan and Danbolt (2002), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Feidakisa and Rovolisb (2007), Yu and Aquino 
(2011), Antoniou et al. (2008), Frank and Goyal (2004) 
(-) Pandey (2001) 
(NS) 
Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed (2009), Shen (2008), Moosa et al. 
(2011), Titman and Wessels (1988)  
Return on Equity 
 (+) Bhandari (1988), Dhaliwal et al. (2006) 
(-) 
Ardatti (1976), Korteweg (2004), George and Hwang (2009) and 
Adami et al. (2015) 
Growth 
Opportunities  
 (+) 
Chen (2004), Hong Yan (2008), Feidakisa and Rovolisb (2007), Yu 
and Aquino (2011). 
(-) 
De Jong et al. (2008), Bhabra et al. (2008), Liu and Ren (2009), 
Pandey (2001), Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz (2008), Bevan 
and Danbolt (2002), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Antoniou et al. 
(2008), Frank and Goyal (2004) 
Firm Risk  
(+) 
Antoniou et al. (2008), Thies and Klock (1992), Lowe et al. (1994), 
Shenoy and Koch (1996), Bennet and Donnelly (1993) 
(-) Qian et al. (2009), Feidakisa and Rovolisb (2007) 
 (NS) 
Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed (2009), Shen (2008), Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Antoniou et al. (2008) 
Payout Ratio  
 (+) 
Frank and Goyal (2004) 
Antoniou et al. (2008) only in book leverage. 
(-) Wandeto (2005) 
 (NS) 
Moosa et al. (2011) 
Antoniou et al. (2008) only in market leverage. 
Share Price 
Performance   
(+) Antoniou et al. (2008) 
(-) Feidakisa and Rovolisb (2007) 
(NS) Moosa et al. (2011) 
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Table 2.1(Continued) 
Note that (+) significantly positive; (-) significantly negative; (NS) insignificant 
Firm-Specifics Reported sign Empirical Studies 
Asset Utilisation   (+) Filbeck and Gorman (2000) 
Age of the Firm         (NS) Shen (2008) and Moosa et al. (2011) 
Income 
Variability 
(NS) Moosa et al. (2011) 
Tax Rate 
(+) 
Frank and Goyal (2004), De Jong et al. (2008), Shen (2008), 
Deangelo and Masulis (1980) and Chiarella et al. (1991) 
(-) Antoniou et al. (2008) 
 (NS) Fama and French (1998) 
Non-Debt-Tax 
Shield  
 (+) Huang and Song (2006) 
(-) Qian et al. (2009), Scott (1977), Moore (1986), Antoniou et 
al.(2008) 
 (NS) Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed (2009), Titman and Wessels (1988) 
Inventory 
Outstanding  
(-) Voulgaris et al. (2002) 
Uniqueness of the 
product 
(-) Harris and Raviv (1991), Titman and Wessels (1988) 
Capital Intensity  (+) Shen (2008) 
Intangible Assets   (+) Frank and Goyal (2004) 
Change in Sales (+) Frank and Goyal (2004) 
Change in Aeests (+) Frank and Goyal (2004) 
Capex  (+) Frank and Goyal (2004) 
Term Structure of 
Interest Rates 
(-) Antoniou et al. (2008) and Antoniou et al. (2002). 
GDP Growth 
(+) Hanousek and Shamshur (2009) 
(-) Dincergok and Yalciner (2011), Bastos et al. (2009), Gajurel (2006) 
GDP per Capita (-) Bokpin (2009) 
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An important contribution is the study of capital structure of Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
who investigate the determinants of capital structure in the G-7 countries. They find 
similarity in the determinants of firm leverage and advocated deeper understanding of the 
determinants and effects of institutional differences. Their results are consistent with the 
predictions of capital structure theories. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that leverage is 
positively correlated with size and asset tangibility but negatively related to profitability 
and growth opportunity.  
 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) investigate the determinants of capital structure in the United 
Kingdom and analyse 822 British firms between 1991 and 1997. They argue that the 
determinants of leverage vary significantly depending on which component of debt is being 
analysed. Many other studies investigate the determinants of capital structure for developed 
countries (Marsh, 1982; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Antoniou et al., 2008). For instance, 
Marsh (1982) studies the capital structure choice of British firms between 1959 and 1974. 
These studies argue that firm determinant effects as well as institutional and environmental 
differences should be taken into account, as they profoundly influence capital structure 
choice. 
 
Titman and Wessels (1988) present evidence on capital structure choice in firms operating 
in the United States between 1974 and 1982, reporting that factors such as uniqueness of 
products and profitability are negatively related to the leverage choice of firms. However, 
they do not find any evidence to support the relationship between leverage and variables 
such as growth opportunity, non-debt tax shields, tangibility and risk. Harris and Raviv 
(1991) find a positive relationship between leverage and firm size, tangibility, non-debt tax 
shields and investment opportunities. They also detected a negative relationship between 
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bankruptcy risk and uniqueness of products. Frank and Goyal (2004) examine 38 factors 
relevant to the capital structure decisions of publicly traded U.S. firms for the period of 
1950 to 2000, reporting the most reliable factors that influence leverage. They conclude that 
firms with higher growth opportunity and dividend-paying firms have a negative impact on 
leverage. Leverage is negatively related to profits as well, and it has been documented that 
larger firms with larger collateral ratio tend to have high leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2004). 
Frank and Goyal’s results are more supportive of the trade-off theory. 
 
Moosa et al. (2011) investigate firm-specific determinants of capital structure for 344 
publicly listed Chinese firms. They employ extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to test the 
robustness of variables reported as being important in previous studies. Nine potential 
explanatory variables were covered: firm size, liquidity, profitability, tangibility, growth 
opportunities, payout ratio, stock price performance, age of firm and income variability. 
They found the robust variables to be size, liquidity, profitability and growth opportunities. 
The fragile variables were tangibility and stock price performance, while the remaining 
variables were insignificant. 
 
Close to China, Choi (2014) analysed firms operating in South Korea. He reports that 
profitability, tangibility of assets and firm size have a significantly positive effect on 
leverage. On the other hand, he reveals a significant and negative relationship between 
leverage and growth opportunities and non-debt tax shield substitutes. Referring again to 
China, Huang and Song (2006) examine the capital structure of 1,200 listed firms from 
1994 to 2003. They report a positive relationship between leverage and firm size and fixed 
assets. On the other hand, they report a negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunity and managerial shareholdings. They 
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also report an insignificant relationship between debt and state ownership. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1999) compare the capital structure of firms from 11 developed and 
developing countries and find that institutional differences in developing countries 
influence capital structure choices of small and large firms. 
 
 In a different way, Bhabra et al. (2008) investigate the capital structure decisions of listed 
Chinese firms between 1992 and 2001. They adopt an approach similar to that of 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Booth et al. (2001), testing the role of various 
categories of ownership structures (with different monitoring abilities and legal rights) on 
sample firms’ long-term leverage ratios in an environment without a significant external 
corporate control market. They conclude that Chinese firms use very little long-term debt 
and that the Chinese stock market does not motivate the long-term leverage market to grow. 
Their results concerning firm-specific determinants are consistent with the results of other 
studies on developed and emerging economies. 
 
Antoniou et al. (2008) analyse data from France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and 
the United States between 1987 and 2000. Their findings show that the capital structure 
choice of firms is affected by institutional differences such as corporate governance 
practices, tax systems and the degree of investor protection. Fan et al. (2006) evaluated a 
sample of 39 countries and found a significant relationship between leverage and a few 
country-specific factors such as the degree of development in the banking sector, equity and 
bond markets. 
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In another study, Song and Philippatos (2004) examine 30 OECD countries and report that 
variation in international capital structure emerges from the heterogeneity of firm-specific, 
industry-specific and country-specific factors. Yet other studies such as Booth et al. (2001), 
Claessens et al. (2001), and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) discover that in addition to firm 
determinants of capital structure, country determinants also influence capital structure. 
 
De Jong et al. (2008) analyse the importance of firm-specific and country-specific factors in 
the leverage choices of businesses from 42 countries. They argue that country-specific 
factors influence leverage through two channels: direct impact (meaning that country-
specific factors influence leverage directly) and indirect impact (meaning that country-
specific factors influence the way in which firm-specific factors affect capital structure). 
They find that country determinants and institutional differences affect the leverage choice 
of firms. Their results regarding several firm-specific determinants are consistent with the 
predictions of conventional capital structure theories, namely firm size, risk, growth 
opportunities and profitability. Yet, some of their results regarding certain firm-specific 
determinants are not consistent with the theories’ predictions. 
 
Other studies analyse data from firms operating in developed countries and investigate 
capital structure choice (Booth et al., 2001; Pandey, 2001; Chen, 2004; Deesomsak et al., 
2004; Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 2009). For instance, Booth et al. (2001) present evidence 
from firms operating in 10 developing countries over the period of 1980 to 1991. They 
investigate Brazil, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, 
Turkey and Zimbabwe. Acedo-Ramírez et al. (2014) used the generalized method of 
moments technique to test the influence of country characteristics on firms’ leverage 
choice. They analysed firms operating in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United 
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Kingdom during the period of 1998 to 2008. They concluded that capital structure 
differences across countries can be attributed to differences in financial systems that nations 
use. Other analyses (Jordan et al., 1998; Michaelas et al., 1999) examine the role of 
industry effects and effective tax rates. Jordan et al. (1998) study 605 small firms operating 
in the United Kingdom during the period of 1989 to 1993, and they find that industry 
factors affect capital structure and that the tax rate is irrelevant. Moreover, Michaelas et al. 
(1999) investigate 3,500 small firms operating in the United Kingdom from 1986 to 1999. 
They find that taxation rules may exert an influence on only short-term debt, and industry 
effects have an influence on capital structure choice.  
 
2.9 Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter, theories of capital structure were discussed, including Durand’s relevance 
theory, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance theory, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
trade-off theory and agency cost theory, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory 
and Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory. Case studies and empirical evidence 
were also presented – for instance, Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey of CFOs, in which 
most of the participants supported the pecking order theory except in the context of 
information asymmetry. For example, financial flexibility and equity undervaluation have 
an important influence on debt decisions, which is consistent with the hierarchical 
proposition of the pecking order theory. However, asymmetric information does not 
influence the importance of the variables. Less support for the trade-off theory is reported. 
 
Significant empirical research has been done on the determinants of capital structure. 
Researchers usually rely on existing theories and literature in determining the variables that 
are relevant to be included in a regression. However, existing literature does not provide a 
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clear path to direct empirical work on capital structure. There is no model specifying a full 
set of explanatory variables to be included in a regression. Consequently, there is an 
emphasis on using EBA to reveal the robustness, fragility or insignificance of various 
determinants of capital structure. EBA also provides a trustworthy analysis of the country 
and firm determinants of capital structure. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND 
HYPOTHESES 
3.1     Introduction 
The determinants of capital structure differ with the level of economic development and 
institutional backgrounds. The countries considered in this study are Austria, Australia, 
Brazil, Chile, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, India, Hong Kong, 
South Africa, the United Kingdom, Turkey and the United States. This chapter is divided 
into three sections, the first of which (section 3.1) discusses predictions of the theories of 
capital structure and the proposed effects of its determinants. Also examined are the 
theoretical predictions on specific variables such as size, profitability and age. Section 3.2 
looks at the major institutional differences from country to country. Section 3.3 examines 
the development of the hypotheses to answer the research question of this study.  
 
3.2    Overview of Theoretical Predictions  
Many determinants of capital structure are implied by the theories of capital structure 
described in the previous chapter. Table 2.1 in the previous chapter provides a summary of 
several capital structure studies and offers insights into the determinants of leverage. Prior 
research suggests that size and tangibility have a positive relationship with leverage, while 
profitability has a negative effect on leverage. Described below are the potential 
determinants of capital structure.  
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Firm Size  
Firm size is expected to have a positive impact on leverage. Capital grows as the firm 
grows in size, and large firms have diverse business lines and face lower bankruptcy costs, 
which means that they can afford to have high debt ratios (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
According to the trade-off theory, size is inversely proportional to the possibility of 
bankruptcy, implying a positive correlation between size and leverage. Numerous studies 
report leverage to be positively related to firm size (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Deloof and Verschueren, 1998; Frank and Goyal, 2004; Huang and Song, 
2006; Yan, 2008). Firm size plays a crucial role in capital structure choice. The pecking 
order theory assumes that in small firms, managers usually prefer internal financing to 
minimise the intrusion of outsiders. If internal funds are insufficient, they prefer to use debt 
rather than equity because of a lower risk of losing control of the firm. 
 
Moreover, smaller firms are expected to have smaller debt ratios because of the information 
asymmetry problem. According to Smith (1977), the cost of issuing equity for small firms 
is higher due to information asymmetry. Hence, information asymmetry between managers 
and investors should be less in larger firms. However, the pecking order theory assumes 
that the problem of information asymmetry becomes less acute as the firm grows, which 
means that a negative relationship between size and leverage is expected. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) report a positive relationship between leverage and firm size for all G-7 
countries, except Germany where a negative relationship is found.  
 
Tangible Assets  
A firm’s asset structure may have a substantial influence on the debt-equity choice of firms. 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory predicts a positive relationship between 
leverage and asset tangibility, implying that in order to reduce information asymmetry it 
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may be advantageous for a firm to sell secured debts. Securities in which managers have 
more information than outside investors are associated with more costs, unlike issuing debt 
secured by an asset that will eliminate these costs. Thus, firms with a high percentage of 
tangible assets that can be used as collateral are expected to issue more debts to take 
advantage of this opportunity. Moreover, Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that using 
tangible assets as collateral should reduce some costs such as the agency costs of debt and 
equity. Using more tangible assets can result in higher liquidation value, availability of 
cheap funds, and willingness of lenders would to provide credit. Likewise, Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between asset tangibility 
and leverage, as a higher percentage of tangibility means a lower probability of financial 
distress as well as less risk for lenders because tangible assets serve as collateral. Hence, 
high leverage is expected to be associated with high tangible assets.  
 
Other empirical studies also report that leverage is positively related with asset tangibility 
(Bradley et al., 1984; Wedig et al., 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Allen, 1995; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Michaelas et al., 1999; Amidu, 2007). In contrast, Grossman and Hart 
(1982) propose a negative relationship with leverage, implying that higher leverage will 
result in higher bankruptcy cost and that firms with less collateral assets might have higher 
agency costs due to the difficulty of monitoring capital expenditure. Consequently, firms 
with low collateral assets might have more leverage in order to control their managers. 
 
Growth Opportunity  
Fast-growing firms tend to go for lower leverage in order to minimise conflicts between 
shareholders and creditors that arise from asset-substitution and under-investment. Thus, 
firms with high growth opportunities may seek equity financing and avoid debt financing. 
According to Myers (1977), debt financing may force businesses to give up profitable 
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investments due to wealth transfer from shareholders to creditors. Hence, growth 
opportunity is expected to have a negative relationship with leverage. On this theme, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that leverage is higher in firms with poor opportunities of 
growth and vice versa. The studies of Kim and Sorensen (1986) and Titman and Wessels 
(1998) support this view as well. Jensen and Meckling (1976) find that firms with notably 
large investment opportunities face higher agency problems. Myers (1984) suggests that 
agency problems can be reduced by issuing short-term instead of long-term debt. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) report an inverse relationship between growth opportunity and leverage. 
However, they argue that a negative relationship could result because firms might time their 
equity issue when their stocks are overpriced.  
 
On the other hand, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory argues that firms with 
higher growth potential are expected to have a positive relationship with debt because 
internal financing might not be sufficient. A firm with high growth potential has great 
revenue potential as well, which allows it to take on more debt because creditors are more 
willing to lend to firms with high growth potential. Higher growth leads to higher debt 
ratios (Marsh, 1982). Other studies found a positive relationship between leverage and 
growth opportunity as well (Michaelas et al., 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Eriotis, 
2007). 
 
Profitability and Liquidity of the Firm 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory postulates that firms follow a specific 
financing hierarchy, whereby firms prefer retained earnings first, then debt, and, as a last 
resort, firms will issue costly new equity. The costs associated with equity might be due to 
asymmetric information or transaction costs. The hierarchy begins with one that is not too 
sensitive or risky because of asymmetric information. Issuing securities for investors who 
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have little information can be costly, whereas debt holders have a claim on a firm’s assets 
while receiving interest. Internal financing is the cheapest option for firms to fund their 
projects. Therefore, the pecking order theory (1984) suggests a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage as firms choose to use internal funds instead of external 
funds to finance projects. The studies of Myers and Majluf (1984), Daskalakis and Psillaki 
(2008) and Vasiliou et al. (2009) report results supporting the theory. Likewise, liquidity is 
expected to have an inverse relationship with leverage according to the pecking order 
theory. Liquidity is considered a source of internal funds, so firms will prefer to use it first 
before considering any external financing. 
 
According to Jensen (1986), profitable firms may face the agency problem of free cash 
flows, a situation in which managers may take advantage of accessible benefits. This will 
create conflicts between the beneficiaries (managers and shareholders) and may lead to 
shareholders increasing their leverage in order to control managers. Jensen (1986) argues 
that the firm’s high leverage controls agency problems by pushing managers to pay debt 
holders from the firm’s cash flows. A manager’s commitment to using money from the 
company’s earnings for payments would reflect that leverage boosts profitability or that 
there is a strong relationship between the two. The trade-off theory predicts a positive 
relationship between profitability and leverage. The theory proposes that factors such as 
bankruptcy and taxes, including agency costs, provide more leverage for firms. Creditors 
are more willing to provide credit to profitable firms, and bankruptcy costs go down when 
earnings go up. Additionally, firms tend to prefer more debt financing due to deductible 
interest, which reduces a firm’s taxable income (Bessler et al., 2011). Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) also find a negative relationship between leverage 
and profitability. 
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Inventory Outstanding  
A low inventory turnover ratio may reflect a loss of customers or an inappropriate pricing 
policy, which in turn will lead to (i) the accumulation of stocks more than required or (ii) 
the end of restocking (hence, the firm will have a small inventory). On the other hand, a 
higher ratio of turnover indicates that the number of times that inventory is purchased and 
sold is high; hence, it is expected that the firm will have higher return. Because of the 
association between inventory ratio and return, it is expected that inventory turnover has a 
positive relationship with leverage according to the trade-off theory. Likewise, Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory suggests that a higher turnover ratio means that more 
tangible assets can be used as collateral. As discussed earlier, firms with large tangible 
assets that can be used as collateral are expected to issue more debt to take advantage of 
this opportunity. Thus, a positive relationship is expected by the pecking order theory as 
well. 
 
Payout Ratio  
Dividend policy affects a firm’s financial structure, flow of funds, liquidity, stock prices 
and investor satisfaction. In a perfect world, dividend does not affect a firm’s value. 
However, under the assumption of market imperfection, dividends can be categorised as 
two types: (i) dividend payments that reduce shareholders’ wealth according to the 
transaction cost theory of dividend and tax hypothesis and (ii) dividend payments that boost 
shareholders’ wealth according to the signalling theory and agency cost theory. High 
leverage may be associated with high returns, but it is also associated with high risk and 
may cause financial distress and agency costs. Benito and Young (2001) suggest that 
reduced dividends eventuate when a firm has high level of leverage, which implies a 
negative relationship between leverage and payout ratio. While this view is also supported 
by Wandeto (2005), Frank and Goyal (2004) suggest that the payout ratio has a positive 
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effect on leverage. A firm issuing continual dividend payments reduces the problem of 
information asymmetry, but, at the same time, firms may face diminishing liquidity, and 
their internal funds may be insufficient, in which case, the management is forced to look for 
external financing.  
 
Stock Price and Return 
According to Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) second proposition, stock return should have 
a positive relationship with leverage in perfect markets, as firms take more debt risk even if 
financial distress rises. In turn, stock risk rises, and hence equity holders will demand 
higher returns. However, empirical research reports mixed results on the relationship 
between leverage and stock return. The trade-off theory is consistent with Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958) second proposition, predicting a positive relationship and implying that a 
firm with low debt is expected to have low return. Moreover, Harris and Raviv (1991) 
report a positive association between leverage and stock prices, stating that stock prices rise 
if a firm announces debt issues and decline in equity issues. The studies of Bhandari (1988) 
and Dhaliwal et al. (2006) detect a positive relationship. 
 
On the other hand, the pecking order theory suggests an inverse relationship between 
leverage and stock return. The market timing theory also suggests a negative relationship, 
assuming that managers tend to act irrationally by reducing the debt ratio and keeping 
equity issues, as stock prices are high. The studies of Ardatti (1976), Korteweg (2004), 
George and Hwang (2009) and Adami et al. (2015) also report an inverse relationship. 
Moreover, a firm’s management is more likely to consider stock prices when making 
capital structure decisions. According to the pecking order theory, managers are more likely 
to sell equity at a discount if the benefits of raising external capital outweigh the cost of the 
discount (managers sell at such a discount to reduce the problem of information 
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asymmetry). According to Lucas and McDonald (1990), firms tend to issue more equity 
following rising stock prices, which means that equity could be issued after an increase in 
stock prices due to overvaluation. If this happens, existing shareholders’ wealth will not be 
affected when a discount is offered. Hence, an inverse relationship is suggested between 
stock prices and leverage. 
 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), if the problem of information asymmetry 
intensifies, it can exert a negative influence on stock prices. The larger the extent of 
information asymmetry, the greater is the decline in stock prices. Firms issue equity when 
the problem of information asymmetry is relatively low, while leverage goes up depending 
on the degree of information asymmetry. Baker and Wurgler (2002) present evidence 
indicating that firms tend to issue equity as long as stock prices are low. According to the 
debt overhang theory, future under-investments may occur with increased leverage, which 
leads to a reduction in firms’ value associated with its stock price. Myers (1977) suggests 
an inverse relationship between stock price and leverage.  
 
Firm Risk  
A factor such as bankruptcy costs is expected to have a negative impact on leverage. 
According to the trade-off theory, as risk increases, the volatility of earnings goes up and so 
does the probability of bankruptcy; in return, creditors will be less likely to provide credit. 
As a result, increased risk can lead to declining leverage, which represents a negative 
impact on the firm as a whole. Riskier firms might not use their tax incentives according to 
the static trade-off theory due to high bankruptcy costs. If firms have weaker earnings, they 
experience smaller cash flows, in which case they might not utilise debt and its benefits. 
According to the pecking order theory, risky firms usually rely on internal funds, 
suggesting a negative relationship as well. Deloof and Vershueren (1998) report a negative 
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relationship between risk and leverage. In contrast, other studies report a positive 
relationship between risk and leverage (Thies and Klock, 1992; Bennet and Donnelly, 
1993; Lowe et al., 1994; Shenoy and Koch, 1996). A positive relationship may arise 
because of information asymmetry in riskier firms, consequently, the need for more 
leverage increases in order to reduce these costs.  
 
Tax Rate and Non-Debt Tax Shield 
Tax laws in some countries such as the United States motivate firms to issue more debt, but 
it is not clear how firms react to this incentive. According to Graham (2000), the tax 
benefits of debt are huge and firms could boost their values by increasing their leverage 
levels. The tax rate is expected to have a positive effect on the level of debt, which means 
that if a firm faces a high corporate tax rate, taking more debt means maximising tax 
deduction. Hence, tax shields lead firms to decide whether to engage in debt financing. A 
tax shield is expected to affect the capital structure choice of firms in environments where 
interest rates are high. Modigliani and Miller (1963) hypothesise that there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and tax, and other researchers support this hypothesis (e.g. 
DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Chiarella et al., 1991). Although the trade-off theory 
supports this view, the empirical evidence reports mixed results. According to Myers 
(2003), it is very difficult to find evidence indicating that tax has a systematic effect on 
financing decisions. Conversely, Fama and French (1998) cannot find any evidence that 
supports the positive relationship between tax and debt.   
 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that tax deduction for depreciation, investment tax 
credits and deferred tax losses are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing and can 
reduce cash outflows. Furthermore, it is assumed that non-debt tax shields and capital 
structure have a negative relationship due to the substitution effect on enterprise debt. 
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Country Characteristics  
Country characteristics may influence leverage choice, as indicated by the evidence 
reported by several studies such as Booth et al. (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004). For 
instance, the term structure of interest rates is expected to have an inverse relationship with 
leverage. If the long-term interest rates in a specific country rise, managers are more likely 
to issue equity instead of debt. According to the proposition of maximising shareholders’ 
wealth, management may opt for equity instead of debt, particularly if long-term interest 
rates are high. A country with a developed stock market structure has lower cost in issuing 
equity, which may offer an incentive to issue more equity instead of debt. Conversely, a 
country where the bond market structure is more developed offers more protection to 
creditors, in which case one expects a positive relationship with leverage.  
 
An accumulation of retained earnings is expected if an increase in capital formation occurs. 
This, in turn, affects leverage negatively according to the pecking order theory. Historical 
data suggest that inflation is unanticipated and subsequently reduces market systems’ 
efficiency. As a rule, if the inflation rate is high, both bond and stock markets will be 
negatively influenced. The rate of return is expected to be higher, and this will subsequently 
affect securities prices. Higher inflation makes debt capital look more beneficial to firms. A 
study by de Jong et al. (2008) finds that in countries with higher GDP growth, firms are 
more willing to raise the level of debt to finance new investments. 
 
3.3     Institutional Differences across Countries 
Different institutional factors across countries might be responsible for differences in the 
leverage choice of firms. Using an international sample is somehow challenging, but one 
must analyse cross-country differences and their impacts on financing decisions. The 
financial system has a major influence on economic growth in the long run, and it 
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determines how most countries develop. The literature on law and finance, especially that 
of La Porta et al. (1998), emphasises the importance of creditor’s rights and the strength of 
equity in influencing the development of financial systems. A review of institutional 
differences is important due to the possibility of impacting financial choices of firms within 
and across countries. The major institutional differences across countries are analysed, 
including bankruptcy law, legal institutions, bank-based versus market-based economic 
systems and ownership concentration. 
 
Legal Traditions 
Legalities in countries around the world are determined by both legal tradition and the legal 
origin. According to La Porta et al. (1998), laws in different countries generally belong to 
two different legal traditions: (i) the common law regime, which is English in origin and (ii) 
the civil law regime, which derives from Roman law. The civil law tradition is the oldest, 
with three points of origin: French, German and Scandinavian. These laws were the basis of 
modern commercial laws and codes. Research shows that while countries have their own 
laws, scholars agree that these legal systems are sufficiently similar. The chosen sample of 
countries used in the study is ideal for examining institutional differences. The sample 
covers (i) countries that belong to the English common law regime, such as Australia, Hong 
Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United 
States; (ii) countries that use the French law code such as Brazil, Chile, France, Indonesia 
and Turkey; and (iii) countries with the German law code, such as Austria, Germany and 
Japan. 
 
Bankruptcy Law 
Each legal system has different sets of laws to protect investors, which might influence the 
behaviour of firms. La Porta et al. (1998) investigate company and 
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bankruptcy/reorganisation laws, which involve legal relationships between shareholders, 
creditors and corporations. Bankruptcy law is the legal procedure used in case a firm fails 
to pay back debts and the extent of control that management has during the procedure. The 
commercial code in countries that belongs to the civil law tradition includes 
bankruptcy/reorganisation laws, whereas in common law countries, it exists as separate 
laws. 
 
This thesis sets out to establish whether laws related to investor protection have an effect on 
the leverage choice of firms across countries and whether or not the degree of enforcement 
of these laws has an influence as well. Strict enforcement of creditor’s rights gives creditors 
the opportunity to control corporate management in case they descend into financial 
distress. According to Rajan and Zingales (1995), strict enforcement reduces the 
negotiation cost in case the original contract is violated. Moreover, if creditors’ rights are 
violated during bankruptcy, it may be easier to provide managers with appropriate 
incentives to allocate corporate resources post-bankruptcy, especially for profitable 
enterprises. The extent of enforcing creditor’s rights differs from country to country.  
 
La Porta et al. (1998) create an index where they measure the degree of creditor and 
shareholder rights protection for several countries, together with an index that shows the 
extent of enforcing these laws.
8
 Countries such as Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom are reported to have a stronger creditor’s rights 
protection scheme than other nations, in which case one expects that firms will have higher 
leverage because creditors will be more willing to lend. Conversely, countries such as Hong 
Kong, India, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States have stronger 
shareholder rights. The remaining countries fall in between.  
                                                          
8
 For a better understanding of the index, refer to Chapter 4, Table 4.2, Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. 
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Nonetheless, the level of legal enforcement differs across countries, and a weak system of 
legal enforcement is linked to the failure to protect investors even if the country has strong 
laws. For instance, a strong legal enforcement system can be a substitute for weak 
shareholders and creditor’s rights, and a well-functioning system can assist investors 
against exploitation. According to La Porta et al. (1998), the quality of law enforcement in 
German civil law is the best, that of French civil law countries is the worst, while common 
law countries are somewhere in between. German civil law countries have the highest 
scores in La Porta’s index, which includes efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, 
level of corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of repudiation by government. 
 
 Moreover, La Porta et al. (1998) add that their results contradict the belief that the quality 
of law enforcement compensates for weak investor protection laws. Investors in French 
civil law countries are poorly protected by the legal system that enforce these laws, while in 
common law countries, investors are more protected on average by laws and the 
enforcement system. Lastly, their results show that richer countries have a superior legal 
enforcement system.  
 
According to La Porta et al. (1998), there are significant differences between common and 
civil law countries. Their study shows that legal protection for shareholders and creditors is 
better in common law countries than in civil law countries. According to the index of La 
Porta et al. (1998), investors are more likely to have the right to vote by mail in common 
law countries. There are no blocked shares as time nears for meetings; minorities 
(particularly oppressed minorities) are most likely to be protected by law; and (in most 
cases) only a few shares are required in order for a shareholder meeting to be called. In 
French civil law countries, voting by mail is not commonly allowed, and share blocking 
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incidents in the context of shareholder meetings are high. There is weak protection for 
minorities in French civil law countries. Finally, it is necessary for investors to hold a large 
percentage of shares in order to request a shareholders’ meeting.  
 
La Porta et al. (1998) report that shareholders’ and creditor’s rights indices suggest that 
both parties are highly protected in countries such as Hong Kong, India and the United 
Kingdom, whereas in the United States, creditors are not protected as much as shareholders. 
For instance, in the United States, management is given substantial rights by bankruptcy 
law, and the U.S. code strongly encourages firms to keep going. A firm’s management can 
propose a reorganisation plan within 120 days of filing for bankruptcy, which gives 
management the right to manage the firm and halt further legal proceedings by creditors. In 
the United Kingdom, the bankruptcy law gives the priority to creditors, which leads to 
liquidation of the business in many cases.  
 
Market-Based versus Bank-Based Economies 
Disputes have arisen between economists and financial analysts regarding whether a bank-
based or market-based system is more effective and whether these systems have a 
substantial effect on firms’ financial choices. In bank-based systems, banks provide credit 
to the economy, and they play an important role in capital allocation, risk management, 
mobilisation of savings and supervision of firm managers’ investment decisions. 
Conversely, firms operating in market-based systems are more likely to raise funds in 
bonds and equity markets. In the context of market-based systems, the securities market 
works with banks in order to provide national savings to companies, exert and increase 
corporate control and provide management. However, as financial wealth rises, financial 
markets become more important for the economy than banks. Table 3.1 lists the countries 
considered in this study and their respective financial systems. However, bank-based and 
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market-based systems are created through the financing choices of firms. According to 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), there is no difference between the extent of leverage in bank-
based and market-based countries, which raises the question of whether these systems 
affect a firm’s financing decisions. In certain countries (such as the United Kingdom and 
United States), borrowing and lending activities occur through organised markets – these 
are instances of the market-based economy.  
 
Table 3.1: Financial Systems 
Sources: Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2001and Allen et al. (2012) 
Country Bank-based Market-based Country Bank-based Market-based 
Austria Yes  Japan Yes  
Australia  Yes Singapore  Yes 
Brazil  Yes Malaysia  Yes 
Chile  Yes India Yes  
China  Yes Hong Kong  Yes 
France Yes  South Africa  Yes 
Germany Yes  
United 
Kingdom  Yes 
Indonesia Yes  Turkey  Yes 
   United States  Yes 
 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that banks’ powers differ across countries. For instance, 
banks in Germany are allowed to own equity in firms and underwrite corporate securities, 
while substantial limits are placed on both activities in the United States. Banks’ power in 
the remaining countries hovers between what is observed in Germany and the United 
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States. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also argue that there are comparative advantages of the 
bank-based system in countries that have a weak legal system. This is because it is possible 
for powerful banks to pressure companies to reveal information and to repay debt. This 
view suggests that the benefits of a market-based system can only be experienced when the 
legal system is strong.  
 
Ownership Concentration 
The level of ownership concentration differs across countries, as firms in countries with 
weak investor protection laws have a concentrated ownership structure. According to La 
Porta et al. (1998), two scenarios may explain the concentrated ownership of shares in such 
countries: (i) Large shareholders might need more capital to control management and avoid 
being expropriated by managers. (ii) in countries with week investor protection, small 
investors are willing to buy shares only when the price is extremely low; this would lead 
firms to stop issuing more shares to the public due to lack of their appeal, which means that 
concentrated ownership will increase because of low demand by small investors. 
Furthermore, in countries with such poor protection systems, concentrated ownership of 
large shareholders can compensate for weak investor protection, because dominant 
shareholders control the firm’s management in the hope of receiving returns on their 
investment. Concentrated ownership is associated with management discipline; dominant 
shareholders have the incentive to monitor a firm’s managers and, in return, improve firm 
value and performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
 
It has been argued that the classic agency problem is more likely to occur as there is less 
concentration within the ownership structure, which means that the presence of 
concentrated ownership (large shareholders) reduces the agency cost between the involved 
beneficiaries (managers and shareholders). However, concentrated ownership might cause 
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issues – for instance, a potential conflict between large and small shareholders might 
develop, because the former hold the majority, whereas the latter hold the minority. This 
may result in large owners using their position to their own advantage by extracting other 
benefits – for instance, they might be undiversified and tend to oppose debt, which leads to 
lower leverage levels. On the other hand, these shareholders might be banks, forcing the 
firm to take on more debt and reducing outside sources.  
 
 
Table 3.2: Ownership of the 10 Largest Firms by Large Shareholders 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Country  
Median of ownership by 3 
largest shareholders 
Average market capitalisation of 
firms (USD) 
English-origin countries 
Australia   .28  5,943 
Hong Kong   .54  4,282 
India   .43  1,721 
Malaysia   .52  2,013 
Singapore   .53  1,637 
South Africa   .52  6,238 
United Kingdom   .15  18,511 
United States   .12  71,650 
French-origin countries 
Brazil   .63  1,237 
Chile   .38  2,330 
France   .24  8,914 
Indonesia   .62  882 
Turkey   .58  477 
German-origin countries 
Austria   .51  325 
Germany   .50  8,540 
Japan   .13  26,677 
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Table 3.2, which is based on La Porta et al. (1998), shows that French civil law countries 
have the highest concentration of ownership, with the lowest ownership concentration 
found in Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. This suggests that ownership 
structure might compensate for poor investor protection and enforcement of laws. As 
mentioned earlier, French civil law countries have the worst protection systems in place for 
investors and also have weak enforcement. 
 
3.4     Hypotheses Development  
The hypotheses are developed in line with the theoretical framework and prior empirical 
work. Several theories of capital structure suggest diverse factors that influence decision 
making with reference to debt-equity choice. Table 3.3 summarises the expected influence 
of factors on the leverage choice of firms.  
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Table 3.3: Expected Relationship between Leverage and its Determinants as Reported by Capital Structure Theories 
Factor Expected Sign Explanation 
SIZE + 
Larger firms have diverse businesses and earnings, and so they can afford to have high debt ratios. Smaller firms have lower 
debt ratios because their information asymmetry problem is larger. Studies on larger firms tend to show that they do not take 
many risks in financing decisions (Abor, 2008). It is expected that size has a positive effect on leverage. 
PROFITABILITY  - 
The pecking order theory explains how profitability is associated with capital structure as firms choose to use internal funds 
instead of external funds to finance projects (Abor, 2008). The hierarchy method begins with the one that is not too sensitive 
and not too risky due to asymmetric information. So, if internal funds are insufficient, firms prefer to use debt rather than 
equity to minimise the problem of information asymmetry between firms’ managers and external investors. Firms that obtain 
high profits attain lower debt ratios because they use internal funds to finance their projects. This creates a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. 
LIQUIDITY - 
Liquidity serves as a source of internal funding and will be used before debt. It can be theorised that firm size also has a 
positive impact on liquidity due to increasing number of assets available for use to earn a profit, which can have a negative 
effect on leverage. It is hypothesized that liquidity has a negative effect on leverage.  
TANGIBILITY + 
A factor such as bankruptcy cost is expected to have a negative impact on leverage, so used here as a proxy is asset 
tangibility. Firm with more tangible assets, can liquidate easily when needing cash flow, higher tangibility indicates less risk 
for the lender and guarantees debts to be safer. In using tangible assets as collateral, some costs are reduced such as those for 
bankruptcy. According to Öztekin (2015), firm size and tangibility have positive effects on leverage and they are in fact 
considered to be two of the most impactful factors of leverage. It is a reasonable hypothesis to assume that tangibility will  
result in a positive effect on leverage.  
FIRM RISK - 
The trade-off theory postulates that, as risk increases, the volatility of earnings increases and so does the probability of 
bankruptcy. In return creditors will be less likely to give credit. Consequently, higher risk can result in lower leverage, which 
constitutes a negative impact on the firm as a whole.  
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Factor Expected Sign Explanation 
CAPITAL GAIN + 
The pecking order theory suggests an inverse relationship between capital gain (stock price performance) and leverage. It is 
hypothesised that capital gain has a positive effect on leverage.  
TAX RATE + 
Taxes affect debt and equity, more so on firms’ financing decisions. Tax shields influence whether a firm considers debt 
financing or otherwise. The trade-off theory proposes that firms tend to prefer more debt financing due to deductible interest, 
which reduces a firm’s taxable income. Therefore it is expected that as the tax liability increases, leverage will also increase.  
NON-DEBT TAX 
SHIELD  
- 
Tax deductions for depreciation are substitutes for the tax benefit of debt financing. This suggests that firms with large non-
debt tax shields have less debt in their capital structure.  
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITY 
- 
Agency cost theory assumes that an optimal capital structure can be determined by reducing conflicts of interest between the 
beneficiaries. In order to minimise conflicts, firms with higher growth opportunities tend to go for lower leverage and 
therefore seek internal financing; if it is insufficient then they will seek equity financing. The trade-off theory predicts a 
negative relationship as well. The pecking order theory predicts that a fast-growing firm may not have sufficient internal 
funds and cash flow to support this growth which means more need to borrow funds. It is hypothesised that growth 
opportunity has a negative effect on leverage.  
ASSET UTILISATION + 
Asset performance refers to the ways or methods whereby the firm’s assets are used to produce cash or revenues for its 
various operations. It is possible that firms may experience improvement in profitability through efficiency in utilising assets, 
establishing a positive effect on leverage. The more efficient the firm is then the more debt they can afford to carry.  
PAYOUT RATIO - 
An optimal capital structure supports shareholders’ investment so that they can receive their investment dividends or income 
derived from their capital. Agency cost, ownership structure, and tax laws in the country where the firm operates affect the 
relationship between payout ratio and leverage as well as the impact of information asymmetry.  
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Factor Expected Sign Explanation 
SHARE PRICE 
PERFORMANCE 
- 
If leverage declines after an increase in share price, a larger firm may enjoy a higher share price because more investors want 
to invest in the firm. It is also theorised that a higher share price performance may result in lower leverage.  
CAPITAL INTENSITY  - 
The trade-off theory explains that a company with high capital intensity is able to take on more debt due to the fact that it has 
more collateral assets. Hence, capital intensity is positively related to leverage. On the other hand, Barton and Gordon (1988) 
postulates that capital intensity is negatively related to capital structure. An increase in the employment of fixed assets 
suggests higher risk of future income. Thus, management are more likely to opt for lower debt levels, in order to retain 
control of the firm, and to limit risk of default. 
FIRM AGE + 
According to the trade-off theory, older firms have already proved their performance, which means that they have good 
reputation, which assists borrowing. As a result, it can be suggested that older firms have higher level of leverage.  
INTANGIBLE ASSETS - 
Firms with more tangible assets are less likely to default. Higher tangibility indicates lower risk for creditors by using 
tangible assets as collateral. Since no such guarantee can be used when most assets are intangible, creditors may require more 
favorable terms. As a result, firms with less collateralisable assets are more likely to use equity rather than debt financing.  
INVENTORY 
TURNOVER 
+ 
The literature on inventory emphasises production and obtaining supplies as a major determining factor of a corporation’s 
inventory policy. Once more, firms with assets that can be used as collateral are less likely to default, and expected to take on 
more debt. Therefore it is expected that inventory affects leverage positively 
UNIQUENESS OF 
PRODUCTS  
- 
Associates (such as customers, workers, and suppliers) of firms that produce unique products may suffer relatively higher 
costs in the event of liquidation (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Whoever works for firms that produce unique products must 
have specific skills required for the job, as well as the suppliers who must have job-specific capital. Likewise, customers who 
want unique products will probably have difficulties in replacing or finding alternative businesses for their unique product 
demands. The uniqueness of a product is expected to have a negative relationship with leverage.  
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Factor Expected Sign Explanation 
CHANGE IN ASSETS + 
As a company grows, its assets will change. According to trade-off theory, if a firm has more tangible assets it can take on 
more debt. Hence, change in assets may have a positive effect on leverage.  
CHANGE IN SALES + 
More sales indicate higher profits. According to the pecking order theory, firms prefer to use internal financing, which means 
that if internal funds are insufficient firms prefer to use debt rather than equity. This creates a negative relationship between 
change in sales and leverage. However, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship with leverage. 
CAPEX + 
According to the pecking order theory when firms need to finance capital expenditures they will acquire debt when there are 
insufficient retained earnings. Therefore, CAPEX is expected to have a positive influence on leverage. 
INCOME 
VARIABILITY  
- 
The trade-off theory proposes an inverse relationship, but a positive relationship may be expected if higher income variability 
generates a reduced agency cost of debt. 
BOND MARKET 
STRUCTURE 
+ 
As the bond market develops, creditors and borrowers are more likely to be protected, and have better legal enforcement, as 
well as provisions for bankruptcy procedures and increased protections for and from creditors. Consequently, creditors are 
more willing to provide debt, implying that bond market structure has a positive effect on leverage.  
STOCK MARKET 
STRUCTURE 
- 
As the stock market develops, firms will have more funding and lower equity costs. It is expected that stock market structure 
affects leverage negatively.  
CAPITAL 
FORMATION 
- 
The strength of capital formation depends on country size, such that an increase in capital formation means more earnings, 
suggesting a negative impact on leverage according to the pecking order theory.  
INFLATION RATE + 
Inflation decreases the value of money or invested capital over time, which means that debt gets cheaper to pay back over 
time. As a result, debt financing becomes more attractive, thus suggesting a positive impact on leverage.  
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Factor Expected Sign Explanation 
TERM STRUCTURE 
OF INTEREST RATES 
- 
This refers to hopes of market players about possible positive modifications in interest rates and their comments on current 
monetary policies. If long-term interest rates are expected to increase, managers tend to avoid taking on more debt. Hence, it 
is expected for term structure of interest rates to have an inverse relationship with leverage.  
GDP GROWTH + 
GDP growth is believed to have a negative impact on leverage according to some studies (Dincergok and Yalciner, 2011; 
Bastos et al., 2009; Gajurel, 2006). On the other hand, Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) report a positive and a significant 
relationship between leverage and GDP growth.  
GDP PER CAPITA - Bokpin (2009) reports a significant and negative relationship between GDP per capita and leverage.  
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3.5     Conclusion  
This chapter summarises the predictions of several capital structure studies, together with 
the prediction of conventional capital structure theories. It also offers insights into the 
determinants of leverage. The hypotheses development for all variables included in this 
thesis is in line with the theoretical framework and prior empirical work. Theories of capital 
structure differ in their predictions on the relationships between determinants of capital 
structure and leverage. The trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between debt 
level and variables such as size, growth and profit, while the pecking order theory assumes 
a negative relationship between the same variables and leverage. Whether the relationships 
are positive or negative, the determinants of the capital structure and their effect on 
leverage will be investigated and compared later on. Prior research suggests that size and 
tangibility have a positive relationship with leverage, while profitability has a negative 
effect on leverage.  
 
Institutional differences between countries were investigated and explained. According to 
La Porta et al. (1998), there are significant differences between common and civil law 
countries. The study shows that legal protection for shareholders and creditors is stronger in 
common law countries than in civil law countries. At the same time, the study shows that 
the best legal system (laws that protect shareholders and creditors) exists in common law 
countries. On the other hand, a weak legal system is evident in French civil law countries.   
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CHAPTER 4 
A DESCRIPTION AND PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE 
DATA  
4.1     Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the data collection procedure, and identifying the 
sources of data. Furthermore, this chapter describes the measures of leverage, measures of 
firm-specific variables and measures of the country-specific variables. Moreover, 
descriptive statistics for the firms, industries and countries included in the sample are 
discussed. A summary of the statistics for the entire sample can be found in Appendix A, 
Table A-1, which provides descriptive statistics for Australia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Table A-2 provides descriptive statistics for Austria and Hong Kong and 
Turkey; Table A-3 for France, Germany and Singapore; Table A-4 for China, Japan and 
Malaysia; Table A-5 for Brazil, India and Indonesia; and Table A-6 for Chile and South 
Africa. The tables report statistics for 20 firm-specific variables, seven country-specific 
variables and six types of leverage, along with their number of observations, means, min, 
max and standard deviation.  
 
Apart from the availability, or otherwise, of data on a wide range of explanatory variables, 
the choice of countries is based on the need for diversity to create a wide range of values 
for the explanatory variables. We can readily see the geographical diversity as the countries 
chosen are from Europe, Australasia, North America, South America and Africa. We also 
have diversity with respect to the legal systems as the selected countries vary drastically 
with respect to efficiency of judicial system, the rule of law, corruption, risk of 
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expropriation and the risk of contract repudiation. Wide differences can also be observed 
with respect to financial systems. 
 
4.2     Sources of Data 
Due to the nature of the research problem and the research design, this study relies on 
historical data. To understand the determinants of capital structure, a huge and 
comprehensive dataset has been assembled. The data analysis and management are 
executed by using the Stata 13 statistical software. The empirical analysis is based on a 
large and diverse sample covering firms operating in developed and emerging economies in 
Europe, North and South America, Africa, Asia and Australia. The size, complexity and 
detail of the dataset constitute a unique advantage for the analysis. In particular, the dataset 
comprises information at the firm and country levels covering 42 variables nested within 33 
industries in 17 countries over the period of 2003 to 2013. Financial and insurance firms are 
excluded for a number of reasons, such as the high level of leverage in relation to non-
financial firms and the possibility that they might operate under different regulatory 
frameworks.
9
  
 
The data on leverage and the firm- and country-specific determinants of capital structure 
have been extracted from three sources: (i) the first is Thomson Reuters Datastream; (ii) the 
second source constitutes the World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Financial 
Structure Database of the World Bank; while (iii) a selection of some country-specific 
determinants related to corporate governance are mainly extracted from La Porta et al. 
(1998). Thomson Reuters Datastream is the world’s most comprehensive database as it 
                                                          
9
 The sample covers listed companies only. This by no means implies that non-listed companies are not 
important for the economy. Rather the decision to use listed companies only is based on pragmatism as it 
pertains to data availability. 
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covers more than 60 years of economic history. It contains companies’ balance sheets, 
profit-and-loss statements and cash flow statements. Datastream has more than 100,000 
active equities and more than 103,000 inactive equities covering 100 developed and 
emerging markets. It covers over 200 fields including prices, volumes, market 
capitalisation, earnings, dividends and more. Data are sourced directly from exchanges, 
leading international and local suppliers and published reports.  
 
WDI is the World Bank’s primary collection of development indicators, assembled from 
approved and acknowledged international sources. WDI provide accurate and current 
global development data that are national, regional and global. WDI has data for 214 
economies and many indicators, covering 50 years of economic history. Furthermore, WDI 
provides statistics about development and people’s lives around the globe, which make 
cross-country comparisons possible. The WDI database is divided into six sections: World 
View, People, Environment, Economy, States and Markets and Global Links.  
 
4.3     The Organization and Size of Data  
Due to the state of this research, the data have been organised in two sets: one set has data 
on firm-specific factors while the other has data on country-specific variables, together with 
variables related to corporate governance. The first set is the largest, as it includes monthly 
financial data on all listed firms in the 17 countries under examination. The second set 
includes data on the country-specific variables. Both sets are merged together to generate 
results with the objective of differentiating between the fragile and robust determinants of 
capital structure.The first dataset, as shown in Table 4.1, has more than 3.3 million 
observations for each variable collected on more than 25,000 firms nested within 33 
industries. The sample has monthly data covering 11 years from 2003 to 2013. Table 4.1 
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shows that all years have similar data points at about 305,652 observations for each 
variable. Table 4.1 shows that the United States has the most data points, and each variable 
has more than 1.1 million observations over the sample period. Furthermore, the United 
States has the most number of firms (7,962) followed by Japan and India, with 3,342 and 
3,164 firms, respectively. Countries such as Austria and Chile have the least number of 
firms, with 67 and 180 firms, respectively. The remaining countries fall between Chile and 
India, ranging from 273 to 2,289 firms. 
Figure 4.1: Proportion of Firms in the Sample by Country (%) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the proportion of firms by country. The United States represents 31% 
of all firms in the sample, followed by Japan and India with 13% and 12%, respectively. 
Other important countries are China (9%), Australia (6%) and the United Kingdom (6%). 
Austria has a relatively small number of firms in the sample (around 1%). Figure 4.2 
illustrates the distribution of firms according to industry. It shows all 33 industries, and the 
firms in the sample are more or less equally distributed among these industries. This 
implies that the sample is representative and covers all sectors of the economy, which is 
important for the generalisation of findings.  
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Figure 4.2: Number of Firms in the Sample by Industry 
 
 
The second dataset has a total of 2,057 observations. This sample has annual data covering 
the period from 2003 to 2013. All the years have similar data points, specifically, 121 data 
point for every year. Corporate governance variables have specifically 11 observations 
every year. Observations on corporate governance are averaged through 1980-1983 and 
1982-1995, as reported by La Porta et al. (1998).
10
  
                                                          
10
 Observations on corporate governance variables is discussed in more detail in the following section.   
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Table 4.1: Number of Firms in the Sample and Data Points for each Variable Distributed by Country and Year 
COUNTRY 
YEAR Number of 
Listed Firms 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL 
Austria 804 804 804 804 804 804 804 804 804 804 804 8,844 67 
Australia 20,256 20,256 20,256 20,256 20,256 20,256 20,256 20,256 20,256 20,256 20,256 222,816 1,688 
Brazil 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 36,036 273 
Chile 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 23,760 180 
China 27,468 27,468 27,468 27,468 27,468 27,468 27,468 27,468 27,468 27,468 27,468 302,148 2,289 
France 8,592 8,592 8,592 8,592 8,592 8,592 8,592 8,592 8,592 8,592 8,592 94,512 716 
Germany 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 96,492 731 
Hong Kong 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 159,588 1,209 
Indonesia 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 4,236 46,596 353 
Japan 40,104 40,104 40,104 40,104 40,104 40,104 40,104 40,104 40,104 40,104 40,104 441,144 3,342 
Malaysia 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 104,016 788 
India 37,968 37,968 37,968 37,968 37,968 37,968 37,968 37,968 37,968 37,968 37,968 417,648 3,164 
South Africa 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 2,832 31,152 236 
Singapore 8,004 8,004 8,004 8,004 8,004 8,004 8,004 8,004 8,004 8,004 8,004 88,044 667 
Turkey 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 3,480 38,280 290 
United Kingdom 18,192 18,192 18,192 18,192 18,192 18,192 18,192 18,192 18,192 18,192 18,192 200,112 1,516 
United States 95,544 95,544 95,544 95,544 95,544 95,544 95,544 95,544 95,544 95,544 95,544 1,050,984 7,962 
TOTAL 305,652 305,652 305,652 305,652 305,652 305,652 305,652 305,652 305,652 305,652 305,652 3,362,172 25,471 
73 
 
The information on the first dataset is organised into five categories, which are used as 
subject names for each data point: (i) country name, (ii) industry name, (iii) firm name, (iv) 
variable name and (v) date of data. This dataset involves a four-level hierarchy. The first 
level consists of 17 countries, the second includes 33 industries, the third includes 25,471 
firms (excluding financial and insurance firms) and the fourth level consists of 42 variable 
codes for each firm.  
Figure 4.3: Dataset of Four-Level Hierarchy 
 
 
The information contained in the second dataset is organised into three categories: (i) 
country, (ii) date of data and (ii) variable code. The categories are used as the subject name 
for each data point. This set has a two-level hierarchy, with 17 countries in the first level 
and 34 variable codes for each country in the second level. 
Figure 4.4: Dataset of Two-Level Hierarchy 
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Both sets of financial and economic data serve to generate precisely six measures of 
leverage and a total of 28 potential explanatory variables, of which 21 are firm-specific 
determinants and seven are country-specific determinants. Variables will be defined in the 
next section. Several variables investigated in this thesis are suggested by the theories of 
capital structure, which were discussed in Chapter 2, including the trade-off theory, agency 
cost theory and pecking order theory. The variables used in previous empirical studies of 
capital structure are included in this analysis. Although, the variables were discussed 
previously according to the theoretical hypotheses, they are defined here with reference to 
the collected data. Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that measuring leverage and the 
explanatory variables is difficult and that separating their effects and finding suitable 
proxies for them is challenging. 
 
4.4     Measures of Leverage  
A number of measures of leverage have been developed. While previous studies consider 
forms of the debt ratio, such as the total debt to total assets ratio (TD/TA) and total debt to 
equity ratio (TD/E), they differ with respect to the choice between the market or book value 
measures for either the denominator or the numerator, and also with respect to the use of 
total debt or its components.  
 
The components of leverage measures associated with theories of capital structure play a 
key role in determining the relation between leverage and a particular variable. According 
to Rajan and Zingales (1995, p.1427), ‘the extent of leverage and the most relevant measure 
depends on the objective of the analysis’. For instance, the leverage level and the agency 
problems associated with it relate to a firm’s past financing decisions (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Since explanatory variables wield different effects on the 
75 
 
debt components, great care is taken to define leverage as used in the analysis. 
Consequently, the measures suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) are adopted. 
 
Non-Equity Liabilities to Total Assets 
This measure is considered the broadest definition of leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
suggest that this measure would act as a proxy for the firm value in case of liquidation and 
that what is left is for shareholders. However, they argue that this measure is influenced by 
pension liabilities and that accounts payable may exaggerate the leverage amount. 
Furthermore, this measure does not show whether the firm faces default risk in the near 
future. At book value, the leverage measure is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets (LEVB1). 
       
  
  
                                                                                     
At market value, the leverage ratio is calculated by adjusting total assets by subtracting the 
book value of equity and adding the market value of equity (LEVM1). 
      
  
         
                                                              
where TL is total liabilities, TA is total assets, EBV is the book value of equity capital and 
reserves and MV is the market value of equity. 
 
Debt to Total Assets  
At book value, leverage is defined as total debts to total assets (LEVB2). 
      
  
  
                                                                                      
At market value, the leverage ratio is calculated by adjusting the total assets’ value by 
subtracting the book value of equity and adding the market value of equity (LEVM2). 
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where TD refers to total debt. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that this measure is 
influenced by trade credit. Accordingly, the level of leverage may go down if the amount of 
trade credit increases.  
 
Debt to Capital 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that this measure best represents the effects of past 
financing decisions (LEVB3). At book value, leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to 
capital, where capital is the sum of total debt and equity. 
      
  
      
                                                                       
At market value, the leverage ratio is calculated by adjusting the book value of equity in the 
denominator with the market value (LEVM3). 
      
  
     
                                                                           
 
4.5     Measures of Explanatory Variables (Firm-Specific Variables) 
Many variables used in previous empirical studies of capital structure are included in this 
study. The explanatory variables are divided into two groups: (i) firm-specific variables and 
(ii) country-specific variables. Country-specific variables are discussed in the following 
section.  
 
Size (SIZ)  
Firm size, which is measured as the natural logarithm of sales, is an inverse proxy for 
financial distress since larger firms have diverse businesses and earnings. As a result, they 
are unlikely to go bankrupt, so they can afford to have high debt ratios. Hence, 
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where SA is sales. Size can be measured as the natural logarithm of assets, which is not 
preferable because it does not reflect current values as sales do. The logarithm use seems to 
be consistent with previous studies, although none of them explains the mean for the 
logarithm transformation.  
 
Profitability (PRF)  
Profitability is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) divided by total assets. This ratio is not affected by interest, taxes and 
depreciation, which makes it the most relevant proxy for profitability. Thus, 
     
      
  
                                                                               
where EBITDA is earning before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. 
 
Tangibility (TAN)  
Tangibility is the degree of guarantee a firm can provide to its debtors. Debtors are more 
willing to lend funds with much security, considering that assets can be liquidated easily if 
bankruptcy occurs. A low ratio of tangible assets provides a small collateral during 
bankruptcy. TAN is measured as fixed assets divided by total assets, which gives 
     
  
  
                                                                                        
where FA is fixed assets. 
 
Growth Opportunities (GOP)  
The market-to-book ratio or Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value divided by book 
value of total assets.  
    
           
  
                                                              
Tobin's Q measures a firm’s performance and helps management in decision making.  
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Liquidity (LIQ)  
Liquidity describes how quickly an asset can be bought or sold in the market without 
affecting the asset price. LIQ is measured by the current ratio, which is current assets 
divided by current liabilities. The current ratio measures a company's ability to pay short-
term and long-term obligations. The current ratio, which is a short-term solvency, is 
measured as 
    
  
  
                                                                                         
where CA represents current assets and CL represents current liabilities. 
 
Risk (RISK)  
Risk is a proxy for business risk; higher risk indicates a higher probability of bankruptcy. 
Risk is measured as the standard deviation of operating income divided by the book value 
of total assets during the sample period. Hence, 
     
       
  
                                                                          
where OI is the operation income. 
 
Payout Ratio (POR)  
Payout ratio represents the proportion of earnings paid to shareholders as dividend. It is 
measured as the ratio of dividends to net income, which gives 
    
  
  
                                                                             
where DR is dividend ratio and NI represents net income. 
 
Share Price Performance (SHPP)  
Share price performance is the percentage change in share price. 
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Asset Utilisation (ASUTI)  
Asset utilisation indicates the efficiency of a firm in using its assets to generate earnings. 
ASUTI is measured as the ratio of sales to total assets. Hence, 
      
  
  
                                                                             
The asset utilization ratio calculates a firm’s revenue for every dollar of assets a firm owns.  
 
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTAX)  
Tax shield effects represent a reduction in taxable income as an outcome for claiming 
allowable deductions (e.g. mortgage interest, charity donations, amortisation and 
depreciation). Tax shields differ from country to country, depending on the tax rate and 
cash flows for a given year. NDTAX is defined as the ratio of depreciation to total assets, 
which gives 
      
   
  
                                                                             
where DEP is ratio of depreciation. 
 
Inventory Outstanding (DIO)  
‘Days Inventory Outstanding’ indicate how fast a firm uses its supply of goods over a 
period of time (how long it takes to turn inventory into sales). Thus, DIO is calculated as 
follows 
    
       
  
                                                                       
where INV is inventory. 
 
Uniqueness of the Product (UNPR)  
Titman and Wessels (1988) provide three indicators that measure the uniqueness of 
products. Indicators of uniqueness include (i) expenditures on research and development 
over sales; (ii) selling expenses over sales; and (iii) the quit rate. The ratio of selling 
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expenses to sales emphasises that unique products should be subjected to rigorous selling 
endeavours. The second indicator is the ratio of research and development to sales, which 
means that unique products are the result of intensive research. The third indicator is the 
quit rate, which is the percentage of the work force that willingly quit their jobs in the 
sample years. Workers in industries that make unique products are valuable and have high 
level of specific skills; thus, workers will find it too costly if they quit their jobs. Therefore, 
firms with relatively high quit rates are most likely less unique. Titman and Wessels state 
that firms that emphasise research and development and have more selling expenses tend to 
have low debt ratios. Thus, 
        
  
  
                                                                              
        
  
  
                                                                                
where RD is research and development, SE is selling expenses and SA is sales. 
 
Capital Intensity (CAPIN)  
Capital intensity refers to the amount of capital a firm should produce to create revenue. 
Higher capital intensity means more assets for the firm to generate more sales. It is 
calculated as the ratio of total assets to total revenue. 
      
  
  
                                                                                     
where TR is total revenue. 
 
Taxes (TAX)  
The taxes affect capital structure. Taxes are directly extracted from the World Bank 
database. 
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Growth Variables 
Growth in assets G(AS) is defined as the percentage change in total assets, Growth in sales 
G(SA) is defined as the change in log sales, and capital expenditure (CAPEX) is the ratio of 
capital expenditure to total assets. Thus, 
                                                                                       
                                                                                      
      
  
  
                                                                                                  
where CE represents capital expenditure. 
 
Intangibles (INTAN)  
Intangibles represent assets that do not have a physical existence. It is measured as the ratio 
of intangible assets to total assets. 
      
   
  
                                                                                     
where INA represents intangible assets. 
 
Return on Equity (ROE)  
Return on equity is a profitability measure (firm performance). ROE reveals how much 
profit is generated from investments made by shareholders (profit a firm earns from its net 
assets). This ratio (ROE) refers to management effectiveness in using the firm's resources in 
the most efficient way. Return on equity is measured as the ratio of net income to common 
shareholders equity. Hence, 
    
  
   
                                                                                             
where CSE is common shareholders equity. 
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Income Variability (VAR)  
Income variability refers to fluctuations in a firm's net income during a certain period of 
time. Income variability is measured as the standard deviation of the firm’s net operating 
income over a 10-year period. Hence, 
                                                                                        
where OI  represents operating income. 
 
Age of the Firm (AGE) 
Age matters in the sense that the older the business is, the stronger is its reputation. Age is 
measured as the number of years since incorporation. Age is extracted directly from 
Datastream 
 
4.6     Measures of Explanatory Variables (Country-Specific Variables) 
Inflation Rate (INF)  
Inflation is a macroeconomic factor that influences the leverage ratio. Historical data show 
that inflation is unanticipated, suggesting uncertainty. According to Hatzinikolaou et al. 
(2002), inflation uncertainty increases business risk, which leads to uncertainty about tax 
shields. Inflation is measured as the annual percentage change in the consumer price index 
(CPI) directly extracted from Datastream. 
 
Capital Formation (CPF)  
Capital formation is the average of annual gross capital formation (as a proportion of GDP) 
in each country directly extracted from the World Bank. Capital formation refers to real 
capital (e.g. equipment and tools) for a particular country, which assists in increasing the 
level of goods and services. CPF does not consider the consumption (depreciation) of fixed 
capital; however, it refers to the increase or decrease in physical assets. 
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GDP Growth (GGDP)  
GDP growth is the annual real GDP growth rate. The GDP includes goods and services 
produced annually by country. 
 
GDP per Capita (CGDP)  
GDP per capita is a measure of the total output of a country divided by population.  
 
Term-Structure of Interest Rates (TSI)  
The structure of interest rates plays a key role in a country’s economy. The level of the 
term-structure influences capital structure by affecting the cost of debt. TSI is calculated as 
the annualised difference between the yields on long-term government bonds and the three-
month treasury bills.  
Bond Market Structure (BMS)  
Bond market structure is suggested by de Jong et al. (2008) and represents a combination of 
three variables: (i) bond market development (BMD), (ii) creditors’ rights protection 
(CDRP) and (iii) enforcement (ENF). These variables tend to strengthen the role of the 
bond market in an economy.   First, bond market development is measured as the total 
(private plus public) bond market capitalisation over GDP. Thus, BMD is measured as 
follows:  
    
   
   
                                                                                                
where BMC refers to bond market capitalization. Second, the variable creditors’ rights 
protection is a country-specific determinant related to corporate governance. This variable 
is mainly extracted from La Porta et al. (1998). Just like any individual or group, creditors 
have rights that should be protected by law.  CDRP is defined by considering the following 
criteria: no automatic stay on assets, secured creditors paid first, restrictions on going into 
reorganisation, management not staying in the reorganisation and creditor’s rights and legal 
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reserve required as a percentage of capital. Table 4.5 describes these variables. Finally, the 
variable rule of law (enforcement) is a country-specific determinant related to corporate 
governance, which is extracted from La Porta et al. (1998). Enforcement indicates a 
country’s legal enforcement system, which is defined by using the following criteria: 
efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of 
contract repudiation. Table 4.4 describes the above variable.  
 
Stock Market Structure (SMS)  
Stock market structure represents the strength of a country’s stock market. SMS is 
suggested by de Jong et al. (2008), and this variable is a combination of three variables: (i) 
stock market development (SMD), (ii) shareholder rights protection (SHRP) and (iii) market 
versus bank base financial system (BMBASE).
11
 If the country’s financial system is market-
based, then the dummy variable takes the value of 1, otherwise it is zero. Stock market 
development is important because stock market returns influence the firm’s capital 
structure. SMD is calculated as the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP. Hence, 
    
   
   
                                                                                         
Shareholder rights protection is a country-specific determinant related to corporate 
governance, which is extracted from La Porta et al. (1998). Shareholders should have a 
number of rights as part owners of the firm. To evaluate shareholders’ rights, La Porta et al. 
(1998) consider the following criteria: one share-one vote, proxy by mail allowed, shares 
not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed minority, pre-emptive rights to 
new issues, percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting, 
shareholders’ rights and mandatory dividend. Table 4.6 describes these variables.  
                                                          
11
 Financial Systems of Countries based on Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001); and Allen et al. (2012); see  
Table 3.1  in Chapter Three. 
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Table 4.2: Enforcement (ENF) Variables 
This table provides data on enforcement (ENF) in countries. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Country 
Efficiency of 
judicial system 
Rule of Law Corruption 
Risk of 
expropriation 
Risk of contract 
repudiation 
English-origin countries 
Australia 10 10 8.52 9.27 8.71 
Hong Kong 10 8.22 8.52 8.29 8.82 
India 8 4.17 4.58 7.75 6.11 
Malaysia 9 6.78 7.38 7.95 7.43 
Singapore 10 8.75 8.22 9.3 8.86 
South Africa 6 4.42 8.29 6.88 7.27 
United 
Kingdom 
10 8.75 9.1 9.71 9.63 
United 
States 
10 10 8.63 9.98 9 
French-origin countries 
Brazil 5.75 6.32 6.32 7.62 6.3 
Chile 7.25 7.02 5.3 7.5 6.8 
France 8 8.98 9.05 9.65 9.19 
Indonesia 2.5 3.98 2.15 7.16 6.09 
Turkey 4 5.18 5.18 7 5.95 
German-origin countries 
Austria 9.5 10 8.57 9.69 9.6 
Germany 9 9.23 8.93 9.9 9.77 
Japan 10 8.98 8.52 9.67 9.69 
 
 
Table 4.3: Creditors’ Rights Protection (CDRP) 
This table provides information for creditor’s rights protection. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Country 
No automatic 
stay on assets 
Secured 
creditors 
first paid 
Restriction for 
reorganisation 
Management 
doesn’t stay on 
reorganisation 
Creditor’s 
rights 
Legal reserve 
required as % 
English-origin countries 
Australia 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Hong Kong 1 1 1 1 4 0 
India 1 1 1 1 4 0 
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 4 0 
Singapore 1 1 1 1 4 0 
South Africa 0 1 1 1 3 0 
United 
Kingdom 
1 1 1 1 4 0 
United States 0 1 0 0 1 0 
French-origin countries 
Brazil 0 0 1 0 1 0.2 
Chile 0 1 1 0 2 0.2 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 4 0 
Turkey 0 1 1 0 2 0.2 
German-origin countries 
Austria 1 1 1 0 3 0.1 
Germany 1 1 1 0 3 0.1 
Japan 0 1 0 1 2 0.25 
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Table 4.4: Shareholder Rights Protection (SHRP) 
This table provides data for shareholder right protection. Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Country 
One share- 
one vote 
Proxy by 
 mail  
Shares not 
blocked 
before 
meeting 
Cumulative 
voting  
Oppresses 
minority 
Preemptive 
right to 
new issues 
Required shares 
to call for 
meeting 
Shareholder 
rights 
Mandatory 
divined 
English-origin countries 
Australia 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.05 4 0 
Hong 
Kong 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0.10 5 0 
India 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.10 5 0 
Malaysia 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.10 4 0 
Singapore 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.10 4 0 
South 
Africa 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0.05 5 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0.10 5 0 
United 
States 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0.10 5 0 
French-origin countries 
Brazil 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.05 3 0.5 
Chile 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.10 5 0.3 
France 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.10 3 0 
Indonesia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.10 2 0 
Turkey 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.10 2 0 
German-origin countries 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.05 2 0 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 1 0 
Japan 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.03 4 0 
 
Table 4.5: Corporate Governance Variables 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Variable  Description 
One share-one vote  If commercial code of the country or the company law requires ordinary 
shares carry one vote per share, then the variable take the value of 1, 
otherwise it is zero.  
Proxy by mail   If the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to mail their 
proxy vote to the firm, then the variable take the value of 1, and zero 
otherwise.  
Cumulative voting or 
proportional 
representation 
 The variable take the value of 1, if the company law or commercial code: (i) 
allows shareholders to give all their votes for one candidate standing 
for election to the board of directors (cumulative voting); or (ii) if it 
allows a proportional representation in the board by which minority 
may name a proportional number of directors to the board, otherwise 
the variable take the value of zero. 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Variable  Description 
Shares before meeting  If the company law or commercial code does not allow firms to require that 
shareholders deposit their shares prior to a general shareholders 
meeting, then the variable take the value of 1, and zero otherwise.  
Oppressed minorities 
 
 Minority shareholders are those who own at most 10% of share capital. The 
variable take the value of 1 if the company law or commercial code: (i) 
gives minority shareholders a judicial venue to challenge decisions of 
management; or (ii) give them the right to step out of the company by 
requiring the company to purchase their shares when they object to 
certain changes (for example mergers, asset dispositions and changes in 
the articles of incorporation), otherwise it is zero.  
Preemptive rights  The variable take the value of 1, if the company law or commercial code 
grants shareholders' prior right to purchase new issues of stock before 
they can be publicly available for purchase, and this right can be waived 
only by a shareholders' vote, otherwise the variable takes the value of 
zero.  
Percentage of share 
capital owned to call for 
meeting 
 The minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that gives a 
shareholder the right to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting 
(fractional ownership of the corporation). The percentages range from 
3% to 10 % in the examined countries.  
Shareholder rights  Shareholder rights is an index provided by La Porta, in which he aggregate 
shareholder rights in the examined countries. The index is formed by 
adding 1 each time the law in a country allows one of the following 
rights: (i) shareholders' are allowed to mail their proxy vote to the firm; 
(ii) shareholders' are not required to deposit their shares prior to the 
general shareholders' meeting; (iii) if cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (iv) if a 
mechanism for oppressed minorities is established; (v) if the minimum 
percentage of ownership of share capital that gives a shareholder the 
right call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is 10% or less; or 
(vi) if shareholder preemptive rights can be waived only by a 
shareholders' vote. At the end, the six (shareholder rights) scores are 
added up into an aggregate score named shareholder rights. The index 
ranges from zero to six.  
Restrictions for going 
into reorganisation 
 If the company law or commercial code imposes restrictions in order to file for 
reorganization, otherwise it takes the value of zero. 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Variable  Description 
Mandatory dividend  If the company law or commercial code obligate firms' to distribute dividends 
among ordinary stockholders, then each country takes a value that is 
equivalent to the required percentage of net income to be distributed. If a 
country does not have such restriction, then it takes a value equal to zero.  
Automatic stay on                    
secured assets 
 
 The variable takes the value of 1, if the procedure of reorganisation in a 
particular country does not impose an automatic stay on the assets of 
the firm when filing for reorganisation. Otherwise it is zero. 
Secured creditors first  The variable takes the value of 1, if secured creditors are given priority to be 
paid from the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm. It takes the value of zero if non-secured creditors are 
given priority. 
Management does not 
stay 
 The variable takes the value of 1, if management does not stay during the 
time of reorganisation, and an official is appointed either by court or by 
creditors, on the other hand it also means that the debtor does not retain 
the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganisation, otherwise it is zero. 
Creditor rights  Creditor rights is an index provided by La Porta, in which he aggregate 
creditor rights in the examined countries. The index is formed by 
adding 1 each time the law in a country impose one of the following 
rights: (i) when the country imposes restrictions to file for 
reorganisation; (ii) when secured creditors can claim their security once 
the reorganisation petition is approved; (iii) secured creditors are given 
priority to be paid first from the proceeds that result from the 
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (iv) if management 
does not stay during the time of reorganisation. At the end, the four 
(creditor rights) scores are added up into an aggregate score named 
creditor rights. The index ranges from zero to four. 
Legal reserve  The variables takes a value equals to the percentage of share capital a firm 
must keep, which is required by corporate law to avoid the dissolution 
of a firm in a particular country. The variable takes the value of zero 
for countries without such a restriction.  
Rule of law  An assessment of the law and order in the country produced by the country 
risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). The scale ranges 
from zero to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and order. 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Variable  Description 
Efficiency of judicial 
system 
 An assessment of the "efficiency of the legal environment as it affects 
business, particularly foreign firms" produced by the country risk rating 
agency Business International Corp. Each country in question has a 
particular score, which ranges from zero to 10, countries with lower 
scores, has lower efficiency levels.  
Corruption  ICR's assessment of the corruption in government. Countries with lower scores 
indicate: (i) that government officials are more likely to get special 
payments; and (ii) illegal payments occurs in the lower levels of 
government, (bribes can be connected to import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans). The scale 
ranges from zero to 10, with lower scores for higher levels of corruption. 
Risk of expropriation  ICR's assessment of the risk of outright confiscation. The scale ranges from 
zero to 10, with lower scores for higher risks.  
Repudiation of contracts 
by government 
 ICR's assessment of the risk of a modification in a contract due to budget 
cutbacks, indigenisation pressure, a change in government, or a change 
in government economic and social priorities. The scale ranges from zero 
to 10, with lower scores for countries with higher risks.  
Accounting standards  An index created by La Porta, the index examines the annual reports of at least 
three firms in each country, and rate the firms' depending on their 
inclusion or exclusion of 90 items. The examined items fall into seven 
categories: (i) general information; (ii) income statements; (iii) balance 
sheets; (iv) funds flow statement; (v) accounting standards; (vi) stock 
data; and (vii) special items.  
 
 
4.7     Descriptive Statistics 
This section is about the descriptive statistics for firms, industries and countries comprising 
the sample. The variables were exposed to a cleaning procedure to ensure reasonable values 
for each observation. In addition, the smallest 1% and highest 1% of the distribution within 
each country were eliminated.
 
Summary statistics for the entire sample are displayed in 
Appendix A. The tables in Appendix A report the statistics for firm-specific variables, 
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country-specific variables and leverage ratios, including the number of observations, mean, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviation. General and brief analyses for all countries 
are presented. Table A-1 illustrates several measures for leverage, highlighting the 
descriptive statistics for Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
 
Australia has a low level of leverage when compared with the other countries. Table A-1 
indicates that the average leverage ratio in Australia is 0.28 (using LEVB1), which means 
that firms in the Australian sample have an average of 28% liabilities to the book value of 
total assets. Furthermore, Table A-1 shows that the average leverage ratios are 11.5% and 
15.7%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 19.8% and 31.0% (using LEVB2 and 
LEVB3). Using market measures, the average leverage ratios are 20.9%, 8.7% and 11.2% 
with standard deviations of 21.6%, 14.5% and 18.5%, respectively. These multiple 
measures provide a good basis for the investigation that follows. Overall, when compared 
with other countries, Australia has the lowest level of leverage when using both the book 
and market values. Figure 4.5 illustrates the mean of leverage ratios employed in Australian 
firms during the sample period. 
 
In the United States, the level of leverage ratios was quite high when compared with the 
leverage ratios in other countries. Certain companies in the United States are known for 
their aggressive debt financing. For instance, Apple Inc. had 143.36% liabilities to total 
assets in 2015. Overall, firms in the United States had an average of 108% liabilities to 
book value of total assets (LEVB1) and a lower proportion of 61% debt to book value of 
total assets (LEVB2). Additionally, the average leverage ratio is 22.7, 33.4, 14.3 and 20.9%, 
respectively, for LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3. Figure 4.6 illustrates the mean of 
leverage ratios employed in U.S. firms during the sample period. 
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Figure 4.5: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Australian Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in U.S. Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3. 
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The average level of leverage for firms in the United Kingdom has a proportion of 48% 
liabilities to total assets (LEVB1). The leverage ratios (LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 
and LEVM3) in U.K. firms are relevant to ratios employed in Australian firms, and firms in 
the United Kingdom had an average leverage ratios of 16.3%, 25.6%, 34.3%, 11.9% and 
17.5%, respectively, for LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3. Figures 4.7 
displays the average leverage ratios employed in the U.K.  
 
Figure 4.7: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in U.K. Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
 
Descriptive statistics for the remaining countries under investigation are shown in Table A-
2 to Table A-6. In all examined countries, the average level of leverage has the highest 
value when using LEVB1, which is a proxy for liabilities to total assets. When examining 
the remaining measures of leverage in all countries (LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, 
LEVM2 and LEVM3), leverage has a proportion of 60% or less.  
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For LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3, in Turkey, leverage in firms 
has an average proportion of 46.6%, 20.4%, 29.2%, 40.2%, 18.8% and 25.6%, respectively. 
In Austria, the average level of leverage is 53.7%, 24.4%, 36.8%, 47.7%, 22.6% and 
32.5%, respectively. In Hong Kong, the average level proportion is 47.9%, 20.3%, 25.9%, 
36.3%, 16.9% and 23.3%, respectively. In France, leverage in firms had an average 
proportion of 59%, 20.6%, 33.3%, 47.5%, 17.5% and 27%, respectively. Figures 4.8 to 
4.11 display the average leverage ratios employed in firms operating in Turkey, Austria, 
Hong Kong and France. 
 
Figure 4.8: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Turkish Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
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Figure 4.9: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Austrian Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Hong Kong Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
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Figure 4.11: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in French Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
 
 
In Germany, the average level of leverage is 54.1%, 19.2%, 30%, 44.2%, 16.5% and 
25.2%, respectively, for LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3. In 
Singapore, the average level of leverage is 45.1%, 19.4%, 28.1%, 43.8%, 19.9% and 28%, 
respectively. In China, leverage ratio in firms has an average proportion of 46.4%, 24.6%, 
23.6%, 29.5%, 16.4% and 20.6%, respectively. In Japan, the average level of leverage is 
49.5%, 20.2%, 29.5%, 50.3%, 20.1% and 30.4%, respectively. In Malaysia, the average 
proportion of leverage is 38.2%, 19%, 24.6%, 41.4%, 21.8% and 29.2%, respectively. 
Figures 4.12 to 4.15 display the average leverage ratios employed in firms operating in 
Germany, Singapore, China, Japan and Malaysia, respectively. 
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Figure 4.12: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in German Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Singaporean Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
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Figure 4.14: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Chinese Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Japanese Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
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Figure 4.16: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Malaysian Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
 
In India, the level of leverage in firms has an average proportion of 57.9%, 30.7%, 42.4%, 
52.3%, 28.6% and 40%, respectively, for LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and 
LEVM3. In Indonesia, the leverage average is 54.2%, 28.5%, 38.4%, 46.3%, 25.6% and 
34%, respectively. Brazil has high leverage, especially in LEVB1. The proportion of 
liabilities to total book assets is 73.8%, similar to the ratio for LEVM1 at around 60.2%. 
The proportion of debt to total assets is 26.8% and 26%, respectively for LEVB2 and 
LEVM2. Finally, the average leverage ratios for LEVB3 and LEVM3 are 34% and 45.4%, 
respectively. In South Africa, the average level of leverage is 50.5%, 18.3%, 28.3%, 39.1%, 
14.5% and 20.7%, respectively, for LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3. 
Finally, in Chile, the average level of proportion is 43.8%, 22.1%, 29.6%, 36.8%, 19% and 
25%, respectively. Figures 4.17 to 4.21 display the average leverage ratios employed in 
firms operating in India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and Chile, respectively. 
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Figure 4.17: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Indian Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Indonesian Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
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Figure 4.19: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Brazilian Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in South African Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
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Figure 4.21: Annual Mean of Leverage Ratio in Chilean Firms, 2003-2013 
This figure illustrates the means of the following leverage ratios: LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, 
LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
 
 
4.8     Concluding Remarks 
To understand the determinants of capital structure, a huge and comprehensive dataset has 
been collected. The empirical analysis is based on a large and diverse sample covering 
firms operating in different parts around the world. The set of financial and economic data 
serve to generate precisely six measures of leverage and 28 explanatory variables. Many of 
the variables used in previous empirical studies of capital structure are included in this 
study. The explanatory variables are divided into two groups: (i) firm-specific variables and 
(ii) country-specific variables; that is, a total of 28 potential explanatory variables, of which 
21 are firm-specific determinants and seven are country-specific determinants. Overall, the 
dataset provides a solid foundation for a thorough investigation of the determinants of 
leverage. In general, this project attempts to study the determinants of capital structure 
within an international framework to determine if cross-country differences affect capital 
structure.  
102 
 
CHAPTER 5 
OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY 
5.1     Introduction 
Theories in general, and particularly those of capital structure, do not provide a clear path 
with reference to the selection of variables to be included in economic models. Various 
methods have been proposed to address this problem, including extreme bounds analysis 
(EBA). Other methods proposed include (i) Bayesian model averaging (BMA), developed 
and revised by Clyde and George (1994); (i) Bayesian averaging of classical estimates 
(BACE), employed by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004); and (ii) random forests by Breiman 
(2001).  
 
This chapter explains how EBA is used to reveal the robustness, fragility or insignificance 
of various determinants of capital structure. EBA can guide researchers in selecting 
variables and addressing model uncertainty. EBA is a sensitivity test that determines how 
robust a variable is by examining the association between a dependent variable and a large 
set of explanatory variables. This technique involves examining a large number of model 
specifications in order to reveal the robustness or fragility of a particular variable. 
Moreover, this method is useful when testing the influence of changes in the list of 
explanatory variables, which can fundamentally change the results of empirical studies. 
EBA can be used to confirm, or otherwise, the soundness of reported results in quantitative 
studies and to check if a particular variable should be included or excluded from a 
regression model. Fragile inference is not worth reporting.  
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Finally, this chapter discusses EBA proposed by Leamer (1983, 1985) and the extensions 
suggested by Granger and Uhlig (1990) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). Concerns about 
multicollinearity are addressed later in the chapter.  
 
5.2     Motivating Extreme Bounds Analysis 
Studies investigating the determinants of capital structure typically use cross-sectional 
regression, and the equation takes the following form: 
       ∑       
 
                                                      (5.1) 
where     
is a measure of leverage,    denotes the set of explanatory variables,    represents 
the coefficients on the explanatory variables,   represents individual firms,    is a constant 
and    is the error term. Studies usually employ Equation (5.1) to report a sample of 
regression results that include several combinations of the explanatory variables.  
 
Moosa et al. (2011) argue that in existing cross-sectional studies, the reported regression 
results are chosen because they confirm pre-conceived beliefs. According to Sturm and 
Haan (2005), several models appear reasonable if they fit a given set of data but lead to 
different conclusions about the parameters of interest (model uncertainty). For example,    
may be shown to be statistically significant if the estimated model includes explanatory 
variables    and    but not when    is included. Moosa (2012) demonstrates the possibility 
of changing the sign and significance of a coefficient by manipulating the set of 
explanatory variables. He shows that adding explanatory variables to the model or taking 
them out can change the sign and significance from significantly positive to significantly 
negative and vice versa. In the absence of a theoretical model, and since the ‘true model’ is 
unknown, it is common between economists to report favourable results. Leamer (1983) 
criticizes the practice of estimating various regressions and reporting only one or a few.  
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5.3     Extreme Bounds Analysis Modelling Approach 
EBA is a procedure developed by Leamer (1983, 1985) and applied by, among others, 
Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). In short, EBA is a sensitivity analysis 
applied to a set of explanatory variables in a linear regression, which helps with the 
problem of selecting variables for empirical models. For example, let us say that a large 
number of N variables have been identified to be related to capital structure, and none of 
the N variables have been acknowledged as being robust or fragile.
12
 Thus, in order to 
prove whether or not a variable is robust, this study uses the EBA proposed by Leamer. The 
estimated regressions take the following form: 
       ∑   
 
     
      
  ∑   
 
                                          (5.2) 
where       the dependent variable (a measure of leverage),    is a constant and  
 represents 
individual firms.   
  represents the free variable included in every regression (a vector of 
fixed variables that appear in all regressions), whereas   is the variable of interest whose 
robustness is to be tested.    
  represents potentially important variables (usually three 
variables taken from the pool of N variables).  
 
EBA is designed to determine the broadest range of coefficients for the variable of 
interest, , by running a series of regressions while changing the set of conditioning 
variables (pool of N variables),  , to find out if the variables of interest   remain 
statistically significant. EBA is used to test the robustness of explanatory variables by 
finding upper and lower bounds for the parameter of interest from all possible combinations 
of potential explanatory variables.
13
  
                                                          
12
 Note that N is a number of predetermined variables. In this study, 28 potentially important variables are 
examined. Naturally, the total number of regressions increases with the number of variables.  
13
 For each model, one finds an estimate,    , and a corresponding standard deviation  . 
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A relationship between the dependent variable and a particular explanatory variable is 
robust if the estimated coefficient remains statistically significant without any change in 
sign, even if the set of explanatory variables changes. This method is helpful in reporting 
the sensitivity of estimated coefficients when changes occur in model specification. Temple 
(2000) argues that there is no certainty that any model dominates all the possibilities in all 
dimensions in empirical research. EBA provides evidence for the sensitivity of the findings 
to alternative modelling choices and implements these suggestions by providing a means of 
assessing the degree of support for various relationships.  
 
Leamer’s Extreme Bounds Analysis 
According to Leamer’s EBA, robustness requires that the estimated   remain statistically 
significant without any change in sign among all sets of possible regression models. 
Therefore, if the lower extreme bound of   minus two standard deviations (lowest value 
of  ) is negative, and the upper extreme bound of   plus two standard deviations (highest 
value of  ) is positive (change signs), then one can say that the variable of interest, , is 
fragile.
14
 The upper and lower extreme bounds can be determined as follows: 
                                                                                            
                                                                                            
On the other hand, if both upper and lower extreme bounds are either negative or positive 
(stays with the same sign) and remain significant among all regression models, then it can 
be inferred that the variable of interest, , is robust. In short, Leamer’s EBA scans all 
possible specifications and checks the lowest and highest values of    at a particular 
confidence level. Leamer identifies the robustness or fragility of variables, depending on 
whether or not the extreme bounds of    stay with the same sign, in addition to statistical 
                                                          
14
 Note that among all regression models (in at least one regression), if either the sign of   changes or happens 
to be insignificant, then one can say that the variable of interest is fragile. 
106 
 
significance. For a variable to be robust, Levine and Renelt (1992) assume that each   
among all sets of possible regressions should not be rejected at the 0.05 significance level, 
which follows the conventions of hypothesis testing. 
 
Granger and Uhlig’s Extreme Bounds Analysis 
Granger and Uhlig (1990) develop a restricted reasonable EBA. Reasonable EBA estimates 
the upper and lower extreme bounds of the coefficient of interest   and eliminates models 
with poor goodness of fit (measured by   ). The    decision rule specifies that the extreme 
bounds of   should be selected from a distinct set of models that meets a level of goodness 
of fit imposed by Granger and Uhlig, in which all models with low    are deemed 
irrelevant for the calculation of EBA. This criterion is represented by the following 
equation: 
   
  [         
       
 ]                                                (5.5) 
where             Further,     
  is the highest    value and     
  is the lowest    
among all regression models. Thus, if   = 1, it means that all models are relevant for the 
EBA. On the other hand, if   = 0, then it means that all models are inappropriate, and only 
the model with the uppermost    is applicable to EBA. Any other value of   means that the 
upper and lower extreme bounds are determined by models with an    that is in the top   
percent of the    range.15 The extreme boundaries of these models are expected to be 
narrower in relation to unrestricted EBA, and therefore they increase the probability of 
fragile results.  
 
                                                          
15
 Note that the range for R2 is R2max – R
2
min. 
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Sala-i-Martin’s Extreme Bounds Analysis 
Both EBA and restricted EBA overlook the distribution of the coefficient of interest. Sala-i-
Martin (1997) argues that Leamer’s EBA is too strong for any variable to pass. If the 
distribution of the parameters of interest has positive and negative values and an adequate 
number of regressions are run, then at least one regression will be found in which the 
estimated coefficients become insignificant or change signs.  
 
Sala-i-Martin suggested an extension to Leamer’s EBA to test the robustness of variables 
using the same methodology and regressions, but he changed the way of calculating the 
extreme bounds of the variable of interest. He suggested analysing the entire distribution of 
regression coefficient estimates of  , particularly the fraction of the variable’s cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) lying on each side of zero and assigning a level of confidence 
to each variable of interest while reporting the weighted and unweighted parameter 
estimates of the coefficient, standard deviation and outcome of the CDF test.
16
  
 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggests a new robustness criterion, claiming that if at least 90% of 
the CDF of the estimates of   lies on either side of zero (the fraction of CDF lying to either 
side of zero), then the variable is considered robust. For example, if 95% of the density 
function for the estimates of    lies to the right of zero and only 52% of the density 
function for    lies to the right of zero, then variable 1 is robust while variable 2 is fragile. 
In short, Sala-i-Martin's EBA criterion for robustness holds if greater proportion of a 
specific variable coefficient estimate lies on the same side of zero. Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
operates under two different assumptions. The first assumption is that the distribution of the 
estimated    across models is normal. Sala-i-Martin suggests calculating the CDF for each 
                                                          
16
 Sala-i-Martin (1997) divides the area under the density function into two using zero, where the larger side is 
named ‘CDF(0)’ and the smaller side is called ‘1-CDF(0)’. Thus .5   CDF(0)    1 (CDF(0) will always be a 
number between 0.50 and 1, regardless of whether the area is above or below zero. 
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variable of interest. When the density function is normal, Sala-i-Martin points out the need 
to compute the weighted mean of the regression coefficients,    and the standard deviation 
of this distribution. For each regression model, one must compute the integrated likelihood, 
L, estimated coefficient,  , and the standard deviation  . With these values, Sala-i-Martin 
constructs the mean estimate  ̂ as the weighted average of each estimate  .  
 ̂      ∑  
 
   
                                                                                 
where the weights   are proportional to the integrated likelihoods, and   refers to the 
number of carried out regressions. 
       ∑  
 
   
⁄                                                                                
Sala-i-Martin (1997) uses the weighting scheme to give more weight to the regression 
models that are more likely to be the true model. Likewise, he calculates the mean 
variance  ̂  as the weighted average of all estimated variances    . Thus, 
  ̂      ∑  
 
   
                                                                                
 
After estimating the mean and variance of the distribution, the CDF(0) is computed using 
the normal tables. The second assumption is that the distribution of the estimated    across 
models is not normal. When the density function is not normal (  is not normally 
distributed across all models for any variable of interest), Sala-i-Martin (1997) computes 
the aggregate non- normal CDF, denoted CDF(0). For each regression model, Sala-i-Martin 
computes the area under the density function to the right of zero denoted as      ̂  ̂   . 
The individual CDFs for each regression model are used to calculate the aggregate CDF(0) 
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of    as the weighted average of all individual CDFs. The weights follow equation (5.7), the 
integrated likelihood. Thus, 
      ∑  
 
   
      ̂  ̂                                                                      
The variable of interest   is considered robust when both the weighted normal and non-
normal cumulative distribution functions are greater than or equal to 0.95. 
 
5.4     Application of Extreme Bounds Analysis 
In order to assess the factors that might influence the capital structure of firms, a large and 
diverse dataset have been assembled.
17
 To apply the EBA, the Stata 13 statistical software 
is utilised. The application of EBA involves running around 2 million regressions to 
produce the results reported in Chapter 6. To employ EBA, each regression must have at 
least one free variable, X (which is included in every regression), one variable of interest, 
Q, and three (or more) potentially important variables, Z (the set of Z changes in every 
regression until we go through the whole list of N variables).
18
 For example, if the variable 
of interest is PROF, then 
                                      , 
                                       , 
                                         ,                     (5.10) 
                                                                                                                        
                                                                      
                                                          
17
 Definitions of variables included in this study and information on the dataset can be found in Chapter 4. 
18
 This research uses the variable firm size as the free variable, X, because its importance has been established 
in previous studies. 
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A total of 28 explanatory variables (N), 21 firm-specific and seven country-specific 
determinants are examined. Assuming that all models are of the same factor size, the total 
possible number of regressions for each variable of interest is calculated as follows: 
   
  
          
                                                                              
where M refers to the number of all carried out regression models,   is the number of 
potentially important variables included in every regression (3) and    is calculated by 
subtracting the free variable and variable of interest (2 variables) from the list of N 
variables.  
 
Thus, in the first phase, the application of EBA involves running a total of 1,976,930 
regressions for all 17 countries (at firm level for all six measures of leverage). More 
specifically, 969 regressions are run for each variable of interest (for only one measure of 
leverage). However, in the second phase, the number of carried out regressions varies for 
each country (and for each measure), depending on how many variables pass the first round 
as robust. 
 
5.5     Multicollinearity and VIF Restriction  
EBA causes some concerns about multicollinearity. Once more, EBA is a sensitivity 
analysis applied to a set of explanatory variables in a linear regression. EBA does this by 
finding upper and lower bounds for the parameter estimates of interest from all possible 
combinations of potential explanatory variables, and certain combinations are likely to be 
more problematic than others. For example, consider a model with                    , 
where all five explanatory variables are positively correlated. Leamer (1985) argues that 
criticism of the EBA for not dealing with multicollinearity is irrelevant. To address 
concerns about multicollinearity, an improvement of the EBA model is implemented. This 
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modification restricts the analysis and excludes regression models that exhibit a variance 
inflation factor (VIF) within a given limit. The objective of VIF is to isolate instances in 
which multicollinearity occurs, rather than disqualify a robust variable that happens to 
correlate with another variable.  
       
 
    
.                                                                   
The VIF restriction specifies that only estimates with VIF below five are reported, and it 
isolates estimates for any model specification with a VIF greater than five. 
 
5.6     Conclusion  
This chapter explains how EBA is used to reveal the robustness and fragility of various 
determinants of capital structure. EBA can guide researchers in selecting variables and 
addressing model uncertainty. EBA is designed to determine the broadest range of 
coefficients for a particular variable, Q, by running a series of regressions while changing 
the set of explanatory variables: a set of Z variables. A particular explanatory variable, Q,  
is considered robust if the estimated coefficients for the variable, Q, remains statistically 
significant without any change in sign, even if the set of explanatory variables (the set of Z) 
changes. This chapter discusses EBA proposed by Leamer (1983, 1985) and the extensions 
suggested by Granger and Uhlig (1990) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). This work extends the 
existing literature on firms’ capital structure choices. Considered here are six measures of 
leverage and 28 variables during 2003 to 2013. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to report the results of the extreme bounds analysis (EBA). 
Throughout the first phase, the application of EBA involves running a total of 1,976,760 
regressions for all countries, comprising 116,290 regressions for each country for the 20 
variables under examination. For each variable, exactly 98,838 regressions in total are run. 
The second phase involves running a total of 12,439 regressions.  
 
All the way through the investigation, it is found that for each measure of leverage, there is 
a specific set of robust variables, which confirms the belief that determinants of leverage 
vary depending on which component of debt is analysed. Some variables may be robust for 
a particular measure of leverage but fragile for another measure. In general, the results for 
the determinants of capital structure across countries are inconsistent, but there are 
similarities with regard to robust and fragile variables. The consistency of results 
(specifically the robustness of variables), within and across countries, is more likely to 
occur when using either book value measures or market value measures of leverage. 
 
The results show that some variables support Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) trade-off 
theory, while others are more supportive of Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order 
theory. Moreover, particular variables support the predictions of both theories, and the 
results indicate that certain variables (robust variables), for example, X1, may support a 
particular theory when the robustness of X1 is tested using a particular measure of leverage; 
however, when a different leverage measure is used, the coefficient of X1 changes sign and 
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appears to be more supportive of another theory (such as in the case of the variable GOP in 
the United States). The results confirm the importance of several explanatory variables 
across all countries such as liquidity, profitability and growth opportunity. These variables 
are robust in all countries. The findings also confirm the fragility of other variables within 
and across countries, such as the variables of change in sales and change in assets. 
Concerning country-specific variables, it is concluded that country-specific determinants do 
not have a substantial effect on leverage choice. 
 
In this chapter, results are reported for 17 countries, including Australia, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Turkey, China, Austria, France, Germany, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, India, Brazil, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore and Hong Kong. The 
empirical results are presented in four subsections. In section 6.2, results of the EBA 
applied to firm-specific determinants of capital structure are generally discussed. Then, in 
section 6.3, results in the first phase are compared and validity of the predictions of 
conventional capital structure theories’ are discussed, together with the effects of firm-
specific determinants on the leverage choice of firms. Likewise, in section 6.4, results of 
the EBA applied to firm-specific and country-specific variables are generally presented and 
discussed. Countries’ results in the second phase are compared, and the validity of the 
predictions of conventional capital structure theories’ are discussed as well. Whether 
country characteristics have an effect on the leverage choice of firms is also considered. 
 
6.2      Results of Phase One: EBA of Firm-Specific Determinants 
Appendix B shows the results of the traditional EBA applied to firm-specific variables. The 
discussion of the results begins by outlining distinctive robust and fragile determinants of 
capital structure in each country, then comparing the results across countries using a 
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variable-by-variable analysis. The relationship between the dependent variable and a 
particular explanatory variable is robust if the estimated coefficient remains statistically 
significant without any change in sign, even if the set of explanatory variables changes. 
Tables in Appendix B report      and       of the variables of interest, together with their 
t-statistics, p-values and number and percentage of regressions producing significant βs at 
the 5% significance for variables at the firm level. In the first phase, the application of EBA 
involves running a total of 5,814 regressions for each variable for all six measures of 
leverage. Specifically, this involves 969 regressions for each variable of interest and a total 
of 116,290 regressions for each country, which gives a total of 1,976,930 regressions for all 
17 countries. 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Australia 
Table B-1.1 and Table B-1.2 in Appendix B summarise the test statistics of the examined 
variables for Australia, showing that the explanatory variables of TAN, RISK, AGE, TAX, 
INV, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile 
when using all the measures of leverage (when any leverage ratio is used as the dependent 
variable). Table 6.1 summarises the results for Australia, displaying the sign of the 
coefficients, together with showing the variable’s robustness or fragility.  
 
Looking at Table 6.1 and the results for all leverage ratios, it is evident that the coefficient 
changes sign in the cases of TAN, AGE, TAX, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ROE 
and VAR, which means that these variables are considered fragile according to the 
employed robustness test (EBA). Moreover, among all tested leverage ratios, Table B-1.1 
and Table B-1.2 show that the coefficients do not change signs in the cases of particular 
variables, such as RISK, INV, CAPIN and UNPR. Still, the variables are not considered 
robust because the coefficients must remain significant (did not reach the target of 100% 
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significant regressions). Consequently, one can say that there are seven robust variables in 
Australia when using all the measures of leverage, and they are PRF, LIQ, POR, NDTAX, 
ASUTI and GOP in addition to the free variable SIZ. The variables of PRF, LIQ, POR, 
NDTAX, ASUTI and GOP are robust at least for one measure of leverage. Therefore, the 
models suggested by EBA for LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 can 
be specified as 
                                                                               (6.1) 
                                                                                                          (6.2) 
                                                                                                          (6.3) 
                                                                                 (6.4)    
                                                                                                         (6.5) 
                                                                                                         (6.6) 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors for Australia 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. 
(R) the variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all 
coefficients are with a positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. 
* 
Denotes that 
the coefficients are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Australia 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R -  F -  F -  F 
TAN -  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
RISK +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR ±  F ±  F -  F - *R -  F -  F 
AGE ±  F ±  F +  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
TAX +  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
NDTAX + *R +  F +  F +  F +  F ±  F 
DIO +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
G(SA) ±  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F +  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
INTAN ±  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
SHPP ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI + *R -  F +  F + *R -  F -  F 
ROE -  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
GOP +  F +  F +  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
UNPR  +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
VAR ±  F +  F +  F -  F -  F -  F 
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Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis on the United States 
Table B-2.1 and Table B-2.2 in Appendix B show the test statistics of examined variables, 
and it is evident that the variables POR, TAX, INV, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, ROE, 
CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile among all measures of leverage. The results shows that 
the coefficients change signs in the cases of several variables such as POR, TAX, INV, 
G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR. On the same theme, although coefficients 
of the variables G(SA) and ROE retain the same signs, the variables are not considered 
robust. This is because the sufficient condition is that each coefficient must remain 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 6.2: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in the United States 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. 
(R) the variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all 
coefficients are with a positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. 
* 
Denotes that 
the coefficients are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
United States 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R +*R -  F -  F -  F 
TAN ±  F ±  F +*R +*R + *R +*R 
RISK +*R +*R -  F +  F ±  F +  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR +  F ±  F -  F - *R -  F - *R 
AGE +  F ±  F - *R -  F - *R - *R 
TAX +  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
NDTAX + *R + *R ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
DIO ±  F ±  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
G(SA) -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
G(AS) -  F -  F ±  F -  F ±  F -  F 
CAPEX ±  F -  F ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
INTAN ±  F ±  F +  F ±  F +  F ±  F 
SHPP -  F -  F -  F - *R - *R - *R 
ASUTI + *R + *R - *R +  F ±  F ±  F 
ROE +  F +  F -  F +  F +  F +  F 
GOP + *R + *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN -  F -  F +  F ±  F +  F ±  F 
UNPR  ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F 
VAR +  F +  F ±  F ±  F +  F +  F 
 
Thus, one can infer that, among all the measures of leverage, there are 10 robust 
determinants of capital structure. The robust variables include PRF, TAN, RISK, LIQ, POR, 
AGE, NDTAX, SHPP, ASUTI and GOP in addition to the free variable SIZ. 
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Therefore, the models suggested by the EBA for all six leverage ratios (LEVB1, LEVB2, 
LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3) can be specified as 
                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                             (6.7) 
                                                   
                                                                                                                                    (6.8)  
                                                                     
                                                                               
                                                                                               
                                                           6.12)  
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for the United Kingdom  
Results for the United Kingdom show that the variables RISK, POR, AGE, TAX, INV, 
G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile. 
Accordingly, there are seven robust determinants of capital structure; the robust variables 
include PRF, TAN, LIQ, NDTAX, ASUTI and GOP in addition to the free variable SIZ. The 
coefficients of all robust variables do not change signs, and test statistics reveal that each 
coefficient is statistically significant in all 969 regressions. Therefore, the models suggested 
by EBA can be written as  
                                                                             (6.13) 
                                                                                             (6.14) 
                                                                                             (6.15) 
                                                                                           (6.16) 
                                                                                             (6.17) 
                                                                                   (6.18) 
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Table 6.3: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in the United Kingdom 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. 
(R) the variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all 
coefficients are with a positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. 
* 
Denotes that 
the coefficients are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
United Kingdom 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R -  F -  F - *R 
TAN ±  F + *R + *R ±  F + *R + *R 
RISK +  F +  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE ±  F -  F -  F +  F -  F -  F 
TAX -  F -  F ±  F +  F ±  F ±  F 
NDTAX + *R +  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
DIO -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F +  F +  F 
G(SA) -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F 
INTAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
SHPP -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI + *R ±  F +  F + *R -  F ±  F 
ROE ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
GOP +  F +  F ±  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
UNPR  ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F +  F 
VAR ±  F +  F ±  F -  F -  F -   F 
 
 
 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Turkey  
It is evident that TAN, RISK, POR, AGE, TAX, NDTAX, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, 
SHPP, ASUTI, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile among all measures of leverage. 
On the other hand, five variables turn out to be robust. The robust variables include PRF, 
LIQ, DIO and GOP in addition to the free variable SIZ. Coefficients of the variables PRF, 
LIQ, DIO and GOP never change signs, and test statistics confirm that the coefficients are 
consistently significant in all 969 regressions. Thus, the models suggested by EBA are  
                                                                                             (6.19) 
                                                                                                        (6.20)  
                                                                                                        (6.21) 
                                                                                  (6.22) 
                                                                                            (6.23) 
                                                                                  (6.24) 
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Table 6.4: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Variables in Turkey 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. 
(R) the variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all 
coefficients are with a positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. 
* 
Denotes that 
the coefficients are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Turkey 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN ±  F +  F ±  F ±  F +  F +  F 
RISK +  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
TAX -  F -  F -  F +  F -  F -  F 
NDTAX -  F ±  F +  F -  F ±  F -  F 
DIO +  F +  F +  F + *R +  F + *R 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F +  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
INTAN +  F +  F +  F -  F +  F +  F 
SHPP ±  F -  F ±  F -  F +  F +  F 
ASUTI +  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
ROE -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
GOP - *R +  F +  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN +  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
UNPR  +  F ±  F +  F +  F ±  F ±  F 
VAR ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F ±  F 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Austria  
Table B-5.1 and Table B-5.2 in Appendix B show test statistics of the examined variables 
in Austria, and one can infer that the variables TAN, RISK, POR, AGE, TAX, NDTAX, INV, 
G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ASUTI, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile when 
using all measures of leverage without exception. The coefficients of the fragile variables 
change signs at times, and at other times, the coefficients are not significant in all 
regression models (100% significance).  
 
Therefore, it is evident that there are five robust determinants of capital structure in Austria. 
The robust variables include PRF, LIQ, ROE and GOP in addition to the free variable SIZ. 
The coefficients of the variables PRF, LIQ, ROE and GOP never change signs, and test 
statistics confirm that the coefficients are statistically significant in all 969 regressions 
carried out (at least for one measure of leverage). Therefore, the models suggested by EBA 
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for the leverage measures LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 can be 
shown below as follows: 
                                                                                             (6.25) 
                                                                                                       (6.26) 
                                                                                             (6.27) 
                                                                                            (6.28) 
                                                                                                       (6.29) 
                                                                                  (6.30) 
 
 
Table 6.5: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Austria 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Austria 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R -  F - *R 
TAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
RISK ±  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE -  F -  F ±  F +  F -  F +  F 
TAX +  F +  F ±  F +  F ±  F ±  F 
NDTAX -  F ±  F +  F ±  F ±  F +  F 
DIO ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -   F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
INTAN +  F +  F +  F -  F +  F ±  F 
SHPP ±  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI +  F -  F -  F +  F -  F ±  F 
ROE - *R -  F - *R -  F -  F - *R 
GOP ±  F -  F ±  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN -  F ±  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F 
UNPR  ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
VAR -  F +  F ±  F ±  F +  F +  F 
 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Hong Kong  
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 in Appendix B report the test statistics in Hong Kong, and it is 
clear that the variables of RISK, TAX, NDTAX, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ROE 
and UNPR are fragile when using any of the six leverage ratios as dependent variables. 
Table B-6.1 summarises the results of EBA, and it is evident that there are 10 robust 
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determinants of capital structure in Hong Kong, including PRF, TAN, LIQ, POR, INV, 
ASUTI, GOP, CAPIN and VAR in addition to the free variable SIZ. The coefficients of the 
robust variables never change signs, and test statistics confirm that all coefficients are 
statistically significant (each variable turns to be robust at least once). Therefore, the 
models suggested by the EBA for the leverage ratios LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, 
LEVM2 and LEVM3 are specified as follows: 
                                                                                (6.31)    
                                                                                             (6.32)    
                                                                                  (6.33)    
                                                            (6.34) 
                                                         (6.35) 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                         (6.36)      
 
Table 6.6: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Hong Kong 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Hong Kong 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN ±  F + *R + *R +  F + *R + *R 
RISK +  F +  F +  F ±  F -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F - *R - *R - *R - *R 
AGE -  F -  F -  F + *R +  F + *R 
TAX ±  F +  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
NDTAX +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F 
DIO ±  F +  F +  F +  F +  F + *R 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F +  F +  F +  F 
CAPEX ±  F +  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
INTAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
SHPP ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI + *R ±  F -  F +  F -  F -  F 
ROE +  F +  F +  F -  F -  F -  F 
GOP + *R +  F -  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN -  F +  F +  F +  F + *R + *R 
UNPR  ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
VAR ±  F +  F +  F - *R -  F -  F 
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Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for France  
Table B-7.1 and Table B-7.2 in Appendix B summarise the test statistics of the examined 
variables, and the statistics show that the variables RISK, POR, AGE, TAX, NDTAX, INV, 
G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile when 
using all the measures of leverage. The coefficients of the fragile variables change signs at 
times, and at other times, the coefficients are not 100% significant.Moreover, Table 6.7 
shows that the coefficients of several variables do not change signs among several leverage 
ratios, such as the variables PRF, TAN, LIQ and GOP. Moreover, test statistics reveal that 
the coefficients of the variables PRF, TAN, LIQ and GOP are statistically significant in all 
969 regressions.  
 
Table 6.7: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in France 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
France 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R -  F - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN ±  F + *R +  F ±  F + *R + *R 
RISK +  F +  F +  F ±  F -  F ±  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F 
AGE -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
TAX -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
NDTAX +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
DIO +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F -  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
INTAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
SHPP ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI + *R -  F -  F +  F -  F -  F 
ROE ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F 
GOP -  F - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
UNPR  ±  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
VAR ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
 
 
Consequently, according to the traditional EBA, five robust determinants of capital 
structure exist, including PRF, LIQ, ASUTI and GOP in addition to the free variable SIZ 
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(each variable turns to be robust at least once). Therefore, the models suggested by the EBA 
for the leverage ratios LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 are specified 
as follows: 
                                                                                           (6.37)      
                                                                                             (6.38)      
                                                                                             (6.39)      
                                                                                            (6.40)      
                                                                                 (6.41)      
                                                                                 (6.42)     
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Germany  
Table B-8.1 and Table B-8.2 in Appendix B show test statistics of the examined variables. 
It is shown that in Germany, the variables RISK, POR, TAX, INV, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, 
INTAN, SHPP, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile when using all measures of 
leverage. Table 6.8 displays the coefficient signs of the examined variables, and it is 
evident that for each measure of leverage, there is a particular set of robust variables. 
Subsequently, it is concluded that there are nine robust determinants for all measures of 
leverage in Germany, including PRF, TAN, LIQ, AGE, NDTAX, INV, ASUTI and GOP in 
addition to the free variable SIZ. Therefore, the models suggested by EBA for the leverage 
ratios LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 can be presented as follows: 
                                                                  (6.44)      
                                                                        (6.45)      
                                                                        (6.46)      
                                                            (6.47)      
                                                                       (6.48)      
                                                                       (6.50)      
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Table 6.8: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Germany 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Germany 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN + *R + *R + *R + *R + *R + *R 
RISK +  F -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE +  F -  F -  F + *R -  F ±  F 
TAX ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
NDTAX + *R +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
DIO +  F + *R + *R + *R + *R + *R 
G(SA) -  F -  F ±  F -  F ±  F -  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
INTAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F ±  F 
SHPP -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI + *R -  F ±  F +  F -  F -  F 
ROE -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
GOP +  F - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN -  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
UNPR  -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
VAR ±  F -  F -  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Singapore  
Table 9.1 and Table 6.2 in Appendix B provide summary statistics for Singapore. One can 
infer that, in Singapore, it is evident that the explanatory variables RISK, POR, TAX, 
NDTAX, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile 
among all measures of leverage. As shown in Table 6.9, when using certain measures of 
leverage as dependent variables, the coefficients of the explanatory variables PRF, TAN, 
LIQ, AGE, INV, ASUTI and GOP do not change signs, and test statistics confirm that all 
coefficients are statistically significant in all 969 regression models. 
 
Thus, one can say that, in Singapore, there are eight robust determinants of capital structure 
among all measures of leverage, including PRF, TAN, LIQ, AGE, INV, ASUTI and GOP in 
addition to the free variable SIZ. Therefore, the models suggested by the EBA for the 
leverage ratios LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 can be presented as 
follows:  
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                                                                                (6.51)      
                                         ,                                        (6.52)      
                                                                                  (6.53)      
                                                                       (6.54)      
                                                            (6.55)      
                                                                       (6.56)      
 
Table 6.9: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Singapore 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Singapore 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN ±  F + *R +  F ±  F + *R +  F 
RISK +  F -  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE -  F -  F -  F - *R - *R - *R 
TAX ±  F +  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
NDTAX ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
DIO +  F + *R + *R + *R + *R + *R 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F -  F 
INTAN -  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
SHPP ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI + *R -  F ±  F +  F -  F -  F 
ROE ±  F -  F ±  F -  F ±  F -  F 
GOP + *R ±  F +  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F +  F ±  F ±  F +  F +  F 
UNPR  -  F -  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
VAR ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for China  
Table B-10.1 and Table B-10.2 in Appendix B show test statistics of the examined 
variables. The results for China show that the variables NDTAX, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, 
INTAN, SHPP, UNPR and VAR are fragile for all measures of leverage. Throughout the 
results on China, the coefficients of the variables PRF, TAN, RISK, LIQ, POR, AGE, TAX, 
INV, ASUTI, ROE, GOP and CAPIN do not change signs, and test statistics show that all 
the coefficients are statistically significant in all 969 regression models, over certain 
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measures. Thus, there are 13 robust variables (when using all measures of leverage), 
including PRF, TAN, RISK, LIQ, POR, AGE, TAX, INV, ASUTI, ROE, GOP and CAPIN in 
addition to the free variable SIZ. The variables are robust at least once when testing for all 
measures of leverage. Therefore, the models suggested by the EBA for the leverage ratios 
LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 are specified as follows: 
                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                     
                                                                       
                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                             
                                                                                                      (6.62)      
 
Table 6.10: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in China 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
China 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN +  F + *R + *R +  F + *R + *R 
RISK + *R ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR ±  F +  F +  F +  F + *R +  F 
AGE + *R + *R + *R + *R + *R + *R 
TAX +  F ±  F ±  F + *R +  F + *R 
NDTAX ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
DIO + *R +  F + *R + *R +  F +  F 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
G(AS) -  F -  F -  F +  F +  F +  F 
CAPEX ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
INTAN ±  F ±  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
SHPP +  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI +  F -  F ±  F ±  F - *R - *R 
ROE ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F - *R -  F 
GOP ±  F - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F + *R + *R 
UNPR  -  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
VAR ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
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Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Japan  
The results of traditional EBA in Japan shows that the explanatory variables AGE, TAX, 
NDTAX, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ROE and CAPIN are fragile among all 
measures of leverage. The coefficients of the variables deemed fragile change signs at 
times, and at other times, the coefficients are not significant in all regressions.  
       
Table 6.11: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Japan 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Japan 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN +  F + *R + *R +  F + *R + *R 
RISK ±  F ±  F ±  F - *R -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR - *R - *R - *R -  F -  F - *R 
AGE ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
TAX +  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
NDTAX ±  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
DIO ±  F + *R + *R ±  F + *R + *R 
G(SA) -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
G(AS) -  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
CAPEX ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
INTAN ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
SHPP +  F ±  F +  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI + *R ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
ROE -  F -  F -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
GOP ±  F ±  F ±  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
UNPR  -  F ±  F ±  F - *R ±  F -  F 
VAR ±  F ±  F ±  F - *R ±  F ±  F 
 
 
On the other hand, the coefficients of the explanatory variables PRF, TAN, RISK, LIQ, 
POR, INV, ASUTI, GOP, UNPR and VAR do not change signs, and it is evident that all 
coefficients are statistically significant in all 969 regression models (as shown in Table 
6.11). Therefore, the models suggested by the EBA for the leverage ratios LEVB1, LEVB2, 
LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 can be presented as follows: 
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Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Malaysia  
In Malaysia, the variables TAN, RISK, AGE, TAX, NDTAX, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, 
SHPP, ASUTI, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile when using all the measures of 
leverage. According to the test statistics in Appendix B, the coefficients of the variables 
PRF, LIQ, POR, DIO and GOP do not change signs, and test statistics indicate that all 
coefficients of each variable are statistically significant in all 969 regressions (each variable 
turns to be robust at least once). Therefore, the models suggested by the EBA for the 
leverage ratios LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 are specified as 
follows: 
                                                                                             (6.69)            
                                                                                   (6.70)            
                                                                                             (6.71)            
                                                                                 (6.72)            
                                                                       (6.73)  
                                                                       (6.74)        
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Table 6.12: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Malaysia 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Malaysia 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
RISK +  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
AGE -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F +  F 
TAX ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
NDTAX ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
DIO +  F + *R +  F +  F + *R + *R 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F -  F 
INTAN ±  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
SHPP ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI +  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
ROE -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
GOP ±  F -  F -  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
UNPR  -  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
VAR -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for India  
In India, the variables RISK, POR, AGE, TAX, NDTAX, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, 
SHPP, ASUTI, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile in all the measures of leverage. 
The coefficients of the fragile variables, changes signs at times, at other times the 
coefficients are not significant. However, the coefficients of PRF, TAN, LIQ, DIO and GOP 
remain with the same signs, and test statistics confirm that all coefficients (100%) are 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
Thus, according to the EBA, there are six robust determinants of capital structure among all 
measures of leverage, including PRF, TAN, LIQ, DIO and GOP in addition to the free 
variable SIZ. The coefficients of the robust variables never change signs, and test statistics 
confirm that all coefficients are statistically significant (each variable turns to be robust at 
least once). Therefore, the models suggested by the EBA for the leverage ratios LEVB1, 
LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 can be presented as follows: 
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                                                                                              (6.75) 
                                                                                            (6.76) 
                                                                                   (6.77) 
                                                                                  (6.78) 
                                   ,                                                      (6.79)              
                                                                                                (6.80)        
 
 
Table 6.13: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in India 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
India 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN +  F + *R + *R +  F + *R +  F 
RISK +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R -  F - *R - *R -  F ±  F 
POR -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE +  F -  F ±  F +  F -  F ±  F 
TAX +  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F -  F 
NDTAX +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
DIO + *R + *R + *R + *R +  F + *R 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F -  F -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
INTAN ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
SHPP ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
ROE ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
GOP +  F -  F ±  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
UNPR  -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
VAR -  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F -  F 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Indonesia  
The result for Indonesia displays the fragility of the variables TAN, RISK, POR, AGE, TAX, 
NDTAX, INV, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ASUTI, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and 
VAR. The coefficients of the fragile variables change signs at times, and at other times, the 
coefficients are not 100% significant.On the other hand, Table 6.14 shows that coefficients 
of the variables PRF, LIQ and GOP did not change signs, and test statistics indicate that all 
coefficients of each variable are statistically significant (for at least one leverage ratio). 
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This means that the variables PRF, LIQ and GOP are considered robust among different 
leverage ratios. Therefore, the models suggested by the EBA for the leverage ratios LEVB1, 
LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 can be presented as follows: 
                                                                                                        (6.81)  
                                                                                                        (6.82)                
                                                                                                        (6.83)                
                                                                                            (6.84)                
                                                                                            (6.85)     
                                                                                            (6.86)    
 
Table 6.14: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Indonesia 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Indonesia 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
RISK +  F -  F +  F ±  F -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE ±  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
TAX +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
NDTAX +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
DIO +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
G(SA) -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
G(AS) -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
CAPEX -  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
INTAN ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
SHPP ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI +  F -  F -  F +  F -  F -  F 
ROE ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
GOP +  F ±  F ±  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN -  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
UNPR  -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
VAR -  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Brazil  
Table B-15.1 and Table B-15.2 in Appendix B show test statistics of the examined 
variables, and it is observed that TAN, RISK, POR, TAX, NDTAX, INV, G(SA), G(AS), 
CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ASUTI, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile when any of the six 
132 
 
measures of leverage are used as the dependant variable. The coefficients of the fragile 
variables change signs at times, and at other times, the coefficients are not 100% 
significant.Thus, according to the EBA, in Brazil, there are five robust variables for all 
measures of leverage, including PRF, LIQ, AGE and GOP, in addition to the free variable 
SIZ. Subsequently, the models suggested are as follows: 
                                                                                                        (6.87)  
                                                                                                        (6.88) 
                                                                                                        (6.89) 
                                                                                 (6.90) 
                                                                                                       (6.91) 
                                                                                            (6.92) 
 
Table 6.15: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Brazil 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Brazil 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R ±  F - *R -  F - *R 
TAN +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F +  F 
RISK +  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE +  F -  F -  F + *R -  F -  F 
TAX ±  F ±  F ±  F +  F ±  F +  F 
NDTAX +  F +  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F 
DIO ±  F +  F ±  F -  F ±  F -  F 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX -  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F -  F 
INTAN -  F +  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
SHPP ±  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI +  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F 
ROE ±  F -  F - *R -  F -  F -  F 
GOP +  F +  F -  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN -  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F -  F 
UNPR  ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
VAR +  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
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Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for South Africa 
Table B-16.1 and Table B-16.2 in Appendix B show test statistics for the investigated 
variables, and it is evident that TAN, RISK, POR, AGE, TAX, NDTAX, INV, G(SA), G(AS), 
CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ASUTI, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are fragile in the cases of  
LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3. Table 6.16 shows that the 
coefficients of each variable that is considered fragile often change signs, and at other 
times, the coefficients are not statistically significant at the 5% level. In South Africa, 
produced results are consistent among different measures of leverage.  
 
 
When the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value, the coefficients of the variables 
(PRF and LIQ) did not change signs, and test statistics show that all coefficients are 
statistically significant (100% significance). When the dependent variable (leverage) is at 
market value, the coefficients of the variables PRF, LIQ and GOP do not change signs, and 
test statistics show that all coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% confidence 
level. Thus, one can infer that there are four robust variables in South Africa, including 
PRF, LIQ and GOP in addition to the free variable SIZ. Therefore, the models suggested by 
the EBA for the leverage ratios LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 can 
be shown as follows:  
                                                                                                       (6.93) 
                                                                                                       (6.94) 
                                                                                                        (6.95) 
                                                                                            (6.96) 
                                                                                            (6.97) 
                                                                                            (6.98) 
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 Table 6.16: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in South Africa 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
South Africa 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
TAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
RISK +  F -  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE ±  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
TAX +  F -  F +  F -  F -  F -  F 
NDTAX +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
DIO -  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F +  F +  F -  F ±  F ±  F 
INTAN -  F +  F -  F -  F ±  F -  F 
SHPP ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F 
ASUTI +  F -  F -  F +  F -  F -  F 
ROE ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
GOP +  F -  F +  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
UNPR  -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
VAR -  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
 
Results of Extreme Bounds Analysis for Chile 
In Chile, one can infer that the explanatory variables TAN, RISK, POR, AGE, TAX, NDTAX, 
INV, G(SA), G(AS), CAPEX, INTAN, SHPP, ASUTI, ROE, CAPIN, UNPR and VAR are 
fragile among all used measures of leverage. Looking at the results in Chile, it is evident 
that there is consistency in the obtained results (robustness of explanatory variables) among 
all measures of leverage.  
 
When the dependent variable (leverage ratio) is at book value, the coefficients of variables 
PRF and LIQ do not change signs, and test statistics show that all coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. On the other hand, when the dependent 
variable (leverage ratio) is at market value, the coefficients of variables LIQ and GOP do 
not change signs, and test statistics show that the coefficients are statistically significant in 
all 969 regression models. Thus, one can infer that there are four robust variables in Chile, 
including PRF, LIQ and GOP in addition to the free variable SIZ. Therefore, the models 
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suggested by the EBA for the leverage ratios LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and 
LEVM3 are written as follows: 
                                                                                                        (6.99) 
                                                                                                      (6.100) 
                                                                                                      (6.101) 
                                                                                                     (6.102) 
                                                                                                     (6.103) 
                                                                                                     (6.104) 
 
 
Table 6.17: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Factors in Chile 
This table reports the robustness or the fragility of all examined variables, together with the coefficients sign. (R) the 
variable is robust; (F) the variable is  fragile; (-) all coefficients are with a negative sign; (+) all coefficients are with a 
positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes sign. * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 
5% level in all 969 regression models. 
 
Chile 
 Robustness or fragility of variables over all measures 
 
LEVB1 LEVB2 LEVB3 LEVM1 LEVM2 LEVM3 
PRF - *R - *R - *R -  F -  F -  F 
TAN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F +  F +  F 
RISK +  F +  F +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
LIQ - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R - *R 
POR -  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
AGE -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
TAX ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F -  F 
NDTAX +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
DIO +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F +  F 
G(SA) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
G(AS) ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
CAPEX ±  F +  F +  F ±  F -  F -  F 
INTAN -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F -  F 
SHPP ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F ±  F -  F 
ASUTI +  F -  F ±  F +  F -  F -  F 
ROE +  F ±  F ±  F ±  F -  F -  F 
GOP +  F -  F ±  F - *R - *R - *R 
CAPIN ±  F +  F +  F ±  F ±  F +  F 
UNPR  -  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F ±  F 
VAR ±  F +  F +  F +  F ±  F ±  F 
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6.3   Results of Phase One-Factors Affecting Leverage: Cross-Country Analysis  
Table 6.18 displays the results of the EBA for all countries, all firm-specific variables and 
all measures of leverage. However, Table 6.19 highlights only the robust variables when 
using all the measures of leverage. From the results, one can infer that the determinants of 
leverage vary depending on which component of debt is being analysed; the results also 
confirm the importance of several explanatory variables (such as liquidity and profitability). 
Furthermore, EBA outcomes, especially for robust variables, within and across countries, 
are more likely to be consistent if the dependent variable (leverage) is either at book value 
or at market value. In this section, the results across countries are compared variable by 
variable, and the theoretical predictions are addressed as well.  
 
Firms’ Liquidity (LIQ)  
One most important finding concerns the variable liquidity. The results in Table 6.18 and 
Table 6.19 show that the variable liquidity is robust across countries when testing all 
measures of leverage, excepting India.
19
 Liquidity is fragile in India only when using the 
leverage ratios LEVB2, LEVM2 and LEVM3, as shown in Table 6.1. Accordingly, LIQ turns 
out to be robust (100% significance without any change in sign) 99 out of 102 times in all 
examined countries and when testing all the measures of leverage. The variable LIQ is 
fragile only three times.
20
 Test statistics for the coefficients of variable liquidity are 
significant in the majority of carried out regressions, and the variable LIQ yields a 
staggering 98,383 significant coefficients out of a total of 98,838.  
                                                          
19
 Note that when LIQ is fragile in India, test statistics show that the coefficients of LIQ are 84% significant 
and did not change signs. 
 
20
 Note that the robustness of each variable is checked 102 times across all examined countries. The 
robustness of the variable of interest is checked six times per country (six measures of leverage). 
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Table 6.18: Summary of Results, Robust and Fragile Firm-specific Variables for all Countries 
This table presents the coefficients sign and the robustness or fragility of each examined variable (for all countries among all measures of leverage). (R) the variable is robust; (F) the variable is 
fragile; (-) the coefficients of a particular variable are with a negative sign; (+) the coefficients of a particular variable are with a positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes 
sign; (M) is an indication for all  measures of leverage at market value LEVM1, LEVM2  and LEVM3 ; (B) is an indication for all measures of leverage at book value LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3; 
(B1) for LEVB1; (B2) for LEVB2;  (B3) for LEVB3;  (M1) for LEVM1;  (M2) for LEVM2; (M3) for LEVM3. 
 
 
 
-  R(B) -  F(B1) +  F(B)(M) -  R(B)(M) -  R(M1) +  F(B3) +  F(B) +  R(B1) +  F(B)(M) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B)(M) ±  F(B1,3) ±  F(B1) -   F(B2,3)(M) +  R(B1)(M1) -   F(B1)(M1) -  R(M) +  F(B)(M) +  F(B)(M) ±  F(B1)
-  F(M) + F(B2,3)(M2,3) -   F(B3)(M2,3) -  F(M1) -  F(M1) +  F(B2,3)(M1,2) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(B2) +  F(B2,3)(M) ±  F(B1) -   F(B2)(M2,3) +  F(B2,3) +  F(B) +  F(B2,3)
±  FM1) ±  F(B1,2) ±  F(B1,2)(M2,3) ±  F(M2,3) ±  F(M3) -  F(M) +  F(B3) ±  F(M2,3) -   F(M)
-  R(B1,2) +  R(B3)(M) +  R(B1,2) -  R(B)(M) -  R(M1,3) -  R(B3)(M2,3) ±  F(B)(M) +  R(B1,2) +  F(M)(B3) -  F(B)(M) -  F(B1,2)(M1,3) -  F(B2)(M1) +  F(B3)(M2) -  R(M) +  R(B1,2) +  F(B1,2)(M) -   R(B3)(M)  +  F(B3)(M2) -  F(M2,3) +  F(B1,2)(M2,3)
+  R(B3) ±  F(B1,2) -  F(B3) -  F(B3)(M2) -  F(M1) ±  F(B3)(M) ±  F(B1,2) ±  F(B3)(M2) ±  F(B1,3)(M2,3) ±  F(B1,2)(M1,3) -  F(M) -  R(B3) -  F(B3) +  R(B1,2) -   F(B1,2) ±  F(B)(M1) ±  F(B3)(M1)
-  F(M) +  F(M1,3)  ±  F(M2) +  F(B1)  ±  F(B2) +  F(B1)  ±  F(B2) +  F(M1)  ±  (M2,3) ±  F(M1,3)
-  R(B)(M3) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(B) -  R(B)(M) -  F(B2,3)(M) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B1,2) +  R(B1) -  F(B1) -  F(B)(M) ±  F(B)(M) -  F(B1)(M3) +  F(B2,3) -  F(B)(M) +  R(B1)(M1) ±  F(B1)(M3) -  R(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(M3) +  F(B2)
-   F(M1,2) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(M) ±  F(B1) +  F(M1) +  F(M1) +  F(B2,3) +  F(M2,3) ±  F(B2,3)(M1,2) ±  F(B1)(M) +  F(B3)  -  F(M2) +  F(B1,2) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B)(M1,2) -   F(M)
±  F(B1) ±  F(B3)(M2,3) ±  F(M) ±  F(B2,3)(M1) ±  F(B2)(M3) ±  F(B3) ±  F(B1,3)
-  R(B)(M) +  F(B2)(M2,3) +  F(B1) -  R(B)(M) -  F(B)(M) -  F(B)(M) -   F(B)(M2,3) -  F(B1)(M1,3) +  R(M1,3) ±  F(B)(M) ±  F(B)(M2,3) +  F(B2,3) +  F(B)(M2,3) +  F(M2,3) +  F(B1) -  F(B)(M) -  R(M)(B1) +  F(B1) +  F(B1,3)(M1) -  F(M1,2)
±  F(B1,3)(M1) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(M1) +  F(B3) +  F(B)(M2) +  F(M1) -  F(M1) -  F(M1) -  F(B2)(M1) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(B2,3) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) ±  F(B2)(M2,3) ±  F(B)(M3)
±  F(M1) ±  F(B2)(M2) ±  F(B1)(M2,3) ±  F(B1,3) ±  F(M1) ±  F(M1)
-  R(B)(M1,3) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  R(B)(M) -   F(B)(M) +  F(M1,3) +  F(B1,2)(M1) +  F(B3)(M3) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(M) ±  F(B)(M) ±  F(B1,2) +  F(B)(M2) -  F(B2)(M) +  F(B1)(M1) -  R (B1,3)(M3) -   R(M) -  F(B1,3)(M1,3) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(B2)(M2,3)
-  F(M2) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B1)(M1) -  F(B1,2)(M2) ±  F(B3)(M2,3) -  F(B1) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B) -  F(B3)(M) -  F(M1) ±  F(B1,3) -  F(B2,3)(M2) -  F(B2)(M1,2) -   F(B2) ±  F(B2)(M2) -   F(B1)
±  F(B3) ±  F(B2)(M1,2) ±  F(M3) ±  F(M3) ±  F(B1,3) ±  F(B3)(M1)
-  R(B)(M) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(B) -  R(B)(M) -  R(B3)(M) +  R(M1,3) +  F(B2,3) +  F(B1) +  R(M3) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(M) +  F(B2) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(M) +  R(B1) +  F(B) -  R(M)  +  R (M2,3) -  F(B2,3)(M) -  R (M1)
+  F(M1) -  F(M2,3) -   F(B1,2) +  F(M2) ±  F(B1)(M) -  F(M2,3) +  F(B2,3)(M1,2) ±  F(B) -  F(M) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B) -  F(B3)(M2,3) -  F(M) +  R(B1) +  F(B2,3)(M1) ±  F(B1) +  F(B2,3)
±  F(B1) ±  F(M1) -  F(B) ±  F(B2,3)(M1) ±  F(B1) ±  F(B1,3) +  F(M1)  ±  F(B2) +  F(B2)  -  F(B3) -   F(B1) -  F(M2,3)  ±  F(B1)
-  R(B1,3)(M) +  R(B2)(M2,3) +  F(B) -  R(B)(M) -  F(B)(M1,3) -   F(B)(M) -   F(B)(M) +   F(B)(M) +   F(B)(M) -  F(M1,3) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(B2,3) +  F(B2,3) -  F(M) +  R(B1) -  F(M2,3) -  R(B2,3)(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B2)(M) -  F(B2,3)(M)
-  F(B2) +  F(B3) -  F(M2) ±  F(M2) ±  F(B)(M2) -  F(M1) ±  F(B1)(M) ±  F(B) +  F(M1) ±  F(B)(M1) -  F(B1) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B1,3) ±  F(B1)
±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(M1,3) ±  F(B1)(M2,3) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3)
-  R(B)(M) +  R(B)(M) +  F(B1) -  R(B)(M) -  F(B)(M) +  R(M1) -   F(M) +  R(B1) +  R(B2,3)(M) -  F(B1,2)(M1,3) ±  F(B)(M) -  F(M1) +  F(B2,3)(M2) -  F(B)(M) +  R(B1) -  F(B)(M) -  R(B2,3)(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B)(M) -  F(B2,3)(M1)
-  F(B2) -   F(B2,3)(M2) ±  F(B) +  F(B2,3)(M) +  F(B1) ±  F(B3)(M2) ±  F(B)(M2,3) ±  F(B1)(M1,3) -   F(B2)(M2,3) +  F(B1) -  F(B1) ±  F(B1)(M2,3)
±  F(B3)(M) +  F(B1)  ±  (M3) +  F(M1)  ±  (B3) ±  F(M1)
-  R(B)(M) +  R(B2)(M2) +  F(B1) -  R(B)(M) -   F(B)(M) -  R(M) +  F(B2) -  F(B2) +  R(B2,3)(M) ±  F(B)(M) ±  F(B)(M) -  F(M1,3) -  F(B1,3)(M) -  F(M) +  R(B1) -  F(B2)(M1,3) -  R(M)  +  F(B2)(M2,3) +  F(B3) -   F(B2)(M2,3)
+  F(B3)(M3) -  F(B2)(M2) -  F(B) -  F(M) ±  F(B1,3)(M) +  F(B1) ±  F(B)(M2) ±  F(B2) ±  F(B) -  F(B2)(M2,3) ±  F(B1,3)(M2) +  R(B1) ±  F(B1,3)(M1) -  F(B1,2) ±  F(B1,3)(M1)
±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B3)(M1,3) ±  F(B1,3) +  F(M1)  ±  (B3) +  F(B3)  ±  (B2) ±  F(M)
COUNTRIES     PRF     TAN   CAPEX     INTAN    SHPP       ASUTI     ROE    GOP     CAPIN    UNPR    VAR
Australia
United States
United Kindom
Turkey
Austria
Hong Kong
France
Germany
Singapore
    RISK      LIQ      POR      AGE   TAX    NDTAX     DIO    G(SA)    G(AS)
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Table 6.18 (Continued) 
This table presents the coefficients sign and the robustness or fragility of each examined variable (for all countries among all measures of leverage). (R) the variable is robust; (F) the variable is 
fragile; (-) the coefficients of a particular variable are with a negative sign; (+) the coefficients of a particular variable are with a positive sign; (±) the coefficients of a particular variable changes 
sign; (M) is an indication for all  measures of leverage at market value LEVM1, LEVM2  and LEVM3 ; (B) is an indication for all measures of leverage at book value LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3; 
(B1) for LEVB1; (B2) for LEVB2;  (B3) for LEVB3;  (M1) for LEVM1;  (M2) for LEVM2; (M3) for LEVM3 
 
 
 
-  R(B)(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(B1) -  R(B)(M) -  R(B)(M) +  F(M3) -  F(M1) ±  F(B)(M) +  R(B2)(M2,3) ±  F(B)(M) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(B2,3) +  F(B2,3) -  F(B2,3)(M) +  F(B1) -  F(B)(M) -  R(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B1)(M) -  F(B)(M)
±  F(B1)(M1) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B1) ±  F(B)(M2,3) +  F(B1,3)(M1) -  F(M1,3) -  F(M1) ±  F(B1) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B2,3) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B2,3)
±  F(M1) ±  F(B2,3)(M1,2) ±  F(B1)(M2) ±  F(B1)(M2,3) ±  F(M1) ±  F(B1)
-  R(B)(M) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) +  R(B1) -  R(B)(M) +  R(M2) +  R(B)(M) +  R(M1,3) ±  F(B)(M) +  R(B1,3)(M1) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(M) -  F(M1) +  F(B3) +  F(B1) -  R(M2,3) -  R(M2) -  R(B2,3)(M) +  R(M2,3) -  F(B)(M2,3) -   F(B3)
+  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B2,3)(M) +  F(B2,3)(M1,3) +  F(B1)(M2) +  F(B2)(M2,3) -  F(B) ±  F(B)(M2,3) ±  F(B1,2)(M) -   F(M) -  F(B2) -  F(M1,3) ±  F(B1) ±  F(B)(M1) ±  F(M1) ±  F(B1,2)(M)
±  F(B1) ±  F(B2,3) ±  F(B2,3) +  F(B1)  ±  (B3)(M1) ±  F(B)
-  R(B) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(B) -  R(B)(M) -   F(B1)(M) -  F(B)(M) -   F(M) +  F(B)(M) +  F(B)(M) ±  F(B)(M) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(B2,3) -  F(B)(M) -   F(M1,3) +  F(B1)(M1) +  F(B1) -  R(M) +  F(B2,3)(M3) -  F(M1) +  F(B2,3)(M1)
-  F(M) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(M) ±  F(B2,3) ±  F(B) -  F(M2,3) ±  F(B)(M2) -   F(B2)(M2,3) -  F(M2,3) +  F(B1) ±  F(B1)(M1,2) ±  F(B)(M2,3) ±  F(B1)(M2,3)
±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(B3) ±  F(B2,3)(M1) -   F(B2)  ±  (B3)
-  R(B)(M) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) -  R(M1) -  R(B)(M) -  R(B)(M3) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(B1) +  F(B2) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B)(M) -  F(B)(M2,3) ±  F(B)(M) -  F(M1) +  F(B1,3) +  R(B1) -  F(B) -  R(M) ±  F(B)(M) -  R(M1) -  R(M1)
+  F(B1)(M1) -  F(M2,3) -  F(M1,2) -   F(M) ±  F(B1,3)(M) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±  F(M1) ±  F(B)(M2,3) -   F(M) ±  F(B2,3)(M) ±  F(M) ±  F(B) -  F(B1)(M3) ±  F(B)(M2,3)
±  F(B) ±  F(B2,3) ±  F(B2) ±  F(B2,3)(M2)
-  R(B)(M) +  R(B2,3)(M2) +  F(B1) -  R(B1,3)(M1) -   F(B)(M) +  F(B1)(M1) +  F(B) +  F(B1) +  R (B)(M1,3) -  F(M1) ±  F(B)(M) -  F(B2,3) -  F(M1) -  F(M) +  F(B1) -  F(M) -  R(M) ±  F(B)(M) -  F(B)(M) -  F(B1)(M1,3)
+  F(B1)(M1,3) -  F(M2,3) -  F(B2)(M2) -  F(B2)(M2) -   F(M1,3) ±  F(B2,3)(M) +  F(M2) ±  F(B)(M2,3) ±  F(B1)(M) ±  F(B)(M2,3) ±  F(B) ±  F(B2,3)(M) ±  F(B) -  F(B2) ±  F(B2,3)(M2)
±  F(B2,3)(M1) ±  F(B3)(M3) ±  F(M2) +  F(B1)  ±  (B3)
-  R(B)(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(B1,3) -  R(B)(M) -   F(B)(M) +  F(B2,3)(M) +  F(B)(M) +  F(B)(M) +  F(B)(M) -  F(B)(M) -  F(B)(M) -  F(B1)(M) -  F(M) -  F(M) +  F(B1)(M1) -  F(B2,3)(M) -  R(M) +  F(B2,3) -  F(B)(M) -   F(B1,3)(M)
±  F(B1)(M1) -  F(B2)(M2,3) ±  F(B1) ±  F(B2,3) ±  F(B) ±  F(B) -   F(B2,3)(M2,3) ±  F(B1) +  F(B1) -  F(B1)(M1) ±   F(B2)
±  F(M1) ±  F(B2,3) ±  F(M2,3)
-  R(B1,2)(M1,3) +  F(B1,2)(M) +  F(B1) -  R(B)(M) -   F(B1,2)(M) +  R(M1) +  F(M1,3) +  F(B1,2) +  F(B2) -  F(M2,3) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(B2,3) +  F(B2) -  F(B2)(M) +  F(B1) -  R(B3) -  R(M) +  F(B2,3) -  F(B2,3)(M) +  F(B1)
-   F(M2) ±  F(B3) -  F(B2,3)(M) ±  F(B3) +  F(B1) ±  F(B)(M2) -  F(B3)(M1,3) -  F(M1,3) ±  F(B)(M1) -  F(B1)(M1,3) -  F(B1)(M) ±  F(B1,3) -   F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B2)(M) +  F(B1,2) -  F(B1)(M1,3) ±  F(B1) -  F(B2,3)(M)
±  F(B3) -  F(B2,3)(M2,3) ±  F(M2) ±  F(B1,3)(M2) ±  F(M2) ±  F(B3) ±  F(M1) ±  F(B1) -   F(B3) ±  F(M2)
-  R(B)(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) +  F(B1) -  R(B)(M) -   F(B)(M) -   F(B2,3)(M) +  F(B1,3) +  F(B)(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) ±  F(B)(M) ±  F(B)(M) +  F(B2,3) +  F(B2) -  F(M2,3) +  F(B1)(M1) -  F(M) -  R(M) +  F(B2,3)(M2,3) -  F(B)(M) -   F(B1)(M)
±  F(B1)(M1) -  F(B2)(M) ±  F(B1) -  F(B2)(M) -  F(B1) -  F(M1) -  F(B1,3)(M1,3) ±  F(B)(M1) -   F(B2,3)(M2,3) ±  F(B) +  F(B1,3) ±  F(B1)(M1) ±   F(B2,3)
±  F(B3) ±  F(M1) ±  F(B1)(M2,3) ±  F(M2) -  F(B2)
    ROE    GOP     CAPIN    UNPR    VAR  TAX    NDTAX     DIO    G(SA)    G(AS)   CAPEX     INTAN    SHPP       ASUTI
Brazil
South Africa
COUNTRIES
Malaysia
China
Chile
Japan
India
Indonesia
    PRF     TAN     RISK      LIQ      POR      AGE
139 
 
 
Table 6.19: Summary of Results, Robust Firm-specific Variables across Countries. 
This table reports the coefficients signs for only robust variables across countries among all measures of leverage. For a variable to be robust, all coefficients must remain with the same sign (either positive or 
negative) in all carried out regressions, in addition to being significant at the 5% level. (R) the variable is robust ; (-) coefficients of a particular variable are with a negative sign; (+) coefficients of a particular 
variable are with a positive sign (M)an indication for all measures of leverage at market value LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 ; (B) an indication for all measures of leverage at book value LEVB1, LEVB2 and 
LEVB3; (B1) refers to LEVB1; (B2) refers to LEVB2;  (B3) refers to LEVB3;  (M1) refers to LEVM1; (M2) refers to LEVM2; (M3) refers to LEVM3. Note: the coefficients of certain variables (such as PRF, 
ASUTI and GOP) changes sign from negative to positive and vice versa when testing for different measures of leverage 
 Countries PRF TAN RISK LIQ POR AGE TAX NDTAX DIO SHPP ASUTI ROE GOP CAPIN UNPR  VAR 
Australia -   R(B) 
  
-   R (B)(M) -   R(M1) 
  
+   R(B1)       
 
+   R(B1)(M1)       -    R(M)                   
United States 
-   R(B1,2) 
+  R(B3)(M) +  R(B1,2) -   R (B)(M) -   R(M1,3) - R(B3)(M2,3) 
 
+   R(B1,2)       -  R(M) +  R(B1,2)       -    R(B3)(M)                     
+  R(B3) -  R(B3) +   R(B1 B2) 
United Kingdom -   R(B)(M3) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) 
 
-   R (B)(M)                   +   R(B1)             +   R(B1)(M1)       -    R(M)                   
Turkey -   R(B)(M) 
  
-   R (B)(M)                         +   R(M1,3)                   -    R(M)(B1)                   
Austria -   R(B)(M1,3) 
  
-   R (B)(M)                         
 
            -   R (B1,3)(M3) -    R(M)                   
Hong Kong -   R(B)(M) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) 
 
-   R (B)(M) -   R(B3)(M) +   R(M1,3)             +    R(M3)       +   R(B1)       -    R(M)   +  R (M2,3) 
 
-  R (M1) 
+   R(B1) 
France -   R(B1,3)(M) +  R(B2)(M2,3) 
 
-   R (B)(M)       
 
            
 
      +   R(B1)       -    R(B2,3)(M)                   
Germany -   R(B)(M) +  R(B)(M) 
 
-   R (B)(M)       +   R(M1)       +   R(B1) +  R(B2,3)(M)       +   R(B1)       -    R(B2,3)(M)                   
Singapore -   R(B)(M) +  R(B2)(M2) 
 
-   R (B)(M)       -    R(M)             +  R(B2,3)(M)       +   R(B1)       -    R(M)                     
+   R(B1) 
Malaysia -   R(B)(M) 
  
-   R (B)(M) -   R(B)(M) 
 
            +  R(B2)(M2,3)             
 
      -    R(M)                   
China -   R(B)(M) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) +  R(B1) -   R (B)(M) +  R(M2) +  R(B)(M) +    R(M1,3)       +  R(B1,3)(M1)       -   R(M2,3) -   R(M2) -    R(B2,3)(M) +  R(M2,3) 
  
Chile -   R(B) 
  
-   R (B)(M) 
 
                  
 
      
  
-   R(M) 
   
Japan -   R(B)(M) +  R(B2,3)(M2,3) -  R(M1) -   R (B)(M) -   R(B)(M3)                   +  R(B2,3)(M2,3)       +    R(B1) 
 
-   R(M) 
 
-   R(M1) -   R(M1) 
India -   R(B)(M) -  R(B2,3)(M2)       -   R (B1,3)(M1)                         +  R(B)(M1,3)                   -   R(M)                   
Indonesia -   R(B)(M)             -   R (B)(M)                                                 -   R(M)                   
Brazil -   R(B1,2)(M1,3)              -   R (B)(M)       +  R(B1)                               -   R(B3) -   R(M)                   
South Africa -   R(B)(M)             -   R (B)(M)                                                 -   R(M)                   
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All coefficients of variable liquidity are with a negative sign, which indicates a negative 
relationship between liquidity and leverage in all examined countries.Furthermore, a negative 
sign proves that the results are consistent with the theoretical proposition. The negative sign 
of liquidity supports Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory and suggests that firms 
use retained earnings for new investments and that the liquidity of firms serves as a source of 
internal funds. Thus, retained earnings are used before debt; however, if retained earnings are 
not enough, firms prefer debt first and consider equity later.Other studies also find that 
liquidity has a significant and negative relationship with leverage (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Moosa et al., 2011). De Jong et al. (2008) presume that negative and significant 
coefficients of liquidity are generally found in advanced economies.  
 
Concerning results for India, according to Bhide (1993), increased asymmetric information 
can cause illiquidity of firms. In an emerging market such as India, family ownership is 
predominant, and agency conflicts and symmetry of market information may be more 
obvious in emerging markets than conflicts in advanced economies. This leads to higher 
concentration of ownership to reduce these problems. High concentration of ownership 
protects companies from hostile takeovers and may be a substitute for weak investor 
protection. In India, family plays an important role in the management and decision-making 
processes, and subsequently high concentration of ownership can lead to inferior liquidity 
and firm value. Shareholders might choose to buy more shares, especially in profitable firms, 
instead of using debt. On this theme, Saarani and Shahadan (2012) and Goel et al. (2015) 
detect a significant and negative relationship between liquidity and leverage in India.  
 
Firms’ Profitability (PRF)  
The variable of profitability or PRF is robust in all examined countries when using most 
leverage measures. The variable of profitability is robust in Turkey, Hong Kong, Germany, 
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Singapore, Malaysia, China, Japan, India, Indonesia and South Africa (when using all six 
measures of leverage). However, in the United States, Chile and Australia, the variable PRF 
is robust only when leverage is measured at book value (LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3). Faff et 
al. (2016) prove that Australian business managers adjust their capital structure choice based 
on book measures whose importance was enhanced. This can be associated with the 
insignificant profitability in market measures for particular countries, especially Australia. 
 
In the remaining countries, profitability is robust when using four to five measures of 
leverage out of a total of six measures. The results of the EBA indicate that variable 
profitability turns out to be robust 87 out of 102 times (the coefficients are 100% significant 
without any change in sign). Thus, profitability yields 84,303 significant coefficients out of a 
total of 98,838. Furthermore, test statistics confirm that the coefficients of PRF are significant 
in most of the regression models, and nearly all coefficients of profitability remain with a 
negative sign. A negative sign indicates that profitability supports the pecking order theory, 
in which firms use retained earnings for new investments first but move to debt and equity if 
necessary. Titman and Wessels (1988), Kester (1986), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Moosa 
et al. (2011) report a significantly negative correlation between profitability and leverage.  
 
However, variable profitability happens to be robust and with a positive sign when using 
LEVB3, suggesting that different types of leverage have different implications for firms’ 
capital structure choice (the coefficients of profitability happen to have a positive sign once in 
the United States). Abor (2005) reports a significant and positive relationship between 
profitability and short-term debt and between profitability and total debt. Short-term debt 
tends to be less expensive with quite lower interest rates than long-term debt, and it will assist 
in increasing firms’ profits. A positive sign for variable profitability is more supportive of 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) trade-off theory, which suggests that firms prefer the use of 
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debt financing to reduce income subject to tax. Firms with high profitability rate have more 
chances to issue debt. The more the profitable the firm is, the more guarantees the lender has, 
which makes it easier for profitable firms to manage more debt. Despite the consistency of 
most results for PRF, and the consistency of results in other empirical studies (refer to Table 
2.1), some researchers debate this conclusion regarding the negative effect of profitability of 
leverage. Some studies (e.g. Taub, 1975; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Roden and Lewellen, 
1995; Hadlock and James, 2002; Abor, 2005) find a significant and positive relationship 
between total debt and profitability, suggesting that profitable firms use more debt.  
 
Growth Opportunity (GOP)  
The variable growth opportunity or GOP is robust in all countries, mostly when leverage is at 
market value. Growth opportunity turns out to be robust 63 times (100% significance without 
any change in sign). Thus, the coefficients of GOP are significant in 61,047 regressions 
across all countries for all measures. Moreover, test statistics show that GOP is fragile around 
39 times, in which GOP has a proportion of significant coefficients but never reaches the 
100% significance. When growth opportunity is robust, test statistics indicate that the 
coefficients of GOP are consistently negative, especially when using LEVM1, LEVM2 and 
LEVM3 (leverage ratios at market value). 
 
The negative relationship between growth opportunity and leverage tends to support Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory, which asserts that fast-growing firms with bright 
futures tend to go for lower leverage in order to not give up profitable investments. The trade-
off theory predicts a negative relationship as well. Other studies such as de Jong et al. (2008) 
and Moosa et al. (2011) find that growth opportunity is significantly and negatively related to 
leverage. Yet, when the book value measures of leverage are used, the variable GOP is robust 
only in the United States, Turkey, Hong Kong, France, Germany, Singapore and China. The 
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coefficients of GOP occasionally change signs from a significantly negative to a significantly 
positive relationship with leverage, such as the case in the United States, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. The coefficients of profitability that have a positive sign appear only when using either 
LEVB1 or LEVB2. A positive relationship between GOP and leverage supports the prediction 
of Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory, and it suggests that rapidly growing 
firms might not have enough funds to support their growth, which implies a further need to 
acquire more debt.  
 
Tangibility (TAN)  
It is observed that the variable of tangibility turns out to be robust around 32 times across all 
countries for all measures of leverage. Thus, the coefficients of tangibility are significant in a 
total of 31,008 regressions. In cases wherein tangibility is robust, coefficients of the variable 
are always with a positive sign, which supports Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) trade-off 
theory. The trade-off theory suggests that firms move towards a target debt-to-asset ratio, and 
this involves trading off between tax advantages and bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs are 
expected to have a negative effect on leverage, so higher tangibility indicates lower risk for 
the lender and guarantees debt to be less unsafe. According to the trade-off theory, small 
chances of financial distress and low agency costs occur when there is a positive correlation 
between tangible assets and leverage. Furthermore, other empirical studies find that leverage 
is positively related with asset tangibility (e.g. Bradley et al., 1984; Wedig et al., 1988; 
Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2004; Bhabra et al., 2008; de Jong et al., 2008). 
 
Firm Risk (RISK)  
The results of the EBA indicate that variable firm risk is robust only four times, and it is 
fragile around 98 times across all countries (see Table 6.18 and Table 6.19). Thus, the 
coefficients of firm risk are significant in only 3,876 regressions out of a total of 98,838. Risk 
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is robust in a few countries (e.g. in the United States, China and Japan). In cases wherein the 
variable risk is robust, one can notice that the coefficients of risk have a negative sign only in 
Japan when the dependent variable is LEVM1. The negative sign supports Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) trade-off theory, in which higher risk indicates a higher probability of 
bankruptcy, and, in turn, risk is expected to have a negative impact on leverage.  
 
On the other hand, coefficients of variable risk happen to have a positive sign in the United 
States and China. The positive sign of risk indicates a positive relationship with leverage; 
hence, it supports neither the pecking-order theory nor the trade-off theory. Several studies 
find a positive relationship between firm’s risk and leverage, assuming that higher leverage is 
linked to increased risk (e.g. Thies and Klock, 1992; Lowe et al., 1994; Bennet and Donnelly, 
1993; Shenoy and Koch, 1996). However, this contradicts the results of Deloof and 
Vershueren (1998) and Schoubben and Hulle (2004). Mixed results are also found in Wald 
(1999), Booth et al. (2001) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
 
Payout Ratio (POR)  
The variable payout ratio is robust in six countries when using certain measures of leverage 
(e.g. Australia, the United States, Hong Kong, Malaysia, China and Japan), and it turns out to 
be fragile in the remaining countries when using any measure of leverage. The results show 
that POR turns out to be robust only 18 times, which means that the coefficients of POR are 
significant in 17,442 regressions. Moreover, the variable POR failed to be robust around 84 
times across all countries for all measures; however, POR retained significant coefficients in 
multiple countries but never at the 100% significance. For instance, in Turkey, POR had a 
proportion of significant regressions ranging from 61% to 98%, whereas in France, POR 
yielded a very low proportion ranging from 0.0% to 0.03%.  
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Furthermore, one can notice that the variable payout is robust only in countries with 
relatively strong shareholder rights protection laws together with a strong system that 
enforces these rules. Once the variable payout ratio is robust, it is evident that the coefficients 
consistently have a negative sign (suggesting an inverse relationship with leverage), except in 
China where the coefficients of POR have a positive sign. Overall, the results obtained on the 
variable POR are more supportive of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) trade-off theory.  
 
On the other hand, the results for the variable POR in China suggest otherwise, proposing 
that firms with a high dividend payment stream may have declining internal funds, which 
raises the need for external financing. Thus, China is more supportive of Myers and Majluf’s 
(1984) pecking order theory. The study by Moosa et al. (2011) investigates firm-specific 
determinants of capital structure for 344 publicly listed firms in China and finds that the 
payout ratio is fragile. 
 
Firm Age (AGE)  
It is evident that firm age is robust in particular countries when using certain measures of 
leverage; that is, the United States, Hong Kong, Germany, Singapore and Brazil. However, in 
China, firm age is robust when using all measures of leverage. The variable AGE turns out to 
be robust 16 out of 102 times, and thus the coefficients of AGE are significant in 15,504 
regression models. Table 6.18 shows that the coefficients of firm age in Hong Kong, 
Germany, Brazil and China carry a positive sign, indicating a positive relationship with 
leverage. The positive sign supports Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) trade-off theory and 
suggests that the older the firm, the more debt it can take in, because a firm’s good reputation 
accumulated over many years assists in borrowing debt. On the other hand, in the United 
States and Singapore, the coefficients of firm age carry a negative sign, meaning an inverse 
relationship with leverage. The negative sign of firm age is consistent with the prediction of 
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Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory that small firms with high growth 
opportunities differ from larger firms. The former may not have enough funds to support their 
growth, which means needing to borrow more and therefore increasing their debt (younger 
businesses take on more leverage). 
 
Tax Rate (TAX)  
The results of the EBA show that the impact of tax on firms’ leverage choice is robust only 
twice, yielding 1,938 significant coefficients out of a total of 98,838. Tax is robust only in 
China when using LEVM1 and LEVM3 as shown in Tables 6.18 and 6.19. The coefficients of 
tax rate carry a positive sign, which confirms the trade-off theory prediction. Firms prefer 
debt financing to reduce income subject to tax. According to MacKie-Mason (1990), most 
studies fail to find significant effects of tax on debt-equity ratios due to the minor impact of a 
tax shield on the marginal tax rate. De Jong et al. (2008) find only two positive significant 
coefficients of tax out of many in their analysis of the determinants of capital structure in 
firms that operate in 42 countries. Thus, the observation seems to have high relevance. 
 
Non-Debt-Tax-Shield (NDTAX)  
The findings make it evident that the variable of non-debt-tax-shield is robust mostly when 
using LEVB1, specifically in countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Whereas in the United States, non-debt-tax-shield is robust specifically when using LEVB1 
and LEVB2; this variable (NDTAX) is fragile in the remaining countries without exception. 
The variable of non-debt-tax-shield turns to be robust only five out of a total of 102 times, 
yielding only 5,814 significant coefficients. The results indicate that the coefficients of 
NDTAX do not change signs and remain consistently positive. The positive sign of NDTAX is 
inconsistent with the prediction of the trade-off theory, in which an inverse relationship is 
expected between non-debt tax shield and leverage. However, Scott (1977) and Moore (1986) 
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suggest that firms with substantial non-debt-tax shields invariably have considerable 
collateral assets that can be used to secure debt, which can reasonably explain the positive 
sign yielded by this empirical research. 
 
Inventory Outstanding (DIO)  
The variable DIO is robust 28 times in several countries but not for all measures of leverage. 
The variable DIO yields 27,132 significant coefficients. Inventory outstanding is robust in 
Turkey, Hong Kong, Germany, Singapore, Malaysia, China, Japan and India at least once. 
Test statistics show that the coefficients of DIO do not change their sign and carry a positive 
sign. Thus, a positive sign indicates that DIO supports the prediction of the pecking order and 
trade-off theories. Both theories presume a positive association between inventory turnover 
and the leverage choice of firms. 
 
Share Price Performance (SHPP)  
Our finding shows that share price performance (SHPP) is robust only three times in the 
United States (when using leverage at market value). The coefficients of SHPP are significant 
2,908 times. Test statistics in Appendix B indicate that SHPP carries a negative sign. The 
negative sign indicates that higher share price performance may result in less leverage; this is 
consistent with the prediction made by Myers (1977) and Baker and Wurgler (2002). Firms 
tend to issue equity when their prices are high and repurchase them when their prices 
decrease. This finding supports the pecking order and market timing theories. Ardatti (1976), 
Korteweg (2004), George and Hwang (2009) and Adami et al. (2015) report an inverse 
relationship. Accordingly, firms’ managers are more likely to sell equity rather than debt, 
especially when the benefits of raising external capital outweigh the costs of selling at a 
discount. Usually, firm managers sell at a discount to reduce the problem of information 
asymmetry. 
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Return on Equity (ROE)  
Table 6.18 and Table 6.19 indicate that the variable of return on equity turns out to be robust 
only five times, which means that ROE yields 4,845 significant coefficients (only in Brazil, 
China and Austria). Test statistics in Appendix B show that the coefficients of ROE carry a 
negative sign. ROE can indicate surplus funds, which management can use on new 
investment opportunities without the need to borrow. A negative sign supports the 
assumption that firms prefer to use retained earnings for new investments first and then move 
to debt financing (the pecking order theory). Ebaid (2009) also reports an inverse relation 
between leverage and ROE. However, the results on return on equity show that this variable 
is fragile in most examined countries, which is consistent with Salim and Yadav (2012) who 
report an insignificant relationship between leverage and ROE. 
 
Capital intensity (CAPIN)  
Our summary of results in Table 6.18 and Table 6.19 demonstrates that the impact of the 
variable capital intensity on leverage choice of firms is robust only four times. The 
coefficients of CAPIN are significant 3,876 times and always carry a positive sign. The 
positive sign supports both trade-off and pecking order theories. The trade-off theory 
proposes that higher tangibility means lower risk for the lender and guarantees that debt will 
be safer, while firms with more collateral assets are less likely to default. The pecking order 
theory suggests that firms with more assets that can be used as collateral are expected to take 
on more debt in order to reduce information asymmetry.  
 
Asset Utilisation (ASUTI)  
Our finding confirms that firm asset utilisation is robust in particular countries when using 
certain measures out of all the six adopted measures; these countries include Australia, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, France, Germany, Singapore, China and 
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Japan. The ASUTI is robust mostly when testing for LEVB1. The variable ASUTI turn out to 
be robust 14 times. Thus, coefficients of ASUTI are significant 13,566 times. Appendix B 
shows that the coefficients of asset utilisation when robust yield a positive sign in Australia, 
the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, France, Germany, Singapore and Japan, while in China, 
ASUTI yields a negative sign.  
 
However, in the United States, ASUTI has a positive sign when testing for LEVB1 and 
LEVB2, but it changes to negative when using LEVB3. A positive relationship with leverage 
supports Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) trade-off theory and suggests that the higher the 
efficiency in utilising assets, the higher is the profit, which makes it easier for firms to 
finance more debt. On the other hand, the negative sign goes along with the prediction in 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory wherein firms prefer to use internal 
financing first. 
 
Uniqueness of Products (UNPR)  
Throughout the investigation and testing multiple measures of leverage, the variable of 
uniqueness of products is robust only once (in Japan, when LEVM1 is the dependant 
variable). The coefficients of the variable UNPR are significant 969 times and consistently 
carry a negative sign. The signs produced by the empirical results are consistent with the 
prediction and more supportive of the trade-off theory. Studies by Titman and Wessels (1988) 
and Harris and Raviv (1991) find that uniqueness is negatively related to debt levels. With 
respect to the variable uniqueness of products, firms that manufacture unique products are 
expected to spend more on advertising to sell their wares. Customers, workers and suppliers 
are expected to bear a fraction of these costs. Firms with high costs are expected to have 
lower debt ratios. 
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Income Variability (VAR)  
The variable of income variability turns out to be robust only twice, in the cases of Japan and 
Hong Kong (when the dependent variable is LEVM1). The coefficients of the variable VAR 
are significant 1,938 times and consistently carry a negative sign. Test statistics in Appendix 
B reveal that the variable VAR is inversely related to leverage (LEVM1). Thus, the obtained 
results support the trade-off theory proposition. 
 
Fragile Variables  
The explanatory variables of intangibility, change in sales, change in assets and CAPEX are 
fragile among all six measures of leverage and in all countries. Although the coefficients of 
these variables are occasionally significant in a couple of regression models in several 
countries, they were never robust (significant in all regression models). Table 6.18 and Table 
6.19 illustrate the fragility of these variables. 
 
6.4      Results of Phase Two – EBA of Firm- and Country-Specific Determinants 
Appendix C summarises the results for the robustness analysis (EBA) with reference to both 
firm- and country-specific variables. Again, in the second phase, the traditional EBA is 
applied only to robust determinants procured from the first phase plus seven new country-
specific determinants. Findings in the second phase are consistent with the first phase: all 
robust variables across countries remained robust, except once in China, when a robust 
variable became fragile due to insignificance in several coefficients. Tables in Appendix C 
report       and      together with their t-statistics, p-statistics and the percentage of 
regressions producing significant βs at the 5% significance level. However, in the second 
phase, the number of regressions varies for each country depending on how many variables 
pass the first phase as robust. For example if three variables (X1, X2 and X3) are robust in the 
first phase, in the second phase, the robust variables (X1, X2 and X3) are added to a new list of 
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seven variables at the country level, and thus the total number of variables is ten variables.
21
 
For example, in Australia, 464 regressions are carried out, specifically 120, 56, 56, 120, 56, 
56 regression models when testing LEVB1, LEVB2, LEVB3, LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3, 
respectively.  In the second phase, the application of EBA involves running a total of 12,439 
regressions in all countries. Specifically, 464, 1,210, 576, 520, 484, 1,128, 576, 1,045, 874, 
738, 420, 428, 420, 1,055, 1,589, 336 and 576 regressions are conducted for Australia, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Austria, Hong Kong, France, Germany, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, China, Chile and India, 
respectively. 
 
Results of Phase Two - Factors Affecting Leverage: Cross-Country Analysis 
Throughout the two phases of analysis, one can conclude that the country-specific 
determinants do not wield a substantial effect on the leverage choice of firms. Moreover, in 
all examined countries, each robust variable in the first phase remains robust in the second 
phase as well. Table 6.20 summarises the results, while the tables in Appendix C illustrate the 
test statistics. As shown in Table 6.20 and Appendix C, all country-specific determinants – 
INF, CGDP, GGDP, SMS, BMS, GCF and SIR – are fragile for all six measures of leverage 
in all countries except Australia, China and Japan. In rare cases, a particular country-specific 
determinant is robust – in fact, it is robust only once out of 102 times – when using a 
particular leverage ratio (e.g. SIR, CGDP and SMS). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 The country-specific variables include INF, CGDP, GGDP, SMS, BMS, GCF and SIR. Refer to Chapter 4. 
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Table 6.20: Summary of Results, Robust Country-Specific Variables across Countries 
This table presents the coefficients sign, only for variables that turn to be robust across countries, for all measures of 
leverage. (R) the variable is robust; (-) the coefficients of a particular variable are with a negative sign; (+) the coefficients of 
a particular variable are with a positive sign.  * Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 5% level in all 969 
regression models.         
  INF CGDP GGDP SMS BMS GCF SIR 
Australia ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- + 
*
R (M1) 
China ----- -  
*
R(B1)  ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Japan ----- ----- ----- -  
*
R(M1) ----- ----- ----- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Australia, Table C-1.1 and Table C-1.2 show that the examined country-specific 
determinants are fragile among all used measures of leverage, except the variable SIR. The 
variable SIR is robust only once (when the leverage measure is LEVM1). The coefficients of 
the variable SIR retain the same sign with no change and meet the 100% significance 
condition once out of 102 times. It is presumed that if long-term interest rates are expected to 
go up, a firm’s management tends to avoid issuing debt. Thus, the term structure of the 
interest rate is expected to have an inverse relationship with leverage. Antoniou et al. (2008) 
detected a negative relationship between SIR and leverage.  
 
 However, the results in Australia, when SIR is robust, reveal a significant and positive 
relationship between debt and the term structure of interest rates. The positive sign indicates 
that with higher SIR, businesses opt for debt capital, suggesting that firms are more likely to 
issue debt when the long-term interest rate is relatively high. The cost of high interest rates is 
compensated by a reduction in taxable income.  
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In China, Table C-10.1 and Table C-10.2 illustrate that the variable GDP per capita is the 
only robust variable at the country level, in addition to robust variables at the firm level. In 
China, when LEVB2 is used, it is evident that the coefficients of CGDP do not change signs 
and maintain at the 100% significance (CGDP is robust only once out of 102 times across all 
examined countries). The variable CGDP carries a negative sign, indicating an inverse 
relationship between GDP per capita and leverage. The results are consistent with findings 
published by Bokpin (2009). In addition, in China, it is evident that the variable POR, which 
is robust in the first phase, becomes fragile in the second phase. (This is the only case 
wherein this situation happens in all countries.)
22
 The analysis by Moosa et al. (2011) finds 
that the variable payout ratio is fragile in China.  
 
In Japan, Table C-11.1 and Table C-11.2 in Appendix C show that all country-specific 
variables are fragile, except stock market structure, SMS. (The variable SMS is robust only 
once out of 102 times across all examined countries.) In Japan, when using LEVM1, one can 
infer that the coefficients of the variable SMS always carry a negative sign, and the 
coefficients are significant in all regressions (100%). The finding reveals a significant inverse 
relationship between leverage and stock market structure, which is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction. A developed stock market will reduce the cost of equity and, in fact, 
promote equity use. In contrast, less-developed stock markets will promote the use of debt.  
 
6.5     Concluding Remarks 
Studies of capital structure produce inconsistent results. The inconsistency of results can be 
attributed to the fact that theoretical models of capital structure do not specify an exact set of 
explanatory variables to be used in an equation where leverage is the dependent variable. 
                                                          
22
 Note that throughout the first phase, the variable POR turns out to be robust in China only once when the 
leverage ratio (LEVM2) is the dependent variable.  
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Thus, numerous models with a different combination of explanatory variables are tested, 
which in turn produce a diversified set of results. This chapter reviews the results of the EBA 
within an international framework and assesses whether cross-country differences affect 
capital structure. Using EBA demonstrates that some variables reported as important 
(significant) in previous studies are important only because they are used with a particular set 
of explanatory variables. A summary of results is provided, in which one can clearly 
distinguish between the factors that truly affect the leverage choice of firms and the factors 
with no effect at all. Six measures of leverage suggested by previous studies are tested 
through two phases. The application of EBA involves running almost 2,000,000 regressions 
for all examined countries. Finally, one can conclude that leverage is mostly affected by a 
firm’s liquidity, profitability and growth opportunities in all examined countries. Results in 
the second phase show that variables at the country level do not have a substantial influence 
on the debt choice of firms.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
7.1 Recapitulation  
Chapter 1 introduced the topic and objectives of the research. The main objective of this 
study is to investigate the determinants of capital structure. Chapter 1 summarises the 
methodology used in this research (extreme bounds analysis or EBA) and also outlines the 
major conceptual ideas and guidelines of this thesis. A large sample of firms operating in 
developed and emerging economies around the world are used to (i) find if cross-country 
differences affect capital structure and (ii) reveal the true determinants that affect firms’ debt 
choices.   
 
Chapter 2 presents a detailed overview of the theoretical foundations of this research. 
Moreover, Chapter 2 reviews empirical studies of capital structure and identifies gaps in 
previous literature. The main conclusion to be drawn from Chapter 2 is that there are 
problems with research focusing on capital structure and the cross-sectional models 
associated with it. Theories of capital structure are not precise enough to produce a particular 
set of determining variables to direct empirical work, which invariably leads to data mining.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the predictions of capital structure theories for all variables, and it 
discusses the institutional differences from country to country (such as bankruptcy law, legal 
institutions, economic systems and concentration of ownership). Chapter 3 develops the 
hypotheses for all variables in line with the theoretical frameworks. The main conclusion to 
be drawn is that theories of capital structure differ in their predictions on the way that 
leverage is affected by country- and firm-specific determinants.  
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Chapter 4 summarises the data collection procedure, sources of data and structure of the data 
set. Chapter 4 outlines the adopted measures of leverage in addition to the measures of all 
variables (firm- and country-specific variables). Moreover, descriptive statistics are 
discussed. The empirical analysis is based on a large and diverse data set (obtained from 
Datastream and the World Bank), covering information at the firm and country levels for 17 
countries during the period from 2003 to 2013.  
 
Chapter 5 explains the concept of EBA and justifies its use. This study adopts a quantitative 
research design to explore corporate finance behaviour and tests existing theories of capital 
structure together with assessing reported results in empirical research. To overcome the 
problems mentioned in the previous chapters, EBA is employed to distinguish between robust 
and fragile determinants of the capital structure. The original version of the EBA is 
employed, which is introduced by Leamer (1983, 1985). This thesis discovers that many 
variables that previous studies find to be statistically significant determinants of capital 
structure are in fact fragile.  
 
The objectives of Chapter 6 are to discuss the empirical results of the EBA. In Chapter 6, the 
validity of the predictions of conventional capital structure theories’ is assessed. By applying 
the EBA and running more than 2 million regressions in two phases of analysis, the results 
reveal important findings in the context of capital structure determinants. Application of the 
EBA proves that changing the set of explanatory variables can drive all the results: Changing 
the set of variables can change the significance and sign of a coefficient from significantly 
positive to significantly negative and vice versa. Therefore, reporting of the preferred results 
of a single model can be misleading. Hence, research findings in most quantitative studies 
may be incorrect. Proper inference requires full reporting and transparency, and p-values and 
related analyses should not be reported selectively. The legitimacy of conclusions of 
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quantitative studies depends on more than the statistical methods themselves. Full reporting 
of the interpretation of statistical results plays a significant role in ensuring that the research 
conclusions and findings are sound. 
 
7.2 Statement of Results  
In previous studies that focus on capital structure, various models with a different 
combination of explanatory variables are tested, which in turn produce a diversified set of 
results. Thus, studies of capital structure produce inconsistent results. The application of EBA 
demonstrates that some explanatory variables, reported to have a significant effect of 
leverage previously, are in fact significant only because of the accompanying set of 
explanatory variables. For instance, conventional analysis used in previous studies tends to 
support variables such as tangibility and share price performance. EBA shows that the 
variable share price performance is important only in the United States only when the 
leverage ratio is at market value, while the variable tangibility is important in only nine 
countries among particular measures of leverage (e.g. in the United States, Hong Kong and 
the United Kingdom).   
 
In each country, for each leverage ratio, a specific set of explanatory variables turn out to be 
robust. Hence, robust explanatory variables that determine capital structure actually depend 
on the components of debt being analysed. In general, one can say that the results are 
inconsistent across countries, yet at the same time, certain variables turn out to be robust in 
all examined countries. The obtained results confirm the importance of several explanatory 
factors such as liquidity, growth opportunity and profitability. The variables of liquidity, 
growth opportunity and profitability report consistent results for all examined countries. 
Moosa et al. (2011) report similar results when employing EBA for China, concluding that 
variables that the determine capital structure of Chinese firms are size, liquidity, profitability 
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and growth opportunity. The robustness of each examined variable is tested 102 times. 
According to the findings, variable liquidity is very sturdy, and liquidity is robust in all 
examined countries when testing all measures of leverage, except in India where the variable 
liquidity is robust for only three particular measures. The variable LIQ turns out to be robust 
99 times across all countries when testing all adopted measures, and it is fragile only three 
times.
23
 Throughout the application of EBA across all countries, the coefficients of variable 
liquidity turn out to be significant 98,383 times (out of a total of 98,838 coefficients). The 
majority of coefficients of liquidity are significant without any change in sign (always with a 
negative sign). Therefore, it can be asserted that liquidity has a huge effect on the level of 
leverage of firms around the world.  
 
The results show that the variable PRF is robust in all countries. Nonetheless, profitability 
turns out to be fragile when using particular measures of leverage in certain countries. Across 
all countries and for all measures of leverage, test statistics show that profitability is robust 87 
times. The coefficients of PRF turn out to be significant 84,303 (out of a total of 98,838 
coefficients), and thus PRF is fragile only 15 times.
24
 Therefore, one can say that variable 
profitability wields a significant effect on the leverage choice of firms. According to the 
results on liquidity and profitability, firms tend to use their retained earnings first and then 
move to other sources of funds; when earnings are low, businesses tend to go for higher 
leverage. This supports the pecking order theory. 
 
Findings on growth opportunity prove its robustness in all examined countries, especially 
when using market value measures of leverage. In fact, the variable GOP is robust in all 
                                                          
23
 Note that even in cases wherein the variable liquidity is fragile (only in India when using LEVB2, LEVM2 and 
LEVM3), the proportion of significant coefficients is high. LIQ has around 84% significant regressions, which is 
close to 100%. 
24
 Table 6.18 provides more insight on the robustness or fragility of variables across countries. 
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countries without exception when using measures of leverage at market value. GOP is also 
robust at times in several countries when using book measures of leverage (such as the case 
in the United States). The variable growth opportunity is robust around 63 times out of a total 
of 102 times, and the coefficients of GOP turn out to be significant 61,047 times without 
changing signs. Results for the remaining variables are not as consistent as the results on LIQ, 
PRF and GOP. However, consistency of results (specifically in regard to robustness or 
fragility of variables) within and across countries is more likely when using either book value 
measures or market value measures of leverage. 
 
For instance, the variable NDTAX is robust only when using either LEVB1 or LEVB2 in 
several countries (e.g. Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany). 
Likewise, the variable ASUTI is robust in several countries only when using book measures, 
especially LEVB1 (e.g. Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom). Further, it is 
noticeable that the similarity between robust or fragile variables (for particular variables) 
increases with geographical proximity; for instance, the variable CAPIN is only robust in 
Hong Kong and China but fragile in the other countries.  
 
Some variables such as ASUTI and TAN are robust mostly in advanced economies (e.g. the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France), while it is noticeable that some 
variables (e.g. POR) is robust only in nations with strong shareholder rights protection laws 
together with a relatively strong system that enforces these rules (e.g. Australia, the United 
States, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Japan). Moreover, the results show that some variables 
support the pecking order theory, while others are more supportive of the trade-off theory. 
For instance, liquidity and profitability support the pecking order theory, which means that 
firms prefer using retained earnings rather than debt or equity. On the other hand, results 
show that variable growth opportunity is more supportive of the trade-off theory, and 
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suggests that firms prefer debt to reduce income subject to tax. Overall, each firm variable 
that turns out to be robust in the first phase, remains robust and with the same sign in the 
second phase.  
 
Finally, results in the second phase show that variables at the country level do not influence 
the debt choice of firms, and it can be stated that country-specific determinants do not have a 
substantial effect on the leverage choice of firms. The majority of country-specific variables 
are fragile in all countries, except three variables SMS, CGDP and SIR. The country-specific 
variables SMS, CGDP and SIR are robust only once across all examined countries. For 
instance, SMS is robust only once in Japan for only one measure. The same thing occurred 
with SIR in Australia when utilising only LEVM1, and CGDP in China for only one 
measure.One can conclude that leverage is mostly affected by a firm’s liquidity, profitability 
and growth opportunities in all examined countries. 
 
7.3     Limitation of Research and Recommendations 
The traditional EBA suggested by Leamer (1983, 1985) is too strong for variables to succeed 
in passing the robustness test according to Sala-i-Martin (1997). Leamer’s EBA contends that 
each estimated coefficient for a specific variable should remain statistically significant 
without any change in sign even when the set of variables changes. Sala-i-Martin argues that 
if the distribution of the parameters of interest has positive and negative values and an 
adequate number of regressions are run, then at least one regression will be found in which 
the estimated coefficients become insignificant or change signs. The results show that many 
variables across countries are very close to be robust. Particular variables have a proportion 
of 98% and 99% significant regressions when using a particular measure of leverage (thus the 
variable is fragile), but when a different measure of leverage is tested, the variable turn out to 
be robust. For example in the United Kingdom, the variable PRF is robust at book value 
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measures of leverage, but some of the coefficients of PRF turn out to be insignificant when 
using the market measure; profitability has a proportion of 90%, 91%, and 99% significant 
coefficients when using LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3, respectively. Therefore, if EBA with 
fewer restrictions is applied, more variables are more likely to become robust. Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) advocates an extension to Leamer’s EBA to test the robustness of variables using the 
same methodology and regressions but changes the method of calculating the extreme bounds 
of the variables of interest.  
 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggests analysing the entire distribution of coefficient estimates of  , 
particularly the fraction of the variable’s cumulative distribution function (CDF) lying on 
each side of zero and assigning a level of confidence to each variable of interest while 
reporting the weighted and unweighted parameter estimates of the coefficient, standard 
deviation and the outcome of the CDF test. Sala-i-Martin suggested a new robustness 
criterion, claiming that if at least 90% of the CDF of the estimates   lies on either side of 
zero (the fraction of CDF lying to either side of zero), then the variable is considered robust. 
Finally, it can be stated that Sala-i-Martin’s EBA is with fewer restrictions, and it is easier for 
variables to pass Sala-i-Martin’s robustness test. It is therefore recommended for future 
research to use an EBA with fewer restrictions, and consequently, more variables could pass 
the robustness test. 
 
The results presented in this study should be of interest not only for finance academics 
specialising in corporate finance, but also for practitioners. The capital structure decision is 
vital, as the temptation to accumulate debt is boundless. Debt accumulation is encouraged by 
the tax code, which treats interest payments as tax-exempt. On the other hand, it has been 
recognised, particularly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, that excessive leverage 
can destroy companies (recall the stories of Long-Term Capital Management, Bear Sterns 
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and others that went the way of the dinosaurs as a result of excessive leverage). Hence, 
practitioners must consider a fine balance between the temptation of and the hazard arising 
from debt accumulation. It will be rather interesting to find what happens to the way 
practitioners determine capital structure in the event that interest payments are no longer tax 
exempt—even better in the event that dividends become tax exempt.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics. 
Table A-1: Descriptive statistics for Firm-specific, Country-specific determinants and dependent variables 
This table presents number of observations (N), mean, min, max and standard deviation values of leverages measures, firm specific characteristics and country-specific characteristics 
Variable 
Australia 
 
United States 
 
United Kingdom 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
  Explanatory Variables - Firm and country-specific determinants 
 
 
     
 
     
SIZ 141401 8.076912 3.607407 0 18.11326 
 
527331 11.33495 3.437007 0 19.98155 
 
120306 10.73982 3.04245 0 19.86781 
PRF 139625 1.55127 214.0533 -799.3461 22984 
 
540627 -5.025582 303.6389 -58902 5429.667 
 
131410 -.1208743 3.277605 -219.1429 113.6502 
TAN 144388 0.3495453 0.3069283 0 1 
 
572474 .247344 .2629975 -5.290247 4.142857 
 
132590 .219431 .2452127 0 2.554144 
RISK 150951 2.0397 59.33742 0 5337.957 
 
582076 14.63052 231.8498 0 28114.19 
 
135739 1.235254 59.67231 0 6159.924 
LIQ 140200 12.11355 83.82158 0 4719 
 
563983 4.603131 204.424 0 43660 
 
133550 4.347408 21.29699 0 846.1921 
POR 131486 0.177919 3.433724 -242.8484 201.269 
 
552754 -.6174604 157.3997 -33766.67 300.4795 
 
125619 .3631745 19.47056 -281.5 1926.333 
AGE 202356 10.83366 7.945799 1 41 
 
1041612 14.41224 10.84518 1 41 
 
168432 14.78997 13.94804 1 49 
TAX 240900 49.74545 2.45556 47.2 54.1 
 
1051512 45.45455 1.412518 42.3 47.1 
 
211992 34.94546 .5836626 34.2 36.1 
NDTAX 138146 0.0479695 0.8820353 -0.0022795 99.9707 
 
562782 .0779668 1.197453 0 178 
 
133616 .0427757 .0693375 -.0385401 3.171271 
INV 135741 152.2497 4110.76 -158.5216 390915 
 
503385 89.9511 1434.243 -44357.11 130357.1 
 
119144 112.929 2538.036 0 191084.3 
G(SA) 150199 0.0094285 0.2640524 -7.840969 8.8498 
 
521111 .0091618 .2008342 -8.425735 10.50263 
 
119050 .0104447 .1938322 -11.01907 8.184952 
G(AS) 159048 0.0092238 0.1660758 -7.811163 7.156956 
 
576281 .0094239 .2521964 -9.400961 11.84436 
 
134453 .0110173 .1754943 -8.04211 9.741778 
CAPEX 141703 0.2386262 10.92014 0 1145.25 
 
566589 .069165 1.489919 0 300 
 
133123 .0481072 .1080978 0 7.834081 
INTAN 148994 0.1197785 0.2143481 0 1 
 
529666 .1623117 .2161108 -1.094118 1 
 
134999 .2506623 .2569991 -.0082112 1.353605 
SHPP 142333 0.011772 0.340655 -0.9972619 66 
 
738008 1.796731 625.5197 -1 409499 
 
115174 .0143104 .6054584 -.9966667 133.505 
ASUTI 147521 1.09792 31.31746 -0.4762188 3007 
 
581839 1.219978 5.559019 -.3913043 507.3333 
 
135607 .9998291 3.61457 -2.03125 364.8027 
ROE 147443 -0.3473667 15.54163 -535.2593 1184 
 
587603 -.310283 115.9517 -24966 1670.643 
 
135726 -.2596519 17.88485 -1768.5 375.5926 
GOP 136322 26.63492 2296.835 -0.5394393 255140 
 
504031 88.67352 3045.574 -.9109849 609328 
 
116351 3.224312 44.44007 -.1001795 4305 
CAPIN 140314 110.2733 800.2959 -166.375 33182.99 
 
518661 20.89843 588.1169 -4821.643 60455 
 
120300 34.49501 1091.536 -17.77164 102660.7 
UNPR 32152 14.13225 97.03617 -47.62963 3032 
 
355730 19.17389 442.5354 -571.3158 55523.8 
 
47750 10.76726 125.4177 .0002805 5259 
VAR 195624 28900.61 273669.2 0 7944833 
 
819852 86058.57 493612.6 0 2.00e+07 
 
166320 129429.9 2008399 0 6.92e+07 
INF 240900 2.752174 0.7313711 1.76278 4.352643 
 
1051512 2.384846 1.118527 -.3555463 3.8391 
 
211992 2.576154 .8964071 1.344596 4.48424 
CGDP 240900 53161.22 9854.18 36166.89 69886.34 
 
1051512 47177.76 3812.724 39682.47 53142.89 
 
211992 22734.9 1774.82 19254.3 25162.27 
GGDP 240900 3.66199 1.137624 2.139735 5.65399 
 
1051512 1.846704 1.786978 -2.802422 3.798041 
 
211992 .7696424 1.501042 -3.318984 2.418605 
SMS 219000 6.934412 0.6160605 5.631256 7.851268 
 
955920 6.178911 .1800154 5.797378 6.401789 
 
192720 6.249049 .2067424 5.689022 6.528109 
BMS 240900 48.84652 0.285632 48.34238 49.19663 
 
1051512 49.05982 .0230108 49.03474 49.09546 
 
211992 53.0835 .2820344 52.68269 53.49071 
GCF 240900 33.39651 4.174022 26.35655 40.06151 
 
1051512 20.62886 2.0119 17.51365 23.32965 
 
211992 9.473825 .3544294 9.03962 10.43901 
SIR 240900 0.2194455 0.7205643 -1.1555 1.2929 
 
1051512 2.224545 1.459231 -.39 3.74 
 
211992 1.130309 1.674046 -1.2232 3.5008 
Dependent Variables - Leverages 
               
LEVB1 151023 .2841266 .2783265 -.0808939 1.78125 
 
580902 1.180425 2.888243 -.1227728 30.72751 
 
135748 .4800128 .3201885 -.4625042 2.15873 
LEVB2 147287 .1151507 .1981042 0 1.681486 
 
580534 .6112124 2.138709 0 31.6 
 
135643 .1638608 .1967927 0 1.177542 
LEVB3 146245 .1578491 .3103915 -.4087301 4.273001 
 
581761 .2278559 .5326238 -2.437958 3.102564 
 
135521 .2568207 .3252912 0 2.494714 
LEVM1 136400 .20932 .2165172 -.0765918 .9698223 
 
509497 .3342076 .249367 -.0019099 .9712333 
 
116372 .3430206 .2396039 -.0979193 1.049714 
LEVM2 133109 .0877872 .1453823 0 .9543176 
 
508921 .1430263 .1663358 0 .7304367 
 
116327 .1193109 .143561 0 .7851871 
LEVM3 134105 .1120476 .18576 0 .9986664   511856 .2092966 .2497841 0 1   116441 .175498 .2106445 0 .9993286 
 
178 
 
Table A-2 : Descriptive statistics for Firm-specific, Country-specific determinants and dependent variables 
This table presents number of observations (N), mean, min, max and standard deviation values of leverages measures, firm specific characteristics and country-specific characteristics 
Variable 
Turkey 
 
Austria 
 
Hong Kong 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
  Explanatory Variables - Firm and country-specific determinants   
            
SIZ 28538 12.05626 1.908845 4.077538 17.66776 
 
6542 12.51519 2.211079 0 17.56852 
 
127658 13.31648 2.1019 .6931472 22.44512 
PRF 26948 .108169 .1692042 -2.957825 1.956747 
 
6453 .113772 .0743679 -.4384832 .4802111 
 
126297 -.2028335 14.2233 -1137.666 79.20695 
TAN 28394 .3226509 .5552808 -20.45949 .9869289 
 
6485 .3279039 .1900116 0 .9638809 
 
128312 .2361656 .209521 0 .976359 
RISK 28418 .0915222 .1950521 .0034079 5.422012 
 
6533 .215079 2.756861 .0070995 59.67052 
 
128525 .5630178 18.26557 0 1677.376 
LIQ 28046 2.701076 5.870297 .0316402 127.7132 
 
6212 14.86379 298.9295 .1413685 6809 
 
115647 3.275303 8.074788 .0000616 321.294 
POR 27950 .2464058 1.93819 -29.27564 59.63248 
 
6281 .3418183 .7085258 -6.80089 8.277372 
 
125562 .3529027 3.352791 -44.2637 169.4 
AGE 38016 14.42708 8.898164 1 26 
 
8580 17.47692 11.60055 1 41 
 
151668 11.86249 8.748535 1 41 
TAX 38940 46.08182 5.467131 39.7 53.59999 
 
8712 55.67273 5.68157 51.9 69.8 
 
160116 23.56364 .5973792 22.6 24.1 
NDTAX 27926 .0400349 .03315 -.0598536 .4239281 
 
6461 .0493756 .0283479 0 .185273 
 
128109 .0339514 .2683412 -.010949 26.77494 
INV 28394 81.64156 297.5048 0 9003.074 
 
6497 52.00815 38.75942 0 316.1678 
 
126806 242.6042 16400.45 -34.59044 1684285 
G(SA) 28279 .0078989 .1235432 -5.586997 5.762211 
 
6486 .0073792 .1703491 -3.743577 9.720946 
 
126444 .0085915 .1946747 -9.151501 7.995501 
G(AS) 28146 .010326 .0981715 -3.26159 4.153579 
 
6477 .007068 .1297706 -2.1716 6.432382 
 
127336 .0130393 .1640716 -7.119172 11.33674 
CAPEX 26279 .0535995 .0766367 0 1.68655 
 
6401 .0623657 .0529853 0 .4807657 
 
127376 .052816 .2854757 0 23.25553 
INTAN 28269 .0437749 .0950016 -.1591851 .972814 
 
6521 .0933118 .1062987 0 .539252 
 
127531 .073907 .1618352 -.043432 .9947871 
SHPP 28227 .0193466 .1680623 -.8039604 7.567273 
 
7033 .0118782 .1929547 -.9812143 8.56 
 
106546 .0187572 .2477711 -.9577795 17.14286 
ASUTI 28406 1.047946 1.067329 0 34.48502 
 
6533 1.024062 .4949852 0 2.64242 
 
128489 1.063512 12.15932 -.2647038 1184.82 
ROE 28598 .0650434 2.111491 -56.4 60.30718 
 
6533 .0083384 .6913368 -7.816815 2.210051 
 
128453 -.0687301 14.26323 -1303.031 484.7297 
GOP 26246 1.428533 1.539956 -.2485697 45.96338 
 
5971 1.257017 .6462928 .3166087 9.975173 
 
105859 6.781572 232.6084 -.4428323 19782.21 
CAPIN 28310 2.629132 9.84867 .0289981 261.2034 
 
6509 6.7674 55.74189 .3784409 1001 
 
127718 14.84978 276.3175 -1127.929 19679.36 
UNPR 17469 .1363427 .6110311 -15.06968 7.152543 
 
3821 .2144028 .1595616 .0042371 .9478312 
 
49433 .8549896 16.88314 .0013417 1057.435 
VAR 33000 39419.45 87768.46 0 654984.1 
 
7392 46156.3 115986.4 179.1432 797492.4 
 
154968 777132.9 1.02e+07 0 2.92e+08 
INF 38940 10.22641 4.970459 6.250977 25.29637 
 
8712 2.057117 .7623826 .5063125 3.266939 
 
160116 2.082003 2.235339 -2.5 5.263158 
CGDP 38940 13443.87 4265.292 6897 20838.5 
 
8712 32768.87 2932.222 27705.08 36945.34 
 
160116 239657.6 34209 186703 295686.1 
GGDP 38940 7.439215 6.246802 -7.479913 14.69395 
 
8712 1.176178 1.487157 -2.751165 2.92534 
 
160116 34.19767 24.44787 -19.06274 67.75652 
SMS 35400 2.315961 .0865635 2.161473 2.442818 
 
7920 1.127615 .0775777 1.057815 1.267853 
 
145560 9.41488 .7968024 8.415662 11.06 
BMS 38940 30.09305 .0104751 30.07811 30.11899 
 
8712 51.50291 .0605305 51.40795 51.58706 
 
160116 49.19025 .0455707 49.14385 49.27291 
GCF 38940 30.50165 5.190002 23.1529 39.45552 
 
8712 17.13129 1.49689 15.14006 20.48692 
 
160116 176.2514 10.11076 163.7893 195.609 
SIR 38940 -8.34091 12.77334 -37.26 7.1 
 
8712 1.444545 .9337595 -.33 2.91 
 
160116 4.71 3.158269 .87 11.39 
Dependent Variables - Leverages 
               
LEVB1 28418 .4667368 .3319489 -1.60353 3.819628 
 
6521 .5356219 .2195253 .0001664 1.25847 
 
128513 .4795234 .5253321 -.0572696 8.647187 
LEVB2 27429 .2047564 .1867609 0 .8929908 
 
6533 .2442386 .1717326 0 .8153598 
 
128450 .2033132 .268714 0 4.060481 
LEVB3 27189 .2926516 .2680288 0 1.749815 
 
6434 .368903 .2642839 0 2.232244 
 
128276 .2590362 .3265322 -2.489925 3.187877 
LEVM1 26246 .4023779 .2368211 -.9767694 .9676714 
 
5971 .4734489 .2172403 .0001791 .8878318 
 
105859 .3625218 .2330571 .0030917 .9437647 
LEVM2 25311 .188783 .173433 0 .8550367 
 
5971 .2261105 .1716392 0 .802869 
 
105847 .169767 .1728668 0 1.012731 
LEVM3 25563 .2562196 .2267548 0 .9730285   6044 .3251039 .2476794 0 .9787316   105879 .2337481 .2376797 0 .9994009 
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Table A-3 : Descriptive statistics for Firm-specific, Country-specific determinants and dependent variables 
This table presents number of observations (N), mean, min, max and standard deviation values of leverages measures, firm specific characteristics and country-specific characteristics 
Variable 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Singapore 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
  Explanatory Variables - Firm and country-specific determinants 
 
 
     
 
     
SIZ 68406 11.69302 2.645313 0 19.02116 
 
70085 11.49714 2.668386 0 19.09875 
 
71017 11.74503 1.949284 0 22.60533 
PRF 65140 .174078 6.197809 -4.891422 453.6898 
 
69346 .0475357 1.541934 -111.0769 22.17391 
 
70516 .4103736 22.58328 -36.46614 1412.982 
TAN 67618 .1721372 .1813902 0 .9756189 
 
71230 .2186629 .2068026 0 1.671516 
 
71136 .2731878 .2174267 0 .9911111 
RISK 67774 .2981922 8.881655 0 633.4556 
 
71806 1.035841 28.76226 0 2005.336 
 
71432 .3716599 11.09165 .0009019 682.2006 
LIQ 65802 2.12162 6.578923 0 255.6604 
 
67785 4.374023 28.08975 .0017823 1288 
 
69919 2.586495 4.362749 0 179.3518 
POR 59146 .3558005 4.025992 -61.83333 156.8868 
 
63143 1.261712 28.81161 -104.75 1540 
 
69271 .6291775 13.87926 -81.77787 968.9114 
AGE 92268 14.07439 9.792472 1 41 
 
94116 15.61851 9.733255 1 41 
 
81576 11.96117 7.921086 1 41 
TAX 96096 65.99091 .548478 64.8 66.6 
 
97812 47.39091 1.612716 43.9 49.4 
 
88440 24.18182 4.354922 18.3 33.8 
NDTAX 66153 .0539045 .3623642 -.0538575 23.56362 
 
69175 .0512269 .0634856 0 1.740741 
 
70874 .0346868 .0393691 -.1252164 .7541502 
INV 65692 62.99323 441.18 0 27933.23 
 
68192 67.58893 464.3474 0 25915 
 
69626 110.642 1169.944 0 73194.01 
G(SA) 67780 .0058915 .1136845 -5.675283 5.755742 
 
69438 .0048408 .1457321 -9.83081 7.332757 
 
70340 .0047675 .1656502 -10.03743 11.25413 
G(AS) 67121 .0070094 .1012102 -3.727087 8.811145 
 
71187 .0060769 .1374683 -5.062595 7.927147 
 
70764 .0082043 .1238701 -4.686525 6.343804 
CAPEX 61550 .0454808 .0685875 0 2.457617 
 
66228 .0766691 1.588194 0 123.4992 
 
70282 .0545809 .0783224 0 1.047049 
INTAN 67516 .1889196 .1750241 -.070922 .9921228 
 
70910 .1528427 .1824044 -.0008997 .9492639 
 
71040 .0403691 .1018132 -.170835 .9929093 
SHPP 67905 .012841 .22236 -.9658915 19.94674 
 
75748 .0497679 5.161214 -1 999 
 
61145 .0114591 .1908558 -.9993104 8 
ASUTI 67682 1.058619 1.006789 0 42.81516 
 
71686 1.199928 1.043251 -.6668301 31.12214 
 
71324 1.02218 1.011578 0 31.44063 
ROE 67768 .0777639 16.77387 -723.24 878.8 
 
71565 -.4856786 25.8726 -1633 173 
 
71423 -.0135108 12.81087 -871.5507 419.2 
GOP 60773 1.556407 2.125398 .0584884 111.0909 
 
64517 2.707861 27.28806 .0868852 2195.5 
 
60772 1.547022 6.991921 .0446506 370.3363 
CAPIN 66994 14.66508 332.0422 .0233562 16281 
 
69920 12.11376 269.8139 -10339.69 6757 
 
70725 15.08087 672.2669 .031806 50988.67 
UNPR 10866 17.83802 468.2253 -.0833333 14095 
 
31950 1.040322 10.62252 -160.8571 442.8824 
 
16562 2.777401 44.29508 -.0851777 1043.556 
VAR 79068 71847.06 277976.5 0 3927434 
 
82104 74027.48 304465.3 0 3842338 
 
83556 2174491 4.01e+07 242.1475 9.39e+08 
INF 96096 1.683614 .6880359 .0880842 2.813915 
 
97812 1.614178 .6161329 .3127377 2.628383 
 
88440 2.527532 1.97393 .4251063 6.51859 
CGDP 96096 28961.97 1805.875 25512.54 31196.42 
 
97812 29623.07 2510.874 26020.53 33956.08 
 
88440 57129.51 8674.094 41070.23 69049.84 
GGDP 96096 .7784448 1.204701 -2.265397 2.049389 
 
97812 .8922921 1.822133 -3.703952 3.029592 
 
88440 9.285499 6.35307 -.8776372 20.78038 
SMS 87360 2.778085 .1719742 2.526989 3.076633 
 
88920 .441463 .0927614 .3057539 .6334615 
 
80400 6.779439 .5123194 5.936485 7.485189 
BMS 96096 45.49628 .1058159 45.33067 45.62717 
 
97812 51.24071 .0465812 51.16752 51.30875 
 
88440 50.38756 .0282868 50.32361 50.42645 
GCF 96096 15.34917 .8462468 13.6408 16.63065 
 
97812 13.62248 .9935268 11.81305 15.81824 
 
88440 36.87224 3.150343 30.73308 43.06528 
SIR 96096 1.71 .8982656 -.13 2.67 
 
97812 1.14 .8192056 -.64 2.03 
 
88440 1.144545 .9488838 -.38 2.98 
Dependent Variables - Leverages                
LEVB1 67762 .5901013 .2441725 -.0539636 2.529891 
 
71782 .5418941 .2795866 -.2915353 2.530289 
 
71420 .4513688 .2284274 .0016928 1.647098 
LEVB2 67738 .2065642 .1766424 0 1.554505 
 
71524 .1925082 .191807 0 1.088022 
 
71420 .1943089 .1688922 0 .88512 
LEVB3 67186 .3330091 .2967901 -1.953407 2.785473 
 
69818 .3000979 .2891686 -.104918 1.695734 
 
71288 .2810778 .2758596 0 3.714286 
LEVM1 60761 .475822 .2185341 -.0165309 .992734 
 
64522 .4426361 .2473341 -.5819116 .9970317 
 
60784 .4383307 .23325 .000297 1.008689 
LEVM2 60761 .1754111 .1488564 0 .9427832 
 
64329 .1652022 .168768 0 .7421881 
 
60784 .199564 .1858543 0 .9744765 
LEVM3 61109 .2708684 .2289593 0 .983777   65083 .2527736 .255113 0 .9999948   60832 .2807587 .2555986 0 .9998961 
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Table A-4 : Descriptive statistics for Firm-specific, Country-specific determinants and dependent variables 
This table presents number of observations (N), mean, min, max and standard deviation values of leverages measures, firm specific characteristics and country-specific characteristics 
Variable 
China 
 
Japan 
 
Malaysia 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
  Explanatory Variables - Firm and country-specific determinants 
 
 
     
 
     
SIZ 228780 13.94745 1.612276 0 21.78116 
 
405087 17.24461 1.763643 7.07327 23.99243 
 
95193 11.9101 1.666594 3.258096 17.67839 
PRF 219192 1.544772 188.4618 -51.83529 25455.37 
 
391805 .07732 .1742008 -8.721848 20.43708 
 
91204 .0883813 .3984597 -11.71341 35.32 
TAN 228876 .3255825 .2013309 0 .9849778 
 
404707 .2915539 .1900844 0 1.052879 
 
91913 .3525395 .2088392 0 .9660357 
RISK 229056 .5411527 39.01988 .0006307 4608.931 
 
404824 .0586754 .4896188 0 53.03031 
 
92030 .2083134 10.15134 0 887.7552 
LIQ 227352 2.317026 4.389879 -5.131825 204.7052 
 
402493 2.247645 8.683269 .0715247 2407 
 
91435 3.425579 8.463623 0 282.4198 
POR 135408 .6230603 3.931699 -35.73935 221.7177 
 
398133 .6221504 23.67412 -219 3669 
 
91168 .3727551 4.579917 -128.902 293.2381 
AGE 301752 9.669291 6.43761 1 23 
 
430452 20.96197 11.75262 1 41 
 
104016 14.46193 7.909893 1 41 
TAX 302148 72.63636 8.04311 63.5 81.2 
 
441276 51.2 2.227108 47.7 55 
 
104148 35.43636 1.412466 33.7 38.9 
NDTAX 225036 .0369519 1.199173 -.0187186 164.1961 
 
403917 .0333882 .0282046 -.1004808 1.020962 
 
91635 .033862 .0792278 -.0004137 9.108 
INV 228324 569.6101 52136.68 0 7030630 
 
400786 41.36432 93.11685 0 9624.474 
 
90016 98.04108 1418.967 0 120582.5 
G(SA) 226523 .0110923 .1359652 -12.25794 11.82702 
 
401825 .0028594 .0684291 -5.817801 9.998534 
 
94361 .0052329 .1271006 -5.874135 8.124629 
G(AS) 226812 .0131553 .112141 -9.136647 8.458129 
 
401547 .0030911 .0566244 -2.770374 5.042199 
 
91202 .0052635 .0903518 -4.504002 7.034975 
CAPEX 228492 .0738593 .5909215 0 81.11929 
 
400169 .0351677 .0405041 0 .8072635 
 
90603 .0452288 .0592452 0 1.332713 
INTAN 228900 .0506068 .0673389 -.0125589 .8435813 
 
400783 .0254646 .1060476 -.1549027 16.98981 
 
91335 .0547085 .1153426 -.0972818 1.496316 
SHPP 192796 .0145228 .7333117 -.9973684 314 
 
379115 .0111585 .2186043 -.9312714 102.6392 
 
85689 .0109702 .2505736 -.9712375 50.6 
ASUTI 229044 .7416289 .586461 0 14.0537 
 
404740 1.231072 .7221562 0 12.88293 
 
92018 .8058978 .900795 0 86.9 
ROE 227928 -18.56498 2576.384 -355081.3 713.4072 
 
404587 .0118224 1.439148 -71.96571 148.281 
 
92006 .0218268 4.500755 -534.6 68.93913 
GOP 192562 8.595954 522.2468 .2354702 57642.45 
 
378855 1.186837 2.255008 -.1359576 264.8487 
 
85632 1.150555 1.153746 .1204897 111.0244 
CAPIN 228708 65.77823 7210.829 0 978886 
 
404602 1.416853 28.09317 .0776221 4827.67 
 
91677 3.71235 73.95282 .0115075 9859.77 
UNPR 72672 .2742169 5.360521 -.0251031 415.6 
 
279300 .3256693 5.084807 .0057444 747.3898 
 
19384 .207744 .9514634 -.0470392 37.03629 
VAR 294624 268828.3 1282528 640.7196 3.56e+07 
 
427152 4408711 2.36e+07 0 9.57e+08 
 
103356 44372.57 137754.5 0 1614509 
INF 302148 2.931393 1.883644 -.7029491 5.864384 
 
441276 -.0422978 .6447866 -1.346719 1.37349 
 
104148 2.345756 1.312351 .5833084 5.440782 
CGDP 302148 24446.28 10383.39 10541.97 42177.2 
 
441276 3848594 116406.1 3687380 4014810 
 
104148 25657.04 5185.404 16824.35 33127.73 
GGDP 302148 74.95408 19.34797 47.52885 107.7409 
 
441276 96.58856 235.4495 -517.1597 408.3546 
 
104148 17.517 7.962327 -5.334979 25.77706 
SMS 274680 3.710515 .4217144 3.331203 4.781969 
 
401160 4.794028 .1747443 4.599544 5.084815 
 
94680 6.410419 .2432631 5.809851 6.682552 
BMS 302148 42.41841 .0040725 42.41431 42.42902 
 
441276 49.67421 .0075091 49.66447 49.68593 
 
104148 43.71543 .0264986 43.67995 43.76755 
GCF 302148 326.4283 17.45965 305.3588 358.0805 
 
441276 2195.821 398.517 1612.426 2694.623 
 
104148 78.66879 7.303865 62.86245 87.58817 
SIR 302148 1.264564 .9088624 -.5328 2.315 
 
441276 .9512482 .3078093 .53564 1.44848 
 
104148 .9529091 .6067655 .089 2.147 
Dependent Variables - Leverages 
   
            LEVB1 228996 .4647307 .2374535 .0176432 2.814788 
 
404730 .4959593 .2107516 .0325695 .997061 
 
92030 .3820148 .1996525 .0172083 .9308244 
LEVB2 228000 .2468384 .1919412 0 1.745979 
 
404520 .2025884 .1824522 0 .8237066 
 
91949 .1906676 .1642266 0 .6666791 
LEVB3 227880 .3268013 .2748294 -2.233674 3.193114 
 
403236 .2959128 .2570805 0 1.478375 
 
91758 .2460427 .212083 0 .8708546 
LEVM1 192538 .2956633 .205716 .0033323 1.001818 
 
378834 .5032187 .2279413 .0114397 .9398602 
 
85632 .4148889 .239297 .0006069 1.150563 
LEVM2 191709 .1645778 .1526396 0 .9116726 
 
378623 .2012654 .1794498 0 .7506704 
 
85632 .2182181 .1931493 0 .9325517 
LEVM3 192569 .2063627 .1993876 0 .9994801   379331 .3044752 .2584043 0 .9943347   85817 .2928168 .2574741 0 .9905525 
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Table A-5 : Descriptive statistics for Firm-specific, Country-specific determinants and dependent variables 
This table presents number of observations (N), mean, min, max and standard deviation values of leverages measures, firm specific characteristics and country-specific characteristics. 
Variable 
India 
 
Indonesia 
 
Brazil 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
  Explanatory Variables - Firm and country-specific determinants 
             
SIZ 219632 14.54908 2.135213 0 22.30912 
 
37143 20.49892 1.946807 10.71442 25.99051 
 
29872 13.25803 2.283477 2.564949 19.53546 
PRF 217266 .1124844 .4159819 -36.71667 50.56063 
 
36003 .1024249 2.048969 -108.7855 21.04789 
 
28786 -4.717644 235.4542 -11534 1.772667 
TAN 220098 .3622014 .2216686 -.0049298 1 
 
37215 .3935667 .2444856 0 .985234 
 
30910 .3490047 .245622 0 .9906132 
RISK 221433 6.122783 413.3662 0 33697.19 
 
37287 .5080719 13.16156 0 722.987 
 
31234 40.24791 1056.338 0 40714.53 
LIQ 219771 7.438782 277.7433 -413.9011 34097.4 
 
36879 3.18978 15.33585 0 455.0488 
 
30586 1.865722 5.422993 .0001169 336.4274 
POR 213192 .2132774 4.912755 -158.4632 471 
 
36897 .0100755 9.504423 -517.2236 29.88421 
 
29422 .4634223 2.738142 -19.7379 81.37671 
AGE 417912 14.02685 7.558764 1 33 
 
46200 12.72857 8.672087 1 24 
 
35112 14.10526 7.430751 1 24 
TAX 418704 64.79091 6.036632 51.8 74 
 
46596 30.62727 1.190956 28.7 31.8 
 
36036 68.1 1.273523 65.6 69 
NDTAX 218688 .0315683 .0276504 -.0125697 1.042851 
 
36951 .0427467 .050759 0 1.66565 
 
29242 .0370609 .0303671 0 .3373661 
INV 206864 80.54116 113.4787 -1202.077 1412.74 
 
36891 86.24371 355.3797 0 9102.921 
 
29500 79.0271 816.5709 0 39009.84 
G(SA) 217334 .010588 .1709793 -9.347372 15.00765 
 
36784 .0127073 .1516045 -4.650581 7.391712 
 
29609 .0084042 .1239892 -4.979941 6.302336 
G(AS) 219414 .0131915 .1314109 -5.876291 10.39329 
 
36934 .0134708 .1484622 -5.379654 7.410597 
 
30969 .0114695 .1537283 -2.187857 11.80033 
CAPEX 209079 .0809351 .098785 0 3.78893 
 
37023 .06397 .0818321 0 .9686432 
 
28117 .0602596 .073213 0 .9860461 
INTAN 211536 .0298948 .0904148 -.0105807 .9282988 
 
33384 .0200284 .0648814 0 .8800476 
 
30430 .0771096 .1490043 -.0047885 .8988901 
SHPP 324484 .035126 1.438861 -.9802759 681.5 
 
31976 .0246697 .2080894 -.914 6.888474 
 
28008 .0319022 1.369306 -1 224 
ASUTI 218994 .9185591 .6029501 -.245109 3.742148 
 
37227 1.152339 1.276678 0 20.97631 
 
31042 .8074 .6476457 0 8.212205 
ROE 221160 .0659614 6.733203 -334.429 693.4091 
 
37263 -.4521649 25.11433 -1376.292 43.74979 
 
31162 .086546 2.41887 -56.10967 80.86464 
GOP 199326 1.563551 3.993802 -2.393289 455.25 
 
31923 1.972677 16.35734 -1.386317 763.6072 
 
27330 4.691113 82.12494 .0377124 8695.494 
CAPIN 212828 1.889265 2.516041 .2038133 24.84352 
 
37143 4.270726 39.61565 0 1445.431 
 
29860 27.60269 251.1535 .12177 5194.141 
UNPR 2529 .1551646 .2060566 .000934 1.504905 
 
8878 .1749705 .2676834 -.0192682 5.733962 
 
6882 .7184738 5.651957 .0000404 93.69775 
VAR 283668 1222865 6558838 0 1.74e+08 
 
45276 2.78e+08 6.58e+08 0 5.66e+09 
 
34848 272702.7 1005091 0 1.36e+07 
INF 418704 7.694038 2.859081 3.767238 11.9923 
 
46596 7.142848 2.637713 4.279512 13.10942 
 
36036 6.348218 2.823618 3.637028 14.71533 
CGDP 418704 52353.07 20247.39 26335.18 87830.68 
 
46596 2.14e+07 9029623 9230874 3.64e+07 
 
36036 16110.93 4768.916 9354.514 24165.63 
GGDP 418704 351.4036 83.35528 169.2768 469.1451 
 
46596 53523.19 6120.983 41001.87 60478.78 
 
36036 7.494075 4.933518 -.6563084 16.71389 
SMS 380640 4.753968 .2864752 4.451346 5.468556 
 
42360 1.361929 .106776 1.193555 1.508168 
 
32760 4.595717 .1766148 4.356444 5.002602 
BMS 418704 35.63691 .0080241 35.62062 35.64832 
 
46596 26.9295 .0096761 26.91704 26.9505 
 
36036 33.87001 .0342998 33.82948 33.94513 
GCF 418704 1607.456 166.1232 1217.602 1854.219 
 
46596 271869.5 45607.69 215036.2 351937.2 
 
36036 38.65549 5.331075 32.99866 50.07026 
SIR 418704 1.974545 3.250616 -3.85 6.99 
 
46596 2.936 1.91742 .511 6.821 
 
36036 7.03391 7.073689 -3.29 19.085 
Dependent Variables - Leverages 
               
LEVB1 217158 .5790467 .2609274 .0218906 2.24102 
 
37287 .5422512 .3113605 -.0053604 2.660213 
 
31234 .7385803 .7830027 -.0035588 8.428984 
LEVB2 221520 .3075131 .2284551 0 1.308601 
 
37287 .2856614 .2573883 0 1.978319 
 
31222 .2684261 .1841421 0 .8643576 
LEVB3 220128 .4241939 .3207946 0 2.571129 
 
37239 .3841193 .3424617 -.4908265 2.786274 
 
31066 .3400297 .2921368 -1.050601 .953915 
LEVM1 199302 .5233246 .2555387 .0062494 .9661332 
 
31923 .4638681 .2607701 -.0127416 .9690731 
 
27330 .6025598 .2714379 -.0053426 1.002157 
LEVM2 199242 .2861952 .2171714 0 .8165257 
 
31923 .2562698 .2250066 -.4206492 1.122959 
 
27318 .2609371 .1846399 0 .8036466 
LEVM3 200696 .4007291 .2954002 0 .99889   31959 .3409097 .2889791 0 .9960581   27450 .4559609 .3040782 0 .999816 
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Table A-6 : Descriptive statistics for Firm-specific, Country-specific determinants and dependent variables 
This table presents number of observations (N), mean, min, max and standard deviation values of leverages measures, firm specific characteristics and country-specific characteristics. 
Variable 
South Africa 
 
Chile 
 
N mean sd min max 
 
N mean sd min max 
 
  Explanatory Variables - Firm and country-specific determinants 
        
SIZ 26358 14.14089 2.332339 0 19.01549 
 
18936 17.93289 2.564568 7.947325 23.22221 
 
PRF 26438 .1541555 .7342876 -19.06417 17.06316 
 
16788 .0783905 .9840946 -27.72923 18.07514 
 
TAN 27114 .2956974 .233983 0 1.205536 
 
19668 .4698509 .2675883 0 1 
 
RISK 27324 .9822303 20.93857 .0022195 914.856 
 
19668 .1392606 1.075913 .0006056 40.84511 
 
LIQ 26709 2.824439 18.60701 .0059172 726.1296 
 
17652 3.378572 16.6989 0 433.5122 
 
POR 26235 .2889327 2.123801 -31.85714 73.04348 
 
17928 .7142831 24.52496 -601.2375 724.3944 
 
AGE 30888 16.20513 9.891483 1 41 
 
20856 18.51266 7.98573 1 26 
 
TAX 31284 33.74545 3.302768 28.6 38.1 
 
23760 25.54545 1.074828 24.5 27.7 
 
NDTAX 26694 .0385261 .0363179 0 .6881468 
 
17652 .0476315 .3399389 -.0019294 13.02958 
 
INV 25681 192.2761 6756.175 0 312615.7 
 
18888 86.28817 794.3103 0 20133.14 
 
G(SA) 26109 .0104921 .1581425 -7.12206 9.727969 
 
18746 .0050607 .1965005 -7.148977 11.45371 
 
G(AS) 27083 .0126413 .1595184 -4.398678 8.392998 
 
19559 .0062248 .1104027 -6.190933 6.291756 
 
CAPEX 26335 .0717117 .345544 0 15.9616 
 
19428 .0514213 .0722025 0 1.992078 
 
INTAN 27166 .1168704 .1675902 0 .9967976 
 
19680 .0570763 .10702 -.02431 .8287738 
 
SHPP 24641 .0166842 .181369 -.8586956 8.8 
 
15966 .0221094 .8493178 -.9961818 93.18604 
 
ASUTI 27312 1.409672 1.115774 -.0685364 18.06294 
 
19728 .7292286 2.132221 0 83.83475 
 
ROE 27312 .0479964 5.293862 -120.48 170.6316 
 
19728 .1008196 .5775463 -9.997288 7.679475 
 
GOP 24396 1.690349 3.231434 .0239678 146.3974 
 
17291 5.949737 35.43911 .0931916 716.8389 
 
CAPIN 26352 152.3857 6591.127 -14.59078 308831 
 
18936 26.61187 318.396 .0119282 9503.973 
 
UNPR 4692 .6933381 8.750651 -.004578 169.76 
 
3384 .295188 .8400423 .0126621 9.807034 
 
VAR 30624 532049.6 1542682 716.567 1.18e+07 
 
22836 2.56e+07 5.74e+07 1547.254 4.36e+08 
 
INF 31284 5.610179 2.437542 1.385382 11.53645 
 
23760 -3.148329 5.218429 -12.10251 3.340318 
 
CGDP 31284 45013.56 11870.77 27419.9 63896.31 
 
23760 5616487 1393433 3364570 7791789 
 
GGDP 31284 24.2674 13.47317 -12.93377 39.08597 
 
23760 2372.891 1060.181 -581.2926 3682.219 
 
SMS 28440 7.05265 .5102549 6.294832 7.912752 
 
21600 7.150319 .1923901 6.736295 7.570488 
 
BMS 31284 36.73866 .0152968 36.7164 36.77354 
 
23760 36.65622 .0244523 36.62573 36.69826 
 
GCF 31284 147.0346 24.28747 114.1988 187.5741 
 
23760 12292.61 1225.802 11090.04 15299.57 
 
SIR 31284 1.305455 1.993144 -3.34 3.409999 
 
23760 -.9654546 1.913848 -3.97 1.67 
 
Dependent Variables - Leverages 
          
LEVB1 27312 .5053133 .2422753 -.2102649 1.954733 
 
19752 .4380301 .2295352 -.0213532 1.9027 
 
LEVB2 27312 .1838988 .179001 0 1.30531 
 
19752 .2218659 .1843073 0 1.482309 
 
LEVB3 27083 .2830537 .2781882 -.5485362 2.384273 
 
19728 .2961594 .2422671 0 1.920863 
 
LEVM1 24390 .3916523 .2133585 -.0822895 1.380742 
 
17291 .3684647 .2173507 -.0127498 .9999292 
 
LEVM2 24396 .1451577 .1464902 0 .7915083 
 
17291 .1903702 .162049 0 .8718141 
 
LEVM3 24530 .2072991 .2085785 0 .9951437   17315 .2505031 .2167344 0 .9999194   
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Appendix B: Results of First Phase - Firm -Specific Determinants 
Table B-1.1 : Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Australia 
This table presents Australia’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.1611* -49.5679 0.0128 -0.0806*   -52.2324   0.0122 100% 
 
-0.0693*   -55.8081    0.0114 -0.0326* -25.9722 0.0245 100% 
 
-0.0939* -20.9110 0.0304 -0.0352* -17.8054  0.0357 100% 
 
TAN -0.1750 -72.2019 0.0088 -0.0282  -12.8927  0.0493 81% 
 
0.0213   12.8194 0.0496 0.1128 25.9251 0.0245 46% 
 
0.0351 12.8638 0.0494 0.1241 17.8416 0.0356 16% 
 
RISK 0.0140 14.0573 0.0452 0.0754 31.4566 0.0202 98%  0.0079   12.8942 0.0493 0.0172 23.7036 0.0268 40%  0.0126 12.9160 0.0492 0.0252 25.4360 0.0250 54%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0083
* -62.1750 0.0102 -0.0058* -102.4805   0.0062 100%  -0.0032* -64.7902 0.0098 -0.0021*  -19.0071  0.0335 100%  -0.0045*  -23.8339 0.0267 -0.0031* -17.0833 0.0372 100%  
POR -0.0219 -7.2406 0.0874 0.0120 8.5700 0.0740 0.00% 
 
-0.0134 -5.1276 0.1226 0.0058 5.1961 0.1210 0.00% 
 
-0.0540 -12.9492  0.0491 -0.0234 -12.8955 0.0493 0.03% 
 
AGE -0.0019 -22.6850 0.0280 0.0012 13.6367 0.0466 8% 
 
-0.0009 -12.9582 0.0490 0.0010  13.9655 0.0455 1% 
 
0.0013 12.7571 0.0498 0.0040 16.6503 0.0382 21% 
 
TAX 0.0036 12.9910  0.0489 0.0105 36.7711 0.0173 78% 
 
0.0030 13.3786 0.0475 0.0060 26.3690 0.0241 84% 
 
0.0044 12.8657  0.0494 0.0079 22.4101 0.0284 77% 
 
NDTAX d 0.4730 27.1261  0.0235 1.1721 63.1630 0.0101 100% 
 
0.1815 12.7752  0.0497 0.4578 32.5240 0.0196 80% 
 
0.2921 12.9565  0.0490 0.6717 30.2215 0.0211 80% 
 
INV 0.0001 12.7293 0.0499 0.0003 30.6439 0.0208 73% 
 
0.0001  12.8091 0.0496 0.0002 26.3898  0.0241 83% 
 
0.0001 12.7919 0.0497 0.0002  17.5781 0.0362 56% 
 
G(SA) -0.0198 -10.3505  0.0613 0.0039 0.8157 0.5644 0.00% 
 
-0.0137  -4.0242 0.1551 -0.0017 -1.0449 0.4860 0.00% 
 
-0.0181 -7.4237  0.0852 -0.0035  -1.3293 0.4106 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.0663 -6.6870 0.0945 0.0182 4.2466  0.1472 0.00% 
 
-0.0264 -3.9054 0.1596 0.0073 2.0436 0.2897 0.00% 
 
-0.0382 -7.6211 0.0831 0.0055 0.9994 0.5002 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.1403 -34.3825   0.0185 0.0653 15.8000  0.0402 22% 
 
0.0388 12.8666 0.0494 0.1383 15.7902 0.0403 10% 
 
-0.0549 -9.7722 0.0649 0.1459 10.0175 0.0633 0.00% 
 
INTAN -0.0946 -13.9427    0.0456 0.1336 40.1493 0.0159 79% 
 
0.0444  18.1698 0.0350 0.1313 48.8038 0.0130 85% 
 
0.0513 13.2985  0.0478 0.1570 37.4620  0.0170 84% 
 
SHPP -0.0553  -7.3863   0.0857 0.0007 0.2107 0.8678 0.00% 
 
-0.0310  -5.5379 0.1137 -0.0108 -4.0474 0.1542 0.00% 
 
-0.0332 -3.4536 0.1794 -0.0117 -1.1736  0.4493 0.00% 
 
ASUTI d c 0.0663*   63.4451  0.0100 0.1212*  50.4840 0.0126 100% 
 
-0.0266 -15.0349  0.0423 -0.0102 -12.7965 0.0496 62% 
 
0.0160 12.7748 0.0497 0.0325 22.9045 0.0278 19% 
 
ROE -0.0074  -38.7419    0.0164 -0.0026 -13.7854 0.0461 86% 
 
0.0017  12.7197 0.0499 0.0060 14.9960 0.0424 6% 
 
0.0024 12.8296 0.0495 0.0117 16.6937 0.0381 31% 
 
GOP m 0.0047 12.7668    0.0498 0.0215 58.8221  0.0108 95% 
 
0.0034   12.7555 0.0498 0.0066 24.1204  0.0264 20% 
 
0.0056 12.7071 0.0500 0.0078 18.0652 0.0352 8% 
 
CAPIN 0.0001 13.0370   0.0487 0.0003 52.7973 0.0121 71% 
 
0.0001   18.6993 0.0340 0.0002 45.6096 0.0140 84% 
 
0.0001 13.1707  0.0482 0.0002 36.6278 0.0174 84% 
 
UNPR 0.0007 13.2879 0.0478 0.0019 30.3737 0.0210 98% 
 
0.0005  12.9954 0.0489 0.0010 21.8312 0.0291 81% 
 
0.0008 12.7981  0.0496 0.0012 15.2985 0.0416 19% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -38.9183  0.0164 0.0000 23.6873 0.0269 42% 
 
0.0000  12.7500 0.0498 0.0000 23.7949  0.0267 69% 
 
0.0000 12.9551 0.0490 0.0000 20.4739 0.0311 35% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-1.2 : Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Australia 
This table presents Australia’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of  βmin and  βmax  are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total 
of 969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.        
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.0884 -68.9210 0.0092 -0.0161 -12.7990 0.0496 65% 
 
-0.0364 -36.5627  0.0174 -0.0117 -12.7775 0.0497 33% 
 
-0.0529 -42.0242 0.0151 -0.0149 -12.7449 0.0498 45% 
 
TAN -0.0971 -50.9760 0.0125 0.1181 28.1354 0.0226 37% 
 
0.0163 12.8735 0.0494 0.1211 37.3185 0.0171 92% 
 
0.0212 13.2404  0.0480 0.1262 30.3315 0.0210 74% 
 
RISK 0.0081 13.4050 0.0474 0.0336 45.8701 0.0139 42%  0.0057 12.7247 0.0499 0.0116 24.3675 0.0261 16%  0.0073 12.7532 0.0498 0.0147 24.4903 0.0260 19%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0056
* -116.1476 0.0055 -0.0038* -37.2046 0.0171 100%  -0.0024* -64.9308 0.0098 -0.0012* -17.1337 0.0371 100%  -0.0030* -62.1403 0.0102 -0.0017* -18.3414 0.0347 100%  
POR c -0.0550* -21.4837 0.0296 -0.0180* -16.0782  0.0395 100% 
 
-0.0266 -14.5307 0.0437 -0.0108  -12.7168 0.0500 24% 
 
-0.0417 -17.8783 0.0356 -0.0145 -13.3519  0.0476 98% 
 
AGE -0.0010 -14.1704  0.0449 -0.0009 -13.1948 0.0482 0.06% 
 
-0.0004 -8.0586 0.0786 0.0006 12.0308 0.0528 0.00% 
 
-0.0006 -8.5862 0.0738 0.0008 11.6344 0.0546 0.00% 
 
TAX -0.0040 -17.3237 0.0367 -0.0029 -12.8566 0.0494 7% 
 
-0.0020  -5.6284 0.1119 0.0013 7.7680 0.0815 0.00% 
 
-0.0022  -4.8434 0.1296 0.0013 6.2403 0.1012 0.00% 
 
NDTAX 0.1881 12.8634 0.0494 0.5310 37.0189 0.0172 69% 
 
0.1380 12.7920 0.0497 0.1551 14.4488 0.0440 0.03% 
 
-0.2372 -9.0428  0.0701 0.1721 12.6090 0.0504 0.00% 
 
INV 0.0002 12.9442 0.0491 0.0003 42.1934 0.0151 91% 
 
0.0001  12.8812 0.0493 0.0002  34.3684 0.0185 97% 
 
0.0002 12.9795 0.0490 0.0002 33.4580  0.0190 98% 
 
G(SA) -0.0210 -12.4784 0.0509 0.0012 0.3462 0.7878 0.00% 
 
-0.0101 -8.5397 0.0742 -0.0011 -0.4535 0.7290 0.00% 
 
-0.0130 -8.7578 0.0724 -0.0010 -0.3213 0.8021 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.0093 -1.3034 0.4166 0.0402 10.9474  0.0580 0.00% 
 
-0.0131 -2.5222 0.2403 0.0113  4.1100 0.1519 0.00% 
 
-0.0165 -2.4894 0.2432 0.0179 5.1344  0.1225 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.1537 -14.9387 0.0426 -0.0436 -13.6105 0.0467 84% 
 
-0.1277  -17.6862 0.0360 -0.0283 -12.7412 0.0499 34% 
 
-0.1586  -17.1095  0.0372 -0.0364 -12.7466 0.0498 65% 
 
INTAN 0.0307 13.0362 0.0487 0.1142 41.2133 0.0154 83% 
 
0.0274 14.0905 0.0451 0.0929 45.5740 0.0140 86% 
 
0.0301 12.7448 0.0498 0.0962 36.8192 0.0173 82% 
 
SHPP -0.0787 -13.7624 0.0462 -0.0389 -15.0906 0.0421 94% 
 
-0.0333  -16.5496 0.0384 -0.0252 -12.7257 0.0499 78% 
 
-0.0472 -18.8054 0.0338 -0.0323 -12.7143 0.0500 82% 
 
ASUTI d c 0.0321* 38.9186 0.0164 0.0626* 36.1560 0.0176 100% 
 
-0.0234 -36.4592 0.0175 -0.0082 -13.0707 0.0486 85% 
 
-0.0155 -19.0434 0.0334 -0.0098 -12.8615 0.0494 7% 
 
ROE -0.0038 -13.4666 0.0472 -0.0016 -12.8276  0.0495 5% 
 
-0.0004  -2.8937 0.2118 0.0016 10.7242 0.0592 0.00% 
 
-0.0007 -4.3903 0.1426 0.0021  10.8260 0.0586 0.00% 
 
GOP m -0.0412*  -79.4134 0.0080 -0.0203*  -77.8488  0.0082 100% 
 
-0.0168* -41.6008  0.0153 -0.0065* -32.2494  0.0197 100% 
 
-0.0232*  -44.8423 0.0142 -0.0097*  -38.2485 0.0166 100% 
 
CAPIN 0.0001 16.6312 0.0382 0.0002 54.0399 0.0118 83% 
 
0.0001 18.7055 0.0340 0.0002 44.5770 0.0143 89% 
 
0.0001  16.9681 0.0375 0.0002  43.9100  0.0145 85% 
 
UNPR 0.0004 13.0394 0.0487 0.0009 18.9106 0.0336 66% 
 
0.0003 13.0013 0.0489 0.0006 17.0491 0.0373 39% 
 
0.0004 12.7146  0.0500 0.0007 15.7146  0.0405 36% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -62.3574 0.0102 -0.0000 -17.7066 0.0359 99% 
 
-0.0000 -27.6259 0.0230 -0.0000 -12.8723  0.0494 6% 
 
-0.0000 -31.1568 0.0204 -0.0000 -12.7710  0.0497 34% 
 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-2.1 : Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), United States 
This table presents the U.S. first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure of 
leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 based 
on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -1.3887* -259.5940 0.0025 -0.4088* -112.5067 0.0057 100% 
 
-0.5484* -247.9527 0.0026 -0.1605* -80.5647 0.0079 100% 
 
0.0189* 17.0155 0.0374 0.1081* 100.2146 0.0064 100% 
 
TAN md -1.5767 -66.0230 0.0096 1.3765 42.7223 0.0149 67% 
 
-0.2817 -29.7138 0.0214 0.7823 73.7358 0.0086 84% 
 
0.1782* 57.9200 0.0110 0.5046* 134.1139 0.0047 100% 
 
RISK d 0.1431* 79.2846 0.0080 0.7834* 268.7518 0.0024 100%  0.0521* 53.7959 0.0118 0.2242* 191.9474 0.0033 100%  -0.0242 -65.4329 0.0097 -0.0048 -12.8651 0.0494 99%  
LIQ
 a
 -0.3868
* -148.1857 0.0043 -0.1118* -94.2984 0.0068 100%  -0.1413* -138.6281 0.0046 -0.0566* -75.3334 0.0085 100%  -0.0426* -132.9581 0.0048 -0.0114* -33.5186 0.0190 100%  
POR 0.1787 13.1166 0.0484 0.1787 13.1166 0.0484 0.01% 
 
-0.0134 -5.1276 0.1226 0.0058 5.1961 0.1210 0.00% 
 
-0.0312 -12.7371 0.0499 -0.0236 -12.7762 0.0497 4% 
 
AGE d c 0.0031 12.8711 0.0494 0.0090 18.0983 0.0351 15% 
 
-0.0006 -8.5862 0.0738 0.0008 11.6344 0.0546 0.00% 
 
-0.0025* -40.4844 0.0157 -0.0009* -12.9000 0.0493 100% 
 
TAX 0.0425 12.9677 0.0490 0.0678 18.6552 0.0341 11% 
 
0.0172 12.8518 0.0494 0.0270 17.7660 0.0358 8% 
 
-0.0022  -4.8434 0.1296 0.0013 6.2403 0.1012 0.00% 
 
NDTAX d 2.1862* 44.9242 0.0142 13.3397* 122.3494 0.0052 100% 
 
1.2276* 46.4844 0.0137 5.1185* 118.7819 0.0054 100% 
 
-0.8258 -60.3520 0.0105 0.3592 21.0014 0.0303 54% 
 
INV -0.0029 -27.1646 0.0234 0.0017 21.6284 0.0294 46% 
 
-0.0008 -19.9127 0.0319 0.0007 22.3784 0.0284 33% 
 
0.0001 12.7936 0.0497 0.0004 32.9006 0.0193 30% 
 
G(SA) -1.0442 -16.3897 0.0388 -0.6620 -12.7975 0.0496 13% 
 
-0.3518 -13.8451 0.0459 -0.3120 -12.8280 0.0495 1% 
 
-0.0181 -7.4237  0.0852 -0.0035  -1.3293 0.4106 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -2.6349 -25.4679 0.0250 -0.8785 -14.6619 0.0434 69% 
 
-0.8636 -22.3361 0.0285 -0.3195 -12.9796 0.0490 67% 
 
-0.0382 -7.6211 0.0831 0.0055 0.9994 0.5002 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -4.2430 -54.9218 0.0116 -0.6919 -18.2396 0.0349 62% 
 
-1.5856 -42.9202 0.0148 -0.3059 -13.9810 0.0455 42% 
 
-0.3742 -31.0679 0.0205 0.7169 47.9268 0.0133 98% 
 
INTAN -1.6272 -59.9132 0.0106 0.8670 27.5330 0.0231 31% 
 
-0.3639 -31.9789 0.0199 0.5706 44.6485 0.0143 53% 
 
0.0485 13.3041 0.0478 0.3870 102.3517 0.0062 99% 
 
SHPP m -0.4483 -26.5890 0.0239 -0.1840 -16.2636 0.0391 15% 
 
-0.1735 -20.3645 0.0312 -0.0833 -13.5452 0.0469 15% 
 
-0.0332 -3.4536 0.1794 -0.0117 -1.1736  0.4493 0.00% 
 
ASUTI b 0.1578* 57.7716 0.0110 0.8433* 138.3278 0.0046 100% 
 
0.0236* 16.3360 0.0389 0.2695* 110.8556 0.0057 100% 
 
-0.0730* -100.2662 0.0063 -0.0143* -18.9864 0.0335 100% 
 
ROE 0.0215 13.2312 0.0480 0.1463 37.3773 0.0170 95% 
 
0.0108 12.7216 0.0499 0.0575 38.2746 0.0166 97% 
 
-0.0124 -25.5245 0.0249 -0.0049 -12.8473 0.0495 85% 
 
GOP
 a
 0.1443
* 264.6269 0.0024 0.2605* 401.3602 0.0016 100% 
 
0.0613* 201.6536 0.0032 0.1015* 294.3633 0.0022 100% 
 
-0.0168* -127.2832 0.0050 -0.0086* -42.2027 0.0151 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0499 -82.0891 0.0078 -0.0024 -14.9346 0.0426 99% 
 
-0.0172 -80.1230 0.0079 -0.0010 -12.9991 0.0489 96% 
 
0.0007 19.8516 0.0320 0.0043 49.8494 0.0128 99% 
 
UNPR -0.0312 -42.2391 0.0151 0.0994 95.0218 0.0067 88% 
 
-0.0136 -42.7739 0.0149 0.0341 82.6652 0.0077 92% 
 
-0.0048 -34.2473 0.0186 0.0038 25.4409 0.0250 31% 
 
VAR 0.0000 12.9620 0.0490 0.0000 98.0561 0.0065 86% 
 
0.0000 12.7270 0.0499 0.0000 91.7392 0.0069 96% 
 
-0.0000 -19.2537 0.0330 0.0000 26.8599 0.0237 29% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-2.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), United States. 
This table presents the U.S. first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.0606 -102.3953 0.0062 0.0079 20.1164 0.0316 91% 
 
-0.0251 -70.2267 0.0091 0.0053 18.5888 0.0342 88% 
 
-0.0418 -69.3464 0.0092 0.0069 16.6091 0.0383 86% 
 
TAN md 0.0879* 55.3981 0.0115 0.3844* 203.9942 0.0031 100% 
 
0.1600* 159.3415 0.0040 0.3367* 263.9751 0.0024 100% 
 
0.2038* 135.7290 0.0047 0.4709* 248.9556 0.0026 100% 
 
RISK d 0.0022 13.4615 0.0472 0.0204 66.2313 0.0096 73%  -0.0016 -15.4873 0.0410 0.0061 31.3937 0.0203 61%  0.0020 12.7637 0.0498 0.0113 38.9355 0.0163 72%  
LIQ
 a
 -0.0486
* -312.0575 0.0020 -0.0352* -209.8134 0.0030 100%  -0.0246* -212.9246 0.0030 -0.0140* -114.3991 0.0056 100%  -0.0395* -233.5737 0.0027 -0.0256* -139.4420 0.0046 100%  
POR c -0.0407* -43.7427 0.0146 -0.0173* -18.4735 0.0344 100% 
 
-0.0212 -33.2664 0.0191 -0.0102 -12.8104 0.0496 28% 
 
-0.0392* -33.6778 0.0189 -0.0129* -12.9903 0.0489 100% 
 
AGE d c -0.0008 -24.6713 0.0258 -0.0004 -12.7230 0.0499 4% 
 
-0.0013* -56.0058 0.0114 -0.0005* -19.5614 0.0325 100% 
 
-0.0017* -52.1942 0.0122 -0.0007* -18.4700 0.0344 100% 
 
TAX -0.0090 -8.9283 0.0710 0.0025   3.3427    0.1710 0.00% 
 
-0.0095 -8.9283 0.0710 0.0025   3.6327    0.1710 0.00% 
 
-0.0127 -7.8567 0.0806 0.0068 6.5456 0.0965 0.00% 
 
NDTAX d -0.1262 -21.8288 0.0291 0.6728 83.9944 0.0076 87% 
 
-0.1070 -25.6542 0.0248 0.4250 78.8887 0.0081 94% 
 
-0.1160 -18.7577 0.0339 0.6294 79.2312 0.0080 94% 
 
INV 0.0001 13.3324 0.0477 0.0002 45.8025 0.0139 28% 
 
0.0001 12.7065 0.0500 0.0002 56.2256 0.0113 53% 
 
0.0001 12.7555 0.0498 0.0003 54.3903 0.0117 51% 
 
G(SA) -0.0809 -17.6399 0.0361 -0.0521 -13.2141 0.0481 75% 
 
-0.0101 -8.5397 0.0742 -0.0011 -0.4535 0.7290 0.00% 
 
-0.0700 -13.0744 0.0486 -0.0536 -12.9521 0.0491 29% 
 
G(AS) -0.0916 -18.1788 0.0350 -0.0603 -12.7175 0.0500 10% 
 
-0.0131 -2.5222 0.2403 0.0113  4.1100 0.1519 0.00% 
 
-0.0753 -14.0548 0.0452 -0.0648 -12.9736 0.0490 3% 
 
CAPEX -0.7379 -113.2681 0.0056 -0.0690 -12.7459 0.0498 41% 
 
-0.4356 -101.0052 0.0063 0.3098 60.7446 0.0105 96% 
 
-0.7072 -111.1293 0.0057 0.3220 42.7008 0.0149 77% 
 
INTAN -0.1293 -75.1450 0.0085 0.1647 84.3171 0.0075 33% 
 
0.0188 14.4310 0.0440 0.1866 142.4393 0.0045 86% 
 
-0.0529 -27.9565 0.0228 0.2390 121.7791 0.0052 98% 
 
SHPP m -0.0527* -31.7777 0.0200 -0.0318* -16.8846 0.0377 100% 
 
-0.0235* -21.5314 0.0295 -0.0152* -14.1196 0.0450 100% 
 
-0.0533* -31.8423 0.0200 -0.0366* -19.1030 0.0333 100% 
 
ASUTI b 0.0044 13.9500 0.0456 0.0391 109.4207 0.0058 88% 
 
-0.0190 -79.8739 0.0080 0.0096 34.8637 0.0183 78% 
 
-0.0183 -50.2287 0.0127 0.0219 53.0543 0.0120 44% 
 
ROE 0.0024 13.5021 0.0471 0.0051 22.4238 0.0284 27% 
 
0.0017 12.8791 0.0493 0.0025 16.4632 0.0386 16% 
 
0.0024 12.9774 0.0490 0.0040 17.6799 0.0360 18% 
 
GOP
 a
 -0.0122
* -173.8706 0.0037 -0.0035* -48.1265 0.0132 100% 
 
-0.0048* -91.4320 0.0070 -0.0008* -16.1930 0.0393 100% 
 
-0.0076* -98.9037 0.0064 -0.0010* -12.8166 0.0496 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0007 -21.1512 0.0301 0.0013 34.3788 0.0185 42% 
 
0.0002 12.8175 0.0496 0.0011 37.6810 0.0169 23% 
 
-0.0003 -17.4066 0.0365 0.0014 37.5893 0.0169 23% 
 
UNPR -0.0031 -36.5787 0.0174 -0.0007 -12.7118 0.0500 78% 
 
-0.0017 -29.6415 0.0215 -0.0005 -12.7240 0.0499 46% 
 
-0.0030 -35.4481 0.0180 -0.0007 -12.7566 0.0498 85% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -37.0014 0.0172 0.0000 21.1729 0.0300 49% 
 
0.0000 12.7260 0.0499 0.0000 22.7779 0.0279 16% 
 
0.0000 12.7513 0.0498 0.0000 20.4815 0.0311 39% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-3. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), United Kingdom. 
This table presents the U.K. first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.2924* -50.3489 0.0126 -0.1763* -26.6689 0.0239 100% 
 
-0.0963* -36.0023 0.0177 -0.0422* -15.7546   0.0404 100% 
 
-0.2100* -43.9897 0.0145 -0.1000*  -14.2363  0.0446 100% 
 
TAN d c -0.1685 -44.7361 0.0142 0.2166 27.8051 0.0229 38% 
 
0.1347* 29.5230 0.0216 0.2938* 101.9577 0.0062 100% 
 
0.1433* 17.5272 0.0363 0.3675* 77.7104 0.0082 100% 
 
RISK 0.0628 14.9744 0.0425 0.2358 23.5044 0.0271 99%  0.0178 12.9686 0.0490 0.0602 17.2642  0.0368 67%  0.0337 12.8148 0.0496 0.0824 23.2752 0.0273 7%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0403
* -144.9887 0.0044 -0.0244* -66.7204 0.0095 100%  -0.0158* -78.7872  0.0081 -0.0079* -44.8001 0.0142 100%  -0.0238* -73.2132 0.0087 -0.0146* -47.2997 0.0135 100%  
POR -0.0051 -5.1665 0.1217 0.0044 2.5327 0.2394 0.00% 
 
-0.0048 -6.9624  0.0908 0.0026  2.489 0.2431 0.00% 
 
-0.0053 -4.5630 0.1373 0.0075  3.9618 0.1574 0.00% 
 
AGE -0.0012 -18.6615 0.0341 0.0024 22.4429 0.0283 40% 
 
-0.0016 -38.8334 0.0164 -0.0010 -22.7650 0.0279 70% 
 
-0.0020 -27.6009  0.0231 -0.0012 -17.1519 0.0371 58% 
 
TAX -0.0200 -14.9125 0.0426 -0.0165 -12.8519 0.0494 4% 
 
-0.0115 -13.3584  0.0476 -0.0115 -13.3584 0.0476  0.01% 
 
-0.0161 -10.3115 0.0615 0.0017 0.6927 0.6143 0.00% 
 
NDTAX d 0.4559 13.3644 0.0475 1.2397 58.4022 0.0109 100% 
 
0.1766 13.2678 0.0479 0.4922 35.4518 0.0180 87% 
 
0.3504 14.6833 0.0433 0.8542 33.7237 0.0189 90% 
 
INV -0.0006 -47.5471 0.0134 -0.0002 -15.4054 0.0413 86% 
 
-0.0002 -22.1354  0.0287 0.0002 15.4693 0.0411 17% 
 
-0.0003 -18.1835 0.0350 0.0004 14.9410 0.0425 20% 
 
G(SA) -0.0450 -5.6284 0.1119 -0.0053 -1.1211 0.4637 0.00% 
 
-0.0167 -3.4227 0.1810 -0.0009 -0.2659 0.8345 0.00% 
 
-0.0321  -3.5955 0.1727 -0.0036 -0.6256 0.6441 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.0686 -7.3408 0.0862 0.0182 3.0726 0.2003 0.00% 
 
-0.0208  -4.0756 0.1532 0.0132 2.9552 0.2077 0.00% 
 
-0.0327  -3.6741 0.1692 0.0150 1.9897 0.2965 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.6500 -40.2612 0.0158 -0.1880 -12.7119 0.0500 47% 
 
-0.3065 -25.4664  0.0250 0.4566 41.7361 0.0153 82% 
 
-0.5280 -24.9317 0.0255 0.4453 24.3576 0.0261 34% 
 
INTAN -0.1915 -51.8893 0.0123 0.1640 25.5671 0.0249 34% 
 
0.0299 12.9327 0.0491 0.1939 74.2686 0.0086 90% 
 
0.0506 12.8869 0.0493 0.2593 36.1685 0.0176 66% 
 
SHPP -0.0834 -14.7265 0.0432 -0.0672 -12.8080 0.0496 10% 
 
-0.0474 -13.0307  0.0488 -0.0474 -13.0307 0.0488 0.01% 
 
-0.0766 -11.8140 0.0538 -0.0362 -3.5169 0.1764 0.00% 
 
ASUTI d c 0.0772* 90.7017 0.007 0.1586 83.2973* 0.0076 100% 
 
-0.0320   -50.7666  0.0125 0.0227 18.4502 0.0345 81% 
 
0.0141 12.9656 0.0490 0.0665 30.5326 0.0208 19% 
 
ROE -0.0012 -5.1141 0.1229 0.0038 8.6930 0.0729 0.00% 
 
-0.0002  -0.7692 0.5826 0.0008 5.0228 0.1251 0.00% 
 
-0.0049 -10.5252 0.0603 0.0002 0.6969 0.6125 0.00% 
 
GOP m 0.0109 19.0803 0.0333 0.0317 56.6751 0.0112 97% 
 
0.0051 12.8737  0.0494 0.0091 23.3887 0.0272 3% 
 
-0.0150 -14.1601   0.0449 0.0133 18.4790 0.0344 3% 
 
CAPIN -0.0023 -23.2393 0.0274 0.0006 17.1639 0.0370 80% 
 
0.0004 14.4675 0.0439 0.0011 17.3183 0.0367 15% 
 
0.0007 16.4647  0.0386 0.0015 14.6479 0.0434 15% 
 
UNPR -0.0026 -21.0554 0.0302 0.0014 12.9872 0.0489 55% 
 
-0.0015 -10.7103 0.0593 0.0009 12.1225 0.0524 0.00% 
 
-0.0018 -7.2651   0.0871 0.0017 11.9260 0.0533 0.00% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -34.3074 0.0186 0.0000 14.6224 0.0435 63% 
 
0.0000 13.1768  0.0482 0.0000 13.4532 0.0472 0.02% 
 
-0.0000 -7.7263 0.0819 0.0000  7.1712 0.0882 0.00% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-3. 2 : Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), United Kingdom 
This table presents the U.K. first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.2256 -79.5677 0.0080 -0.0633 -12.9819 0.0489 90% 
 
-0.0958 -46.1697 0.0138 -0.0304 -13.7564 0.0462 91% 
 
-0.1714 -56.3414 0.0113 -0.0610 -12.8203 0.0496 100% 
 
TAN d c -0.0422 -15.2650 0.0416 0.2956 45.8007 0.0139 92% 
 
0.1493* 44.1971 0.0144 0.3041 136.8827* 0.0047 100% 
 
0.1673* 63.3899 0.0100 0.3697* 110.9681 0.0057 100% 
 
RISK -0.2071 -32.3580 0.0197 0.1048 23.9841 0.0265 63%  -0.0698 -28.6160 0.0222 0.0461 16.3112 0.0390 29%  -0.1048 -17.6842 0.0360 0.0637 14.6210 0.0435 18%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0229
* -109.1773 0.0058 -0.0134* -44.5478 0.0143 100%  -0.0115* -76.2923 0.0083 -0.0050 -37.9236* 0.0168 100%  -0.0157* -69.8160 0.0091 -0.0082* -39.6715 0.0160 100%  
POR -0.0175 -12.9237 0.0492 -0.0089 -12.7145 0.0500 70% 
 
-0.0073 -14.6887 0.0433 -0.0062 -12.8645 0.0494 3% 
 
-0.0154 -20.6456 0.0308 -0.0093 -12.9961 0.0489 84% 
 
AGE 0.0006 12.7879 0.0497 0.0009 16.8795 0.0377 11% 
 
-0.0007 -14.2780 0.0445 -0.0004 -12.7622 0.0498 74% 
 
-0.0010 -13.6760 0.0465 -0.0006 -12.7112 0.0500 54% 
 
TAX 0.0142 13.5323 0.0470 0.0202 18.4872 0.0344 70% 
 
-0.0095 -8.9283 0.0710 0.0025 3.6327 0.1710 0.00% 
 
-0.0127 -7.8567 0.0806 0.0068 6.5456 0.0965 0.00% 
 
NDTAX -0.4695 -17.7357 0.0359 0.4641 31.2040 0.0204 15% 
 
-0.2188 -13.7798 0.0461 0.3055 28.5930 0.0223 46% 
 
-0.3696 -15.4917 0.0410 0.3457 22.8417 0.0279 17% 
 
INV -0.0002 -26.0492 0.0244 0.0003 15.2391 0.0417 08% 
 
0.0001 12.7238 0.0499 0.0002 22.5028 0.0283 23% 
 
0.0001 12.8034 0.0496 0.0003 18.9678 0.0335 7% 
 
G(SA) -0.0331 -4.8412 0.1297 -0.0111 -3.1565 0.1953 0.00% 
 
-0.0114 -4.8189 0.1303 -0.0020 -0.5400 0.6848 0.00% 
 
-0.0200 -3.1784 0.1941 -0.0062 -1.7694 0.3275 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.0315 -4.6648 0.1344 0.0516 5.2843 0.1191 0.00% 
 
-0.0137 -2.9333 0.2092 0.0246 4.2103 0.1485 0.00% 
 
-0.0231 -3.3899 0.1826 0.0363 4.0539 0.1540 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -1.0018 -36.5489 0.0174 -0.1848 -16.9738 0.0375 98% 
 
-0.4634 -47.0609 0.0135 0.2388 27.7116 0.0230 75% 
 
-0.7478 -51.3074 0.0124 -0.1818 -14.2817 0.0445 15% 
 
INTAN -0.1174 -48.1777 0.0132 0.1493 29.5860 0.0215 31% 
 
-0.0383 -21.5843 0.0295 0.1398 71.9912 0.0088 23% 
 
-0.0532 -13.2635 0.0479 0.1656 52.7471 0.0121 17% 
 
SHPP -0.1189 -26.7056 0.0238 -0.0510 -12.8552 0.0494 96% 
 
-0.0573 -18.8452 0.0337 -0.0375 -12.9079 0.0492 82% 
 
-0.1042 -23.5641 0.0270 -0.0616 -14.5695 0.0436 95% 
 
ASUTI d c 0.0136* 17.5375 0.0363 0.0810* 50.3909 0.0126 100% 
 
-0.0382 -73.6114 0.0086 -0.0075 -14.0291 0.0453 90% 
 
-0.0367 -47.5312 0.0134 0.0237 15.9754 0.0398 75% 
 
ROE -0.0007 -2.1033 0.2825 0.0003 0.9031 0.5324 0.00% 
 
-0.0006 -3.2953 0.1876 0.0001 1.2920 0.4193 0.00% 
 
-0.0010 -3.4367 0.1803 0.0001 0.8726 0.5432 0.00% 
 
GOP m -0.0843* -195.1738 0.0033 -0.059*5 -99.2647 0.0064 100% 
 
-0.0306* -90.6983 0.0070 -0.0174* -58.6691 0.0108 100% 
 
-0.0467* -98.3570 0.0065 -0.0282* -47.2336 0.0135 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0012 -17.3523 0.0366 0.0012 18.0099 0.0353 53% 
 
0.0003 13.2910 0.0478 0.0010 19.9453 0.0319 15% 
 
0.0004 14.2499 0.0446 0.0013 17.4112 0.0365 15% 
 
UNPR -0.0022 -13.8756 0.0458 0.0013 16.3289 0.0389 37% 
 
-0.0013 -12.9221 0.0492 0.0008 13.6510 0.0466 0.02% 
 
0.0011 12.7149 0.0500 0.0012 13.1302 0.0484 0.02% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -49.8124 0.0128 -0.0000 -14.1285 0.0450 99% 
 
-0.0000 -30.2757 0.0210 -0.0000 -12.7250 0.0499 12% 
 
-0.0000 -29.2036 0.0218 -0.0000 -12.9072 0.0492 74% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-4. 1 : Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Turkey 
This table presents Turkey’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a -1.1695* -49.4646 0.0129 -0.3794* -23.5854 0.0270 100% 
 
-0.6068* -38.9729 0.0163 -0.2226* -19.2075 0.0331 100% 
 
-0.9501* -43.1964 0.0147 -0.3757* -23.0089 0.0277 100% 
 
TAN -0.3269 -37.4285 0.0170 0.1570 16.2385 0.0392 18% 
 
0.0688 12.7357 0.0499 0.1782 30.1059 0.0211 75% 
 
-0.1452 -17.9675 0.0354 0.1503 17.2515 0.0369 19% 
 
RISK 0.2810 12.9730 0.0490 0.6982 19.1278 0.0333 20%  -0.2772 -15.3745 0.0413 -0.1884 -12.8001 0.0496 6%  -0.3344 -12.7386 0.0499 -0.2901 -12.8830 0.0493 1%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0861
* -80.6879 0.0079 -0.0661* -84.2748 0.0076 100%  -0.0405* -65.5922 0.0097 -0.0327* -56.5939 0.0112 100%  -0.0609* -81.2750 0.0078 -0.0503* -63.0856 0.0101 100%  
POR -0.0539 -19.1616 0.0332 -0.0293 -12.8855 0.0493 73% 
 
-0.0247 -16.1089 0.0395 -0.0195 -12.8064 0.0496 61% 
 
-0.0380 -16.6173 0.0383 -0.0306 -12.7515 0.0498 68% 
 
AGE -0.0059 -23.9369 0.0266 -0.0029 -13.2788 0.0479 53% 
 
-0.0043 -25.8926 0.0246 -0.0019 -12.8220 0.0496 74% 
 
-0.0054 -22.8565 0.0278 -0.0027 -12.9446 0.0491 59% 
 
TAX -0.0052 -15.3288 0.0415 -0.0044 -13.2654 0.0479 0.04% 
 
-0.0065 -27.9732 0.0227 -0.0029 -12.7178 0.0500 98% 
 
-0.0076 -23.2814 0.0273 -0.0040 -12.7642 0.0498 87% 
 
NDTAX -1.5617 -14.5147 0.0438 -0.8339 -12.7915 0.0497 19% 
 
-0.8227 -13.1105 0.0485 0.9621 21.0267 0.0303 12% 
 
0.7873 13.0245 0.0488 1.2690 19.3318 0.0329 8% 
 
DIO c 0.0004 12.7278 0.0499 0.0012 24.5858 0.0259 79% 
 
0.0002 12.7389 0.0499 0.0005 19.8857 0.0320 82% 
 
0.0004 12.7138 0.0500 0.0009 22.7770 0.0279 86% 
 
G(SA) -0.0708 -3.2009 0.1928 0.0559 2.4706 0.2449 0.00% 
 
-0.0262 -1.6720 0.3431 0.0350 2.8736 0.2132 0.00% 
 
-0.0329 -1.4644 0.3814 0.0601 3.4530 0.1795 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.0206 -0.9458 0.5177 0.1249 4.6053 0.1361 0.00% 
 
-0.0301 -2.2284 0.2685 0.0295 1.4729 0.3797 0.00% 
 
-0.0192 -1.0353 0.4890 0.0438 1.5354 0.3675 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.4434 -14.7497 0.0431 0.3207 13.0350 0.0487 1% 
 
0.2388 12.7265 0.0499 0.3895 20.6167 0.0309 22% 
 
0.3463 12.9039 0.0492 0.4063 15.0177 0.0423 5% 
 
INTAN 0.2573 12.8391 0.0495 0.3611 15.5493 0.0409 0.06% 
 
0.1553 12.7959 0.0497 0.3208 24.0902 0.0264 56% 
 
0.2210 12.7699 0.0498 0.4167 21.2896 0.0299 62% 
 
SHPP -0.0420 -2.9464 0.2083 0.0250 2.0614 0.2875 0.00% 
 
-0.0454 -4.4219 0.1416 -0.0056 -0.7053 0.6089 0.00% 
 
-0.0620 -4.1691 0.1499 0.0001 0.0083 0.9947 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0280 13.8928 0.0457 0.1061 23.0952 0.0275 84% 
 
-0.0538 -32.4692 0.0196 -0.0204 -12.8261 0.0495 83% 
 
-0.0635 -25.9759 0.0245 -0.0286 -12.9395 0.0491 25% 
 
ROE -0.0635 -20.9095 0.0304 -0.0415 -13.6202 0.0467 14% 
 
-0.0771 -25.0395 0.0254 -0.0169 -12.7477 0.0498 31% 
 
-0.0898 -19.8241 0.0321 -0.0307 -12.9283 0.0491 24% 
 
GOP m d 0.0455* 18.7990 0.0338 0.1274* 45.1638 0.0141 100% 
 
0.0190 12.7766 0.0497 0.0205 13.8256 0.0460 .09% 
 
0.0275 12.7866 0.0497 0.0421 18.8999 0.0337 8% 
 
CAPIN -0.0174 -17.7868 0.0358 -0.0099 -13.1466 0.0483 40% 
 
0.0065 12.9686 0.0490 0.0150 17.0580 0.0373 13% 
 
0.0146 12.7601 0.0498 0.0157 13.2937 0.0478 0.05% 
 
UNPR 0.1434 12.7528 0.0498 0.2634 18.3880 0.0346 61% 
 
-0.0349 -4.5040 0.1391 0.0734 7.8398 0.0808 0.00% 
 
0.0104 0.9381 0.5203 0.1704 12.6647 0.0502 0.00% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -8.4703 0.0748 0.0000 7.7039 0.0822 0.00% 
 
-0.0000 -10.2144 0.0621 0.0000 11.4867 0.0553 0.00% 
 
-0.0000 -9.0082 0.0704 0.0000 10.8340 0.0586 0.00% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-4. 2 : Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Turkey 
This table presents Turkey’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.9790
* -56.5529 0.0113 -0.3687* -30.5821 0.0208 100% 
 
-0.5391* -35.5792 0.0179 -0.1474* -12.9649 0.0490 100% 
 
-0.7513* -40.4364 0.0157 -0.2606* -17.8798 0.0356 100% 
 
TAN -0.1578 -27.3625 0.0233 0.1637 23.6187 0.0269 32% 
 
0.0645 12.8725 0.0494 0.1936 22.8594 0.0278 86% 
 
0.0853 13.0684 0.0486 0.2377 21.4976 0.0296 76% 
 
RISK -0.5735 -20.8531 0.0305 0.2819 13.4262 0.0473 51%  -0.3993 -18.2878 0.0348 -0.1884 -13.0524 0.0487 75%  -0.4446 -16.1865 0.0393 -0.2325 -12.9008 0.0492 59%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0618
* -90.2980 0.0070 -0.0516* -81.8198 0.0078 100%  -0.0371* -63.7718 0.0100 -0.0295* -60.6459 0.0105 100%  -0.0509* -68.1956 0.0093 -0.0418* -60.2189 0.0106 100%  
POR -0.0538 -23.9077 0.0266 -0.0195 -12.7493 0.0498 98% 
 
-0.0328 -18.4891 0.0344 -0.0198 -13.5849 0.0468 82% 
 
-0.0490 -21.1662 0.0301 -0.0221 -12.7524 0.0498 98% 
 
AGE -0.0034 -15.2375 0.0417 -0.0024 -13.2949 0.0478 6% 
 
-0.0031 -17.1039 0.0372 -0.0021 -12.7300 0.0499 11% 
 
-0.0035 -15.3415 0.0414 -0.0027 -12.7074 0.0500 2% 
 
TAX 0.0033 12.8985 0.0493 0.0068 25.0144 0.0254 24% 
 
-0.0040 -19.0551 0.0334 -0.0025 -12.7654 0.0498 17% 
 
-0.0047 -17.3936 0.0366 -0.0032 -12.8294 0.0495 9% 
 
NDTAX -1.8497 -23.3573 0.0272 -0.6742 -12.8186 0.0496 82% 
 
-0.9275 -15.0672 0.0422 0.6359 14.1872 0.0448 1% 
 
-1.3326 -16.6032 0.0383 -0.7523 -12.7539 0.0498 4% 
 
DIO c 0.0004* 18.3348 0.0347 0.0012* 35.5279 0.0179 100% 
 
0.0003 14.0787 0.0451 0.0006 23.8862 0.0266 97% 
 
0.0004 16.4636 0.0386 0.0009 27.3457 0.0233 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.0599 -3.2879 0.1880 0.0531 2.6904 0.2266 0.00% 
 
-0.0392 -2.5099 0.2414 0.0226 1.8680 0.3129 0.00% 
 
-0.0504 -2.4987 0.2424 0.0396 2.5317 0.2395 0.00% 
 
G(AS) 0.0151 0.9782 0.5070 0.1299 5.4034 0.1165 0.00% 
 
-0.0205 -1.6546 0.3461 0.0402 2.0106 0.2938 0.00% 
 
-0.0049 -0.3042 0.8120 0.0714 2.7518 0.2219 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.6504 -18.2386 0.0349 -0.2760 -12.8877 0.0493 63% 
 
-0.1807 -6.4997 0.0972 0.2393 12.4172 0.0512 0.00% 
 
-0.3550 -9.7647 0.0650 0.1922 7.7702 0.0815 0.00% 
 
INTAN -0.2096 -14.7733 0.0430 -0.1781 -12.7623 0.0498 0.08% 
 
0.1637 13.1896 0.0482 0.1981 15.6930 0.0405 1% 
 
0.2110 12.7487 0.0498 0.2147 13.3048 0.0478 0.02% 
 
SHPP -0.0630 -4.8880 0.1285 0.0020 0.1784 0.8876 0.00% 
 
-0.0483 -4.7489 0.1321 -0.0114 -1.1804 0.4475 0.00% 
 
-0.0643 -4.8651 0.1291 -0.0149 -1.4915 0.3760 0.00% 
 
ASUTI -0.0424 -15.9050 0.0400 0.0508 24.5167 0.0260 15% 
 
-0.0529 -33.5341 0.0190 -0.0215 -12.7377 0.0499 82% 
 
-0.0697 -23.9616 0.0266 -0.0284 -12.7547 0.0498 75% 
 
ROE -0.0727 -18.5441 0.0343 -0.0215 -13.0758 0.0486 29% 
 
-0.0639 -20.9414 0.0304 -0.0196 -12.7195 0.0499 25% 
 
-0.0767 -19.2387 0.0331 -0.0370 -17.2486 0.0369 23% 
 
GOP m d -0.1099* -61.5801 0.0103 -0.0689* -42.1006 0.0151 100% 
 
-0.0455* -28.8885 0.0220 -0.0193* -14.3496 0.0443 100% 
 
-0.0709* -34.9838 0.0182 -0.0347* -17.6305 0.0361 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0066 -10.7074 0.0593 0.0109 11.1226 0.0571 0.00% 
 
0.0064 12.8757 0.0493 0.0127 14.6543 0.0434 15% 
 
0.0082 12.9051 0.0492 0.0192 18.3461 0.0347 16% 
 
UNPR 0.1106 14.4307 0.0440 0.1612 16.9269 0.0376 17% 
 
-0.0461 -6.0810 0.1038 0.0480 5.1433 0.1223 0.00% 
 
-0.0442 -4.0430 0.1544 0.0868 7.1316 0.0887 0.00% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -15.3741 0.0414 -0.0000 -12.7142 0.0500 17% 
 
-0.0000 -14.0203 0.0453 -0.0000 -12.8985 0.0493 0.08% 
 
-0.0000 -10.3065 0.0616 0.0000 9.5479 0.0664 0.00% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-5. 1 : Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Austria 
This table presents Austria’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF  b c -1.2856* -27.9029 0.0228 -0.3729* -12.7966 0.0496 100% 
 
-1.1869* -32.1616 0.0198 -0.3724* -12.7469 0.0498 100% 
 
-1.7770* -33.6886 0.0189 -0.7368* -16.9311 0.0376 100% 
 
TAN -0.2476 -14.7890 0.0430 0.3628 18.8596 0.0337 14% 
 
0.1696 13.3615 0.0476 0.5987 36.4718 0.0175 98% 
 
0.2478 13.3741 0.0475 0.5708 21.2872 0.0299 44% 
 
RISK -0.7448 -10.6789 0.0594 0.4496 8.9704 0.0707 0.00%  -1.0885 -16.2334 0.0392 -0.7357 -12.9167 0.0492 4%  -1.3447 -12.9739 0.0490 -1.3295 -12.8034 0.0496 0.02%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.1969
* -52.2078 0.0122 -0.1389* -56.2168 0.0113 100%  -0.1391* -33.8220 0.0188 -0.0773* -28.8236 0.0221 100%  -0.2176* -32.9377 0.0193 -0.1455* -37.0830 0.0172 100%  
POR -0.1388 -19.6651 0.0323 -0.0623 -12.7130 0.0500 81% 
 
-0.1323 -22.6259 0.0281 -0.0667 -13.0511 0.0487 89% 
 
-0.1976 -15.7466 0.0404 -0.1140 -13.3114 0.0477 97% 
 
AGE -0.0029 -13.3682 0.0475 -0.0027 -12.8067 0.0496 0.06% 
 
-0.0032 -16.0577 0.0396 -0.0023 -12.8845 0.0493 1% 
 
-0.0023 -6.8807 0.0919 0.0023 4.5227 0.1385 0.00% 
 
TAX -0.0017 -4.8839 0.1286 0.0040 9.8658 0.0643 0.00% 
 
-0.0019 -5.2376 0.1201 0.0039 8.1176 0.0780 0.00% 
 
0.0002 0.4295 0.7418 0.0080 10.6292 0.0597 0.00% 
 
NDTAX -1.4535 -13.4087 0.0474 -0.8991 -13.2697 0.0479 1% 
 
-1.1196 -13.0366 0.0487 2.5650 27.2668 0.0233 30% 
 
2.0892 12.8535 0.0494 2.4646 15.4598 0.0411 1% 
 
INV -0.0019 -20.5627 0.0309 0.0009 16.1019 0.0395 15% 
 
0.0008 12.9147 0.0492 0.0019 31.0243 0.0205 81% 
 
0.0012 12.8853 0.0493 0.0023 24.6527 0.0258 14% 
 
G(SA) -0.4803 -2.8603 0.2141 0.0218 0.2338 0.8538 0.00% 
 
-0.4204 -2.7717 0.2204 0.0001 0.0009 0.9994 0.00% 
 
-0.7751 -3.0902 0.1992 0.0014 0.0107 0.9932 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1662 -1.2312 0.4343 0.3019 1.5940 0.3567 0.00% 
 
-0.2756 -2.1463 0.2776 0.1944 1.1217 0.4635 0.00% 
 
-0.3502 -1.7182 0.3356 0.3598 1.2656 0.4257 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.9006 -14.1285 0.0450 -0.5214 -13.0663 0.0486 10% 
 
-0.8342 -14.9651 0.0425 0.8431 13.6429 0.0466 1% 
 
-1.2888 -14.1901 0.0448 -1.0628 -12.7224 0.0499 0.09% 
 
INTAN 0.3208 13.1373 0.0484 0.4573 17.7702 0.0358 0.09% 
 
0.2688 13.8134 0.0460 0.5773 25.9206 0.0245 15% 
 
0.3300 12.9016 0.0492 0.5346 14.8052 0.0429 1% 
 
SHPP -0.1630 -5.1959 0.1210 0.0055 0.2182 0.8632 0.00% 
 
-0.1672 -5.6602 0.1113 -0.0195 -0.8788 0.5410 0.00% 
 
-0.2242 -4.7526 0.1320 0.0077 0.2277 0.8575 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0584 12.8464 0.0495 0.1750 28.7577 0.0221 69% 
 
-0.2469 -22.2190 0.0286 -0.0650 -13.9394 0.0456 40% 
 
-0.2477 -13.0062 0.0489 -0.1225 -12.7395 0.0499 0.07% 
 
ROE d c -0.0920* -24.0112 0.0265 -0.0335* -14.2695 0.0445 100% 
 
-0.0872 -25.5142 0.0249 -0.0360 -12.7306 0.0499 97% 
 
-0.1367* -26.6824 0.0238 -0.0533* -13.4149 0.0474 100% 
 
GOP m -0.0575 -9.8962 0.0641 0.0592 12.3735 0.0513 0.00% 
 
-0.0943 -17.3361 0.0367 -0.0661 -12.8552 0.0494 13% 
 
-0.0930 -11.0550 0.0574 0.0644 5.8792 0.1073 0.00% 
 
CAPIN -0.0550 -25.3563 0.0251 -0.0218 -15.5107 0.0410 82% 
 
-0.0519 -18.5610 0.0343 0.0703 13.1343 0.0484 30% 
 
-0.0593 -13.3600 0.0476 -0.0200 -12.9988 0.0489 19% 
 
UNPR -0.4688 -23.3432 0.0273 -0.2342 -13.6782 0.0465 32% 
 
-0.3342 -16.9677 0.0375 -0.2139 -12.8752 0.0493 23% 
 
-0.5417 -16.7988 0.0379 -0.3365 -12.8852 0.0493 15% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -14.1669 0.0449 -0.0000 -13.0445 0.0487 13% 
 
0.0000 12.7601 0.0498 0.0000 16.6219 0.0383 6% 
 
-0.0000 -10.0575 0.0631 0.0000 7.3471 0.0861 0.00% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-5. 2   : Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Austria 
This table presents Austria’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF  b c -1.7416* -45.9987 0.0138 -0.4656* -15.5686 0.0408 100% 
 
-1.3975 -38.4275 0.0166 -0.4365 -14.2197 0.0447 98% 
 
-2.0618* -39.7535 0.0160 -0.6421* -16.0102 0.0397 100% 
 
TAN -0.1940 -16.1800 0.0393 0.4197 19.2194 0.0331 12% 
 
0.1565 14.3708 0.0442 0.6200 34.8069 0.0183 98% 
 
0.2087 12.8664 0.0494 0.6587 21.7889 0.0292 75% 
 
RISK 0.5383 14.1024 0.0451 1.1000 16.8136 0.0378 14%  -0.9501 -13.4770 0.0472 -0.6937 -12.8047 0.0496 0.08%  0.7795 12.7328 0.0499 0.8967 14.1563 0.0449 1%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.1548
* -28.9658 0.0220 -0.0961* -29.6334 0.0215 100%  -0.1259* -27.0173 0.0236 -0.0584* -21.1075 0.0301 100%  -0.1796* -28.0635 0.0227 -0.1034* -25.7888 0.0247 100%  
POR -0.1341 -16.4360 0.0387 -0.0732 -14.5863 0.0436 62% 
 
-0.1340 -20.3041 0.0313 -0.0680 -12.8234 0.0495 87% 
 
-0.1861 -16.4257 0.0387 -0.0948 -12.9099 0.0492 96% 
 
AGE 0.0029 13.6391 0.0466 0.0051 14.0093 0.0454 2% 
 
-0.0032 -17.2176 0.0369 -0.0023 -12.7496 0.0498 4% 
 
0.0059 12.7403 0.0499 0.0069 14.9319 0.0426 2% 
 
TAX 0.0057 12.9165 0.0492 0.0067 14.8967 0.0427 3% 
 
-0.0023 -4.0328 0.1547 0.0031 8.1118 0.0781 0.00% 
 
-0.0027 -4.5989 0.1363 0.0063 11.9215 0.0533 0.00% 
 
NDTAX -1.0592 -13.2772 0.0479 1.6775 13.8326 0.0459 1% 
 
-1.3184 -12.8191 0.0496 2.2975 22.8482 0.0278 18% 
 
1.4289 12.7270 0.0499 2.6567 19.2618 0.0330 7% 
 
INV -0.0010 -13.0542 0.0487 0.0013 15.5142 0.0410 10% 
 
0.0008 13.0400 0.0487 0.0019 27.9557 0.0228 83% 
 
0.0011 12.8586 0.0494 0.0021 21.5476 0.0295 42% 
 
G(SA) -0.5071 -2.5721 0.2361 -0.0111 -0.1358 0.9140 0.00% 
 
-0.4351 -3.8029 0.1637 -0.0347 -0.2809 0.8257 0.00% 
 
-0.6513 -2.8119 0.2175 -0.0535 -0.3506 0.7853 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.2573 -1.8642 0.3134 0.2593 1.1606 0.4528 0.00% 
 
-0.3423 -2.5084 0.2415 0.1000 0.7035 0.6097 0.00% 
 
-0.3912 -2.4565 0.2461 0.2024 0.7784 0.5789 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -1.1625 -13.2194 0.0481 -0.4851 -13.4849 0.0471 3% 
 
-1.0970 -19.2936 0.0330 -0.6630 -12.9369 0.0491 10% 
 
-1.5119 -17.3945 0.0366 -0.9634 -12.9133 0.0492 8% 
 
INTAN -0.2880 -13.3981 0.0474 -0.2880 -13.3981 0.0474 0.01% 
 
0.2614 13.1346 0.0484 0.4260 17.1420 0.0371 6% 
 
-0.3459 -12.3982 0.0512 0.4458 11.8111 0.0538 0.00% 
 
SHPP -0.2142 -5.6984 0.1106 -0.0015 -0.0652 0.9585 0.00% 
 
-0.2235 -7.2694 0.0870 -0.0480 -2.2757 0.2636 0.00% 
 
-0.3198 -7.5901 0.0834 -0.0595 -2.1018 0.2827 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0653 12.8562 0.0494 0.1998 29.9826 0.0212 45% 
 
-0.2321 -17.9599 0.0354 -0.0590 -13.7931 0.0461 38% 
 
-0.1276 -13.2055 0.0481 0.1110 13.9978 0.0454 0.07% 
 
ROE d c -0.0901 -18.9030 0.0336 -0.0399 -12.9493 0.0491 83% 
 
-0.0833 -23.4652 0.0271 -0.0391 -12.8142 0.0496 98% 
 
-0.1250* -24.8494 0.0256 -0.0550* -12.7561 0.0498 100% 
 
GOP m -0.3483* -56.9810 0.0112 -0.2437* -43.9561 0.0145 100% 
 
-0.2418* -40.5220 0.0157 -0.1091* -22.9676 0.0277 100% 
 
-0.3753* -47.9003 0.0133 -0.2121* -31.5369 0.0202 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0496 -28.4749 0.0223 -0.0194 -12.8575 0.0494 67% 
 
-0.0518 -22.8999 0.0278 0.0669 12.7382 0.0499 35% 
 
-0.0603 -19.4941 0.0326 -0.0175 -12.9300 0.0491 45% 
 
UNPR -0.4534 -20.8165 0.0306 -0.1989 -12.9227 0.0492 14% 
 
-0.2990 -16.1882 0.0393 -0.2268 -13.5153 0.0470 4% 
 
-0.4584 -17.3613 0.0366 -0.3038 -12.7736 0.0497 7% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -14.9331 0.0426 0.0000 15.4091 0.0413 1% 
 
0.0000 12.9372 0.0491 0.0000 14.9343 0.0426 6% 
 
0.0000 13.1182 0.0484 0.0000 14.4472 0.0440 0.09% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-6.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Hong Kong 
This table presents Hong Kong’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.6326
* -97.5924 0.0065 -0.3316* -63.3481 0.0100 100% 
 
-0.3069* -55.6175 0.0114 -0.2000* -68.3349 0.0093 100% 
 
-0.3868* -47.4811 0.0134 -0.1855* -46.3112 0.0137 100% 
 
TAN d c -0.2538 -20.8500 0.0305 0.2055 28.2447 0.0225 23% 
 
0.0954* 14.6511 0.0434 0.2242* 57.7891 0.0110 100% 
 
0.1175* 14.0680 0.0452 0.2849* 53.4459 0.0119 100% 
 
RISK 0.1296 13.2854 0.0478 0.6670 79.5743 0.0080 99%  0.0429 13.2182 0.0481 0.1464 32.8444 0.0194 77%  0.0570 12.7195 0.0499 0.1277 13.1293 0.0484 8%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0453
* -74.9969 0.0085 -0.0293* -86.8221 0.0073 100%  -0.0180* -49.3269 0.0129 -0.0119* -59.7591 0.0107 100%  -0.0223* -55.4710 0.0115 -0.0145* -54.5143 0.0117 100%  
POR m d -0.0543 -19.9680 0.0319 -0.0303 -12.8563 0.0494 92% 
 
-0.0339 -23.6207 0.0269 -0.0177 -15.9651 0.0398 97% 
 
-0.0454 -30.5667 0.0208 -0.0294 -17.9728 0.0354 100% 
 
AGE c -0.0078 -47.1210 0.0135 -0.0024 -13.5011 0.0471 70% 
 
-0.0019 -22.4729 0.0283 -0.0011 -12.8610 0.0494 10% 
 
-0.0040 -34.8505 0.0183 -0.0015 -12.7253 0.0499 58% 
 
TAX -0.0556 -22.5402 0.0282 0.0454 20.6063 0.0309 12% 
 
0.0152 12.7861 0.0497 0.0152 12.7861 0.0497 0.01% 
 
0.0203 13.4529 0.0472 0.0304 19.3322 0.0329 2% 
 
NDTAX 0.5945 13.2484 0.0480 3.4404 36.7605 0.0173 99% 
 
-0.3501 -13.8451 0.0459 1.3456 27.0248 0.0235 56% 
 
-0.6625 -18.9094 0.0336 0.5167 15.4638  0.0411 5% 
 
DIO c -0.0002 -12.9072 0.0492 0.0002 15.9406 0.0399 4% 
 
0.0001 12.7551 0.0498 0.0001 17.3585 0.0366 21% 
 
0.0001 12.9473 0.0491 0.0004 24.0060 0.0265 99% 
 
G(SA) -0.0377 -4.1561 0.1503 0.0481 3.6145 0.1718 0.00% 
 
-0.0126 -1.5546 0.3639 0.0229 5.7681 0.1093 0.00% 
 
-0.0025 -0.3855 0.7657 0.0563 6.2129 0.1016 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1376 -5.6284 0.1119 0.0688 6.3749 0.0991 0.00% 
 
-0.0525 -4.8850 0.1285 0.0419 7.1779 0.0881 0.00% 
 
-0.0350  -2.6130 0.2327 0.0704 4.7904 0.1310 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.4262 -15.2203 0.0418 0.5647 18.4462 0.0345 24% 
 
0.1720 12.9342 0.0491 0.4047 22.2260 0.0286 54% 
 
-0.4133 -17.4853 0.0364 0.5061 20.4971 0.0310 45% 
 
INTAN -0.2632 -17.8965 0.0355 0.1236 14.7913 0.0430 29% 
 
0.0570 12.7338 0.0499 0.1290 28.0716 0.0227 17% 
 
0.0753 12.7338 0.0499 0.1720 15.4320 0.0412 29% 
 
SHPP -0.0633 -7.4714 0.0847 0.0426 3.6525 0.1701 0.00% 
 
-0.0255 -5.9186 0.1066 0.0066 1.6495 0.3469 0.00% 
 
-0.0228 -2.5744 0.2359 0.0112 2.0962 0.2834 0.00% 
 
ASUTI  d 0.0746*  41.3396 0.0154 0.2388* 64.3352 0.0099 100% 
 
-0.0231 -22.9136 0.0278 0.0340 15.9161 0.0399 14% 
 
-0.0540 -20.6323 0.0308 -0.0158 -12.9345 0.0491 78% 
 
ROE 0.0270 17.9188 0.0355 0.0756 47.7984 0.0133 89% 
 
0.0102 13.0253 0.0488 0.0321 38.1840 0.0167 82% 
 
-0.0265 -15.9666 0.0398 0.0337 29.1378 0.0218 16% 
 
GOP m d 0.0252* 32.7828 0.0194 0.0645* 106.9501 0.0060 100% 
 
0.0058 13.0642 0.0486 0.0161 53.6804 0.0119 99% 
 
-0.0115 -19.3275 0.0329 -0.0044 -12.8530 0.0494 70% 
 
CAPIN c -0.0063 -38.6757 0.0165 -0.0016 -12.9148 0.0492 82% 
 
0.0008 12.7791 0.0497 0.0024 18.6500 0.0341 8% 
 
0.0010 12.7876 0.0497 0.0039 21.9271 0.0290 44% 
 
UNPR -0.0554 -16.0827 0.0395 0.0420 13.2988 0.0478 11% 
 
-0.0492 -27.6657 0.0230 -0.0189 -13.1796 0.0482 15% 
 
-0.0596 -24.1895 0.0263 -0.0242 -12.7889 0.0497 19% 
 
VAR c -0.0000 -16.6939 0.0381 0.0000 38.8378 0.0164 62% 
 
0.0000 14.6880 0.0433 0.0000 31.0545 0.0205 85% 
 
0.0000 12.9242 0.0492 0.0000 25.4678 0.0250 69% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-6.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Hong Kong 
This table presents Hong Kong’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.2999* -53.2236 0.0120 -0.0697* -24.2333 0.0263 100% 
 
-0.1829* -45.0187 0.0141 -0.0573* -25.9300 0.0245 100% 
 
-0.2643* -46.8173 0.0136 -0.0811* -27.0586 0.0235 100% 
 
TAN d c 0.0440 12.7226 0.0499 0.2915 40.1357 0.0159 97% 
 
0.1181* 25.3995 0.0251 0.2795* 94.4108 0.0067 100% 
 
0.1106* 17.0407 0.0373 0.3435* 47.8165 0.0133 100% 
 
RISK -0.2339 -36.0032 0.0177 0.0894 22.6081 0.0281 64%  -0.1685 -34.1412 0.0186 -0.0349 -12.8959 0.0493 92%  -0.2235 -32.8554 0.0194 -0.0496 -12.8255 0.0495 83%  
LIQ a -0.0237* -84.8324 0.0075 -0.0179* -101.1922 0.0063 100%  -0.0125* -57.3445 0.0111 -0.0080* -59.0520 0.0108 100%  -0.0178* -58.2848 0.0109 -0.0124* -67.0393 0.0095 100%  
POR m d -0.0493* -27.4647 0.0232 -0.0314* -18.0821 0.0352 100% 
 
-0.0328* -37.6530 0.0169 -0.0175* -13.5269 0.0470 100% 
 
-0.0510* -43.0097 0.0148 -0.0275* -15.4054 0.0413 100% 
 
AGE c 0.0020* 22.0607 0.0288 0.0053* 31.6979 0.0201 100% 
 
0.0012 17.8147 0.0357 0.0025 21.2366 0.0300 95% 
 
0.0021 21.5530 0.0295 0.0042* 25.4499 0.0250 100% 
 
TAX -0.0286 -14.6334 0.0434 0.0211 17.8335 0.0357 2% 
 
-0.0288 -20.8655 0.0305 0.0119 13.2209 0.0481 11% 
 
-0.0344 -17.8667 0.0356 0.0157 12.7420 0.0499 4% 
 
NDTAX -0.8168 -32.4333 0.0196 0.5934 14.0924 0.0451 18% 
 
-0.9272 -48.9036 0.0130 -0.2336 -12.7874 0.0497 32% 
 
-1.2370 -47.4863 0.0134 -0.3120 -12.7146 0.0500 39% 
 
DIO c 0.0001 13.0337 0.0487 0.0003 23.3588 0.0272 99% 
 
0.0001 12.7285 0.0499 0.0002 19.9250 0.0319 98% 
 
0.0001* 15.4122 0.0412 0.0003* 24.3172 0.0262 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.0234 -5.6222 0.1121 0.0141 2.0691 0.2866 0.00% 
 
-0.0140 -4.2794 0.1461 0.0098 3.3090 0.1868 0.00% 
 
-0.0199 -4.5431 0.1379 0.0145 3.5088 0.1767 0.00% 
 
G(AS) 0.0690 12.8897 0.0493 0.0709 13.3399 0.0476 0.04% 
 
0.0507 12.9135 0.0492 0.0522 13.3455 0.0476 0.03% 
 
0.0699 12.8740 0.0494 0.0760 14.1212 0.0450 0.09% 
 
CAPEX -0.9593 -37.6655 0.0169 -0.2080 -14.5734 0.0436 99% 
 
-0.5244 -27.9343 0.0228 -0.1355 -12.7332 0.0499 22% 
 
-0.8804 -33.9196 0.0188 -0.1796 -12.7154 0.0500 69% 
 
INTAN -0.1191 -16.2412 0.0391 0.0631 13.9793 0.0455 13% 
 
0.0411 12.7278 0.0499 0.1127 20.2401 0.0314 20% 
 
0.0648 14.1654 0.0449 0.1281 28.6202 0.0222 13% 
 
SHPP -0.0737 -20.3939 0.0312 -0.0484 -13.7640 0.0462 84% 
 
-0.0407 -15.1557 0.0419 -0.0332 -12.7643 0.0498 63% 
 
-0.0628 -17.1080 0.0372 -0.0467 -12.8547 0.0494 82% 
 
ASUTI  d 0.0121 12.8202 0.0496 0.0503 28.8656 0.0220 87% 
 
-0.0463 -36.6427 0.0174 -0.0095 -12.7429 0.0499 99% 
 
-0.0512 -29.2194 0.0218 -0.0126 -12.8396 0.0495 88% 
 
ROE -0.0212 -17.4622 0.0364 -0.0101 -12.9597 0.0490 5% 
 
-0.0143 -16.2266 0.0392 -0.0073 -13.0338 0.0487 3% 
 
-0.0216 -17.7363 0.0359 -0.0101 -12.7823 0.0497 10% 
 
GOP m d -0.0251* -63.2760 0.0101 -0.0098* -44.1173 0.0144 100% 
 
-0.0099* -34.6814 0.0184 -0.0030* -17.5841 0.0362 100% 
 
-0.0151* -38.7560 0.0164 -0.0053* -22.6565 0.0281 100% 
 
CAPIN c 0.0008 12.7139 0.0500 0.0045 35.8705 0.0177 52% 
 
0.0009* 20.6099 0.0309 0.0036* 38.8419 0.0164 100% 
 
0.0011* 18.2906 0.0348 0.0048* 37.1938 0.0171 100% 
 
UNPR -0.0591 -31.6819 0.0201 -0.0188 -12.9944 0.0489 18% 
 
-0.0431 -32.0001 0.0199 -0.0135 -12.9369 0.0491 19% 
 
-0.0555 -29.7202 0.0214 -0.0190 -12.8432 0.0495 13% 
 
VAR c -0.0000* -51.3316 0.0124 -0.0000* -24.1116 0.0264 100% 
 
-0.0000 -15.1862 0.0419 -0.0000 -12.7334 0.0499 14% 
 
-0.0000 -22.6685 0.0281 -0.0000 -12.7323 0.0499 77% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-7. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), France 
This table presents France’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF m d -0.7305* -41.6275 0.0153 -0.3814* -53.8274 0.0118 100% 
 
-0.3119 -51.7831 0.0123 -0.1212 -22.6397 0.0281 87% 
 
-0.6540* -27.7236 0.0230 -0.3200* -37.5495 0.0170 100% 
 
TAN  d c -0.2165 -41.0614 0.0155   0.1065 19.3850 0.0328 20% 
 
0.1770* 48.0961 0.0132 0.4287* 34.3567 0.0185 100% 
 
0.1529 24.4120 0.0261 0.4127 20.1070 0.0316 95% 
 
RISK 0.3109 30.7811 0.0207 0.5871 48.7230 0.0131 84%  0.1029 12.9764 0.0490 0.2105 22.4445 0.0283 10%  0.1766 12.8498 0.0494 0.3102 19.2383 0.0331 10%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.1196
* -155.2898 0.0041 -0.0461* -98.0738 0.0065 100%  -0.0565* -45.9774 0.0138 -0.0141* -36.9911 0.0172 100%  -0.0961* -47.7201 0.0133 -0.0252* -42.5795 0.0149 100%  
POR -0.0238 -16.4010 0.0388 -0.0089 -7.3409 0.0862 0.00% 
 
-0.0231 -8.9294 0.0710 -0.0015 -1.5308 0.3684 0.00% 
 
-0.0427 -9.8117 0.0647 -0.0085 -5.1628 0.1218 0.00% 
 
AGE -0.0039 -32.0222 0.0199 -0.0015 -13.0645 0.0486 94% 
 
-0.0028 -32.6006 0.0195 -0.0012 -13.5766 0.0468 85% 
 
-0.0042 -28.5185 0.0223 -0.0021 -12.8290 0.0495 86% 
 
TAX -0.0416 -23.7252 0.0268 -0.0207 -13.2858 0.0478 76% 
 
-0.0192 -15.8841 0.0400 -0.0146 -12.7765 0.0497 5% 
 
-0.0339 -16.8202 0.0378 -0.0258 -12.8563 0.0494 19% 
 
NDTAX 0.2592 12.7780 0.0497 1.0626 48.2856 0.0132 77% 
 
0.2256 13.8448 0.0459 0.8079 51.6352 0.0123 96% 
 
0.3599 13.0853 0.0486 1.2601 46.0956 0.0138 95% 
 
INV 0.0001 13.7230 0.0463 0.0003 31.7250 0.0201 21% 
 
0.0002 28.6855 0.0222 0.0005 68.1194 0.0093 84% 
 
0.0003 19.7531 0.0322 0.0006 43.4112 0.0147 84% 
 
G(SA) -0.0670 -2.5762 0.2357 0.0202 1.9157 0.3063 0.00% 
 
-0.0737 -3.6989 0.1681 0.0052 0.6386 0.6382 0.00% 
 
-0.1511 -4.4675 0.1402 0.0100 0.7791 0.5786 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1274 -3.3653 0.1839 0.0470 3.3851 0.1829 0.00% 
 
-0.0579 -2.2710 0.2641 0.0421 3.9186 0.1591 0.00% 
 
-0.1594 -3.6329 0.1710 0.0767 4.3292 0.1445 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.4304 -26.7173 0.0238 0.2753 16.0879 0.0395 7% 
 
0.1807 13.1702 0.0482 0.5398 40.7799 0.0156 69% 
 
0.2740 12.8783 0.0493 0.7073 32.2995 0.0197 63% 
 
INTAN -0.2527 -26.1032 0.0244 0.1128 19.8437 0.0321 21% 
 
0.0482 12.9012 0.0492 0.2933 75.7265 0.0084 78% 
 
0.0791 12.7927 0.0497 0.3293 44.1096 0.0144 60% 
 
SHPP -0.0144 -2.2202 0.2694 0.0467 3.1836 0.1938 0.00% 
 
-0.0207 -4.0479 0.1542 0.0009 0.1992 0.8748 0.00% 
 
-0.0274 -3.3767 0.1833 0.0288 1.5301 0.3685 0.00% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0288* 18.3781 0.0346 0.1458* 29.3498 0.0217 100% 
 
-0.1118 -26.9836 0.0236 -0.0176 -15.3897 0.0413 96% 
 
-0.0706 -36.6589 0.0174 -0.0235 -12.8900 0.0493 66% 
 
ROE -0.0817 -20.1822 0.0315 0.0789 40.3331 0.0158 26% 
 
-0.0186 -13.2769 0.0479 0.0284 19.3425 0.0329 2% 
 
-0.0790 -14.4893 0.0439 0.1049 14.1773 0.0448 3% 
 
GOP m d -0.0440 -19.6207 0.0324 -0.0138 -12.9887 0.0489 34% 
 
-0.0338* -38.2566 0.0166 -0.0107* -13.1795 0.0482 100% 
 
-0.0616* -40.6614 0.0157 -0.0295* -21.4847 0.0296 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0295 -49.6126 0.0128 0.0535 41.0365 0.0155 68% 
 
0.0047 12.9425 0.0491 0.0384 36.1210 0.0176 77% 
 
0.0074 12.7469 0.0498 0.0576 33.1988 0.0192 40% 
 
UNPR -0.0402 -25.4724 0.0250 0.0077 14.4301 0.0440 18% 
 
-0.0335 -23.4113 0.0272 -0.0081 -12.7233 0.0499 8% 
 
-0.0479 -21.2422 0.0299 0.0099 13.9580 0.0455 3% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -15.0877 0.0421 0.0000 23.5873 0.0270 14% 
 
-0.0000 -22.8443 0.0279 -0.0000 -12.7461 0.0498 16% 
 
-0.0000 -14.8037 0.0429 -0.0000 -13.2134 0.0481 0.03% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-7. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), France 
This table presents France’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF m d -0.8269* -43.4975 0.0146 -0.3147* -45.3807 0.0140 100% 
 
-0.3265* -25.5428 0.0249 -0.0939* -17.7075 0.0359 100% 
 
-0.7009* -34.2164 0.0186 -0.2702* -35.3758 0.0180 100% 
 
TAN  d c -0.0767 -18.2932 0.0348 0.4152 24.8086 0.0256 63% 
 
0.1702* 54.9374 0.0116 0.4056* 40.7256 0.0156 100% 
 
0.1788* 37.1672 0.0171 0.5379* 32.2976 0.0197 100% 
 
RISK -0.7441 -19.9850 0.0318 0.2519 22.2461 0.0286 87%  -0.4605 -17.3888 0.0366 -0.1029 -12.7183 0.0500 66%  -0.7064 -16.5271 0.0385 0.2080 16.9491 0.0375 54%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0936
* -115.0167 0.0055 -0.0320* -27.7133 0.0230 100%  -0.0459* -81.2671 0.0078 -0.0104* -30.9190 0.0206 100%  -0.0747* -85.0184 0.0075 -0.0195* -39.0014 0.0163 100%  
POR -0.0079 -13.0331 0.0488 -0.0079 -13.0331 0.0488 0.01% 
 
-0.0140 -6.9699 0.0907 0.0003 0.3436 0.7893 0.00% 
 
-0.0091 -12.9191 0.0492 -0.0090 -12.7980 0.0496 0.03% 
 
AGE -0.0023 -23.3735 0.0272 -0.0012 -12.8872 0.0493 15% 
 
-0.0021 -30.0976 0.0211 -0.0010 -12.7202 0.0499 60% 
 
-0.0031 -12.9089 0.0492 -0.0015 -12.7763 0.0497 59% 
 
TAX -0.0645 -16.1077 0.0395 -0.0190 -13.9415 0.0456 88% 
 
-0.0373 -13.8806 0.0458 -0.0135 -12.9425 0.0491 63% 
 
-0.0618 -13.9634 0.0455 -0.0201 -12.7270 0.0499 80% 
 
NDTAX 0.2370 12.7582 0.0498 0.5797 25.7442 0.0247 49% 
 
0.1816 12.8140 0.0496 0.5497 17.8476 0.0356 75% 
 
0.2795 12.7576 0.0498 0.7560 34.5938 0.0184 72% 
 
INV 0.0001 13.5876 0.0468 0.0007 17.9766 0.0354 79% 
 
0.0003 40.0527 0.0159 0.0005 81.1526 0.0078 84% 
 
0.0003 32.0856 0.0198 0.0007 59.1701 0.0108 84% 
 
G(SA) -0.0833 -3.3558 0.1844 -0.0026 -0.1269 0.9197 0.00% 
 
-0.0601 -3.4226 0.1810 0.0046 0.6789 0.6203 0.00% 
 
-0.0943 -3.3096 0.1868 -0.0059 -0.5852 0.6630 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1175 -3.5658 0.1741 0.0668 4.2051 0.1486 0.00% 
 
-0.0579 -2.5590 0.2372 0.0375 3.5000 0.1772 0.00% 
 
-0.1248 -3.3655 0.1839 0.0518 3.2066 0.1924 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -1.2381 -21.3637 0.0298 -0.2141 -15.1989 0.0418 26% 
 
-0.6852 -19.3701 0.0328 0.4292 34.8998 0.0182 68% 
 
-1.1334 -19.0529 0.0334 0.4764 25.5933 0.0249 38% 
 
INTAN -0.3819 -34.2171 0.0186 0.1148 19.6954 0.0323 36% 
 
-0.1575 -19.7817 0.0322 0.2074 58.9933 0.0108 27% 
 
-0.3029 -24.8749 0.0256 0.2286 38.8748 0.0164 27% 
 
SHPP -0.1030 -15.3757 0.0413 -0.0772 -13.1190 0.0484 58% 
 
-0.0499 -10.7076 0.0593 -0.0134 -1.3477 0.4064 0.00% 
 
-0.0959 -13.3936 0.0474 -0.0811 -12.8465 0.0495 11% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0198 16.2606 0.0391 0.1651 28.1011 0.0226 97% 
 
-0.0650 -18.2153 0.0349 -0.0160 -15.5112 0.0410 84% 
 
-0.0644 -39.2778 0.0162 -0.0199 -12.9670 0.0490 78% 
 
ROE -0.1247 -19.4463 0.0327 0.0278 12.8152 0.0496 57% 
 
-0.0256 -18.4498 0.0345 -0.0123 -12.8045 0.0496 37% 
 
-0.1129 -16.8312 0.0378 -0.0208 -13.0304 0.0488 76% 
 
GOP m d -0.1521* -156.0154 0.0041 -0.1152* -58.6593 0.0109 100% 
 
-0.0634* -43.6997 0.0146 -0.0435* -70.0752 0.0091 100% 
 
-0.1112* -98.3672 0.0065 -0.0840* -84.8655 0.0075 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0277 -48.1858 0.0132 0.0584 33.9243 0.0188 66% 
 
0.0040 12.7740 0.0497 0.0310 30.5699 0.0208 68% 
 
-0.0081 -13.4470 0.0473 0.0534 28.3442 0.0225 38% 
 
UNPR -0.0668 -32.1794 0.0198 -0.0083 -12.7588 0.0498 31% 
 
-0.0388 -28.2991 0.0225 -0.0061 -12.9299 0.0491 23% 
 
-0.0614 -27.9468 0.0228 -0.0102 -12.7432 0.0499 16% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -37.4773 0.0170 -0.0000 -12.8207 0.0496 71% 
 
-0.0000 -32.2483 0.0197 -0.0000 -12.7305 0.0499 68% 
 
-0.0000 -27.0439 0.0235 -0.0000 -12.8327 0.0495 57% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-8. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Germany 
This table presents Germany’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.5751
* -57.6461 0.0110 -0.2753* -42.8142 0.0149 100% 
 
-0.2189* -28.2712 0.0225 -0.0690* -13.5805 0.0468 100% 
 
-0.4665* -41.0440 0.0155 -0.1385* -16.7219 0.0380 100% 
 
TAN
 a
 0.1320
* 24.5600 0.0259 0.3530* 61.6622 0.0103 100% 
 
0.2848* 82.2206 0.0077 0.4682* 73.8978 0.0086 100% 
 
0.3787* 70.9822 0.0090 0.6197* 102.2938 0.0062 100% 
 
RISK 0.1093 14.2708 0.0445 0.5277 44.2304 0.0144 99%  -0.1405 -21.2252 0.0300 -0.0484 -12.8497 0.0494 37%  -0.2200 -21.4917 0.0296 0.1184 15.6086 0.0407 24%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.041
*2 -85.8619 0.0074 -0.0174* -75.7303 0.0084 100%  -0.0171* -45.0975 0.0141 -0.0042* -26.0433 0.0244 100%  -0.0276* -49.0767 0.0130 -0.0085* -34.0014 0.0187 100%  
POR -0.0303 -23.7134 0.0268 -0.0141 -12.7181 0.0500 82% 
 
-0.0150 -17.0906 0.0372 -0.0105 -12.8388 0.0495 12% 
 
-0.0228 -16.7118 0.0380 -0.0162 -12.7221 0.0499 25% 
 
AGE c 0.0014 13.3246 0.0477 0.0039 23.7125 0.0268 59% 
 
-0.0032 -40.0147 0.0159 -0.0011 -12.9734 0.0490 89% 
 
-0.0029 -23.4138 0.0272 -0.0015 -12.9532 0.0491 11% 
 
TAX -0.0031 -4.1281 0.1513 0.0064 11.0022 0.0577 0.00% 
 
-0.0035 -6.1838 0.1021 0.0018 4.3535 0.1437 0.00% 
 
-0.0022 -2.6817 0.2272 0.0047 7.5278 0.0841 0.00% 
 
NDTAX d 0.5099* 13.5698 0.0468 1.4530* 51.2473 0.0124 100% 
 
0.2499 12.9210 0.0492 0.8807 42.1044 0.0151 89% 
 
0.3851 13.2537 0.0479 1.4272 45.3954 0.0140 95% 
 
DIO m d 0.0003 13.0829 0.0486 0.0005 17.5115 0.0363 19% 
 
0.0003* 21.8848 0.0291 0.0008* 36.2730 0.0175 100% 
 
0.0003* 13.8524 0.0459 0.0010* 32.4631 0.0196 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.1033 -7.2572 0.0872 -0.0035 -0.3523 0.7844 0.00% 
 
-0.0416 -3.5016 0.1771 -0.0008 -0.1105 0.9300 0.00% 
 
-0.0495 -3.0059 0.2045 0.0073 0.3901 0.7632 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1437 -7.1364 0.0886 0.0167 1.3606 0.4035 0.00% 
 
-0.0464 -3.5609 0.1743 0.0197 1.9998 0.2952 0.00% 
 
-0.0918 -4.5251 0.1385 0.0261 1.7563 0.3295 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.7546 -20.3640 0.0312 0.4799 24.1331 0.0264 33% 
 
-0.4952 -18.2946 0.0348 0.5734 22.9701 0.0277 97% 
 
-0.7815 -19.2312 0.0331 0.6826 28.8074 0.0221 79% 
 
INTAN -0.1830 -26.6966 0.0238 0.2041 34.8712 0.0183 24% 
 
0.0513 12.7515 0.0498 0.3049 78.1156 0.0081 87% 
 
0.0764 12.7769 0.0497 0.4059 65.4694 0.0097 52% 
 
SHPP -0.0628 -6.5961 0.0958 -0.0038 -0.3948 0.7606 0.00% 
 
-0.0457 -6.1901 0.1020 -0.0137 -2.3295 0.2581 0.00% 
 
-0.0729 -6.5411 0.0966 -0.0213 -2.5302 0.2396 0.00% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0218* 22.5822 0.0282 0.0744* 58.5011 0.0109 100% 
 
-0.0308 -32.6985 0.0195 -0.0092 -13.3987 0.0474 80% 
 
-0.0312 -20.1823 0.0315 0.0175 16.3948 0.0388 34% 
 
ROE -0.0319 -20.8583 0.0305 -0.0104 -12.7360 0.0499 72% 
 
-0.0225  -19.9653 0.0319 -0.0084 -12.7100 0.0500 93% 
 
-0.0375 -35.6466 0.0179 -0.0147 -14.0808 0.0451 95% 
 
GOP m d 0.0146 12.8646 0.0494 0.0164 14.7935 0.0430 1% 
 
-0.0333* -35.1401 0.0181 -0.0143* -16.6878 0.0381 100% 
 
-0.0534* -38.4553 0.0166 -0.0245* -19.0237 0.0334 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0062 -12.9066 0.0492 -0.0023 -12.9099 0.0492 51% 
 
0.0044 12.7783 0.0497 0.0081 21.0447 0.0302 4% 
 
0.0071 13.5053 0.0471 0.0105 18.3794 0.0346 1% 
 
UNPR -0.0526 -32.4521 0.0196 -0.0187 -13.3338 0.0477 20% 
 
-0.0304 -20.6493 0.0308 -0.0141 -12.9210 0.0492 7% 
 
-0.0437 -20.2654 0.0314 -0.0197 -12.8148 0.0496 13% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -18.3827 0.0346 0.0000 21.1756 0.0300 11% 
 
-0.0000 -24.3001 0.0262 -0.0000 -12.9647 0.0490 1% 
 
-0.0000 -13.0189 0.0488 -0.0000 -13.0189 0.0488 0.01% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-8. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Germany 
This table presents Germany’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level. Notes: a The variable is robust in all measures; b The variable is robust in only Book value measures; m The variable is robust in only market value measures; d The variable is robust 
in at least one book measure ; c The variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.         
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.5341
* -55.3161 0.0115 -0.2124* -33.1277 0.0192 100% 
 
-0.2299* -34.0329 0.0187 -0.0610* -13.0599 0.0487 100% 
 
-0.4104* -40.4170 0.0157 -0.1575* -22.7669 0.0279 100% 
 
TAN
 a
 0.1676
* 44.0765 0.0144 0.4295* 49.0117 0.0130 100% 
 
0.2671* 88.4629 0.0072 0.4369* 72.3016 0.0088 100% 
 
0.3491* 79.4177 0.0080 0.5958* 68.2003 0.0093 100% 
 
RISK -0.2355 -30.7328 0.0207 0.2691 31.5460 0.0202 32%  -0.1789 -31.4575 0.0202 0.0582 14.1084 0.0450 41%  -0.2555 -30.7013 0.0207 0.1493 15.5235 0.0410 24%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0320
* -66.1505 0.0096 -0.0123* -64.5561 0.0099 100%  -0.0145* -41.2959 0.0154 -0.0045* -28.2129 0.0226 100%  -0.0225* -44.0034 0.0145 -0.0072* -29.7615 0.0214 100%  
POR -0.0297 -25.4685 0.0250 -0.0130 -14.1113 0.0450 94% 
 
-0.0130 -16.5214 0.0385 -0.0093 -12.7972 0.0496 12% 
 
-0.0215 -14.2067 0.0447 -0.0137 -12.7381 0.0499 11% 
 
AGE c 0.0023* 24.1041 0.0264 0.0054* 48.0689 0.0132 100% 
 
-0.0023 -31.4329 0.0202 -0.0010 -12.7504 0.0498 16% 
 
-0.0015 -13.9960 0.0454 0.0019 15.0374 0.0423 3% 
 
TAX -0.0117 -16.0482 0.0396 -0.0067 -12.7669 0.0498 18% 
 
-0.0067 -12.9511 0.0491 -0.0067 -12.9511 0.0491 0.01% 
 
-0.0102 -13.3593 0.0476 -0.0095 -12.7394 0.0499 1% 
 
NDTAX d 0.3102 14.1466 0.0449 1.0348 37.7244 0.0169 85% 
 
0.2706 14.6715 0.0433 0.7392 38.6424 0.0165 81% 
 
0.3483 12.7577 0.0498 0.9816 34.6351 0.0184 79% 
 
DIO m d 0.0002* 12.9486 0.0491 0.0006* 23.8803 0.0266 100% 
 
0.0003* 24.8935 0.0256 0.0007* 37.7042 0.0169 100% 
 
0.0003* 16.3174 0.0390 0.0008* 30.1805 0.0211 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.0996 -6.8838 0.0918 -0.0085 -1.1291 0.4614 0.00% 
 
-0.0426 -4.0093 0.1556 0.0045 0.6650 0.6264 0.00% 
 
-0.0791 -5.3374 0.1179 -0.0066 -0.7304 0.5984 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1174 -7.2491 0.0873 0.0694 5.3173 0.1183 0.00% 
 
-0.0463  -3.5727  0.1737 0.0331 3.8249 0.1628 0.00% 
 
-0.0902 -4.8435 0.1296 0.0610 4.7070 0.1333 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -1.2409 -33.4550 0.0190 -0.2576 -14.1859 0.0448 22% 
 
-0.5882 -23.0064 0.0277 0.4683 19.8839 0.0320 87% 
 
-1.0863 -29.4094 0.0216 0.3834 18.8815 0.0337 32% 
 
INTAN -0.1739 -33.7066 0.0189 0.1382 25.5674 0.0249 56% 
 
0.0490 12.7652 0.0498 0.2288 46.2068 0.0138 22% 
 
-0.0923 -16.2950 0.0390 0.2515 33.7911 0.0188 18% 
 
SHPP -0.1360 -14.6051 0.0435 -0.0865 -13.0060 0.0489 68% 
 
-0.0727 -10.4396 0.0608 -0.0207 -4.4441 0.1409 0.00% 
 
-0.1084 -13.9884 0.0454 -0.0883 -12.7636 0.0498 49% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0123 13.0132 0.0488 0.0386 37.2257 0.0171 28% 
 
-0.0289 -31.2402 0.0204 -0.0099 -13.1068 0.0485 87% 
 
-0.0381 -20.0177 0.0318 -0.0141 -13.4692 0.0472 71% 
 
ROE -0.0385 -25.5228 0.0249 -0.0098 -12.7486 0.0498 84% 
 
-0.0183 -17.2320 0.0369 -0.0067 -12.8112 0.0496 78% 
 
-0.0284 -18.3867 0.0346 -0.0110 -13.0423 0.0487 85% 
 
GOP m d -0.1561*  -157.9190 0.0040 -0.1258* -141.8665 0.0045 100% 
 
-0.0643* -77.1008 0.0083 -0.0457* -65.4522 0.0097 100% 
 
-0.1105* -91.1989 0.0070 -0.0837* -79.9937 0.0080 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0044 -22.2354 0.0286 0.0106 21.4363 0.0297 11% 
 
0.0043 12.7807 0.0497 0.0073 20.3000 0.0313 3% 
 
0.0029 13.6315 0.0466 0.0122 23.3120 0.0273 10% 
 
UNPR -0.0639 -37.8712 0.0168 -0.0153 -12.8658 0.0494 80% 
 
-0.0335 -26.0865 0.0244 -0.0115 -12.9322 0.0491 34% 
 
-0.0524 -28.4141 0.0224 -0.0185 -12.7695 0.0498 27% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -29.9153 0.0213 -0.0000 -14.2778 0.0445 65% 
 
-0.0000 -28.0396 0.0227 -0.0000 -13.2068 0.0481 59% 
 
-0.0000 -19.5189 0.0326 -0.0000 -12.7746 0.0497 9% 
 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
199 
 
Table B-9. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Singapore 
This table presents Singapore’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.3869
* -69.7845 0.0091 -0.1603* -18.1136 0.0351 100% 
 
-0.2188* -22.8783 0.0278 -0.0680* -20.0171 0.0318 100% 
 
-0.4316* -58.3217 0.0109 -0.1440* -13.1416 0.0483 100% 
 
TAN d c -0.1403 -39.3771 0.0162 0.1633 41.3562 0.0154 50% 
 
0.0673* 22.6116 0.0281 0.2295* 71.9175 0.0089 100% 
 
0.0577 12.8014 0.0496 0.2714 48.2947 0.0132 96% 
 
RISK 0.1250 15.3455 0.0414 0.3925 50.6047 0.0126 84%  -0.2347 -16.6410 0.0382 -0.0521 -12.7206 0.0499 20%  -0.2583 -12.8398 0.0495 0.1975 20.9552 0.0304 8%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0695
* -192.9764 0.0033 -0.0509* -87.9496 0.0072 100%  -0.0366* -122.3771 0.0052 -0.0246* -48.8258 0.0130 100%  -0.0568* -114.1896 0.0056 -0.0394* -54.3738 0.0117 100%  
POR -0.0075 -17.153 0.0371 -0.0054 -12.9738 0.049 70% 
 
-0.0049 -15.2859 0.0416 -0.0041 -12.9209 0.0492 59% 
 
-0.0081 -15.1444 0.0420 -0.0065 -12.7128 0.0500 67% 
 
AGE m -0.0046 -41.5451 0.0153 -0.0013 -12.7585 0.0498 76% 
 
-0.0034 -19.1633 0.0332 -0.0010 -12.7705 0.0497 59% 
 
-0.0037 -14.4762 0.0439 -0.0017 -12.7917 0.0497 4% 
 
TAX -0.0076 -15.2529 0.0417 0.0067 32.6528 0.0195 44% 
 
0.0018 12.8756 0.0493 0.0039 24.3225 0.0262 41% 
 
-0.0076 -13.9439 0.0456 0.0063 24.6681 0.0258 38% 
 
NDTAX -0.2479 -13.5029 0.0471 0.7500 25.6316 0.0248 31% 
 
-0.7683 -38.5207 0.0165 -0.2094 -13.6475 0.0466 24% 
 
-0.5359 -15.5838 0.0408 0.8354 23.3572 0.0272 26% 
 
DIO m d 0.0002 14.0821 0.0451 0.0005 44.2018 0.0144 94% 
 
0.0002* 15.2567 0.0417 0.0005* 62.4436 0.0102 100% 
 
0.0003* 13.9358 0.0456 0.0006* 45.3256 0.0140 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.0590 -7.2264 0.0875 0.0559 4.6280 0.1355 0.00% 
 
-0.0308 -2.0385 0.2903 0.0331 4.1741 0.1497 0.00% 
 
-0.0766 -6.3311 0.0997 0.0341 2.3363 0.2575 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1487 -7.4042 0.0855 0.1409 4.0959 0.1524 0.00% 
 
 -0.0319 -2.5357  0.2391 0.1028 4.0887 0.1527 0.00% 
 
-0.1631 -6.5864 0.0959 0.1060 2.8244 0.2166 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.2786 -22.0934 0.0288 0.3202 23.7196 0.0268 16% 
 
-0.2201 -20.1567 0.0316 0.3252 15.1101 0.0421 38% 
 
-0.3167 -15.0672 0.0422 0.3467 20.4276 0.0311 10% 
 
INTAN -0.2843 -38.9584 0.0163 -0.1067 -12.7622 0.0498 34% 
 
-0.1227 -19.9077 0.0320 0.2176 19.3618 0.0329 7% 
 
-0.2149 -20.6176 0.0309 -0.1233 -13.0520 0.0487 9% 
 
SHPP -0.0250 -4.7748 0.1314 0.0277  2.4781 0.2442 0.00% 
 
 -0.0131 -1.5724 0.3606  0.0007 0.0910 0.9422 0.00% 
 
-0.0330 -5.0453 0.1246 0.0088  0.7421 0.5936 0.00% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0320* 14.3734 0.0442 0.1049* 80.6145 0.0079 100% 
 
-0.0510 -24.6132 0.0259 -0.0125 -12.7454 0.0498 78% 
 
-0.0398 -13.1179 0.0484 0.0431 26.5664 0.0240 13% 
 
ROE -0.0114 -15.0533 0.0422 0.0164 19.4837 0.0326 11% 
 
-0.0140 -13.2096 0.0481 -0.0054 -12.8223 0.0495 21% 
 
-0.0199 -13.6150 0.0467 0.0238 22.7707 0.0279 11% 
 
GOP  m d 0.0271* 27.1503 0.0234 0.0659* 55.6891 0.0114 100% 
 
-0.0110 -13.0442 0.0487 0.0126 14.9973 0.0424 1% 
 
0.0177 12.8469 0.0495 0.0463 31.8217 0.0200 81% 
 
CAPIN -0.0171 -52.3601 0.0122 0.0110 20.116 0.0316 62% 
 
0.0029 12.8121 0.0496 0.0128 30.0856 0.0212 77% 
 
-0.0054 -13.7183 0.0463 0.0143 23.3500 0.0272 18% 
 
UNPR -0.0588 -15.3691 0.0414 -0.0479 -12.7452 0.0498 0.02% 
 
-0.0649 -12.8871 0.0493 -0.0475 -12.7404 0.0499 0.09% 
 
0.0346 12.7154 0.0500 0.0535 16.3162 0.0390 16% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -14.4992 0.0438 0.0000 18.2440 0.0349 6% 
 
-0.0000 -15.9971 0.0397 -0.0000 -13.1229 0.0484 1% 
 
-0.0000 -10.0949 0.0629 0.0000 5.6631 0.1113 0.00% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-9. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Singapore 
This table presents Singapore’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.4786
* -34.6268 0.0184 -0.1714* -35.9307 0.0177 100% 
 
-0.2756* -24.2933 0.0262 -0.0742* -19.2253 0.0331 100% 
 
-0.4713* -30.1561 0.0211 -0.1566* -29.9996 0.0212 100% 
 
TAN d c -0.0681 -19.7744 0.0322 0.2205 45.2696 0.0141 71% 
 
0.0897* 25.0601 0.0254 0.3069* 77.7068 0.0082 100% 
 
0.0602 13.5371 0.0469 0.3742 26.5094 0.0240 99%  
 
RISK -0.3028 -16.0537 0.0396 0.3207 44.3922 0.0143 27%  -0.3072 -19.2846 0.0330 -0.0752 -12.7661 0.0498 56%  -0.4667 -21.4992 0.0296 0.1584 18.5928 0.0342 37%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0528
* -147.8668 0.0043 -0.0362* -48.3587 0.0132 100%  -0.0359* -109.1884 0.0058 -0.0215* -33.3867 0.0191 100%  -0.0505* -113.6325 0.0056 -0.0327* -36.9316 0.0172 100%  
POR -0.0084 -19.0523 0.0334 -0.0046 -12.9589 0.0490 74% 
 
-0.0054 -15.2770 0.0416 -0.0044 -12.8803 0.0493 59% 
 
-0.0082 -16.8515 0.0377 -0.0060 -12.9588 0.0490 70% 
 
AGE m -0.0097* -34.8998 0.0182 -0.0040* -35.8547 0.0178 100% 
 
-0.0059* -26.0093 0.0245 -0.0013* -13.1851 0.0482 100% 
 
-0.0089* -28.7094 0.0222 -0.0026* -20.8757 0.0305 100% 
 
TAX -0.0118 -21.1114 0.0301 -0.0023 -12.9839 0.0489 29% 
 
-0.0072 -15.7541 0.0404 -0.0054 -12.7167 0.0500 13% 
 
-0.0113 -17.8875 0.0356 -0.0031 -13.0638 0.0486 16% 
 
NDTAX -0.7662 -25.7885 0.0247 0.5241 20.4957 0.0310 15% 
 
-1.0226 -45.4758 0.0140 0.2686 13.1100 0.0485 23% 
 
-1.1799 -38.8132 0.0164 0.3733 13.5219 0.0470 23% 
 
DIO m d 0.0002* 24.7812 0.0257 0.0005* 47.4179 0.0134 100% 
 
0.0003* 12.7712 0.0497 0.0006* 68.2758 0.0093 100% 
 
0.0004* 13.3979 0.0474 0.0007* 60.5005 0.0105 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.0952 -4.2673 0.1465 0.0069 0.4058 0.7546 0.00% 
 
-0.0696 -3.6728 0.1692 0.0181 2.1302 0.2794 0.00% 
 
-0.1025 -3.9520 0.1578 0.0163 1.4294 0.3886 0.00% 
 
G(AS)  -0.0893 -5.9273 0.1064 0.1941 4.3743 0.1431 0.00% 
 
 -0.0528 -3.9826 0.1566 0.0988 2.6765 0.2276 0.00% 
 
-0.0915 -5.1475 0.1222 0.1452 2.8662 0.2137 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.5691 -35.9074 0.0177 -0.1554 -12.8358 0.0495 42% 
 
-0.4501 -33.4005 0.0191 0.2068 17.0578 0.0373 14% 
 
-0.6412 -35.2875 0.0180 -0.2003 -12.8246 0.0495 22% 
 
INTAN -0.4038 -23.2733 0.0273 -0.1152 -13.6308 0.0466 96% 
 
-0.2216 -31.4846 0.0202 -0.0940 -12.8069 0.0496 48% 
 
-0.3301 -34.9984 0.0182 -0.1240 -12.7909 0.0497 65% 
 
SHPP -0.0824 -15.5006 0.0410 -0.0668 -13.9275 0.0456 66% 
 
-0.0472 -4.6532 0.1348 -0.0129 -3.0393 0.2024 0.00% 
 
-0.0713 -12.7640 0.0498 -0.0688 -12.7494 0.0498 1% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0147 13.2273 0.0480 0.0583 43.9606 0.0145 64% 
 
-0.0816 -31.0875 0.0205 -0.0146 -12.7523 0.0498 97% 
 
-0.1004 -27.8446 0.0229 -0.0193 -12.8454 0.0495 90% 
 
ROE -0.0128 -15.6596 0.0406 -0.0089 -12.8283 0.0495 11% 
 
-0.0113 -9.3560 0.0678 0.0027 3.7133 0.1675 0.00% 
 
-0.0127 -14.5050 0.0438 -0.0105 -13.2431 0.0480 1% 
 
GOP m d -0.1671* -80.7563 0.0079 -0.1096* -105.3194 0.0060 100% 
 
-0.0795* -39.9690 0.0159 -0.0447* -51.0089 0.0125 100% 
 
-0.1266* -47.2825 0.0135 -0.0741* -61.6707 0.0103 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0078 -25.8789 0.0246 0.0135 18.4834 0.0344 22% 
 
0.0036 13.9140 0.0457 0.0181 34.1768 0.0186 96% 
 
0.0041 12.7705 0.0497 0.0226 31.1252 0.0204 91% 
 
UNPR -0.1716 -23.8293 0.0267 0.0372 14.7032 0.0432 15% 
 
-0.1001 -16.9722 0.0375 0.0328 12.7527 0.0498 2% 
 
-0.1501 -18.3807 0.0346 0.0463 13.0453 0.0487 2% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -13.5937 0.0467 0.0000 14.3875 0.0442 0.03% 
 
-0.0000 -20.8282 0.0305 -0.0000 -12.7183 0.0500 10% 
 
-0.0000 -18.3899 0.0346 -0.0000 -12.7388 0.0499 2% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-10. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), China 
This table presents China’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure of 
leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 based 
on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -1.2381
* -83.9925 0.0076 -0.4525* -46.9269 0.0136 100% 
 
-0.8035* -83.2939 0.0076 -0.3371* -31.3003 0.0203 100% 
 
-1.2497* -94.0287 0.0068 -0.5439* -34.4339 0.0185 100% 
 
TAN d c 0.0321 13.9603 0.0455 0.3074 79.021 0.0081 85% 
 
0.2060* 100.5420 0.0063 0.4139* 160.2094 0.0040 100% 
 
0.1822* 41.9500 0.0152 0.4904* 130.8454 0.0049 100% 
 
RISK d 0.2072* 49.0534 0.0130 0.9138* 50.0106 0.0127 100%  -0.2945 -20.6412 0.0308 0.3829 58.3876 0.0109 65%  -0.2773 -14.2677 0.0445 0.3721 38.3003 0.0166 45%  
LIQ
 a
 -0.0443
* -188.5311 0.0034 -0.0219* -109.7957 0.0058 100%  -0.0261* -147.2771 0.0043 -0.0112* -76.2135 0.0084 100%  -0.0342* -125.0872 0.0051 -0.0156* -76.5416 0.0083 100%  
POR c -0.0105 -14.7759 0.0430 0.0246 36.8150 0.0173 17% 
 
0.0071 12.9033 0.0492 0.0313 59.6640 0.0107 94% 
 
0.0100 13.4935 0.0471 0.0390 56.0269 0.0114 45% 
 
AGE
 a
 0.0026
* 35.6678 0.0178 0.0164* 123.5484 0.0052 100% 
 
0.0011* 17.4521 0.0364 0.0098* 97.3295 0.0065 100% 
 
0.0025* 26.2416 0.0242 0.0146* 94.7078 0.0067 100% 
 
TAX c 0.0007 12.8131 0.0496 0.0074 71.4408 0.0089 95% 
 
-0.0031 -19.5021 0.0326 0.0058 73.8446 0.0086 85% 
 
-0.0028 -13.0265 0.0488 0.0079 63.9622 0.0100 90% 
 
NDTAX -0.3283 -14.1459 0.0449 2.6234 61.0938 0.0104 79% 
 
-1.0827 -44.5883 0.0143 2.2930 75.3508 0.0084 98% 
 
-1.7176 -30.0750 0.0212 2.9421 62.0294 0.0103 93% 
 
DIO d c 0.0001* 31.6469 0.0201 0.0002* 45.9468 0.0139 100% 
 
0.0000 13.4204 0.0473 0.0002 41.0657 0.0155 99% 
 
0.0001* 25.1810 0.0253 0.0002* 48.6758 0.0131 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.0601 -9.8372 0.0645 0.0610 11.5617 0.0549 0.00% 
 
-0.0657 -7.1024 0.0890 0.0200 4.5292 0.1383 0.00% 
 
-0.1065 -8.4213 0.0752 0.0317 5.1873 0.1212 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1656 -17.8657 0.0356 -0.0604 -12.7886 0.0497 39% 
 
-0.0904 -15.2566 0.0417 -0.0505 -12.8310 0.0495 14% 
 
-0.0878 -15.2233 0.0418 -0.0737 -13.0147 0.0488 3% 
 
CAPEX -1.0453 -69.7680 0.0091 0.1427 19.1770 0.0332 83% 
 
-0.4297 -39.9326 0.0159 0.5217 83.7541 0.0076 86% 
 
-0.7623 -45.7772 0.0139 0.5299 60.9615 0.0104 56% 
 
INTAN -0.1797 -15.8492 0.0401 0.1814 25.5275 0.0249 31% 
 
-0.0919 -16.9137 0.0376 0.1779 16.6505 0.0382 34% 
 
0.1016 12.8186 0.0496 0.2380 29.2664 0.0217 26% 
 
SHPP 0.0458 12.7488 0.0498 0.0488 13.7281 0.0463 1% 
 
-0.0376 -6.7106 0.0942 0.0284 9.2142 0.0688 0.00% 
 
-0.0461 -5.9925 0.1053 0.0504 11.6080 0.0547 0.00% 
 
ASUTI c 0.0112 13.0630 0.0486 0.0779 79.6905 0.0080 84% 
 
-0.0661 -64.7601 0.0098 -0.0097 -12.7519 0.0498 92% 
 
-0.0738 -53.4809 0.0119 0.0302 27.0559 0.0235 81% 
 
ROE c -0.2556 -44.1925 0.0144 0.3403 51.3271 0.0124 82% 
 
-0.3365 -71.4112 0.0089 0.0366 15.6304 0.0407 91% 
 
-0.4681 -71.9335 0.0088 0.1265 33.5935 0.0189 88% 
 
GOP m d -0.0350 -46.1910 0.0138 0.0170 28.7058 0.0222 84% 
 
-0.0357* -57.2467 0.0111 -0.0065* -13.3283 0.0477 100% 
 
-0.0475* -91.7284 0.0069 -0.0104* -13.8756 0.0458 100% 
 
CAPIN c 0.0008 15.2631 0.0417 0.0100 32.8131 0.0194 96% 
 
0.0004 12.8610 0.0494 0.0115 47.3837 0.0134 91% 
 
0.0007 12.7348 0.0499 0.0170 51.3461 0.0124 67% 
 
UNPR -0.1545 -33.6597 0.0189 -0.0520 -13.2952 0.0478 71% 
 
-0.2065 -51.1585 0.0124 -0.0481 -14.2610 0.0446 99% 
 
-0.2550 -47.2249 0.0135 -0.0617 -12.7866 0.0497 93% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -42.3859 0.0150 0.0000 31.1609 0.0204 59% 
 
-0.0000 -27.2195 0.0234 0.0000 24.6647 0.0258 37% 
 
-0.0000 -28.5704 0.0223 -0.0000 -12.8452 0.0495 35% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
        
 
 
202 
 
Table B-10. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), China 
This table presents China’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -1.0497
* -68.7213 0.0093 -0.3823* -69.2372 0.0092 100% 
 
-0.6436* -75.2888 0.0085 -0.2164* -36.9557 0.0172 100% 
 
-0.9236* -80.9787 0.0079 -0.3546* -45.8552 0.0139 100% 
 
TAN d c 0.0286 13.3713 0.0475 0.2951 103.5597 0.0061 98% 
 
0.1581* 107.4399 0.0059 0.3970* 93.7113 0.0068 100% 
 
0.1458* 75.6310 0.0084 0.4163* 71.1459 0.0089 100% 
 
RISK d -0.2601 -16.1491 0.0394 0.6855 45.4849 0.0140 69%  -0.3624 -28.7205 0.0222 0.2109 46.4626 0.0137 50%  -0.4246 -25.3714 0.0251 0.3277 18.1527 0.0350 47%  
LIQ
 a
 -0.0242
* -138.3006 0.0046 -0.0097* -58.1305 0.0110 100%  -0.0157* -120.6020 0.0053 -0.0057* -42.2420 0.0151 100%  -0.0198* -113.4029 0.0056 -0.0071* -38.5368 0.0165 100%  
POR c 0.0066 12.7842 0.0497 0.0215 35.1897 0.0181 42% 
 
0.0060* 15.2403 0.0417 0.0244* 53.0542 0.0120 100% 
 
0.0066 12.7634 0.0498 0.0272 46.0144 0.0138 94% 
 
AGE
 a
 0.0025
* 23.8266 0.0267 0.0093* 122.4366 0.0052 100% 
 
0.0011* 12.9729 0.0490 0.0060* 80.2622 0.0079 100% 
 
0.0014* 13.1600 0.0483 0.0075* 75.2078 0.0085 100% 
 
TAX c 0.0007* 15.1773 0.0419 0.0150* 80.3137 0.0079 100% 
 
0.0007 17.9991 0.0353 0.0061 43.9631 0.0145 99% 
 
0.0007* 14.1234 0.0450 0.0115* 60.3998 0.0105 100% 
 
NDTAX -1.1382 -38.6190 0.0165 1.4842 33.1658 0.0192 73% 
 
-1.2915 -62.2670 0.0102 1.4642 44.3242 0.0144 99% 
 
-1.3967 -48.6465 0.0131 1.6644 36.8978 0.0172 97% 
 
DIO d c 0.0000* 25.8089 0.0247 0.0002* 38.1000 0.0167 100% 
 
0.0000 13.0633 0.0486 0.0001 36.9174 0.0172 96% 
 
0.0000 16.7463 0.0380 0.0002 36.8491 0.0173 99% 
 
G(SA) -0.0749 -7.1117 0.0889 0.0301 8.0918 0.0783 0.00% 
 
-0.0577 -7.3804 0.0857 0.0143 4.8476 0.1295 0.00% 
 
-0.0761 -7.3635 0.0859 0.0210 5.5452 0.1136 0.00% 
 
G(AS) 0.0683 12.7381 0.0499 0.1159 17.3884 0.0366 15% 
 
0.0516 13.2259 0.0480 0.0749 14.3117 0.0444 2% 
 
0.0672 12.8372 0.0495 0.1074 16.0150 0.0397 6% 
 
CAPEX -0.7548 -47.1238 0.0135 -0.0892 -12.8248 0.0495 96% 
 
-0.4512 -39.4296 0.0161 0.3053 55.3571 0.0115 71% 
 
-0.5747 -36.3639 0.0175 0.2785 39.4014 0.0162 35% 
 
INTAN -0.3441 -29.1773 0.0218 0.0668 12.9869 0.0489 48% 
 
-0.1180 -26.6683 0.0239 0.1048 25.2494 0.0252 16% 
 
-0.2103 -17.3690 0.0366 0.0989 18.1821 0.0350 16% 
 
SHPP -0.0938 -15.2210 0.0418 -0.0569 -19.0396 0.0334 72% 
 
-0.0640 -13.1724 0.0482 -0.0385 -17.1684 0.0370 70% 
 
-0.0890 -13.7610 0.0462 -0.0531 -18.1443 0.0351 71% 
 
ASUTI c -0.0743 -37.5936 0.0169 0.0172 14.2668 0.0445 89% 
 
-0.0769* -51.7083 0.0123 -0.0245* -27.3274 0.0233 100% 
 
-0.0967* -48.5463 0.0131 -0.0242* -20.1422 0.0316 100% 
 
ROE c -0.3376 -61.3775 0.0104 -0.0326 -12.8130 0.0496 88% 
 
-0.3019* -73.3086 0.0087 -0.0228* -12.8092 0.0496 100% 
 
-0.3939 -71.5487 0.0089 -0.0323 -13.4315 0.0473 99% 
 
GOP m d -0.1032* -174.1422 0.0037 -0.0705* -163.9363 0.0039 100% 
 
-0.0544* -109.3998 0.0058 -0.0389* -112.0334 0.0057 100% 
 
-0.0779* -118.8692 0.0054 -0.0544* -118.7051 0.0054 100% 
 
CAPIN c 0.0010 22.5402 0.0282 0.0123 46.4984 0.0137 99% 
 
0.0005* 16.7852 0.0379 0.0113* 54.9550 0.0116 100% 
 
0.0009* 22.9739 0.0277 0.0142* 52.5684 0.0121 100% 
 
UNPR -0.1443 -30.8433 0.0206 0.0647 16.8311 0.0378 31% 
 
-0.1666 -49.1474 0.0130 -0.0405 -12.7551 0.0498 91% 
 
-0.1763 -39.3078 0.0162 -0.0517 -12.7298 0.0499 57% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -24.2834 0.0262 0.0000 48.6227 0.0131 74% 
 
-0.0000 -20.5520 0.0310 0.0000 42.8705 0.0148 63% 
 
-0.0000 -22.6998 0.0280 0.0000 46.2444 0.0138 67% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-11. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Japan 
This table presents Japan’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure of 
leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 based 
on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.9309
* -177.6921 0.0036 -0.4459* -101.0556 0.0063 100% 
 
-0.6385* -144.2300 0.0044 -0.2449* -71.9492 0.0088 100% 
 
-1.0744* -167.9718 0.0038 -0.4860* -102.7375 0.0062 100% 
 
TAN d c 0.0214 15.3212 0.0415 0.3753 204.5646 0.0031 88% 
 
0.2571 167.8956 0.0038 0.5047 346.5851 0.0018 100% 
 
0.2616* 123.3381 0.0052 0.6216* 294.1501 0.0022 100% 
 
RISK c -0.642 -73.0748 0.0087 0.4248 40.8229 0.0156 66%  -0.5937 -69.4664 0.0092 0.4376 51.7815 0.0123 85%  -0.7534 -62.7633 0.0101 0.6483 52.3547 0.0122 77%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0812
* -529.2522 0.0012 -0.0713* -454.8218 0.0014 100%  -0.0585* -371.1461 0.0017 -0.0369* -256.8806 0.0025 100%  -0.0822* -378.8192 0.0017 -0.0586* -287.4377 0.0022 100%  
POR b c -0.0318* -55.5585 0.0115 -0.0149* -41.8066 0.0152 100% 
 
-0.0189* -39.1020 0.0163 -0.0072* -19.0205 0.0334 100% 
 
-0.0329* -47.3903 0.0134 -0.0167* -32.3484 0.0197 100% 
 
AGE -0.0024 -70.2029 0.0091 0.0030 69.8559 0.0091 61% 
 
-0.0022 -74.7653 0.0085 0.0016 45.8957 0.0139 60% 
 
-0.0028 -65.6863 0.0097 0.0028 51.6774 0.0123 70% 
 
TAX -0.0014 -13.3935 0.0474 0.0024 17.0096 0.0374 21% 
 
0.0016 12.9767 0.0490 0.0023 17.6488 0.0360 30% 
 
0.0023 12.7596 0.0498 0.0029 15.9306 0.0399 18% 
 
NDTAX -1.0128 -66.6050 0.0096 0.9499 58.3985 0.0109 74% 
 
0.1908 17.3095 0.0367 2.0490 149.7216 0.0043 98% 
 
-0.3913 -21.1965 0.0300 2.3834 120.6497 0.0053 89% 
 
DIO m d -0.0003 -30.6401 0.0208 0.0009 90.4900 0.0070 60% 
 
0.0003* 32.7233 0.0194 0.0009* 127.4991 0.0050 100% 
 
0.0002* 18.4457 0.0345 0.0013* 119.8172 0.0053 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.1531 -15.3418 0.0414 -0.1130 -12.8141 0.0496 10% 
 
-0.1834 -18.8220 0.0338 -0.1168 -12.7091 0.0500 23% 
 
-0.2705 -19.2177 0.0331 -0.1618 -13.1345 0.0484 32% 
 
G(AS) -0.3769 -20.6172 0.0309 -0.1331 -14.6579 0.0434 82% 
 
-0.3018 -22.4744 0.0283 -0.1310 -14.0944 0.0451 83% 
 
-0.4919 -22.0478 0.0289 -0.2156 -13.2009 0.0481 84% 
 
CAPEX -0.6088 -50.8342 0.0125 0.6049 77.0275 0.0083 84% 
 
-0.2948 -29.6905 0.0214 1.0375 134.0716 0.0047 91% 
 
-0.5416 -38.0828 0.0167 1.1871 118.2271 0.0054 98% 
 
INTAN -0.3005 -40.2018 0.0158 0.3440 39.3126 0.0162 68% 
 
-0.2332 -34.3962 0.0185 0.6086 86.0751 0.0074 67% 
 
-0.3066 -32.5450 0.0196 0.7291 70.1737 0.0091 42% 
 
SHPP 0.0264 12.9434 0.0491 0.0460 14.8589 0.0428 11% 
 
-0.0161 -7.5226 0.0841 0.0272 10.2893 0.0617 0.00% 
 
0.0441 13.0776 0.0486 0.0441 13.0776 0.0486 0.01% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0218* 58.3219 0.0109 0.1350* 188.5752 0.0034 100% 
 
-0.0447 -79.6463 0.0080 0.0492 82.9679 0.0077 60% 
 
-0.0330 -40.6891 0.0156 0.0957 109.2215 0.0058 97% 
 
ROE -0.1101 -87.1284 0.0073 -0.0129 -13.5524 0.0469 96% 
 
-0.0877 -76.1645 0.0084 -0.0125 -15.1352 0.0420 98% 
 
-0.1351 -85.6466 0.0074 -0.0221 -19.5993 0.0325 98% 
 
GOP m -0.0166 -36.4132 0.0175 0.0483 78.9280 0.0081 58% 
 
-0.0158 -37.8459 0.0168 0.0372 74.5358 0.0085 60% 
 
-0.0192 -32.3010 0.0197 0.0596 81.0982 0.0078 64% 
 
CAPIN -0.0906 -145.2787 0.0044 0.0457 93.7720 0.0068 95% 
 
-0.0397 -94.7128 0.0067 0.0587 147.9577 0.0043 66% 
 
-0.0638 -110.3000 0.0058 0.0706 98.3455 0.0065 65% 
 
UNPR c -0.3190 -153.3467 0.0042 -0.0190 -12.7392 0.0499 93% 
 
-0.1346 -77.0939 0.0083 0.0633 47.7872 0.0133 94% 
 
-0.2458 -97.9308 0.0065 0.0612 31.3400 0.0203 94% 
 
VAR c -0.0000 -78.8100 0.0081 0.0000 33.9356 0.0188 84% 
 
-0.0000 -22.6475 0.0281 0.0000 86.0043 0.0074 49% 
 
-0.0000 -32.8813 0.0194 0.0000 64.0824 0.0099 52% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-11. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Japan 
This table presents Japan’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure of 
leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 based 
on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -1.2632
* -224.1452 0.0028 -0.5905* -181.3274 0.0035 100% 
 
-0.6825* -161.3192 0.0039 -0.2973* -93.5257 0.0068 100% 
 
-1.1557* -189.4135 0.0034 -0.5861* -130.7725 0.0049 100% 
 
TAN d c 0.0290 19.9131 0.0319 0.5271 252.2962 0.0025 98% 
 
0.2752* 186.1517 0.0034 0.5296* 341.5918 0.0019 100% 
 
0.2715* 126.8964 0.0050 0.6946* 303.9004 0.0021 100% 
 
RISK c -1.8274* -192.2840 0.0033 -0.1359* -13.5970 0.0467 100%  -0.8854 -113.3981 0.0056 -0.0962 -14.2667 0.0445 96%  -1.3912 -124.1311 0.0051 -0.1578 -13.8146 0.0460 99%  
LIQ 
a -0.0793* -420.4233 0.0015 -0.0619* -305.5792 0.0021 100%  -0.0564* -354.0406 0.0018 -0.0353* -203.9295 0.0031 100%  -0.0809* -362.6597 0.0018 -0.0554* -220.3937 0.0029 100%  
POR b c -0.0273 -48.1825 0.0132 -0.0054 -12.8115 0.0496 99% 
 
-0.0182 -37.6367 0.0169 -0.0050 -13.3346 0.0477 99% 
 
-0.0324* -46.3396 0.0137 -0.0121* -22.6567 0.0281 100% 
 
AGE -0.0012 -35.2743 0.0180 0.0037 87.1427 0.0073 85% 
 
-0.0015 -49.2046 0.0129 0.0020 56.7915 0.0112 82% 
 
-0.0017 -38.9065 0.0164 0.0031 57.4897 0.0111 86% 
 
TAX -0.0070 -43.1817 0.0147 -0.0016 -13.8717 0.0458 88% 
 
-0.0022 -15.7194 0.0404 -0.0014 -12.7522 0.0498 1% 
 
-0.0043 -22.7902 0.0279 -0.0020 -12.8571 0.0494 13% 
 
NDTAX -1.9964 -127.9927 0.0050 0.9298 56.3482 0.0113 68% 
 
-0.2829 -21.8324 0.0291 2.0201 144.9508 0.0044 89% 
 
-0.9050 -47.2540 0.0135 2.2470 111.7892 0.0057 95% 
 
DIO d c -0.0001 -17.0966 0.0372 0.0012 120.5383 0.0053 87% 
 
0.0004* 43.0269 0.0148 0.0011* 144.9645 0.0044 100% 
 
0.0004* 34.9891 0.0182 0.0014* 130.2881 0.0049 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.2853 -27.2101 0.0234 -0.1443 -12.7779 0.0497 41% 
 
-0.2134 -23.3572 0.0272 -0.1164 -12.8730 0.0494 52% 
 
-0.3335 -25.8960 0.0246 -0.1738 -12.9198 0.0492 66% 
 
G(AS) -0.3171 -20.4200 0.0312 0.2306 17.1879 0.0370 45% 
 
-0.2736 -21.8753 0.0291 -0.1212 -12.8497 0.0494 75% 
 
-0.4108 -22.5236 0.0282 -0.1728 -12.9016 0.0492 76% 
 
CAPEX -1.3686 -112.2528 0.0057 0.1995 22.8610 0.0278 88% 
 
-0.5938 -57.7215 0.0110 0.8472 109.8195 0.0058 97% 
 
-1.0387 -67.4212 0.0094 0.8394 78.2580 0.0081 82% 
 
INTAN -0.9775 -109.3775 0.0058 -0.1073 -13.4852 0.0471 99% 
 
-0.4318 -61.2840 0.0104 0.4510 62.5510 0.0102 70% 
 
-0.7174 -69.6155 0.0091 0.3857 36.6692 0.0174 86% 
 
SHPP -0.0882 -30.9500 0.0206 -0.0301 -13.5847 0.0468 73% 
 
-0.0420 -19.5292 0.0326 -0.0277 -12.7167 0.0500 32% 
 
-0.0747 -21.4706 0.0296 -0.0384 -12.7118 0.0500 72% 
 
ASUTI d -0.0114 -24.6671 0.0258 0.1036 127.9421 0.0050 94% 
 
-0.0536 -96.1215 0.0066 0.0409 67.3036 0.0095 85% 
 
-0.0524 -63.9030 0.0100 0.0785 86.0072 0.0074 58% 
 
ROE -0.1081 -82.9872 0.0077 0.0545 61.1571 0.0104 99% 
 
-0.0783 -72.5058 0.0088 0.0164 17.6652 0.0360 89% 
 
-0.1170 -76.0978 0.0084 0.0300 22.9803 0.0277 87% 
 
GOP m -0.1483* -319.6863 0.0020 -0.0931* -155.0309 0.0041 100% 
 
-0.0533* -134.1861 0.0047 -0.0069* -13.9777 0.0455 100% 
 
-0.0887* -155.5576 0.0041 -0.0206* -28.5535 0.0223 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0948 -181.9434 0.0035 0.0430 53.0244 0.0120 95% 
 
-0.0394 -95.5750 0.0067 0.0579 143.6043 0.0044 61% 
 
-0.0680 -115.5855 0.0055 0.0634 86.2937 0.0074 61% 
 
UNPR c -0.4641* -224.5685 0.0028 -0.0942* -52.5945 0.0121 100% 
 
-0.1900 -104.0459 0.0061 0.0300 17.6145 0.0361 91% 
 
-0.3463 -142.9526 0.0045 -0.0303 -12.7441 0.0499 99% 
 
VAR c -0.0000* -142.1997 0.0045 -0.0000* -15.9342 0.0399 100% 
 
-0.0000 -52.5937 0.0121 0.0000 65.2645 0.0098 61% 
 
-0.0000 -76.8201 0.0083 0.0000 34.1882 0.0186 88% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-12. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Malaysia 
This table presents Malaysia’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.8680
* -47.5902 0.0134 -0.3337* -44.1772 0.0144 100% 
 
-0.6363* -44.7080 0.0142 -0.3055* -51.6899 0.0123 100% 
 
-0.8636* -100.5412 0.0063 -0.3241* -30.8421 0.0206 100% 
 
TAN -0.0631 -23.1848 0.0274 0.1168 34.5917 0.0184 79% 
 
0.0665 26.6058 0.0239 0.2009 68.0573 0.0094 98% 
 
0.0446 13.8905 0.0458 0.2177 56.8545 0.0112 97% 
 
RISK 0.0882 12.741 0.0499 0.1098 15.8351 0.0401 0.03%  -0.1214 -15.4523 0.0411 -0.0381 -12.8343 0.0495 33%  -0.1720 -19.8313 0.0321 -0.0528 -13.0665 0.0486 34%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0382
* -210.4353 0.003 -0.0285* -74.993 0.0085 100%  -0.0242* -143.2738 0.0044 -0.0175* -50.9224 0.0125 100%  -0.0314* -145.6448 0.0044 -0.0219* -50.3544 0.0126 100%  
POR
 a
 -0.1299
* -78.0225 0.0082 -0.0518* -18.1766 0.035 100% 
 
-0.0932* -68.2086 0.0093 -0.0445* -34.2315 0.0186 100% 
 
-0.1266* -72.6227 0.0088 -0.0612* -18.6930 0.0340 100% 
 
AGE -0.0046 -26.0113 0.0245 -0.0010 -13.6519 0.0465 75% 
 
-0.0022 -14.3363 0.0443 0.0010 13.8922 0.0457 16% 
 
-0.0031 -15.9064 0.0400 0.0012 12.9148 0.0492 15% 
 
TAX -0.0045 -7.1712 0.0882 0.0011 3.0541 0.2014 0.00% 
 
-0.0038 -7.2024  0.0878 0.0015 4.5317 0.1383 0.00% 
 
-0.0055 -8.1783 0.0775 0.0017 4.0867 0.1528 0.00% 
 
NDTAX -0.5509 -23.8785 0.0266 1.0628 16.6702 0.0381 22% 
 
-0.3867 -17.4790 0.0364 0.9051 18.1097 0.0351 60% 
 
-0.5635 -19.8306 0.0321 1.3069 20.5943 0.0309 38% 
 
DIO d c 0.0001 12.7518 0.0498 0.0003 25.6414 0.0248 59% 
 
0.0002* 26.5208 0.0240 0.0005* 23.8968 0.0266 100% 
 
0.0002 19.1975 0.0331 0.0004 41.3169 0.0154 94% 
 
G(SA) -0.0681 -7.5693 0.0836 0.0273 1.3306 0.4103 0.00% 
 
-0.0451 -6.2951 0.1003 0.0270 1.5763    0.3599 0.00% 
 
-0.0648 -7.0056 0.0903 0.0291 1.3340 0.4095 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.2031 -10.8598 0.0585 0.0328 0.7537 0.5888 0.00% 
 
-0.1322 -8.6253 0.0735 0.0400 1.1036 0.4687 0.00% 
 
-0.1893 -9.6231 0.0659 0.0572 1.2328 0.4339 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.1839 -18.249 0.0349 0.2091 19.5795 0.0325 12% 
 
0.1143 12.7355 0.0499 0.3337 15.9698 0.0398 32% 
 
0.1315 12.8351 0.0495 0.3603 13.4538 0.0472 14% 
 
INTAN -0.1264 -26.1036 0.0244 0.0926 15.1317 0.042 7% 
 
0.0622 14.2045 0.0447 0.1992 19.6469 0.0324 20% 
 
0.0791 12.7608 0.0498 0.2261 17.1638 0.0370 19% 
 
SHPP -0.0533 -9.8124 0.0647 0.0124  0.9872  0.5041 0.00% 
 
-0.0529 -4.8957 0.1283 -0.0135 -2.9365    0.2090 0.00% 
 
-0.0664 -11.2957 0.0562 -0.0134 -2.3072 0.2604 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0162 13.6565 0.0465 0.0887 23.7095 0.0268 59% 
 
-0.0575 -51.4076 0.0124 -0.0152 -12.8428 0.0495 83% 
 
-0.0647 -46.1387 0.0138 -0.0192 -12.9903 0.0489 72% 
 
ROE -0.2936 -40.1488 0.0159 -0.0344 -12.7242 0.0499 96% 
 
-0.1401 -24.9816 0.0255 -0.0055 -12.7530 0.0498 53% 
 
-0.2276 -31.3570 0.0203 -0.0074 -13.4476 0.0473 96% 
 
GOP m -0.0236 -17.0108 0.0374 0.0297 25.8704 0.0246 20% 
 
-0.0449 -38.4096 0.0166 -0.0143 -13.3172 0.0477 87% 
 
-0.0541 -35.9400 0.0177 -0.0175 -13.2309 0.0480 80% 
 
CAPIN -0.0075 -22.1261 0.0288 0.0133 13.9287 0.0456 26% 
 
0.0035 13.1540 0.0483 0.0113 42.8377 0.0149 72% 
 
0.0042 12.7531 0.0498 0.0148 17.3056 0.0367 79% 
 
UNPR -0.1867 -17.0931 0.0372 -0.1295 -13.6643 0.0465 3% 
 
-0.0895 -9.8167 0.0646 0.0243 2.7237 0.2240 0.00% 
 
-0.1085 -9.2708 0.0684 0.0447 3.8498 0.1618 0.00% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -27.5292 0.0231 -0.0000 -12.8437 0.0495 57% 
 
-0.0000 -25.1204 0.0253 -0.0000 -13.1248 0.0484 29% 
 
-0.0000 -19.9497 0.0319 -0.0000 -13.2197 0.0481 19% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-12. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Malaysia 
This table presents Malaysia’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -1.2107
* -58.8675 0.0108 -0.4768* -63.5474 0.0100 100% 
 
-0.8094* -47.7817 0.0133 -0.3539* -48.6034 0.0131 100% 
 
-1.1404* -103.9929 0.0061 -0.5460* -58.1770 0.0109 100% 
 
TAN -0.0469 -15.2003 0.0418 0.2455 55.6759 0.0114 76% 
 
0.0790 27.9730 0.0227 0.2707 75.3812 0.0084 98% 
 
0.0532 14.3791 0.0442 0.3237 67.6730 0.0094 98% 
 
RISK -0.5267 -19.2928 0.0330 0.1159 14.0141 0.0454 42%  -0.4463 -19.9696 0.0319 -0.0649 -13.0601 0.0487 72%  -0.5724 -19.6541 0.0324 -0.0882 -13.3864 0.0475 58%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0439
* -189.6734 0.0034 -0.0286* -62.8669 0.0101 100%  -0.0288* -143.2865 0.0044 -0.0180* -44.2558 0.0144 100%  -0.0398* -150.2958 0.0042 -0.0245* -46.4917 0.0137 100%  
POR
 a
 -0.2017
* -51.1866 0.0124 -0.0748* -49.0855 0.0130 100% 
 
-0.1290* -80.1801 0.0079 -0.0543* -36.7340 0.0173 100% 
 
-0.1863* -87.7202 0.0073 -0.0809* -42.4362 0.0150 100% 
 
AGE -0.0031 -13.7510 0.0462 0.0031 29.5965 0.0215 36% 
 
-0.0015 -15.0978 0.0421 0.0020 22.6730 0.0281 16% 
 
0.0016 13.0284 0.0488 0.0041 34.4039 0.0185 59% 
 
TAX -0.0081 -15.0216 0.0423 -0.0058 -13.3070 0.0478 36% 
 
-0.0040 -9.3011 0.0682 0.0009 2.2440 0.2669 0.00% 
 
-0.0061 -10.6171 0.0598 0.0006 1.1111 0.4665 0.00% 
 
NDTAX -1.1480 -37.0521 0.0172 0.8540 13.6398 0.0466 28% 
 
-0.7345 -27.0009 0.0236 0.8491 30.9243 0.0206 40% 
 
-1.1586 -32.9071 0.0193 0.9715 12.9936 0.0489 30% 
 
DIO d c 0.0002 18.8598 0.0337 0.0007 53.6548 0.0119 98% 
 
0.0003* 32.9065 0.0193 0.0007* 29.8775 0.0213 100% 
 
0.0003* 28.6133 0.0222 0.0008* 26.2320 0.0243 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.0781 -7.6812 0.0824 0.0530 2.1573 0.2763 0.00% 
 
-0.0479 -5.5400 0.1137 0.0457 4.0420 0.1544 0.00% 
 
-0.0803 -6.9926 0.0904 0.0497 1.8510 0.3153 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.2313 -11.6586 0.0545 0.1402 2.7082 0.2252 0.00% 
 
-0.1663 -8.4657 0.0749 0.0876 2.0248 0.2920 0.00% 
 
-0.2464 -11.0062 0.0577 0.1137 2.0120 0.2936 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.7620 -49.1686 0.0129 -0.1775 -12.9451 0.0491 93% 
 
-0.4256 -34.2668 0.0186 0.1950 16.9163 0.0376 26% 
 
-0.7173 -43.4639 0.0146 -0.2126 -13.6865 0.0464 66% 
 
INTAN -0.2722 -42.3483 0.0150 -0.0806 -12.8209 0.0496 68% 
 
-0.1167 -22.1281 0.0288 0.1774 28.9594 0.0220 17% 
 
-0.1826 -26.2229 0.0243 0.1846 22.5097 0.0283 19% 
 
SHPP -0.1487 -22.4077 0.0284 -0.0748 -14.7937 0.0430 82% 
 
-0.0996 -18.5606 0.0343 -0.0633 -12.8184 0.0496 60% 
 
-0.1508 -21.3600 0.0298 -0.0884 -13.7840 0.0461 81% 
 
ASUTI -0.0514 -32.1322 0.0198 0.0843 23.3021 0.0273 30% 
 
-0.0754 -54.7004 0.0116 -0.0179 -12.7755 0.0497 75% 
 
-0.0976 -53.8438 0.0118 -0.0246 -12.8078 0.0496 69% 
 
ROE -0.2108 -29.0262 0.0219 -0.0232 -14.4113 0.0441 37% 
 
-0.1255 -22.0314 0.0289 -0.0063 -12.7650 0.0498 46% 
 
-0.1684 -22.3549 0.0285 -0.0084 -12.8308 0.0495 50% 
 
GOP m -0.2106* -136.7945 0.0047 -0.1665* -59.2218 0.0107 100% 
 
-0.1206* -92.4898 0.0069 -0.0872* -66.5934 0.0096 100% 
 
-0.1714* -99.7186 0.0064 -0.1261* -72.1201 0.0088 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0153 -17.0427 0.0373 0.0103 28.6266 0.0222 24% 
 
0.0041 13.4855 0.0471 0.0126 40.0739 0.0159 60% 
 
0.0053 13.2688 0.0479 0.0179 43.3825 0.0147 64% 
 
UNPR -0.3130 -24.4340 0.0260 -0.1302 -12.8895 0.0493 17% 
 
-0.1556 -14.2231 0.0447 -0.1318 -12.9179 0.0492 4% 
 
-0.2102 -15.0284 0.0423 -0.1691 -12.8391 0.0495 8% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -54.3216 0.0117 -0.0000 -14.6658 0.0433 95% 
 
-0.0000 -39.4987 0.0161 -0.0000 -12.7468 0.0498 76% 
 
-0.0000 -40.6734 0.0156 -0.0000 -12.7678 0.0498 87% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-13.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), India 
This table presents India’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure of 
leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 based 
on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -2.1918
* -30.6873 0.0207 -0.6955* -129.4619 0.0049 100% 
 
-1.6872* -27.1225 0.0235 -0.6225* -104.9239 0.0061 100% 
 
-2.4260* -30.5141 0.0209 -0.9545* -114.2542 0.0056 100% 
 
TAN d c 0.0447 18.4841 0.0344 0.4658 15.3924 0.0413 85% 
 
0.3261* 141.6315 0.0045 0.6102* 21.7591 0.0292 100% 
 
0.3229* 102.6862 0.0062 0.8817* 22.6966 0.0280 100% 
 
RISK 0.059 12.7467 0.0498 0.2695 50.3548 0.0126 21%  -0.2306 -41.1755 0.0155 0.1135 25.3663 0.0251 60%  -0.2470 -30.6658 0.0208 0.2398 37.2443 0.0171 44%  
LIQ d c -0.0699* -216.7769 0.0029 -0.0352* -21.5728 0.0295 100%  -0.0397 -132.3955 0.0048 -0.0182 -73.9153 0.0086 84%  -0.0617* -144.8265 0.0044 -0.0254* -12.9709 0.0490 100%  
POR -0.1843 -74.5129 0.0085 -0.095 -42.0869 0.0151 84% 
 
-0.3257 -13.3311 0.0477 -0.1143 -62.1813 0.0102 88% 
 
-0.4542 -12.7601 0.0498 -0.1604 -59.9561 0.0106 85% 
 
AGE 0.0009 12.7786 0.0497 0.0123 15.3372 0.0414 65% 
 
-0.0027 -42.6812 0.0149 -0.0008 -12.9044 0.0492 46% 
 
-0.0026 -28.2338 0.0225 0.0018 16.8113 0.0378 15% 
 
TAX 0.0013 12.7648 0.0498 0.0027 24.7705 0.0257 15% 
 
0.0011 12.8261 0.0495 0.0034 34.4493 0.0185 55% 
 
0.0017 12.7800 0.0497 0.0042 30.6286 0.0208 41% 
 
NDTAX 0.3475 14.5044 0.0438 2.2837 84.0898 0.0076 77% 
 
-0.5184 -21.0968 0.0302 2.7804 114.3608 0.0056 73% 
 
-0.5535 -15.5643 0.0408 3.6919 107.2784 0.0059 73% 
 
DIO b c 0.0002* 29.5521 0.0215 0.002* 22.9767 0.0277 100% 
 
0.0003* 47.3855 0.0134 0.0017* 25.3938 0.0251 100% 
 
0.0004* 43.9114 0.0145 0.0022* 19.4850 0.0326 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.1051 -1.9787 0.2979 0.0552 1.1699 0.4503  0.00% 
 
-0.0413 -8.2976 0.0764 0.1228 3.1330 0.1967 0.00% 
 
-0.0741 -10.0586 0.0631 0.1547 2.2269 0.2687 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.4724 -3.1009 0.1986 0.0785 6.8559 0.0922 0.00% 
 
-0.1460 -13.1140 0.0485 -0.1460 -13.1140 0.0485 1% 
 
-0.2050 -12.8114 0.0496 -0.2050 -12.8114 0.0496 0.01% 
 
CAPEX -1.0137 -13.794 0.0461 0.1905 34.7153 0.0183 23% 
 
-0.0884 -16.7615 0.0379 0.4482 83.6752 0.0076 72% 
 
-1.1407 -13.5970 0.0467 0.4287 62.4531 0.0102 81% 
 
INTAN -0.3302 -56.0721 0.0114 0.0844 12.9295 0.0491 79% 
 
-0.1410 -27.4561 0.0232 0.3069 56.8615 0.0112 31% 
 
-0.2092 -29.0987 0.0219 0.3722 48.1638 0.0132 34% 
 
SHPP -0.0943 -2.2336 0.2680 0.0441 1.3271 0.4111 0.00% 
 
-0.0866 -2.4573 0.2460 0.0236 0.7322 0.5976 0.00% 
 
-0.1291 -2.5512 0.2378 0.0468 1.1631 0.4521 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0111 12.8649 0.0494 0.1539 16.7559 0.0379 72% 
 
-0.0805 -86.7353 0.0073 0.0223 27.6676 0.0230 81% 
 
-0.0788 -59.1213 0.0108 0.0709 61.2111 0.0104 62% 
 
ROE -0.0858 -51.9217 0.0123 0.0819 44.1556 0.0144 84% 
 
-0.1130 -76.7468 0.0083 0.0269 16.5932 0.0383 71% 
 
-0.1731 -82.8131 0.0077 0.0533 22.8997 0.0278 72% 
 
GOP m 0.0102 13.2222 0.0481 0.0645 75.8423 0.0084 78% 
 
-0.0505 -67.2325 0.0095 -0.0107 -13.6029 0.0467 82% 
 
-0.0573 -50.3544 0.0126 0.0210 19.6698 0.0323 71% 
 
CAPIN -0.0049 -36.0031 0.0177 0.004 31.2367 0.0204 41% 
 
-0.0095 -15.0427 0.0423 0.0057 50.0258 0.0127 60% 
 
-0.0114 -14.3185 0.0444 0.0077 47.0659 0.0135 62% 
 
UNPR -0.4919 -13.6506 0.0466 -0.3124 -12.8911 0.0493 3% 
 
-0.3521 -14.7569 0.0431 -0.2748 -12.9841 0.0489 1% 
 
-0.5289 -13.6321 0.0466 -0.3373 -12.9199 0.0492 3% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -12.8240 0.0495 -0.0000 -13.1730 0.0482 61% 
 
-0.0000 -32.4271 0.0196 0.0000 22.9522 0.0277 29% 
 
-0.0000 -30.4657 0.0209 0.0000 13.5925 0.0468 51% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-13.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), India 
This table presents India’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -2.1557
* -34.1975 0.0186 -0.5520* -117.6519 0.0054 100% 
 
-1.3973* -23.0754 0.0276 -0.4465* -75.5015 0.0084 100% 
 
-2.5984* -34.8108 0.0183 -0.7246* -113.1797 0.0056 100% 
 
TAN d c 0.0521 24.8951 0.0256 0.5132 15.9222 0.0399 85% 
 
0.2814* 137.1534 0.0046 0.5564* 22.1714 0.0287 100% 
 
0.2815 102.6348 0.0062 0.6749 18.2093 0.0349 89% 
 
RISK -1.0428 -17.9470 0.0354 0.0889 15.9954 0.0397 89%  -0.7986 -16.6090 0.0383 -0.0676 -13.8186 0.0460 91%  -1.2171 -17.1976 0.0370 -0.0869 -13.5067 0.0470 91%  
LIQ d c -0.0544* -213.6014 0.0030 -0.0315* -16.2703 0.0391 100%  -0.0332 -125.1549 0.0051 -0.0144 -54.8211 0.0116 84%  -0.0522 -150.6895 0.0042 -0.0289 -82.4586 0.0077 86%  
POR -0.4166 -15.8021 0.0402 -0.0962 -52.2183 0.0122 95% 
 
-0.2914 -13.7557 0.0462 -0.1003 -59.1783 0.0108 91% 
 
-0.5122 -16.5739 0.0384 -0.1493 -65.8513 0.0097 95% 
 
AGE 0.0008 13.0874 0.0485 0.0116 15.9052 0.0400 31% 
 
-0.0023 -32.7342 0.0194 -0.0009 -13.7908 0.0461 32% 
 
-0.0020 -19.8526 0.0320 0.0019 19.5387 0.0326 7% 
 
TAX -0.0059 -50.4327 0.0126 -0.0012 -13.1755 0.0482 79% 
 
-0.0029 -27.8260 0.0229 0.0013 14.6710 0.0433 57% 
 
-0.0055 -41.6615 0.0153 -0.0015 -13.1125 0.0485 74% 
 
NDTAX -0.9838 -31.2453 0.0204 1.7020 61.8442 0.0103 70% 
 
-0.8278 -33.5307 0.0190 3.5465 14.1571 0.0449 80% 
 
-0.9972 -29.7705 0.0214 4.8720 14.3233 0.0444 79% 
 
DIO b c 0.0003* 43.7480 0.0145 0.0018* 21.2714 0.0299 100% 
 
0.0004 55.5219 0.0115 0.0012 13.5116 0.0470 84% 
 
0.0005* 57.9717 0.0110 0.0019* 17.5912 0.0362 100% 
 
G(SA) -0.0628 -1.9564 0.3008 0.0745 1.8141 0.3207 0.00% 
 
-0.0320 -5.9339 0.1063 0.0994 2.5407 0.2387 0.00% 
 
-0.0555 -0.9577 0.5138 0.1077 1.9148 0.3064 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.4216 -3.0558 0.2013 0.1426 12.1779 0.0522 0.00% 
 
-0.3076 -2.7645 0.2210 0.0994 9.8065 0.0647 0.00% 
 
-0.6416 -3.8421 0.1621 0.1330 9.8992 0.0641 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.3880 -55.2464 0.0115 0.1193 19.8828 0.0320 31% 
 
-0.1654 -29.3313 0.0217 0.3608 69.5274 0.0092 81% 
 
-1.4888 -12.8552 0.0494 0.2806 40.4688 0.0157 62% 
 
INTAN -0.9041 -13.6947 0.0464 -0.0761 -14.4167 0.0441 82% 
 
-0.1727 -33.1072 0.0192 0.2532 48.9742 0.0130 50% 
 
-1.1458 -14.2565 0.0446 0.2392 32.6158 0.0195 68% 
 
SHPP -0.1282 -36.9576 0.0172 -0.0365 -13.0026 0.0489 82% 
 
-0.0825 -28.8028 0.0221 -0.0323 -13.0177 0.0488 72% 
 
-0.1364 -34.1751 0.0186 -0.0471 -13.2246 0.0480 82% 
 
ASUTI -0.0431 -41.4016 0.0154 0.1768 18.8386 0.0338 57% 
 
-0.0892 -100.1063 0.0064 0.0181 21.5452 0.0295 81% 
 
-0.0987 -81.0671 0.0079 0.0585 51.6481 0.0123 69% 
 
ROE -0.1955 -15.8237 0.0402 -0.0562 -45.9913 0.0138 71% 
 
-0.1242 -85.1596 0.0075 -0.0195 -12.7929 0.0497 83% 
 
-0.1662 -85.4316 0.0075 -0.0252 -12.7819 0.0497 79% 
 
GOP m -0.2159* -344.9573 0.0018 -0.1194* -14.9604 0.0425 100% 
 
-0.1370* -208.1129 0.0031 -0.0820* -12.7812 0.0497 100% 
 
-0.1989* -19.4182 0.0328 -0.1288* -15.0997 0.0421 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0073 -50.4240 0.0126 0.0035 25.5782 0.0249 29% 
 
-0.0082 -12.7844 0.0497 0.0051 43.1799 0.0147 49% 
 
-0.0111 -13.1724 0.0482 0.0067 43.5072 0.0146 48% 
 
UNPR -0.5487 -21.3510 0.0298 -0.2527 -12.9119 0.0492 31% 
 
-0.4365 -17.0791 0.0372 -0.2588 -12.8023 0.0496 32% 
 
-0.6042 -19.7219 0.0323 -0.3374 -12.7577 0.0498 20% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -22.3364 0.0285 -0.0000 -13.3982 0.0474 98% 
 
-0.0000 -16.7487 0.0380 0.0000 14.8418 0.0428 80% 
 
-0.0000 -20.8302 0.0305 -0.0000 -13.7005 0.0464 96% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-14. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Indonesia 
This table presents Indonesia’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -1.2378
* -78.7299 0.0081 -0.3812* -19.6858 0.0323 100% 
 
-0.9346* -68.8213 0.0092 -0.3408* -25.9385 0.0245 100% 
 
-1.4065* -43.4736 0.0146 -0.6524* -40.3752 0.0158 100% 
 
TAN -0.3341 -25.1775 0.0253 0.1714 20.7467 0.0307 26% 
 
0.1006 18.1784 0.0350 0.3112 45.5705 0.0140 96% 
 
0.0953 12.7920 0.0497 0.3170 36.7946 0.0173 82% 
 
RISK 0.0955 13.8465 0.0459 0.2029 18.6013 0.0342 8%  -0.5005 -13.0206 0.0488 -0.1276 -13.0709 0.0486 0.06%  0.1153 13.9797 0.0455 0.1400 13.8787 0.0458 0.03%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0980
* -99.3735 0.0064 -0.0754* -54.4207 0.0117 100%  -0.0687* -48.0099 0.0133 -0.0480* -58.2282 0.0109 100%  -0.0800* -78.6850 0.0081 -0.0386* -19.2321 0.0331 100%  
POR -0.2200 -35.0112 0.0182 -0.0638 -13.7487 0.0462 92% 
 
-0.1798 -35.9204 0.0177 -0.0720 -17.3877 0.0366 97% 
 
-0.2460 -37.3093 0.0171 -0.0936 -17.4810 0.0364 96% 
 
AGE -0.0040 -14.4504 0.044 0.0054 23.3557 0.0272 21% 
 
0.0020 12.7500 0.0498 0.0040 18.4111 0.0345 12% 
 
0.0032 13.1142 0.0485 0.0041 15.9218 0.0399 2% 
 
TAX 0.0142 12.7785 0.0497 0.0251 17.5481 0.0362 26% 
 
0.0124 12.7122 0.0500 0.0218 18.5388 0.0343 71% 
 
0.0154 12.9077 0.0492 0.0264 16.8262 0.0378 71% 
 
NDTAX 0.7128 13.5324 0.047 2.3437 23.5099 0.0271 74% 
 
0.5616 12.9635 0.0490 2.3768 30.5152 0.0209 92% 
 
0.6746 12.7826 0.0497 2.6298 23.5689 0.0270 71% 
 
INV 0.0003 12.7485 0.0498 0.0004 17.4581 0.0364 2% 
 
0.0003 12.8064 0.0496 0.0006 27.4278 0.0232 43% 
 
0.0004 14.7441 0.0431 0.0006 20.7895 0.0306 13% 
 
G(SA) -0.0235 -1.0053 0.4983 0.0747 3.1247 0.1972 0.00% 
 
-0.0265 -2.6945 0.2262 0.0489 2.2651 0.2647 0.00% 
 
-0.0595 -1.9138 0.3065 0.0488 1.5877 0.3578 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.0685 -4.1007 0.1523 0.0603 2.7388 0.2229 0.00% 
 
-0.0526 -3.4449 0.1799 0.0268 1.1022 0.4691 0.00% 
 
-0.0629 -3.0580 0.2012 0.0356 1.2745 0.4235 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.7286 -14.0875 0.0451 -0.2570 -14.0082 0.0454 18% 
 
-0.3828 -16.8169 0.0378 0.3832 17.7024 0.0359 11% 
 
-0.3977 -12.9486 0.0491 0.3669 17.3708 0.0366 7% 
 
INTAN -0.2355 -8.6643 0.0732 0.3613 7.3020 0.0866 0.00% 
 
-0.1758 -8.0283 0.0789 0.2764 8.3684 0.0757 0.00% 
 
-0.2098 -7.3250 0.0864 0.3114 5.4769 0.1150 0.00% 
 
SHPP -0.0421 -3.4283 0.1807 0.0351 2.9933 0.2053 0.00% 
 
-0.0618 -3.1556 0.1954 0.0122 1.3049 0.4163 0.00% 
 
-0.0468 -1.4855 0.3772 0.0333 2.6979 0.2260 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0156 13.1816 0.0482 0.0452 33.4557 0.019 82% 
 
-0.0832 -25.1355 0.0253 -0.0141 -13.1981 0.0481 88% 
 
-0.1114 -17.6764 0.0360 -0.0152 -12.8540 0.0494 47% 
 
ROE -0.1354 -26.1544 0.0243 0.0655 13.0564 0.0487 66% 
 
-0.1548 -26.2929 0.0242 -0.0509 -12.7715 0.0497 90% 
 
-0.1909 -16.8354 0.0378 -0.0897 -19.1715 0.0332 82% 
 
GOP m 0.0243 12.7352 0.0499 0.0524 24.6793 0.0258 42% 
 
-0.0480 -16.5674 0.0384 0.0343 19.0073 0.0335 24% 
 
-0.0289 -12.1992 0.0521 0.0205 3.9424 0.1581 0.00% 
 
CAPIN -0.0158 -24.8625 0.0256 -0.0068 -13.9057 0.0457 26% 
 
0.0056 13.0325 0.0488 0.0127 26.0024 0.0245 32% 
 
0.0079 12.7563 0.0498 0.0112 16.9416 0.0375 4% 
 
UNPR -0.5065 -18.0079 0.0353 -0.1645 -12.8506 0.0494 94% 
 
-0.3228 -17.1579 0.0371 -0.1711 -13.0250 0.0488 41% 
 
-0.6176 -18.5539 0.0343 -0.2443 -13.1252 0.0484 96% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -20.6983 0.0307 -0.0000 -12.8596 0.0494 29% 
 
-0.0000 -15.4457 0.0412 0.0000 14.6339 0.0434 1% 
 
-0.0000 -14.4679 0.0439 -0.0000 -12.7065 0.0500 1% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-14.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Indonesia 
This table presents Indonesia’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage, the values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax T p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -1.2947
* -56.7621 0.0112 -0.4932* -44.7738 0.0142 100% 
 
-0.9460* -48.7119 0.0131 -0.3815* -31.3431 0.0203 100% 
 
-1.2622* -52.7965 0.0121 -0.5444* -36.2027 0.0176 100% 
 
TAN -0.2435 -18.9510 0.0336 0.2193 32.4140 0.0196 42% 
 
0.0930 15.3476 0.0414 0.3215 54.0657 0.0118 93% 
 
0.0935 13.4009 0.0474 0.3692 47.9724 0.0133 89% 
 
RISK -1.1109 -21.5519 0.0295 0.1265 15.0370 0.0423 40%  -0.7547 -17.9847 0.0354 -0.0948 -12.7117 0.0500 52%  -1.0674 -20.3268 0.0313 -0.1206 -12.9221 0.0492 43%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0892
* -53.4192 0.0119 -0.0532* -33.4021 0.0191 100%  -0.0540* -78.8364 0.0081 -0.0230* -16.5266 0.0385 100%  -0.0767* -88.3908 0.0072 -0.0363* -21.2107 0.0300 100%  
POR -0.2501 -52.2284 0.0122 -0.0816 -23.1574 0.0275 98% 
 
-0.1906 -45.6591 0.0139 -0.0712 -19.0231 0.0334 98% 
 
-0.2675 -50.1116 0.0127 -0.1003 -21.8045 0.0292 98% 
 
AGE 0.0033 17.4174 0.0365 0.0085 44.9440 0.0142 84% 
 
0.0023 12.7082 0.0500 0.0058 32.3228 0.0197 82% 
 
0.0036 15.6604 0.0406 0.0087 37.9326 0.0168 84% 
 
TAX 0.0132 12.8113 0.0496 0.0318 27.6639 0.0230 84% 
 
0.0126 13.6892 0.0464 0.0247 24.2343 0.0263 84% 
 
0.0164 13.5229 0.0470 0.0345 26.4515 0.0241 84% 
 
NDTAX 0.4759 13.2293 0.0480 2.5078 24.6993 0.0258 62% 
 
0.5209 13.5189 0.0470 2.5640 31.7490 0.0200 84% 
 
0.6290 12.7078 0.0500 2.9188 29.0997 0.0219 84% 
 
INV 0.0003 12.7369 0.0499 0.0009 39.7102 0.0160 77% 
 
0.0003 13.6294 0.0466 0.0008 40.6277 0.0157 84% 
 
0.0003 13.9369 0.0456 0.0010 43.1312 0.0148 85% 
 
G(SA) -0.0049 -0.3240 0.8005 0.1106 4.4650 0.1403 0.00% 
 
-0.0162 -1.6393 0.3487 0.0515 2.5244 0.2401 0.00% 
 
-0.0175 -0.4935 0.7081 0.0976 3.8465 0.1619 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.0252 -1.8221 0.3195 0.0972 3.9077 0.1595 0.00% 
 
-0.0440 -2.8013 0.2183 0.0302 1.0689 0.4788 0.00% 
 
-0.0307 -1.8964 0.3089 0.0848 2.4569 0.2461 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.9355 -23.1008 0.0275 -0.2422 -12.7459 0.0498 92% 
 
-0.6079 -32.6917 0.0195 -0.2245 -12.9818 0.0489 34% 
 
-0.8574 -36.3630 0.0175 -0.2982 -12.8600 0.0494 58% 
 
INTAN -0.4728 -21.2608 0.0299 -0.2424 -12.8610 0.0494 49% 
 
-0.2800 -13.4031 0.0474 -0.2593 -12.7713 0.0497 0.09% 
 
-0.3797 -14.9062 0.0426 -0.3238 -12.8597 0.0494 3% 
 
SHPP -0.1842 -8.2785 0.0765 -0.0049 -0.5840 0.6635 0.00% 
 
-0.1415 -7.2209 0.0876 -0.0064 -0.8030 0.5693 0.00% 
 
-0.1826 -7.7063 0.0822 -0.0095 -0.9473 0.5172 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0143 13.2631 0.0479 0.0452 33.6392 0.0189 76% 
 
-0.0939 -25.1517 0.0253 -0.0133 -13.2018 0.0481 97% 
 
-0.1021 -22.3210 0.0285 -0.0158 -12.9506 0.0491 67% 
 
ROE -0.1913 -44.7637 0.0142 -0.0559 -12.8092 0.0496 85% 
 
-0.1695 -45.4085 0.0140 -0.0493 -12.7529 0.0498 97% 
 
-0.2253 -47.4197 0.0134 -0.0607 -13.0879 0.0485 97% 
 
GOP m -0.1536* -102.1783 0.0062 -0.1139* -39.3152 0.0162 100% 
 
-0.0772* -53.4860 0.0119 -0.0492* -19.5966 0.0325 100% 
 
-0.1171* -64.1260 0.0099 -0.0770* -24.9723 0.0255 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0153 -29.1867 0.0218 -0.0053 -12.7634 0.0498 41% 
 
-0.0068 -14.9645 0.0425 0.0108 22.1930 0.0287 16% 
 
-0.0120 -20.5084 0.0310 0.0089 14.9107 0.0426 1% 
 
UNPR -0.5834 -26.6632 0.0239 -0.1847 -13.2787 0.0479 98% 
 
-0.4497 -23.7313 0.0268 -0.1791 -12.8831 0.0493 97% 
 
-0.5817 -25.1580 0.0253 -0.2287 -12.7547 0.0498 99% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -48.1561 0.0132 -0.0000 -13.1120 0.0485 98% 
 
-0.0000 -16.2935 0.0390 -0.0000 -12.8693 0.0494 59% 
 
-0.0000 -36.3590 0.0175 -0.0000 -12.7255 0.0499 82% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-15. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Brazil 
This table presents Brazil’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure of 
leverage. The values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 based 
on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax T p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF d c -1.8257* -29.1160 0.0219 -0.4837* -12.8518 0.0494 100% 
 
-0.5523* -20.1882 0.0315 -0.1391* -15.0241 0.0423 100% 
 
-0.5070 -18.2785 0.0348 0.5744 35.1980 0.0181 17% 
 
TAN 0.2036 13.7019 0.0464 0.6696 38.3661 0.0166 78% 
 
0.0603 12.8757 0.0493 0.2232 22.0419 0.0289 88% 
 
-0.1100 -13.1755 0.0482 0.2050 13.9446 0.0456 0.06% 
 
RISK 0.5457 14.2431 0.0446 2.0409 21.6159 0.0294 78%  -0.6500 -17.3687 0.0366 -0.1948 -12.9674 0.0490 4%  -1.0824 -20.2659 0.0314 -0.2132 -12.7651 0.0498 71%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.2377
* -63.0174 0.0101 -0.1128* -42.0540 0.0151 100%  -0.0495* -31.7956 0.0200 -0.0323* -33.6397 0.0189 100%  -0.0586* -25.2480 0.0252 -0.0269* -19.3830 0.0328 100%  
POR -0.1502 -22.8125 0.0279 -0.0762 -12.7320 0.0499 69% 
 
-0.0276 -14.0747 0.0452 -0.0236 -12.7430 0.0499 17% 
 
-0.0201 -7.0113 0.0902 0.0210 4.8497 0.1295 0.00% 
 
AGE c 0.0070 12.7432 0.0499 0.0290 47.8964 0.0133 95% 
 
-0.0043 -23.0891 0.0276 -0.0020 -12.7382 0.0499 80% 
 
-0.0078 -17.9822 0.0354 -0.0030 -12.8843 0.0493 92% 
 
TAX -0.0175 -5.9533 0.1059 0.0264 10.3345 0.0614 0.00% 
 
-0.0101 -5.1298 0.1226 0.0011 0.5316 0.6890 0.00% 
 
-0.0045 -1.7417 0.3318 0.0162 5.3991 0.1166 0.00% 
 
NDTAX 1.6439 12.9551 0.0490 3.9682 24.3124 0.0262 28% 
 
0.4537 12.8282 0.0495 1.2037 14.6034 0.0435 35% 
 
-1.1042 -19.8647 0.0320 -0.7129 -12.9785 0.0490 0.09% 
 
INV -0.0010 -16.5094 0.0385 0.0009 14.6211 0.0435 2% 
 
0.0002 12.7639 0.0498 0.0003 14.3622 0.0443 1% 
 
-0.0007 -10.5790 0.0600 0.0002 6.2602 0.1008 0.00% 
 
G(SA) -0.3382 -4.7813 0.1313 0.0770 1.5038 0.3736 0.00% 
 
-0.0447 -1.3812 0.3989 0.0156 1.2820 0.4217 0.00% 
 
-0.0519 -2.3322 0.2579 0.0599 1.7355 0.3328 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.3800 -4.2230 0.1480 0.0146 0.2465 0.8462 0.00% 
 
-0.0256 -1.7647 0.3282 0.0748 1.9123 0.3067 0.00% 
 
-0.0443 -0.9509 0.5160 0.1452 2.7601 0.2213 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -1.8317 -25.1086 0.0253 -0.8511 -12.8688 0.0494 31% 
 
0.2404 12.7142 0.0500 0.4089 20.1773 0.0315 40% 
 
0.3642 13.1466 0.0483 0.5384 17.1169 0.0372 28% 
 
INTAN -0.7101 -26.4225 0.0241 -0.3209 -13.8392 0.0459 11% 
 
0.1063 12.8545 0.0494 0.1194 13.5738 0.0468 1% 
 
-0.1492 -10.8139 0.0587 0.0949 4.3485 0.1439 0.00% 
 
SHPP -0.2960 -6.0460 0.1044 0.0347 1.0659 0.4797 0.00% 
 
-0.0725 -3.4614 0.1790 -0.0131 -1.3988  0.3951 0.00% 
 
-0.0680 -2.1643 0.2755 0.0316 2.3638 0.2548 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0870 12.8548 0.0494 0.2072 22.0420 0.0289 29% 
 
-0.1229 -26.5929 0.0239 -0.0262 -12.9115 0.0492 95% 
 
-0.1238 -18.9684 0.0335 -0.0384 -12.9137 0.0492 68% 
 
ROE d -0.2750 -15.8915 0.0400 0.5752 22.1551 0.0287 20% 
 
-0.1436 -13.6906 0.0464 -0.0561 -12.7171 0.0500 35% 
 
-0.4327* -49.3627 0.0129 -0.2040* -12.7441 0.0499 100% 
 
GOP m 0.0620 12.9454 0.0491 0.4593 135.7872 0.0047 94% 
 
0.0146 12.7569 0.0498 0.0231 18.6604 0.0341 17% 
 
-0.0632 -36.7367 0.0173 -0.0219 -12.8977 0.0493 89% 
 
CAPIN -0.0100 -23.2477 0.0274 -0.0041 -13.2281 0.0480 37% 
 
0.0014 12.7303 0.0499 0.0023 19.0169 0.0334 14% 
 
0.0023 12.8215 0.0496 0.0066 12.9288 0.0491 5% 
 
UNPR -0.3623 -11.6189 0.0547 0.2271 5.3420 0.1178 0.00% 
 
-0.2759 -16.1895 0.0393 -0.1787 -12.7337 0.0499 39% 
 
-0.4588 -20.3437 0.0313 -0.2835 -12.9430 0.0491 90% 
 
VAR 0.0000 12.8611 0.0494 0.0000 23.4141 0.0272 19% 
 
-0.0000 -13.8109 0.0460 -0.0000 -13.3237 0.0477 0.03% 
 
-0.0000 -13.9261 0.0456 -0.0000 -13.0709 0.0486 18% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-15. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Brazil 
This table presents Brazil’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure 
of leverage. The values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 
based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF d c -1.0936* -25.5280 0.0249 -0.2569* -21.5483 0.0295 100% 
 
-0.5118 -25.3277 0.0251 -0.1186 -12.7933 0.0497 90% 
 
-1.0572* -23.0805 0.0276 -0.2984* -17.8761 0.0356 100% 
 
TAN 0.0803 12.7748 0.0497 0.3690 23.0386 0.0276 92% 
 
0.0676 13.5740 0.0468 0.1936 17.4321 0.0365 95% 
 
0.1192 13.3640 0.0475 0.4135 45.0132 0.0141 96% 
 
RISK -1.1860 -21.6928 0.0293 -0.2220 -13.1610 0.0483 38%  -0.9604 -24.5104 0.0260 -0.1730 -12.7814 0.0497 58%  -1.5348 -20.7417 0.0307 -0.2905 -12.7572 0.0498 86%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.1106
* -45.0598 0.0141 -0.0749* -64.1560 0.0099 100%  -0.0481* -25.5863 0.0249 -0.0193* -19.1953 0.0331 100%  -0.1133* -41.8662 0.0152 -0.0726* -49.1933 0.0129 100%  
POR -0.0872 -17.4608 0.0364 -0.0323 -12.8706 0.0494 94% 
 
-0.0278 -13.6421 0.0466 -0.0259 -12.7286 0.0499 8% 
 
-0.0821 -15.0940 0.0421 -0.0395 -13.2066 0.0481 87% 
 
AGE c 0.0061* 17.6650 0.0360 0.0167* 68.3994 0.0093 100% 
 
0.0024 12.7105 0.0500 0.0026 13.4603 0.0472 0.06% 
 
0.0044 15.5979 0.0408 0.0126 42.0730 0.0151 94% 
 
TAX 0.0133 13.4176 0.0474 0.0241 19.5852 0.0325 46% 
 
-0.0053 -2.5638 0.2368 0.0063 2.8965 0.2116 0.00% 
 
0.0166 12.7847 0.0497 0.0298 21.0353 0.0302 34% 
 
NDTAX -2.4196 -20.0231 0.0318 -0.6169 -12.7696 0.0498 22% 
 
-1.0575 -11.6808 0.0544 0.4417 10.8036 0.0588 0.00% 
 
-2.4600 -18.2038 0.0349 -0.7664 -12.8765 0.0493 15% 
 
INV -0.0009 -14.4056 0.0441 -0.0003 -12.7417 0.0499 42% 
 
-0.0001 -2.9596 0.2074 0.0004 8.2981 0.0764 0.00% 
 
-0.0007 -19.5672 0.0325 -0.0004 -12.8491 0.0494 11% 
 
G(SA) -0.2097 -4.3340 0.1444 0.0197 1.1760 0.4486 0.00% 
 
-0.0800 -2.4571 0.2461 -0.0044 -0.1539 0.9028 0.00% 
 
-0.2144 -4.1440 0.1507 -0.0095 -0.4795 0.7153 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1291 -2.6338 0.2310 0.1248 2.0047 0.2946 0.00% 
 
-0.0536 -1.3036 0.4166 0.0958 2.1991 0.2717 0.00% 
 
-0.1539 -2.4785 0.2441 0.1083 1.5607 0.3628 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.9509 -29.1451 0.0218 -0.3597 -13.5838 0.0468 57% 
 
-0.2740 -5.1675 0.1217 0.3584 6.5577 0.0963 0.00% 
 
-0.9001 -23.7742 0.0268 -0.4045 -12.7508 0.0498 19% 
 
INTAN -0.5530 -43.7867 0.0145 -0.1556 -12.8146 0.0496 92% 
 
-0.1714 -19.1971 0.0331 -0.1122 -12.7566 0.0498 37% 
 
-0.4713 -32.2820 0.0197 -0.1911 -12.8861 0.0493 78% 
 
SHPP -0.2222 -7.1626 0.0883 -0.0373 -3.0027 0.2047 0.00% 
 
-0.1276 -5.8685 0.1074 -0.0310 -3.2914 0.1878 0.00% 
 
-0.2421 -6.8818 0.0919 -0.0655 -4.3271 0.1446 0.00% 
 
ASUTI -0.1301 -17.6444 0.0360 0.0737 24.4724 0.0260 16% 
 
-0.1280 -25.7322 0.0247 -0.0279 -13.0622 0.0486 82% 
 
-0.1990 -24.7230 0.0257 -0.0424 -12.7097 0.0500 44% 
 
ROE d -0.3345 -22.3309 0.0285 -0.0910 -12.7302 0.0499 79% 
 
-0.2358 -20.9088 0.0304 -0.0781 -14.2674 0.0445 96% 
 
-0.3932 -22.5234 0.0282 -0.1125 -13.2843 0.0478 91% 
 
GOP m -0.1531* -56.5408 0.0113 -0.0484* -36.0902 0.0176 100% 
 
-0.0752* -36.5111 0.0174 -0.0245* -23.5647 0.0270 100% 
 
-0.1340* -41.9713 0.0152 -0.0257* -15.0029 0.0424 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0032 -16.2551 0.0391 -0.0017 -14.2610 0.0446 14% 
 
-0.0020 -5.0579 0.1243 0.0024 5.3546 0.1175 0.00% 
 
-0.0029 -13.2409 0.0480 -0.0027 -13.3580 0.0476 0.03% 
 
UNPR -0.4415 -15.8902 0.0400 -0.2571 -12.7700 0.0498 29% 
 
-0.3973 -23.5532 0.0270 -0.2034 -12.8434 0.0495 90% 
 
-0.3924 -14.3418 0.0443 -0.2867 -12.8456 0.0495 3% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -15.0111 0.0423 -0.0000 -13.1095 0.0485 2% 
 
-0.0000 -14.7246 0.0432 -0.0000 -13.1503 0.0483 0.05% 
 
-0.0000 -14.2410 0.0446 -0.0000 -12.7362 0.0499 0.06% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-16.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), South Africa 
This table presents South Africa’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage. The values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.8882
* -27.7609 0.0229 -0.1855* -17.476 0.0364 100%  -0.6774* -20.8371 0.0305 -0.1376* -14.8424 0.0428 100%  -1.0109* -23.7600 0.0268 -0.1941* -14.0735 0.0452 100% 
 
TAN -0.1861 -33.5146 0.019 0.1423 18.1974 0.0349 20% 
 
0.0637 13.3714 0.0475 0.1916 31.5096 0.0202 84% 
 
0.0873 12.8103 0.0496 0.2332 23.2582 0.0274 81% 
 
RISK 0.0698 12.8247 0.0495 0.1677 23.5767 0.027 21% 
 
-0.0951 -15.5488 0.0409 -0.0598 -12.8398 0.0495 13% 
 
-0.3528 -9.9034 0.0641 0.0277 3.3169 0.1864 0.00%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.1164
* -56.2173 0.0113 -0.0673* -86.2936 0.0074 100%  -0.0762* -31.6124 0.0201 -0.0290* -42.8079 0.0149 100%  -0.1081* -33.7425 0.0189 -0.0501* -49.4418 0.0129 100%  
POR -0.0745 -21.1023 0.0301 -0.0461 -12.7548 0.0498 48% 
 
-0.0701 -25.3664 0.0251 -0.0339 -13.2799 0.0478 81% 
 
-0.0889 -20.8907 0.0305 -0.0498 -12.7658 0.0498 61% 
 
AGE -0.0034 -22.2225 0.0286 0.0028 13.1127 0.0485 25% 
 
-0.0032 -26.7465 0.0238 -0.0016 -13.3885 0.0475 65% 
 
-0.0042 -23.1971 0.0274 -0.0022 -13.3129 0.0477 57% 
 
TAX 0.0048 12.9252 0.0492 0.0130 28.7045 0.0222 37% 
 
-0.0049 -14.6980 0.0432 -0.0042 -13.2596 0.0479 3% 
 
0.0069 13.5163 0.0470 0.0083 15.5846 0.0408 12% 
 
NDTAX 0.4997 13.2899 0.0478 1.1840 12.949 0.0491 49% 
 
0.4028 12.7219 0.0499 0.6916 20.5771 0.0309 41% 
 
0.6105 13.1829 0.0482 1.1984 23.7477 0.0268 52% 
 
INV -0.0007 -19.0097 0.0335 -0.0005 -12.8594 0.0494 9% 
 
0.0003 12.8134 0.0496 0.0009 18.1660 0.0350 11% 
 
0.0005 12.9215 0.0492 0.0010 14.1013 0.0451 1% 
 
G(SA) -0.1458 -6.2141 0.1016 0.0877 1.9963 0.2956 0.00% 
 
-0.0948 -5.7857 0.1090 0.0837 1.9370 0.3034 0.00% 
 
-0.1406 -5.1739 0.1215 0.1119 1.9125 0.3067 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.0640 -1.9139 0.3065 0.1121 4.5931 0.1365 0.00% 
 
-0.0694 -2.6739 0.2278 0.1174 2.7558 0.2216 0.00% 
 
-0.0958 -2.4424 0.2474 0.1323 2.3708 0.2541 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -0.9028 -16.8517 0.0377 0.3559 15.118 0.042 7% 
 
0.2189 13.1942 0.0482 0.3761 19.6860 0.0323 28% 
 
0.3628 13.3719 0.0475 0.4818 16.7231 0.0380 9% 
 
INTAN -0.3584 -42.2509 0.0151 -0.1121 -12.7159 0.05 49% 
 
0.0901 12.7117 0.0500 0.1095 14.6482 0.0434 1% 
 
-0.1536 -14.5903 0.0436 -0.1368 -13.3563 0.0476 0.04% 
 
SHPP -0.0690 -3.9810 0.1567 0.0479 5.1120 0.1230 0.00% 
 
-0.0773 -3.8665 0.1611 0.0062 0.8557 0.5494 0.00% 
 
-0.1437 -5.3892 0.1168 0.0126 1.1641 0.4518 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0253 18.1795 0.035 0.0754 49.8838 0.0128 89% 
 
-0.0721 -23.7272 0.0268 -0.0157 -12.7431 0.0499 90% 
 
-0.0634 -15.7603 0.0403 -0.0205 -12.7308 0.0499 23% 
 
ROE -0.0867 -32.1176 0.0198 0.4030 24.0537 0.0265 70% 
 
-0.0744 -34.5981 0.0184 0.2875 16.8913 0.0376 82% 
 
-0.1250 -39.5254 0.0161 0.4340 19.4803 0.0327 84% 
 
GOP m 0.0385 20.487 0.031 0.0622 28.0502 0.0227 14% 
 
-0.0217 -13.1136 0.0485 -0.0197 -13.1256 0.0484 2% 
 
0.0336 12.8680 0.0494 0.0394 14.6836 0.0433 3% 
 
CAPIN -0.0141 -16.0397 0.0396 0.0423 17.3832 0.0366 12% 
 
0.0061 13.2734 0.0479 0.0552 23.3250 0.0273 32% 
 
0.0100 12.7382 0.0499 0.0570 17.9760 0.0354 17% 
 
UNPR -0.3904 -17.877 0.0356 -0.2204 -12.9538 0.049 67% 
 
-0.3040 -13.5759 0.0468 -0.2758 -12.8032 0.0496 1% 
 
-0.3865 -12.6217 0.0503 -0.1145 -4.4642 0.1403 0.00% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -17.8697 0.0356 -0.0000 -12.7270 0.0499 18% 
 
-0.0000 -9.1978 0.0689 0.0000 8.3614 0.0758 0.00% 
 
-0.0000 -9.1769 0.0691 0.0000 5.3961 0.1167 0.00% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-16.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), South Africa 
This table presents South Africa’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at market value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each 
measure of leverage. The values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 
969 based on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -1.0419
* -26.8084 0.0237 -0.1909* -19.5881 0.0325 100% 
 
-0.5809* -19.4718 0.0327 -0.1299* -14.9089 0.0426 100% 
 
-0.8120* -20.1487 0.0316 -0.1705* -14.3478 0.0443 100% 
 
TAN -0.1146 -18.4934 0.0344 0.1873 13.8210 0.0460 6% 
 
0.0590 13.2758 0.0479 0.1961 37.2442 0.0171 83% 
 
0.0741 13.2029 0.0481 0.2500 32.9950 0.0193 79% 
 
RISK -0.3774 -16.8151 0.0378 -0.2712 -12.7233 0.0499 8%  -0.0937 -18.3104 0.0347 -0.0596 -12.7360 0.0499 47%  -0.2623 -12.7225 0.0499 -0.0859 -12.7949 0.0497 20%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0894
* -29.1688 0.0218 -0.0455* -52.9619 0.0120 100%  -0.0514* -24.3742 0.0261 -0.0242* -36.4829 0.0174 100%  -0.0719* -24.2755 0.0262 -0.0386* -42.7335 0.0149 100%  
POR -0.1631 -22.7549 0.0280 -0.0373 -12.8101 0.0496 92% 
 
-0.0870 -35.1821 0.0181 -0.0309 -13.5983 0.0467 94% 
 
-0.1256 -35.8465 0.0178 -0.0413 -13.2446 0.0480 94% 
 
AGE -0.0020 -13.0611 0.0486 -0.0020 -13.0611 0.0486 0.01% 
 
-0.0029 -26.6694 0.0239 -0.0014 -13.0068 0.0488 84% 
 
-0.0037 -23.7296 0.0268 -0.0017 -12.9976 0.0489 82% 
 
TAX -0.0079 -19.8134 0.0321 -0.0049 -12.7499 0.0498 9% 
 
-0.0069 -23.5780 0.0270 -0.0036 -13.1101 0.0485 55% 
 
-0.0088 -21.5612 0.0295 -0.0049 -13.2064 0.0481 33% 
 
NDTAX 0.4458 12.9854 0.0489 2.2164 20.9654 0.0303 41% 
 
0.3506 13.2002 0.0481 1.2109 16.1376 0.0394 48% 
 
0.4898 12.7490 0.0498 1.8575 18.0490 0.0352 49% 
 
INV -0.0005 -16.2557 0.0391 0.0008 23.4355 0.0271 30% 
 
0.0003 12.9042 0.0492 0.0007 16.5901 0.0383 41% 
 
0.0004 12.7295 0.0499 0.0009 13.9924 0.0454 32% 
 
G(SA) -0.1006 -5.4295 0.1160 0.0801 1.0063 0.4980 0.00% 
 
-0.0751 -5.6364 0.1118 0.0865 1.6096 0.3539 0.00% 
 
-0.0975 -4.7695 0.1316 0.1007 1.3477 0.4064 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1093 -1.5281 0.3689 0.1023 4.5094 0.1389 0.00% 
 
-0.0696 -1.4526 0.3838 0.0750 2.3162 0.2595 0.00% 
 
-0.1002 -1.4971 0.3749 0.1034 2.3709 0.2541 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -1.8842 -29.4897 0.0216 -0.2321 -13.5748 0.0468 68% 
 
-0.9639 -20.1554 0.0316 0.2863 17.8396 0.0356 23% 
 
-1.4288 -21.6815 0.0293 0.2898 12.9500 0.0491 19% 
 
INTAN -0.3263 -18.3243 0.0347 -0.0906 -12.7794 0.0497 37% 
 
-0.0792 -12.7285 0.0499 0.0911 13.0166 0.0488 0.02% 
 
-0.1250 -14.0649 0.0452 -0.1069 -13.0928 0.0485 0.04% 
 
SHPP -0.1983 -8.2403 0.0769 0.0021 0.2902 0.8202 0.00% 
 
-0.1198 -6.4272 0.0983 -0.0115 -1.8749 0.3119 0.00% 
 
-0.1846 -7.3508 0.0861 -0.0205 -2.4188 0.2496 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0147 13.5264 0.0470 0.0405 33.1356 0.0192 51% 
 
-0.0403 -15.6183 0.0407 -0.0133 -13.0296 0.0488 78% 
 
-0.0484 -33.1875 0.0192 -0.0171 -13.0183 0.0488 71% 
 
ROE -0.3468 -37.5815 0.0169 -0.0338 -13.1731 0.0482 82% 
 
-0.1642 -21.4864 0.0296 -0.0283 -12.7091 0.0500 93% 
 
-0.2631 -25.4147 0.0250 -0.0408 -12.7837 0.0497 95% 
 
GOP m -0.1899* -114.3750 0.0056 -0.1399* -41.8785 0.0152 100% 
 
-0.0789* -60.3565 0.0105 -0.0382* -12.7525 0.0498 100% 
 
-0.1326* -74.6884 0.0085 -0.0706* -17.7267 0.0359 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0172 -20.3804 0.0312 0.0410 12.8852 0.0493 8% 
 
0.0055 12.7732 0.0497 0.0350 15.6517 0.0406 17% 
 
0.0094 12.7515 0.0498 0.0405 13.0206 0.0488 9% 
 
UNPR -0.4756 -18.3703 0.0346 -0.2186 -12.7356 0.0499 75% 
 
-0.2205 -12.1742 0.0522 -0.0569 -3.4222  0.1810 0.00% 
 
-0.3208 -12.6979 0.0500 -0.0987 -4.2325 0.1477 0.00% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -25.1209 0.0253 -0.0000 -13.0056 0.0489 79% 
 
-0.0000 -17.1841 0.0370 -0.0000 -12.8132 0.0496 7% 
 
-0.0000 -18.1306 0.0351 -0.0000 -13.1964 0.0481 13% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-17. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Chile 
This table presents Chile’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure of 
leverage. The values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 based 
on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2) 
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.6697* -36.7583 0.0173 -0.3802* -20.3405 0.0313 100% 
 
-0.6003* -35.9676 0.0177 -0.1140* -15.5948 0.0408 100% 
 
-0.7725* -34.0248 0.0187 -0.2078* -21.4543 0.0297 100% 
 
TAN -0.2753 -13.8345 0.0459 0.1355 20.1909 0.0315 14% 
 
0.0620 12.7608 0.0498 0.1663 12.8416 0.0495 67% 
 
0.0768 12.7626 0.0498 0.1408 18.9507 0.0336 15% 
 
RISK 0.2143 12.9969 0.0489 0.6260 17.0097 0.0374 64%  0.1848 13.0164 0.0488 0.2190 13.7757 0.0461 0.02%  0.2264 12.9388 0.0491 0.2881 14.0065 0.0454 0.06%  
LIQ
 a
 -0.0991
* -34.2471 0.0186 -0.0606* -57.7551 0.0110 100%  -0.0548* -19.8578 0.0320 -0.0321* -33.7862 0.0188 100%  -0.0843* -29.4580 0.0216 -0.0521* -42.0389 0.0151 100%  
POR -0.0736 -12.7886 0.0497 -0.0205 -13.1248 0.0484 3% 
 
-0.0452 -6.7652 0.0934 0.0002 0.1446 0.9086 0.00% 
 
-0.0727 -8.0846 0.0783 0.0024 1.4193 0.3908 0.00% 
 
AGE -0.0099 -14.7494 0.0431 -0.0036 -16.9300 0.0376 87% 
 
-0.0067 -13.3413 0.0476 -0.0023 -13.5728 0.0468 74% 
 
-0.0107 -16.3608 0.0389 -0.0031 -12.8843 0.0493 75% 
 
TAX -0.0276 -10.0604 0.0631 0.0151 4.9387 0.1272 0.00% 
 
-0.0127 -5.9496 0.1060 0.0082 3.3631 0.1840 0.00% 
 
-0.0173 -6.3740 0.0991 0.0102 3.1264 0.1971 0.00% 
 
NDTAX 0.7322 13.0385 0.0487 4.3532 14.9936 0.0424 36% 
 
0.6372 13.0563 0.0487 0.7793 15.7732 0.0403 1.4% 
 
0.7651 12.7853 0.0497 1.0109 15.8735 0.0401 1.1% 
 
INV 0.0003 12.7775 0.0497 0.0004 19.1544 0.0332 12% 
 
0.0002 12.7865 0.0497 0.0006 29.0616 0.0219 47% 
 
0.0003 13.6068 0.0467 0.0006 22.8255 0.0279 14% 
 
G(SA) -0.1702 -2.2255 0.2688 0.0403 2.3439 0.2567 0.00% 
 
-0.1109 -2.3844 0.2528 0.0330 1.6261 0.3510 0.00% 
 
-0.1225 -1.9573 0.3007 0.0499 1.9222 0.3054 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1283 -1.3784 0.3995 0.2074 2.2452 0.2668 0.00% 
 
-0.0500 -1.7104 0.3368 0.1688 2.1772 0.2741 0.00% 
 
-0.0880 -1.0782 0.4761 0.1595 1.5427 0.3661 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -1.4502 -13.3020 0.0478 0.7561 22.3761 0.0284 16% 
 
0.3723 15.4096 0.0413 0.4036 16.6886 0.0381 1.3% 
 
0.4356 13.9748 0.0455 0.4846 15.5456 0.0409 1.3% 
 
INTAN -0.2897 -19.2720 0.0330 -0.1681 -13.1289 0.0484 10% 
 
-0.1704 -14.4238 0.0441 -0.1532 -13.6344 0.0466 1% 
 
-0.2258 -14.6982 0.0432 -0.1913 -12.7077 0.0500 2.2% 
 
SHPP -0.3501 -4.5592 0.1375 0.0306 1.7404 0.3320 0.00% 
 
-0.1971 -3.8508 0.1617 0.0202 1.3197 0.4128 0.00% 
 
-0.3118 -4.5583 0.1375 0.0245 1.2122 0.4391 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0368 13.2104 0.0481 0.2003 20.9944 0.0303 88% 
 
-0.0579 -24.3374 0.0261 -0.0294 -13.3231 0.0477 74% 
 
-0.0357 -5.2367 0.1201 0.0672 6.6777 0.0946 0.00% 
 
ROE 0.0421 12.7410 0.0499 0.2758 31.7612 0.0200 27% 
 
-0.0583 -21.2638 0.0299 0.1730 20.5798 0.0309 21% 
 
-0.0657 -15.5314 0.0409 0.2738 25.3308 0.0251 13% 
 
GOP m 0.0263 12.9028 0.0492 0.0575 24.2213 0.0263 51% 
 
-0.0243 -12.8405 0.0495 -0.0243 -12.8405 0.0495 0.01% 
 
-0.0357 -6.2975 0.1003 0.0561 9.0391 0.0701 0.00% 
 
CAPIN -0.0105 -17.4405 0.0365 0.0133 25.4394 0.0250 29% 
 
0.0053 12.7850 0.0497 0.0098 23.9367 0.0266 15% 
 
0.0077 12.7511 0.0498 0.0163 28.8812 0.0220 29% 
 
UNPR -0.1206 -14.0100 0.0454 0.3941 12.9700 0.0490 1% 
 
-0.1406 -8.5490 0.0741 0.1044 6.4226 0.0983 0.00% 
 
-0.1928 -8.7170 0.0727 0.1807 5.3732 0.1171 0.00% 
 
VAR -0.0000 -13.3757 0.0475 0.0000 14.5908 0.0436 11% 
 
0.0000 12.8422 0.0495 0.0000 13.3322 0.0477 0.07% 
 
0.0000 13.0078 0.0488 0.0000 17.4676 0.0364 24% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Table B-17. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - First Phase (Firm -Specific Determinants), Chile 
This table presents Chile’s first round of results of EBA for each variables of interest, Q, at firm level when the dependent variable (leverage) is at book value. For each variable of interest, 969 regressions are carried out for each measure of 
leverage. The values of βmin and βmax are presented, along with the corresponding t-statistics and p-values of each proposed explanatory variable. The last column identifies the percentage of significant coefficients out of a total of 969 based 
on a two-sided test at the 5% significance level.  
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.4029 -33.1952 0.0192 -0.1271 -12.7580 0.0498 77% 
 
-0.2717 -27.1984 0.0234 -0.0963 -12.7448 0.0498 82% 
 
-0.3922 -30.1485 0.0211 -0.1312 -12.8844 0.0493 84% 
 
TAN -0.2577 -16.7481 0.0380 0.1464 20.2227 0.0315 8% 
 
0.0668 12.7607 0.0498 0.1617 29.2826 0.0217 75% 
 
0.0776 12.8019 0.0496 0.1415 20.1121 0.0316 34% 
 
RISK -0.4539 -16.4328 0.0387 0.3838 19.4210 0.0328 52%  -0.2191 -15.7492 0.0404 0.2282 14.6516 0.0434 10%  -0.3268 -17.2473 0.0369 0.3059 15.2489 0.0417 14%  
LIQ
 a
 -0.0755
* -26.0574 0.0244 -0.0381* -14.6068 0.0435 100%  -0.0477* -27.2671 0.0233 -0.0285* -28.2391 0.0225 100%  -0.0667* -22.6293 0.0281 -0.0409* -30.5893 0.0208 100%  
POR -0.0814 -13.8453 0.0459 -0.0199 -12.7167 0.0500 66% 
 
-0.0492 -9.0204 0.0703 -0.0008 -0.6061 0.6531 0.00% 
 
-0.0829 -10.9557 0.0579 -0.0017 -0.9943 0.5018 0.00% 
 
AGE -0.0095 -14.4801 0.0439 -0.0042 -18.8021 0.0338 88% 
 
-0.0049 -14.5700 0.0436 -0.0023 -12.7789 0.0497 35% 
 
-0.0066 -13.9090 0.0457 -0.0029 -12.7253 0.0499 43% 
 
TAX 0.0354 12.8330 0.0495 0.0510 17.6573 0.0360 7% 
 
0.0270 12.8039 0.0496 0.0295 14.2845 0.0445 1.4% 
 
0.0370 12.7853 0.0497 0.0397 13.8116 0.0460 0.06% 
 
NDTAX 0.6840 13.1018 0.0485 2.2355 14.2915 0.0445 11% 
 
0.6062 13.1044 0.0485 0.7363 15.8427 0.0401 1.1% 
 
0.7721 12.7623 0.0498 0.8305 12.9638 0.0490 0.04% 
 
INV 0.0003 14.1517 0.0449 0.0007 13.1035 0.0485 8% 
 
0.0002 12.7719 0.0497 0.0006 16.1445 0.0394 49% 
 
0.0004 12.8537 0.0494 0.0006 20.6953 0.0307 14% 
 
G(SA) -0.0878 -1.4301 0.3885 0.0572 2.5812 0.2353 0.00% 
 
-0.0835 -2.0899 0.2841 0.0412 2.3955 0.2518 0.00% 
 
-0.0922 -1.6052 0.3547 0.0585 2.4967 0.2425 0.00% 
 
G(AS) -0.1574 -2.0082 0.2941 0.0779 2.2503 0.2662 0.00% 
 
-0.0577 -1.1120 0.4663 0.0680 1.0110 0.4965 0.00% 
 
-0.1200 -1.3838 0.3984 0.0551 0.7481 0.5911 0.00% 
 
CAPEX -1.4233 -15.0208 0.0423 0.3863 13.2531 0.0479 11% 
 
-0.3761 -13.8947 0.0457 -0.3375 -12.7255 0.0499 0.09% 
 
-0.5717 -15.7660 0.0403 -0.4287 -12.7583 0.0498 8% 
 
INTAN -0.4530 -13.0993 0.0485 -0.1877 -14.6929 0.0433 2% 
 
-0.3307 -13.4780 0.0471 -0.1525 -12.9841 0.0489 0.02% 
 
-0.4446 -12.8860 0.0493 -0.1945 -12.7515 0.0498 0.04% 
 
SHPP -0.2628 -4.0082 0.1557 -0.0236 -1.3352 0.4092 0.00% 
 
-0.0951 -2.2332 0.2680 0.0099 0.6414 0.6369 0.00% 
 
-0.1999 -3.2998 0.1873 -0.0081 -0.4116 0.7514 0.00% 
 
ASUTI 0.0338 13.0156 0.0488 0.1619 16.7087 0.0381 62% 
 
-0.0621 -26.6821 0.0238 -0.0300 -12.7987 0.0496 76% 
 
-0.0472 -15.2648 0.0416 -0.0387 -13.0299 0.0488 5% 
 
ROE -0.1061 -26.8095 0.0237 0.1370 14.9461 0.0425 70% 
 
-0.0743 -25.2002 0.0252 -0.0416 -14.4186 0.0441 70% 
 
-0.1016 -25.7296 0.0247 -0.0635 -16.4185 0.0387 70% 
 
GOP m -0.1970* -40.9516 0.0155 -0.1349* -22.8499 0.0278 100% 
 
-0.1043* -55.4153 0.0115 -0.0548* -12.9967 0.0489 100% 
 
-0.1599* -29.9959 0.0212 -0.0930* -15.2223 0.0418 100% 
 
CAPIN -0.0082 -14.1717 0.0448 0.0292 17.1942 0.0370 6% 
 
-0.0063 -12.9504 0.0491 0.0086 15.8955 0.0400 8% 
 
0.0086 12.7121 0.0500 0.0123 17.0516 0.0373 10% 
 
UNPR -0.3032 -15.3752 0.0413 -0.2571 -12.7730 0.0497 0.03% 
 
-0.1067 -7.3362 0.0862 0.1013 4.7143 0.1331 0.00% 
 
-0.1726 -8.6017 0.0737 0.1756 6.0012 0.1051 0.00% 
 
VAR 0.0000 14.8385 0.0428 0.0000 14.8385 0.0428 0.01% 
 
-0.0000 -11.6565 0.0545 0.0000 6.9059 0.0915 0.00% 
 
-0.0000 -2.2189 0.2696 0.0000 10.4924 0.0605 0.00% 
 
 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
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Appendix C: Results of Second Phase- Firm and Country-Specific Determinants 
Table C-1.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Australia 
For each variable of interest, 120, 56 and 56 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3, respectively. For each variable of interest, 120, 56 and 56 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3, respectively. 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.1312* -85.5470 0.0074 -0.0941* -59.3785 0.0107 100% 
 
-0.0522* -42.8366 0.0149 -0.0357* -27.8870 0.0228 100% 
 
-0.0639* -33.3894 0.0191 -0.0415* -20.3636 0.0312 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0072* -123.5815 0.0052 -0.0058* -102.4805 0.0062 100% 
 
-0.0030* -64.0501 0.0099 -0.0028* -58.7722 0.0108 100% 
 
-0.0042* -58.4112 0.0109 -0.0040* -51.2950 0.0124 100% 
 
NDTAX d 0.4730* 27.1261 0.0235 1.1331* 59.4055 0.0107 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
ASUTI d c 0.0788* 80.1921 0.0079 0.1031* 95.6345 0.0067 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
INF -0.0107 -10.6021 0.0599 0.0029 3.7171 0.1673 0.0%   
 
-0.0066 -8.1111 0.0781 0.0018 2.7051 0.2254 0.0%   
 
-0.0091 -7.4840 0.0846 0.0017 1.6748 0.3427 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -27.2624 0.0233 -0.0000 -15.8206 0.0402 34.1%   
 
-0.0000 -19.6036 0.0324 -0.0000 -12.8186 0.0496 17.8%   
 
-0.0000 -15.2762 0.0416 -0.0000 -14.3864 0.0442 14.2% 
 
GGDP 0.0082 15.0972 0.0421 0.0138 21.4326 0.0297 23.3%   
 
0.0072 13.3214 0.0477 0.0084 17.5586 0.0362 12.5%   
 
0.0101 13.3361 0.0476 0.0112 14.5227 0.0438 8.9% 
 
SMS -0.0235 -16.7923 0.0379 -0.0142 -12.7229 0.0499 4.1%   
 
-0.0151 -13.3129 0.0477 -0.0150 -13.4994 0.0471 3.5%   
 
-0.0206 -11.7220 0.0542 0.0228 2.6685 0.2283 0.0% 
 
BMS -0.0939 -22.8404 0.0279 -0.0383 -16.6957 0.0381 37.5%   
 
-0.0514 -15.4570 0.0411 -0.0377 -18.6522 0.0341 17.8%   
 
-0.0669 -13.0238 0.0488 -0.0490 -15.4171 0.0412 14.2% 
 
GCF 0.0022 14.4006 0.0441 0.0041 27.8646 0.0228 32.5%   
 
0.0019 13.9314 0.0456 0.0026 21.7939 0.0292 25%   
 
0.0028 13.3895 0.0475 0.0034 17.4263 0.0365 14.2% 
 
SIR -0.0166 -16.4773 0.0386 -0.0113 -13.6446 0.0466 5%     -0.0076 -9.3945 0.0675 0.0079 7.0271 0.0900 0.0%     -0.0120 -9.6856 0.0655 0.0079 4.5308 0.1383 0.0%   
 
Table C-1.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Australia 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant β's 
at 5% 
LIQ a -0.0051* -106.7871 0.0060 -0.0043* -89.3199 0.0071 100% 
 
-0.0023* -64.1657 0.0099 -0.0021* -58.2147 0.0109 100% 
 
-0.0028* -63.5264 0.0100 -0.0026* -57.0249 0.0112 100% 
 
POR c -0.0319* -28.3307 0.0225 -0.0217* -18.2133 0.0349 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
ASUTI d c 0.0389* 47.7969 0.0133 0.0575* 69.6702 0.0091 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
GOP m -0.0281* -108.3010 0.0059 -0.0224* -84.3313 0.0075 100% 
 
-0.0104* -53.5997 0.0119 -0.0090* -46.3098 0.0137 100% 
 
-0.0144* -58.6788 0.0108 -0.0125* -49.7187 0.0128 100% 
 
INF -0.0233 -27.4118 0.0232 -0.0080 -12.9263 0.0492 58.3%   -0.0101 -16.7645 0.0379 -0.0076 -12.9529 0.0491 14.2%   -0.0144 -18.8616 0.0337 -0.0088 -13.5292 0.0470 26.7% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -20.0069 0.0318 0.0000 28.1272 0.0226 3.0%   -0.0000 -16.3219 0.0390 0.0000 15.4661 0.0411 12.5%   -0.0000 -17.1329 0.0371 0.0000 16.9562 0.0375 14.2% 
 
GGDP -0.0203 -23.8832 0.0266 -0.0059 -13.0556 0.0487 29.1%   -0.0064 -13.9384 0.0456 -0.0064 -13.9384 0.0456 1.7%   -0.0107 -13.6573 0.0465 -0.0073 -12.7082 0.0500 7.1% 
 
SMS -0.0922 -23.4141 0.0272 -0.0130 -12.7499 0.0498 45.8%   -0.0525 -18.2143 0.0349 -0.0099 -13.2450 0.0480 25%   -0.0699 -19.2438 0.0331 -0.0122 -13.0913 0.0485 32.1% 
 
BMS -0.1996 -28.3659 0.0224 0.4261 19.5302 0.0326 21.6%   -0.0839 -16.2518 0.0391 0.2533 15.8681 0.0401 10.7%   -0.1149 -17.6736 0.0360 0.3372 16.7426 0.0380 14.2% 
 
GCF 0.0019 13.3095 0.0477 0.0046 22.4996 0.0283 30.8%   0.0020 12.8547 0.0494 0.0025 16.6686 0.0381 19.6%   0.0024 12.8417 0.0495 0.0031 15.9644 0.0398 14.2% 
 
SIR c 0.0130* 16.4909 0.0386 0.0322* 24.0860 0.0264 100% 
 
0.0070 13.1883 0.0482 0.0147 17.6734 0.0360 82.1%   0.0082 12.7193 0.0499 0.0195 18.6171 0.0342 91%   
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Table C-2.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), United States 
For each variable of interest, 220 regressions are carried out for each measure at book value. Whereas, for each variable of interest, 165, 165, 220 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively (at market value) 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -1.2425* -321.4695 0.0020 -0.4088* -112.5067 0.0057 100% 
 
-0.4811* -268.8770 0.0024 -0.1605* -80.5647 0.0079 100% 
 
0.0248* 23.3540 0.0272 0.0894* 101.1161 0.0063 100% 
 
TAN md 
      
- 
       
- 
 
0.1782* 57.9200 0.0110 0.3103* 110.4335 0.0058 100% 
 
RISK d 0.1453* 80.2331 0.0079 0.4558* 268.2241 0.0024 100% 
 
0.0519* 52.5164 0.0121 0.1390* 217.7403 0.0029 100% 
       
- 
 
LIQ
 a
 -0.3496
* -144.8727 0.0044 -0.1118* -94.2984 0.0068 100% 
 
-0.1367* -142.2493 0.0045 -0.0574* -88.7676 0.0072 100% 
 
-0.0424* -130.0625 0.0049 -0.0187* -60.4328 0.0105 100% 
 
AGE d c 
      
- 
       
- 
 
-0.0026* -40.5574 0.0157 -0.0013* -17.8092 0.0357 100% 
 
NDTAX d 2.1862* 44.9242 0.0142 11.4916* 140.5322 0.0045 100% 
 
1.2276* 46.4844 0.0137 4.4548* 132.8856 0.0048 100% 
       
  
 
ASUTI b 0.1578* 57.7716 0.0110 0.6517* 138.4879 0.0046 100% 
 
0.0236* 16.3360 0.0389 0.1860* 104.5022 0.0061 100% 
 
-0.0661* -101.8277 0.0063 -0.0266* -36.3138 0.0175 100% 
 
GOP a 0.1443* 264.6269 0.0024 0.2451* 457.7690 0.0014 100% 
 
0.0613* 201.6536 0.0032 0.0895* 331.2454 0.0019 100% 
 
-0.0159* -118.1449 0.0054 -0.0094* -57.3946 0.0111 100% 
 
INF -0.1541 -12.7845 0.0497 -0.0384 -14.0913 0.0451 20%   
 
-0.0299 -21.3421 0.0298 -0.0158 -12.8223 0.0495 14%   
 
-0.0123 -9.7148 0.0653 0.0100 11.4303 0.0556 0.0%   
CGDP 0.0000 12.8479 0.0495 0.0000 21.0249 0.0303 54%   
 
0.0000 13.0637 0.0486 0.0000 22.8441 0.0279 33%   
 
-0.0000 -16.3282 0.0389 -0.0000 -13.5808 0.0468 6%   
GGDP -0.0713 -28.1402 0.0226 -0.0206 -13.8473 0.0459 16%   
 
-0.0306 -24.0796 0.0264 -0.0115 -14.8243 0.0429 19%   
 
-0.0100 -10.5457 0.0602 0.0019 4.7628 0.1318 0.0%   
SMS -1.2434 -16.6692 0.0381 -0.2485 -16.3792 0.0388 30%   
 
-0.3822 -13.4689 0.0472 -0.1263 -15.3345 0.0415 33%   
 
0.0725 12.8058 0.0496 0.0725 12.8058 0.0496 0.04%   
BMS -3.5206 -13.1038 0.0485 2.0590 15.4413 0.0412 5%   
 
0.9412 13.2704 0.0479 1.0083 14.4377 0.0440 2%   
 
-0.4688 -9.5922 0.0661 0.1251 3.3273 0.1859 0.0%   
GCF -0.1081 -27.5593 0.0231 -0.0212 -13.5460 0.0469 74%   
 
-0.0310 -20.0364 0.0317 -0.0113 -14.2129 0.0447 47%   
 
0.0047 13.0160 0.0488 0.0147 14.7703 0.0430 57%   
SIR -0.0726 -13.9401 0.0456 0.0690 30.1860 0.0211 20%     0.0133 13.3915 0.0475 0.0245 21.4304 0.0297 10%     -0.0092 -15.5143 0.0410 -0.0062 -12.7808 0.0497 15%   
 
Table C-2.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), United States 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2) 
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3) 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
TAN md 0.0941* 65.6602 0.0097 0.2119* 144.2395 0.0044 100% 
 
0.1637* 157.9068 0.0040 0.2128* 214.7150 0.0030 100% 
 
0.2008* 131.7232 0.0048 0.2936* 197.4837 0.0032 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0447* -301.0437 0.0021 -0.0371* -247.6152 0.0026 100% 
 
-0.0229* -209.3570 0.0030 -0.0167* -159.2119 0.0040 100% 
 
-0.0372* -231.5259 0.0027 -0.0287* -183.9993 0.0035 100% 
 
POR c -0.0374* -36.4630 0.0175 -0.0183* -19.2496 0.0330 100% 
       
- 
 
-0.0349* -36.4866 0.0174 -0.0134* -12.9358 0.0491 100% 
 
AGE d c 
      
- 
 
-0.0010* -42.0487 0.0151 -0.0005* -20.8768 0.0305 100% 
 
-0.0013* -37.9713 0.0168 -0.0005* -15.4382 0.0412 100% 
 
SHPP m -0.0578* -37.2499 0.0171 -0.0378* -25.6394 0.0248 100% 
 
-0.0245* -23.0338 0.0276 -0.0170* -15.5246 0.0410 100% 
 
-0.0565* -35.8401 0.0178 -0.0405* -25.5589 0.0249 100% 
 
GOP a -0.0076* -127.8561 0.0050 -0.0042* -68.3752 0.0093 100% 
 
-0.0032* -72.1409 0.0088 -0.0014* -35.7538 0.0178 100% 
 
-0.0048* -77.8372 0.0082 -0.0018* -29.1820 0.0218 100% 
 
INF -0.0245 -30.9037 0.0206 -0.0052 -13.3110 0.0477 83%   -0.0095 -17.4356 0.0365 -0.0032 -13.3262 0.0477 66% 
 
-0.0192 -23.6547 0.0269 -0.0054 -13.3086 0.0477 81% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -26.3283 0.0242 0.0000 21.1818 0.0300 35%   -0.0000 -16.6241 0.0382 0.0000 13.4173 0.0474 13% 
 
-0.0000 -23.6465 0.0269 0.0000 14.7881 0.0430 25% 
 
GGDP -0.0163 -60.7813 0.0105 0.0051 13.2480 0.0480 95%   -0.0068 -34.9666 0.0182 -0.0021 -13.5193 0.0470 87%   -0.0139 -48.5770 0.0131 -0.0036 -13.6372 0.0466 95% 
 
SMS -0.1539 -29.3965 0.0216 -0.0329 -13.0762 0.0486 84%   -0.0674 -18.6466 0.0341 -0.0229 -12.9442 0.0491 74%   -0.1259 -23.4179 0.0272 -0.0341 -12.7744 0.0497 85% 
 
BMS -0.7378 -30.2994 0.0210 0.5334 32.3357 0.0197 56%   -0.2895 -19.5411 0.0326 0.1938 16.9693 0.0375 22%   -0.6047 -23.3738 0.0272 0.4255 25.0805 0.0254 47% 
 
GCF -0.0226 -37.7484 0.0169 -0.0047 -15.6492 0.0406 93%   -0.0076 -20.4213 0.0311 -0.0022 -15.9258 0.0399 84%   -0.0169 -30.4374 0.0209 -0.0043 -14.2740 0.0445 91% 
 
SIR -0.0091 -14.4003 0.0441 0.0164 69.0706 0.0092 88%   0.0026 14.5072 0.0438 0.0059 33.6777 0.0189 69%   -0.0103 -15.9035 0.0400 0.0118 45.7325 0.0139 77%   
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Table C-3.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), United Kingdom 
For each variable of interest, 120, 84, 84 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively. For each variable of interest, 84, 84, 120 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively.  
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b -0.2699* -70.6675 0.0090 -0.2164* -57.2121 0.0111 100% 
 
-0.0865* -33.6772 0.0189 -0.0603* -21.6916 0.0293 100% 
 
-0.1703* -38.1100 0.0167 -0.1341* -28.0186 0.0227 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.1651* 67.3225 0.0095 0.1939* 82.9703 0.0077 100% 
 0.1774
* 42.3787 0.0150 0.2130* 50.4284 0.0126 100%  
LIQ 
a
 -0.0341
* -130.9331 0.0049 -0.0273* -115.5521 0.0055 100% 
 
-0.0123* -65.3832 0.0097 -0.0109* -65.2927 0.0097 100% 
 
-0.0204* -64.5330 0.0099 -0.0182* -64.0335 0.0099 100% 
 
NDTAX d 0.0147* 30.5174 0.0209 0.0236* 54.6137 0.0117 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
ASUTI d c 0.0810* 96.7605 0.0066 0.1058* 111.9861 0.0057 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
INF -0.0193 -15.1899 0.0419 -0.0127 -12.7710 0.0497 8.3%   
 
-0.0068 -9.5163 0.0667 0.0061 6.8817 0.0919 0.0%   
 
-0.0137 -11.5366 0.0550 0.0115 7.6376 0.0829 0.00% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -20.6614 0.0308 -0.0000 -14.3180 0.0444 68.3%   
 
-0.0000 -13.8980 0.0457 -0.0000 -13.8980 0.0457 1.%   
 
-0.0000 -16.6338 0.0382 -0.0000 -13.5332 0.0470 28.5% 
 
GGDP -0.0124 -13.8313 0.0459 -0.0099 -12.7241 0.0499 5%   
 
-0.0091 -15.2131 0.0418 -0.0070 -13.4175 0.0474 4.7%   
 
-0.0176 -17.6837 0.0360 -0.0107 -12.7643 0.0498 19% 
 
SMS -0.0606 -10.2436 0.0620 0.0119 3.0298 0.2030 0.0%   
 
-0.0346 -10.5495 0.0602 -0.0068 -2.1070 0.2821 0.0%   
 
-0.0583 -10.6238 0.0597 -0.0101 -1.8829 0.3108 0.0% 
 
BMS -0.1513 -17.1536 0.0371 -0.0358 -13.1589 0.0483 39.1%   
 
-0.0534 -15.0383 0.0423 -0.0393 -14.1464 0.0449 5.69%   
 
-0.0975 -16.5125 0.0385 -0.0609 -13.5334 0.0470 13.0% 
 
GCF 0.0416 13.4954 0.0471 0.0544 16.8553 0.0377 5%   
 
-0.0118 -5.8448 0.1079 0.0259 11.1955 0.0567 0.0%   
 
0.0471 12.8327 0.0495 0.0546 14.1379 0.0450 3.5% 
 
SIR -0.0099 -17.8521 0.0356 -0.0062 -12.9059 0.0492 10%     -0.0098 -12.9316 0.0491 -0.0046 -13.2839 0.0478 10.7%     -0.0107 -17.0298 0.0373 -0.0093 -15.0140 0.0423 4.7%   
 
Table C-3.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), United Kingdom 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF b 
      
- 
       
- 
 
-0.1650* -55.3215 0.0115 -0.0895* -27.6631 0.0230 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.1632* 89.2534 0.0071 0.1945* 111.0873 0.0057 100% 
 
0.1733* 64.0178 0.0099 0.2303* 88.1230 0.0072 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0195* -98.1193 0.0065 -0.0158* -80.8751 0.0079 100% 
 
-0.0084* -56.4684 0.0113 -0.0069* -54.3211 0.0117 100% 
 
-0.0126* -58.2775 0.0109 -0.0101* -53.3627 0.0119 100% 
 
ASUTI d c 0.0230* 29.6508 0.0215 0.0458* 67.5812 0.0094 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
GOP m -0.0720* -170.9401 0.0037 -0.0650* -151.5575 0.0042 100% 
 
-0.0249* -80.2747 0.0079 -0.0200* -68.2828 0.0093 100% 
 
-0.0454* -96.7240 0.0066 -0.0313* -67.1766 0.0095 100% 
 
INF -0.0231 -22.4510 0.0283 0.0151 20.5939 0.0309 21.4%   -0.0099 -14.3392 0.0443 -0.0092 -13.6881 0.0464 3.5% 
 
-0.0190 -18.9155 0.0336 0.0103 14.8833 0.0427 10.8% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -29.1585 0.0218 0.0000 14.8520 0.0428 39.2%   -0.0000 -20.4501 0.0311 -0.0000 -13.5284 0.0470 15.4%   -0.0000 -26.2916 0.0242 -0.0000 -15.0201 0.0423 25% 
 
GGDP -0.0274 -53.8091 0.0118 -0.0081 -14.6360 0.0434 95.2%   -0.0125 -19.8767 0.0320 -0.0046 -15.4813 0.0411 91.6%   -0.0215 -35.4840 0.0179 -0.0089 -16.4121 0.0387 97% 
 
SMS -0.1415 -36.4659 0.0175 -0.0410 -14.7641 0.0431 80.9%   -0.0623 -23.8601 0.0267 -0.0282 -13.2847 0.0478 72.6%   -0.1105 -29.1274 0.0218 -0.0409 -13.2286 0.0480 76% 
 
BMS 0.0507 14.7588 0.0431 0.2687 36.0258 0.0177 75%   0.0229 14.6242 0.0435 0.1267 25.4453 0.0250 51.1%   0.0296 13.1292 0.0484 0.2267 31.3678 0.0203 65% 
 
GCF 0.0330 14.8053 0.0429 0.0868 32.9196 0.0193 45.2%   0.0219 13.0105 0.0488 0.0332 14.6657 0.0433 15.4%   0.0312 13.1440 0.0483 0.0562 17.1001 0.0372 25% 
 
SIR -0.0127 -14.3701 0.0442 0.0212 46.3481 0.0137 67.8%   -0.0095 -16.1114 0.0395 0.0061 19.9045 0.0320 20.2%   -0.0145 -16.9948 0.0374 0.0133 29.8208 0.0213 40%   
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Table C-4.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Turkey 
For each variable of interest, 84, 56, 56 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively. For each variable of interest, 120, 84 and 120 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. Notes: a 
indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using market value 
measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable are significant 
at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -1.0515* -57.0665 0.0112 -0.4229* -25.5572 0.0249 100% 
 
-0.5059* -42.6660 0.0149 -0.2130* -17.4601 0.0364 100% 
 
-0.7847* -46.4996 0.0137 -0.3378* -19.7354 0.0322 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0814* -93.5401 0.0068 -0.0690* -85.7848 0.0074 100% 
 
-0.0362* -74.3791 0.0086 -0.0345* -60.8408 0.0105 100% 
 
-0.0550* -65.1536 0.0098 -0.0524* -66.0347 0.0096 100% 
 
GOP m d 0.0628* 26.4264 0.0241 0.1075* 43.2728 0.0147 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
INF 0.0057 13.8376 0.0459 0.0072 16.3203 0.0390 8.3% 
  
-0.0040 -14.1571 0.0449 -0.0030 -12.8962 0.0493 3.5%   
 
-0.0056 -13.7145 0.0463 -0.0056 -13.7145 0.0463 1.7% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -14.4882 0.0439 0.0000 13.4324 0.0473 4.7%   
 
0.0000 13.7707 0.0461 0.0000 15.3885 0.0413 51.7%   
 
0.0000 13.0001 0.0489 0.0000 14.2670 0.0445 39% 
 
GGDP -0.0036 -12.9773 0.0490 -0.0036 -12.9773 0.0490 1.1%   
 
-0.0034 -16.4347 0.0387 -0.0024 -13.4910 0.0471 10.7%   
 
-0.0042 -13.9990 0.0454 -0.0038 -13.9715 0.0455 3.5% 
 
SMS -0.1446 -4.8500 0.1294 0.1663 6.3651 0.0992 0.0%   
 
-0.2104 -11.4926 0.0553 0.0470 3.1476 0.1958 0.0%   
 
-0.3023 -12.8223 0.0495 -0.2823 -12.7956 0.0497 3.5% 
 
BMS 2.5205 12.9131 0.0492 2.5205 12.9131 0.0492 1.1%   
 
1.3752 14.1134 0.0450 1.3891 14.2992 0.0444 3.5%   
 
-2.7367 -8.9996 0.0704 1.7099 6.6201 0.0954 0.0% 
 
GCF -0.0098 -14.5499 0.0437 -0.0052 -13.1941 0.0482 22.6%   
 
0.0031 14.6676 0.0433 0.0063 18.6614 0.0341 16%   
 
0.0046 15.2222 0.0418 0.0088 17.9656 0.0354 14% 
 
SIR -0.0028 -15.7957 0.0402 -0.0022 -14.7115 0.0432  3.5%     0.0014 14.3315 0.0443 0.0043 19.2778 0.0330 42.8%     0.0017 12.7792 0.0497 0.0056 16.9553 0.0375 41%   
 
Table C-4. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Turkey 
Variable 
 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.9372* -67.4605 0.0094 -0.3833 -31.1507 0.0204 100% 
 
-0.4338* -37.9474 0.0168 -0.1592* -14.0319 0.0453 100% 
 
-0.6516* -44.2471 0.0144 -0.2618* -18.1913 0.0350 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0592* -101.8456 0.0063 -0.0510 -82.9293 0.0077 100% 
 
-0.0329* -56.8563 0.0112 -0.0314* -57.7503 0.0110 100% 
 
-0.0454* -61.8592 0.0103 -0.0423* -61.2485 0.0104 100% 
 
DIO c 0.0004* 18.6589 0.0341 0.0009 32.5578 0.0195 100% 
       
- 
 
0.0004* 17.5819 0.0362 0.0008* 29.0516 0.0219 100% 
 
GOP m d -0.1005* -62.0775 0.0103 -0.0778 -53.9001 0.0118 100% 
 
-0.0419* -28.8958 0.0220 -0.0244* -17.0318 0.0373 100% 
 
-0.0670* -36.3746 0.0175 -0.0403* -22.0332 0.0289 100% 
 
INF 0.0038 14.1944 0.0448 0.0091 30.2762 0.0210 32.5%   -0.0026 -7.9897 0.0793 0.0048 11.2860 0.0563 0.0% 
 
-0.0039 -9.0641 0.0700 0.0065 11.8845 0.0534 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -31.1435 0.0204 0.0000 19.5760 0.0325 31.6%   0.0000 14.1278 0.0450 0.0000 14.3306 0.0444 1.3%   0.0000 12.8625 0.0494 0.0000 13.1411 0.0484 12% 
 
GGDP -0.0059 -25.6985 0.0248 -0.0026 -12.9977 0.0489 85%   -0.0031 -14.1668 0.0449 -0.0020 -12.7169 0.0500 15.4%   -0.0044 -15.5543 0.0409 -0.0026 -12.9060 0.0492 46% 
 
SMS -0.4072 -19.0145 0.0334 -0.2090 -13.0370 0.0487 11.6%   -0.3021 -16.9790 0.0375 -0.1794 -13.2810 0.0478 11.9%   -0.4626 -19.9477 0.0319 -0.2379 -13.2584 0.0479 25% 
 
BMS 1.8740 12.8641 0.0494 4.0405 17.5819 0.0362 25%   1.1824 12.8436 0.0495 1.1824 12.8436 0.0495 1.1%   -0.4756 -2.5163 0.2408 3.1233 11.8531 0.0536 0.0% 
 
GCF -0.0141 -28.2582 0.0225 -0.0028 -13.0440 0.0487 70%   0.0030 14.0793 0.0451 0.0034 14.0596 0.0452 2.3%   -0.0074 -14.5347 0.0437 0.0041 13.1236 0.0484 6% 
 
SIR -0.0061 -22.9503 0.0277 -0.0013 -13.8929 0.0457 34%   0.0019 13.1622 0.0483 0.0029 13.2155 0.0481 5.9%   0.0025 13.0537 0.0487 0.0041 14.3608 0.0443 6%   
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Table C-5.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Austria 
For each variable of interest, 84, 56, 84 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively. For each variable of interest, 84, 56 and 120 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. Notes: a 
indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using market value 
measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable are significant 
at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF  b c -0.9054* -25.7540 0.0247 -0.4232* -14.4878 0.0439 100% 
 
-0.7896* -24.8417 0.0256 -0.5915* -19.3118 0.0329 100%  -1.4386* -30.7741 0.0207 -0.8426* -18.9857 0.0335 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.1582* -60.2342 0.0106 -0.1416* -57.4624 0.0111 100% 
 
-0.1081* -37.9493 0.0168 -0.0920* -33.5531 0.0190 100%  -0.1767* -41.5536 0.0153 -0.1443* -36.7596 0.0173 100% 
 
ROE d c -0.0792* -24.6242 0.0258 -0.0394* -15.2527 0.0417 100% 
       
- 
 
-0.1142* -26.4328 0.0241 -0.0606* -14.6855 0.0433 100% 
 
INF -0.0172 -3.6105 0.1720 0.0288 4.4533 0.1406 0.0%   
 
-0.0074 -2.3287 0.2582 0.0215 3.6873 0.1686 0.0%   
 
-0.0265 -4.1135 0.1518 0.0461 5.3317 0.1180 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -4.8069 0.1306 0.0000 1.0318 0.4900 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -4.5166 0.1387 0.0000 4.0696 0.1534 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -10.1002 0.0628 0.0000 0.8370 0.5563 0.0% 
 
GGDP -0.0066 -2.9650 0.2071 0.0146 5.7623 0.1094 0.0%   
 
-0.0086 -4.9252 0.1275 0.0087 3.7857 0.1644 0.0%   
 
-0.0079 -2.5768 0.2357 0.0223 6.6186 0.0955 0.0% 
 
SMS -0.1898 -2.4545 0.2463 0.6299 5.3953 0.1167 0.0%   
 
-0.1840 -1.9325 0.3040 0.3796 3.6040 0.1723 0.0%   
 
-0.2443 -2.3665 0.2545 1.0276 6.5847 0.0959 0.0% 
 
BMS -0.1894 -3.6605 0.1698 0.2572 5.7886 0.1089 0.0%   
 
-0.1611 -3.7585 0.1655 0.1452 2.0267 0.2918 0.0%   
 
-0.3092 -4.4796 0.1398 0.3508 5.8640 0.1075 0.0% 
 
GCF -0.0017 -0.7484 0.5910 0.0115 7.4215 0.0853 0.0%   
 
-0.0024 -1.8163 0.3204 0.0089 2.9117 0.2106 0.0%   
 
0.0041 1.1244 0.4628 0.0197 9.5906 0.0661 0.0% 
 
SIR -0.0169 -2.9996 0.2049 0.0455 4.6318 0.1354 0.0%     -0.0071 -1.3933 0.3963 0.0327 3.6912 0.1684 0.0%     -0.0224 -2.9763 0.2064 0.0750 5.7097 0.1104 0.0%   
Table C-5.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Austria 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF  b c -1.3987* -34.9330 0.0182 -0.5455* -18.7916 0.0338 100% 
       
- 
 
-1.6888* -36.0934 0.0176 -0.6421* -16.0102 0.0397 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.1240* -35.9840 0.0177 -0.0990* -30.7364 0.0207 100% 
 
-0.0923* -30.1584 0.0211 -0.0857* -32.8177 0.0194 100% 
 
-0.1422* -33.6583 0.0189 -0.1066* -27.1498 0.0234 100% 
 
ROE d c 
      
- 
       
- 
 
-0.1206* -24.8037 0.0257 -0.0599* -13.8080 0.0460 100% 
 
GOP m -0.3087* -71.1533 0.0089 -0.2605* -46.3409 0.0137 100% 
 
-0.1954* -42.2241 0.0151 -0.1814* -35.2068 0.0181 100% 
 
-0.3294* -50.1319 0.0127 -0.2533* -39.5174 0.0161 100% 
 
INF -0.0387 -7.4220 0.0853 0.0191 3.5137 0.1765 0.0% 
 
-0.0245 -7.2549 0.0872 0.0130 3.8244 0.1628 0.0% 
 
-0.0387 -8.0735 0.0785 0.0266 3.1983 0.1929 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -8.3349 0.0760 0.0000 1.4390 0.3866 0.0% 
 
-0.0000 -2.8232 0.2167 0.0000 5.2267 0.1203 0.0%   -0.0000 -9.5248 0.0666 0.0000 4.4020 0.1422 0.0% 
 
GGDP -0.0292 -13.3765 0.0475 -0.0265 -15.0754 0.0422 5.9%   -0.0209 -10.9628 0.0579 -0.0004 -0.2150 0.8652 0.0%   -0.0350 -13.0299 0.0488 -0.0284 -13.7090 0.0464 3.3% 
 
SMS -0.6892 -16.9477 0.0375 -0.4185 -13.0258 0.0488 13%   -0.3852 -12.7904 0.0497 -0.3852 -12.7904 0.0497 1.7%   -0.7106 -14.1316 0.0450 -0.5358 -12.8225 0.0495 5% 
 
BMS -0.4148 -5.0021 0.1256 0.5174 6.0696 0.1040 0.0%   -0.3311 -7.3220 0.0864 0.3013 3.8661 0.1611 0.0%   -0.4769 -7.4191 0.0853 0.4869 4.4228 0.1416 0.0% 
 
GCF -0.0179 -5.1278 0.1226 0.0209 10.4727 0.0606 0.0%   -0.0070 -4.7166 0.1330 0.0113 3.3787 0.1832 0.0%   -0.0082 -1.9944 0.2959 0.0224 9.5242 0.0666 0.0% 
 
SIR 0.0310 13.3595 0.0476 0.0522 14.1291 0.0450 15%   0.0286 12.7541 0.0498 0.0288 12.8143 0.0496 3.5%   0.0421 13.9642 0.0455 0.0477 13.9734 0.0455 6.6%   
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Table C-6.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Hong Kong 
For each variable of interest, 120, 84,120 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively.  For each variable of interest, 220, 220 and 364 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.4867* -82.5083 0.0077 -0.4414* -66.3443 0.0096 100% 
 
-0.2387* -87.9815 0.0072 -0.2253* -75.3619 0.0084 100% 
 
-0.2145* -53.9874 0.0118 -0.1906* -46.0706 0.0138 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.1418* 36.5458 0.0174 0.2036* 58.1365 0.0109 100% 
 
0.1848* 38.8033 0.0164 0.2547* 53.8982 0.0118 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0414* -96.0719 0.0066 -0.0294* -79.9516 0.0080 100% 
 
-0.0165* -77.0438 0.0083 -0.0126* -69.1256 0.0092 100% 
 
-0.0182* -74.3282 0.0086 -0.0161* -61.2085 0.0104 100% 
 
POR m d 
      
- 
       
- 
 
-0.0428* -28.8213 0.0221 -0.0308* -18.9161 0.0336 100% 
 
ASUTI  d 0.1109* 54.4913 0.0117 0.1568* 77.1722 0.0082 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
GOP m d 0.0411* 76.0360 0.0084 0.0642* 103.1977 0.0062 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
INF -0.0070 -6.3221 0.0999 0.0176 7.3607 0.0860 0.0%   
 
-0.0012 -3.5148 0.1765 0.0091 7.0218 0.0901 0.0%   
 
-0.0027 -5.7607 0.1094 0.0087 5.5429 0.1136 0.0% 
 
CGDP 0.0000 12.9173 0.0492 0.0000 12.9173 0.0492 0.8%   
 
-0.0000 -4.1202 0.1516 0.0000 11.4510 0.0555 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -5.6267 0.1120 0.0000 6.9329 0.0912 0.0% 
 
GGDP -0.0007 -10.0744 0.0630 0.0004 6.9379 0.0911 0.0%   
 
-0.0001 -3.7982 0.1639 0.0001 4.7877 0.1311 0.0%   
 
-0.0001 -1.5175 0.3709 0.0002 4.6068 0.1361 0.0% 
 
SMS -0.0086 -3.2748 0.1887 0.0243 10.9801 0.0578 0.0%   
 
-0.0036 -3.6446 0.1705 0.0101 8.8105 0.0719 0.0%   
 
-0.0070 -5.2432 0.1200 0.0039 2.7933 0.2189 0.0% 
 
BMS 0.5355 13.5624 0.0469 0.5355 13.5624 0.0469 0.8%   
 
-0.1597 -3.7708 0.1650 0.2348 4.6103 0.1360 0.0%   
 
-0.2376 -6.1494 0.1026 0.2993 4.8387 0.1297 0.0% 
 
GCF -0.0021 -7.2160 0.0877 0.0014 8.4788 0.0747 0.0%   
 
-0.0007 -7.1329 0.0887 0.0004 2.2624 0.2650 0.0%   
 
-0.0005 -5.3440 0.1178 0.0006 2.9681 0.2069 0.0% 
 
SIR -0.0093 -15.4759 0.0411 -0.0069 -13.5454 0.0469 3.3%     -0.0030 -9.6918 0.0655 0.0046 6.4158 0.0984 0.0%     -0.0016 -5.0688 0.1240 0.0064 9.2227 0.0688 0.0% 
 
Table C-6.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Hong Kong. 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.1608* -57.1982 0.0111 -0.0709* -23.3340 0.0273 100% 
 
-0.1009* -48.8677 0.0130 -0.0537* -23.1707 0.0275 100% 
 
-0.1437* -50.3905 0.0126 -0.0774* -24.5444 0.0259 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.1501* 56.2834 0.0113 0.1953* 71.5985 0.0089 100% 
 
0.1446* 38.4701 0.0165 0.2221* 62.5344 0.0102 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0214* -123.8993 0.0051 -0.0185* -105.4805 0.0060 100% 
 
-0.0112* -79.2490 0.0080 -0.0081* -59.4708 0.0107 100% 
 
-0.0165* -89.2638 0.0071 -0.0125* -67.2923 0.0095 100% 
 
POR m d -0.0485* -40.5580 0.0157 -0.0339* -31.4542 0.0202 100% 
 
-0.0309* -34.4697 0.0185 -0.0235* -27.8249 0.0229 100% 
 
-0.0476* -40.8399 0.0156 -0.0370* -32.2990 0.0197 100% 
 
AGE c 0.0024* 25.3912 0.0251 0.0038* 36.5745 0.0174 100% 
       
- 
 
0.0024* 24.6869 0.0258 0.0035* 34.0091 0.0187 100% 
 
DIO c 
      
- 
       
- 
 
0.0001* 17.2833 0.0368 0.0002* 29.7088 0.0214 100% 
 
GOP m d -0.0183* -82.2069 0.0077 -0.0095* -40.9155 0.0156 100% 
 
-0.0078* -45.5327 0.0140 -0.0040* -24.0409 0.0265 100% 
 
-0.0116* -49.4931 0.0129 -0.0063* -27.4402 0.0232 100% 
 
CAPIN c 
      
- 
 
0.0012* 28.3700 0.0224 0.0022* 43.6529 0.0146 100% 
 
0.0013* 19.2428 0.0331 0.0028* 40.4228 0.0157 100% 
 
VAR c -0.0000* -52.2726 0.0122 -0.0000* -28.2349 0.0225 100%   
      
- 
       
- 
 
INF -0.0086 -22.4775 0.0283 0.0166 14.5388 0.0437 29%   -0.0043 -14.8570 0.0428 -0.0036 -12.8199 0.0496 2.2% 
 
-0.0075 -19.0160 0.0334 -0.0043 -12.7851 0.0497 15% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -21.3407 0.0298 -0.0000 -13.7931 0.0461 38%   -0.0000 -17.5779 0.0362 -0.0000 -14.1098 0.0450 7.7%   -0.0000 -14.1668 0.0449 0.0000 14.3084 0.0444 18% 
 
GGDP -0.0009 -23.5850 0.0270 -0.0004 -13.0962 0.0485 99%   -0.0004 -15.8870 0.0400 -0.0003 -13.1098 0.0485 38%   -0.0007 -21.2292 0.0300 -0.0004 -12.7611 0.0498 93% 
 
SMS -0.0247 -22.1643 0.0287 -0.0122 -12.8888 0.0493 25%   -0.0127 -15.2756 0.0416 -0.0090 -12.7500 0.0498 11%   -0.0213 -18.7131 0.0340 -0.0125 -12.8191 0.0496 22% 
 
BMS -0.2677 -12.8798 0.0493 1.0098 21.2090 0.0300 45%   0.1539 13.7318 0.0463 0.5872 16.4732 0.0386 20%   0.2124 13.3169 0.0477 0.8653 17.7609 0.0358 37% 
 
GCF -0.0025 -20.1949 0.0315 -0.0010 -12.9113 0.0492 7.2%   -0.0008 -7.9102 0.0801 0.0007 10.4842 0.0605 0.0%   -0.0016 -12.2972 0.0517 0.0011 11.6321 0.0546 0.0% 
 
SIR 0.0031 12.8230 0.0495 0.0078 23.3668 0.0272 32%   0.0024 12.8205 0.0496 0.0070 14.1760 0.0448 22%   0.0032 13.1714 0.0482 0.0101 14.9584 0.0425 33%   
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Table C-7.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), France 
For each variable of interest, 84 regression models are carried out for each measure of leverage. For each variable of interest, 84,120 and 120 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively. Notes: a indicate that a 
particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using market value measures of 
leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable are significant at the 5% 
level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF m d -0.5598* -89.5339 0.0071 -0.4563* -76.2921 0.0083 100%  
      
- 
 
-0.4182* -44.6799 0.0142 -0.3880* -47.0686 0.0135 100% 
 
TAN  d c 
      
- 
 
0.2089* 54.0641 0.0118 0.2887* 77.5840 0.0082 100%  
      
- 
 
LIQ a -0.0640* -122.2232 0.0052 -0.0519* -110.5643 0.0058 100%  -0.0209* -51.4511 0.0124 -0.0167* -46.5184 0.0137 100%  -0.0371* -54.3580 0.0117 -0.0293* -49.4204 0.0129 100% 
 
ASUTI 0.0442* 30.0923 0.0211 0.1019* 68.3752 0.0093 100%  
      
- 
       
- 
 
GOP m d 
      
- 
 
-0.0217* -25.8297 0.0246 -0.0142* -16.6749 0.0381 100%  -0.0433* -30.2616 0.0210 -0.0389* -29.0395 0.0219 100% 
 
INF 0.0269 14.8132 0.0429 0.0269 14.8132 0.0429 1.1%   
 
-0.0139 -9.2335 0.0687 0.0075 6.5846 0.0959 0.0%   
 
-0.0339 -7.4942 0.0845 0.0165 5.9058 0.1068 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -30.3456 0.0210 -0.0000 -18.2603 0.0348 66%   
 
-0.0000 -9.2663 0.0684 0.0000 3.3343 0.1855 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -17.4486 0.0364 -0.0000 -12.8662 0.0494 48% 
 
GGDP -0.0077 -6.6161 0.0955 0.0086 10.8352 0.0586 0.0%   
 
-0.0074 -11.3049 0.0562 -0.0023 -4.6387 0.1352 0.0%   
 
-0.0114 -8.6869 0.0730 0.0061 7.2171 0.0877 0.0% 
 
SMS -0.1445 -9.9844 0.0635 0.0752 11.4744 0.0553 0.0%   
 
-0.0689 -11.3331 0.0560 0.0197 3.1937 0.1932 0.0%   
 
-0.1542 -8.4841 0.0747 0.0579 8.1153 0.0781 0.0% 
 
BMS -0.3083 -31.4576 0.0202 -0.1412 -16.5030 0.0385 66%   
 
-0.1308 -8.1290 0.0779 0.2977 8.3031 0.0763 0.0%   
 
-0.2432 -20.5283 0.0310 -0.1459 -13.0792 0.0486 55% 
 
GCF 0.0135 14.7515 0.0431 0.0407 15.8205 0.0402 14%   
 
-0.0135 -11.9673 0.0531 0.0047 4.3714 0.1432 0.0%   
 
0.0169 13.6998 0.0464 0.0169 13.6998 0.0464 1.1% 
 
SIR -0.0042 -4.1728 0.1497 0.0128 7.7855 0.0813 0.0%     -0.0179 -9.2270 0.0687 -0.0008 -0.9281 0.5237 0.0%     -0.0258 -7.9112 0.0800 0.0021 1.5242 0.3697 0.0%   
 
 
Table C-7.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), France 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF m d -0.3966* -58.7023 0.0108 -0.3492* -67.1515 0.0095 100% 
 
-0.2116* -46.4901 0.0137 -0.1703* -36.3946 0.0175 100% 
 
-0.3884* -55.7462 0.0114 -0.3334* -48.6494 0.0131 100% 
 
TAN  d c 
      
- 
 
0.1987* 61.7504 0.0103 0.2740* 85.0128 0.0075 100% 
 
0.2109* 43.0514 0.0148 0.3201* 64.8723 0.0098 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0400* -80.1027 0.0079 -0.0359* -95.7638 0.0066 100% 
 
-0.0146* -41.1049 0.0155 -0.0122* -39.9041 0.0160 100% 
 
-0.0256* -47.4056 0.0134 -0.0222* -44.9187 0.0142 100% 
 
GOP m d -0.1360* -157.1994 0.0040 -0.1295* -148.8306 0.0043 100% 
 
-0.0531* -76.0018 0.0084 -0.0456* -71.6656 0.0089 100% 
 
-0.0955* -93.2443 0.0068 -0.0848* -85.6166 0.0074 100% 
 
INF -0.0528 -18.9057 0.0336 0.0462 25.2002 0.0252 34% 
 
-0.0175 -14.0881 0.0451 -0.0113 -12.7364 0.0499 10% 
 
-0.0434 -15.0677 0.0422 0.0327 17.0733 0.0372 22% 
 
CGDP -0.0001 -19.8236 0.0321 -0.0000 -12.9237 0.0492 40%   -0.0000 -16.0862 0.0395 -0.0000 -13.0843 0.0486 3.3%   -0.0001 -19.6567 0.0324 -0.0000 -13.1809 0.0482 18% 
 
GGDP -0.0265 -32.1796 0.0198 -0.0071 -13.4879 0.0471 70%   -0.0135 -23.5477 0.0270 -0.0060 -13.0141 0.0488 60%   -0.0247 -28.6065 0.0222 -0.0089 -13.8037 0.0460 80% 
 
SMS -0.3106 -25.5745 0.0249 -0.0525 -13.7053 0.0464 84%   -0.1273 -23.8976 0.0266 -0.0457 -13.0051 0.0489 40%   -0.2430 -19.8234 0.0321 -0.0637 -12.9439 0.0491 78% 
 
BMS 0.2301 15.3519 0.0414 0.8585 19.0623 0.0334 16.6%   0.1591 13.7137 0.0463 0.5158 16.3620 0.0389 3.3%   0.2786 13.4431 0.0473 0.9127 19.3496 0.0329 10% 
 
GCF -0.0430 -34.2765 0.0186 -0.0132 -13.8960 0.0457 47%   -0.0198 -21.1077 0.0301 -0.0082 -13.1437 0.0483 41%   -0.0370 -27.9598 0.0228 -0.0146 -15.3882 0.0413 45% 
 
SIR 0.0091 12.9600 0.0490 0.0365 23.0596 0.0276 78%   -0.0199 -11.7514 0.0540 0.0104 9.4572 0.0671 0.0%   0.0124 12.7424 0.0499 0.0253 15.2670 0.0416 45%   
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Table C-8.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Germany 
For each variable of interest, 165 regressions are carried out for each measure of leverage.  For each variable of interest, 220, 165 and 165 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. Notes: a indicate that a 
particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using market value measures of 
leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable are significant at the 5% 
level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.3947
* -64.9259 0.0098 -0.2885* -45.5082 0.0140 100% 
 
-0.1538* -32.6601 0.0195 -0.0970* -18.5796 0.0342 100% 
 
-0.2815* -39.3333 0.0162 -0.2065* -26.0300 0.0244 100% 
 
TAN
 a
 0.1507
* 31.4016 0.0203 0.2854* 58.5164 0.0109 100% 
 
0.2901* 84.7867 0.0075 0.3306* 94.1385 0.0068 100% 
 
0.3853* 74.2442 0.0086 0.4549* 85.2662 0.0075 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0217* -87.3913 0.0073 -0.0175* -77.9502 0.0082 100% 
 
-0.0102* -50.4514 0.0126 -0.0064* -40.5181 0.0157 100% 
 
-0.0165* -54.0885 0.0118 -0.0117* -44.6184 0.0143 100% 
 
NDTAX d 0.6924* 26.3305 0.0242 1.3417* 49.6481 0.0128 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
DIO m d 
      
- 
 
0.0003* 21.8848 0.0291 0.0004* 30.3464 0.0210 100% 
 
0.0003* 14.8884 0.0427 0.0006* 26.5688 0.0239 100% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0291* 30.2833 0.0210 0.0540* 49.7214 0.0128 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
GOP m d 
      
- 
 
-0.0335* -33.9413 0.0188 -0.0179* -21.2435 0.0299 100%   -0.0503* -33.8009 0.0188 -0.0266* -20.3495 0.0313 100% 
 
INF 0.0366 13.2375 0.0480 0.0515 14.8381 0.0428 1.2%   
 
-0.0185 -7.6067 0.0832 0.0082 6.1108 0.1033 0.0%   
 
-0.0364 -9.6636 0.0656 0.0228 6.0630 0.1041 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -25.7111 0.0247 -0.0000 -13.2138 0.0481 86%   
 
-0.0000 -13.2934 0.0478 -0.0000 -13.3790 0.0475 1.8%   
 
-0.0000 -16.3642 0.0389 -0.0000 -12.7455 0.0498 29% 
 
GGDP -0.0110 -15.2481 0.0417 -0.0073 -12.8477 0.0495 10.3%   
 
-0.0050 -9.9107 0.0640 -0.0001 -0.3683 0.7754 0.0%   
 
-0.0099 -13.4114 0.0474 -0.0083 -13.2413 0.0480 5.4% 
 
SMS 0.1639 13.6742 0.0465 0.2158 15.7106 0.0405 1.8%   
 
-0.1529 -8.1008 0.0782 0.0181 1.7552 0.3297 0.0%   
 
-0.2139 -7.5305 0.0840 0.1341 8.6700 0.0731 0.0% 
 
BMS -0.5674 -21.8487 0.0291 -0.2601 -12.7644 0.0498 24.8%   
 
-0.1076 -5.5978 0.1125 0.2383 7.0182 0.0901 0.0%   
 
-0.3984 -11.3499 0.0559 0.2776 4.7981 0.1308 0.0% 
 
GCF 0.0132 13.3419 0.0476 0.0277 23.6830 0.0269 64.8%   
 
-0.0053 -5.0826 0.1237 0.0118 7.1497 0.0885 0.0%   
 
0.0145 12.7539 0.0498 0.0218 18.0628 0.0352 20% 
 
SIR 0.0276 13.6580 0.0465 0.0319 13.1773 0.0482 1.8%     -0.0128 -6.8762 0.0919 0.0012 1.3407 0.4080 0.0%     -0.0238 -8.3548 0.0758 0.0072 2.9838 0.2059 0.0%   
 
Table C-8.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Germany 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.2956
* -57.9673 0.0110 -0.2102* -34.0430 0.0187 100% 
 
-0.1259* -29.9787 0.0212 -0.0757* -16.8992 0.0376 100% 
 
-0.2447* -41.6236 0.0153 -0.1742* -25.5041 0.0249 100% 
 
TAN
 a
 0.1676
* 44.0765 0.0144 0.3006* 66.7709 0.0095 100% 
 
0.2714* 90.9967 0.0070 0.3209* 99.4778 0.0064 100% 
 
0.3517* 79.7436 0.0080 0.4371* 92.1153 0.0069 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0163* -67.0360 0.0095 -0.0122* -64.3178 0.0099 100% 
 
-0.0086* -44.7136 0.0142 -0.0057* -37.0816 0.0172 100% 
 
-0.0130* -45.4360 0.0140 -0.0085* -36.3866 0.0175 100% 
 
AGE c 0.0022* 22.7538 0.0280 0.0052* 45.7009 0.0139 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
DIO m d 0.0002* 13.1995 0.0481 0.0005* 24.7008 0.0258 100% 
 
0.0003* 24.8935 0.0256 0.0005* 34.5877 0.0184 100% 
 
0.0003* 16.3174 0.0390 0.0006* 28.7444 0.0221 100% 
 
GOP m d -0.1510* -143.7575 0.0044 -0.1255* -140.1191 0.0045 100% 
 
-0.0632* -74.5668 0.0085 -0.0469* -66.5177 0.0096 100% 
 
-0.1087* -88.4249 0.0072 -0.0836* -79.4795 0.0080 100% 
 
INF -0.0682 -21.5393 0.0295 -0.0157 -13.2450 0.0480 54%   -0.0323 -13.8852 0.0458 -0.0133 -12.7296 0.0499 13%   -0.0650 -19.0981 0.0333 -0.0194 -13.0446 0.0487 35% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -27.9931 0.0227 -0.0000 -13.4373 0.0473 81%   -0.0000 -17.3652 0.0366 -0.0000 -13.7636 0.0462 6.6%   -0.0000 -23.3031 0.0273 -0.0000 -13.2547 0.0479 70% 
 
GGDP -0.0171 -33.6608 0.0189 -0.0052 -13.0360 0.0487 95%   -0.0067 -17.9576 0.0354 -0.0044 -13.3769 0.0475 39%   -0.0147 -26.4456 0.0241 -0.0061 -13.0602 0.0486 82% 
 
SMS -0.4579 -19.0663 0.0334 -0.1224 -13.8891 0.0458 58%   -0.1321 -14.2614 0.0446 -0.0884 -12.7481 0.0498 7.2%   -0.3963 -15.3491 0.0414 -0.1371 -12.7563 0.0498 27.8% 
 
BMS -0.5631 -18.9342 0.0336 -0.2413 -12.8331 0.0495 34%   -0.1579 -8.3630 0.0758 0.3004 8.3033 0.0763 0.0%   -0.4715 -14.8063 0.0429 -0.2964 -12.7814 0.0497 7.8% 
 
GCF -0.0201 -16.1153 0.0395 0.0358 16.2393 0.0392 27.7%   -0.0103 -11.4260 0.0556 0.0133 8.2313 0.0770 0.0%   0.0132 12.9474 0.0491 0.0308 13.0575 0.0487 15% 
 
SIR 0.0121 13.2642 0.0479 0.0262 12.8440 0.0495 36%   -0.0157 -9.1858 0.0690 0.0083 9.8590 0.0644 0.0%   0.0157 13.2880 0.0478 0.0200 16.1061 0.0395 7.8%   
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Table C-9. 1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Singapore 
For each variable of interest, 120, 120, 84 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively.  For each variable of interest, 165, 220 and 165 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.3465
* -60.2930 0.0106 -0.1954* -44.4781 0.0143 100% 
 
-0.1497* -39.1258 0.0163 -0.0877* -25.9427 0.0245 100% 
 
-0.3669* -54.6325 0.0117 -0.2867* -48.3773 0.0132 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.1048* 37.7540 0.0169 0.2000* 71.0353 0.0090 100% 
       
- 
 
LIQ a -0.0661* -178.2942 0.0036 -0.0545* -158.1923 0.0040 100% 
 
-0.0345* -111.4407 0.0057 -0.0284* -95.5578 0.0067 100% 
 
-0.0546* -104.1068 0.0061 -0.0492* -102.7346 0.0062 100% 
 
DIO m d 
      
- 
 
0.0004* 46.1314 0.0138 0.0005* 61.3989 0.0104 100% 
 
0.0004* 30.9169 0.0206 0.0005* 40.9128 0.0156 100% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0452* 40.3040 0.0158 0.0818* 66.1328 0.0096 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
GOP  m d 0.0352* 37.1465 0.0171 0.0606* 48.9685 0.0130 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
INF -0.0059 -13.2110 0.0481 -0.0056 -13.5150 0.0470 1.6% 
  
-0.0038 -12.1821 0.0521 0.0057 9.3606 0.0678 0.0%   
 
-0.0067 -12.9650 0.0490 -0.0067 -12.9650 0.0490 1.1% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -25.4682 0.0250 -0.0000 -13.0996 0.0485 35%   
 
-0.0000 -20.2722 0.0314 -0.0000 -12.9992 0.0489 15%   
 
-0.0000 -20.1961 0.0315 -0.0000 -13.5404 0.0469 34% 
 
GGDP -0.0008 -5.1788 0.1214 0.0013 10.0467 0.0632 0.0%   
 
-0.0006 -5.3774 0.1171 0.0006 6.2724 0.1006 0.0%   
 
-0.0007 -3.8000 0.1638 0.0015 9.6753 0.0656 0.0% 
 
SMS 0.0211 14.5755 0.0436 0.0662 18.4101 0.0345 17.5%   
 
0.0174 13.4911 0.0471 0.0425 15.7949 0.0403 17.5%   
 
0.0277 13.6611 0.0465 0.0682 15.4886 0.0410 22% 
 
BMS 0.3629 14.9799 0.0424 0.8262 21.1561 0.0301 17.5%   
 
0.2568 12.7466 0.0498 0.5137 15.9736 0.0398 17.5%   
 
0.4418 13.0525 0.0487 0.8405 17.6737 0.0360 23% 
 
GCF -0.0046 -14.5869 0.0436 -0.0034 -12.9527 0.0491 2.5%   
 
-0.0031 -12.9806 0.0489 -0.0031 -12.9806 0.0489 0.8%   
 
-0.0049 -12.5675 0.0505 -0.0001 -0.1622 0.8976 0.0% 
 
SIR -0.0079 -8.1049 0.0782 0.0043 4.2484 0.1472 0.0%     -0.0021 -2.8151 0.2173 0.0062 8.1643 0.0776 0.0%     -0.0070 -5.6859 0.1108 0.0054 4.3195 0.1448 0.0%   
 
Table C-9. 2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Singapore 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF
 a
 -0.3313
* -67.8921 0.0094 -0.1673* -35.0498 0.0182 100% 
 
-0.1935* -45.1344 0.0141 -0.0910* -23.3889 0.0272 100% 
 
-0.3162* -53.9715 0.0118 -0.1709* -32.6554 0.0195 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.1317* 41.0566 0.0155 0.2462* 72.0048 0.0088 100% 
       
- 
 
LIQ a -0.0520* -139.2962 0.0046 -0.0394* -99.7230 0.0064 100% 
 
-0.0330* -94.5344 0.0067 -0.0219* -63.2382 0.0101 100% 
 
-0.0475* -101.9239 0.0062 -0.0364* -79.4503 0.0080 100% 
 
AGE m -0.0054* -45.2460 0.0141 -0.0041* -40.1554 0.0159 100% 
 
-0.0025* -25.2925 0.0252 -0.0013* -12.8290 0.0495 100% 
 
-0.0041* -30.5924 0.0208 -0.0025* -17.2820 0.0368 100% 
 
DIO m d 0.0003* 26.2158 0.0243 0.0005* 43.7239 0.0146 100% 
 
0.0004* 47.2291 0.0135 0.0006* 68.2758 0.0093 100% 
 
0.0005* 41.0068 0.0155 0.0006* 53.2749 0.0119 100% 
 
GOP  m d -0.1446* -158.6129 0.0040 -0.1097* -98.6978 0.0064 100% 
 
-0.0731* -76.9967 0.0083 -0.0451* -48.8921 0.0130 100% 
 
-0.1128* -90.8128 0.0070 -0.0789* -61.3186 0.0104 100% 
 
INF -0.0127 -16.5955 0.0383 -0.0107 -13.4168 0.0474 4.8%   -0.0036 -5.5484 0.1135 0.0026 7.2650 0.0871 0.0%   -0.0077 -8.8346 0.0718 0.0027 5.2593 0.1196 0.0% 
 
CGDP 0.0000 14.1097 0.0450 0.0000 19.9050 0.0320 12%   0.0000 12.8539 0.0494 0.0000 12.8539 0.0494 0.4%   -0.0000 -7.5782 0.0835 0.0000 10.4672 0.0606 0.0% 
 
GGDP -0.0038 -29.1010 0.0219 -0.0016 -13.0183 0.0488 95%   -0.0019 -17.2252 0.0369 -0.0014 -13.0776 0.0486 33%   -0.0033 -22.2116 0.0286 -0.0019 -12.7758 0.0497 96% 
 
SMS -0.0840 -25.8782 0.0246 -0.0215 -14.4752 0.0439 24%   -0.0317 -11.3801 0.0558 0.0231 7.3586 0.0860 0.0%   -0.0511 -12.8809 0.0493 -0.0481 -12.7291 0.0499 1.8% 
 
BMS -0.7722 -20.0031 0.0318 -0.3797 -13.0183 0.0488 10%   -0.2097 -8.5138 0.0744 0.3392 6.1308 0.1029 0.0%   -0.4015 -9.0840 0.0698 0.3927 5.2683 0.1194 0.0% 
 
GCF 0.0035 12.9860 0.0489 0.0050 15.8329 0.0402 2.4%   -0.0017 -6.6318 0.0953 0.0013 5.4093 0.1164 0.0%   -0.0023 -6.9328 0.0912 0.0024 6.5453 0.0965 0.0% 
 
SIR 0.0117 13.0256 0.0488 0.0131 13.9691 0.0455 6%   0.0004 0.4257 0.7438 0.0080 9.3506 0.0678 0.0%   0.0024 2.2278 0.2686 0.0128 11.2465 0.0565 0.0%   
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Table C-10.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), China 
For each variable of interest, 165, 165 and 120 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively.  For each variable of interest, 220, 455 and 364 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 
respectively. Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only 
when using market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a 
particular variable are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.8712* -157.2490 0.0040 -0.5477* -112.8900 0.0056 100% 
 
-0.6712* -121.2336 0.0053 -0.4401* -102.5686 0.0062 100% 
 
-1.1565* -138.4180 0.0046 -0.6656* -108.3621 0.0059 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.2111* 104.5121 0.0061 0.3255* 164.4328 0.0039 100% 
 
0.1917* 64.6960 0.0098 0.3774* 131.8404 0.0048 100% 
 
RISK d 0.2087* 48.6361 0.0131 0.4664* 100.4223 0.0063 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
LIQ a -0.0363* -250.0793 0.0025 -0.0317* -238.1455 0.0027 100% 
 
-0.0228* -161.1326 0.0040 -0.0164* -143.4841 0.0044 100% 
 
-0.0293* -142.3883 0.0045 -0.0212* -129.7112 0.0049 100% 
 
AGE a 0.0026* 35.6678 0.0178 0.0104* 120.9640 0.0053 100% 
 
0.0010* 14.7433 0.0431 0.0080* 91.7943 0.0069 100% 
 
0.0021* 21.2162 0.0300 0.0121* 112.0517 0.0057 100% 
 
DIO d c 0.0001* 33.0662 0.0192 0.0002* 67.5186 0.0094 100% 
       
- 
 
0.0001* 25.1810 0.0253 0.0002* 71.4644 0.0089 100% 
 
GOP m d 
      
-   -0.0313* -87.9489 0.0072 -0.0108* -33.2326 0.0192 100% 
 
-0.0470* -84.1061 0.0076 -0.0138* -29.3299 0.0217 100% 
 
INF -0.0077 -25.9463 0.0245 -0.0030 -12.8130 0.0496 26%   
 
-0.0073 -29.1690 0.0218 0.0031 12.9372 0.0491 23% 
  
-0.0102 -29.7272 0.0214 0.0048 13.5878 0.0468 28% 
 
CGDP d -0.0000 -62.8005 0.0101 -0.0000 -15.5452 0.0409 87%   
 
-0.0000* -51.2071 0.0124 -0.0000* -12.7079 0.0500 100%   
 
-0.0000 -46.6505 0.0136 -0.0000 -19.5277 0.0326 96% 
 
GGDP 0.0003 13.7112 0.0463 0.0022 86.0350 0.0074 80%   
 
0.0003 13.1982 0.0481 0.0021 75.6182 0.0084 70%   
 
0.0004 13.8470 0.0459 0.0027 69.9117 0.0091 73% 
 
SMS -0.0294 -19.6409 0.0324 0.0696 50.0228 0.0127 61%   
 
-0.0506 -40.8878 0.0156 0.0399 30.9552 0.0206 33%   
 
-0.0607 -35.1560 0.0181 0.0616 37.5166 0.0170 43% 
 
BMS -13.5832 -61.9169 0.0103 -2.0542 -13.4264 0.0473 95%   
 
-8.5989 -48.1680 0.0132 2.2745 17.4617 0.0364 61%   
 
-13.4084 -55.8416 0.0114 -2.0171 -13.2544 0.0479 71% 
 
GCF -0.0015 -23.7561 0.0268 0.0027 64.4788 0.0099 57%   
 
-0.0009 -14.9298 0.0426 0.0025 71.9761 0.0088 68%   
 
-0.0014 -16.4513 0.0386 0.0035 71.5786 0.0089 67% 
 
SIR -0.0224 -28.0958 0.0226 0.0127 20.2743 0.0314 16%     -0.0211 -32.8396 0.0194 0.0081 13.4740 0.0472 15%     -0.0271 -29.5648 0.0215 0.0131 20.9227 0.0304 24%   
 
Table C-10.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), China 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.7436* -146.5974 0.0043 -0.4543* -103.9728 0.0061 100% 
 
-0.4983* -105.3347 0.0060 -0.2164* -36.9557 0.0172 100% 
 
-0.6783* -138.2411 0.0046 -0.4054* -83.6067 0.0076 100% 
 
TAN d c             - 
 
0.1581* 107.4399 0.0059 0.2538* 166.2474 0.0038 100% 
 
0.1458* 75.6310 0.0084 0.2665* 135.5828 0.0047 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0218* -153.3664 0.0042 -0.0135* -111.6560 0.0057 100% 
 
-0.0159* -104.0113 0.0061 -0.0075* -76.4832 0.0083 100% 
 
-0.0180* -130.0506 0.0049 -0.0092* -72.2675 0.0088 100% 
 
POR             - 
 
0.0060 15.2403 0.0417 0.0224* 52.3197 0.0122 90% 
 
            - 
 
AGE a 0.0032* 39.9791 0.0159 0.0090* 105.0400 0.0061 100% 
 
0.0011* 13.1992 0.0481 0.0057* 82.8600 0.0077 100% 
 
0.0018* 20.9796 0.0303 0.0074* 86.5673 0.0074 100% 
 
TAX c 0.0007* 15.1773 0.0419 0.0097* 77.7587 0.0082 100% 
 
            - 
 
0.0007* 14.1234 0.0450 0.0083* 67.0711 0.0095 100% 
 
DIO d c 0.0001* 38.0324 0.0167 0.0001* 67.2686 0.0095 100% 
 
            - 
 
            - 
 
ASUTI c             - 
 
-0.0710* -109.6060 0.0058 -0.0245* -27.3274 0.0233 100% 
 
-0.0818* -97.3162 0.0065 -0.0281* -32.3882 0.0196 100% 
 
ROE c             - 
 
-0.1432* -83.9197 0.0076 -0.0228* -12.8092 0.0496 100% 
 
            - 
 
GOP m d -0.0842 -261.1523 0.0024 -0.0726 -250.0485 0.0025 100% 
 
-0.0518* -195.2913 0.0033 -0.0386* -111.9372 0.0057 100% 
 
-0.0685* -201.9639 0.0032 -0.0565* -181.7770 0.0035 100% 
 
CAPIN c             -   0.0005* 15.9353 0.0399 0.0014* 35.9433 0.0177 100% 
 
0.0010* 26.8867 0.0237 0.0020* 43.2082 0.0147 100% 
 
INF -0.0207 -67.9067 0.0094 -0.0025 -12.9216 0.0492 95%   -0.0119 -55.7626 0.0114 -0.0020 -12.9649 0.0490 79%   -0.0169 -55.8810 0.0114 -0.0027 -13.3317 0.0477 91%   
CGDP -0.0000 -94.7045 0.0067 0.0000 55.7508 0.0114 79%   -0.0000 -67.5493 0.0094 -0.0000 -19.6917 0.0323 92%   -0.0000 -93.9928 0.0068 0.0000 47.3151 0.0135 83%   
GGDP -0.0014 -30.0661 0.0212 0.0039 73.5640 0.0087 75%   0.0003 15.3201 0.0415 0.0025 60.0753 0.0106 79%   -0.0013 -29.1410 0.0218 0.0034 64.3090 0.0099 71%   
SMS -0.1234 -65.1074 0.0098 0.0300 27.9998 0.0227 77%   -0.0822 -56.2667 0.0113 0.0256 17.8451 0.0356 68%   -0.1122 -59.6400 0.0107 0.0196 17.2628 0.0368 79%   
BMS -11.2746 -58.9917 0.0108 6.1004 44.2408 0.0144 71%   -12.5090 -67.7986 0.0094 4.8030 44.6035 0.0143 72%   -10.5934 -58.9909 0.0108 6.1629 44.5132 0.0143 68%   
GCF -0.0014 -23.8555 0.0267 0.0041 55.9931 0.0114 90%   -0.0007 -14.9435 0.0425 0.0026 93.8886 0.0068 95%   -0.0011 -19.4440 0.0327 0.0035 55.4288 0.0115 94%   
SIR -0.0359 -51.5635 0.0123 0.0236 28.5989 0.0223 52%   -0.0228 -42.6426 0.0149 0.0192 33.6303 0.0189 41%   -0.0306 -44.3187 0.0144 0.0201 24.6105 0.0259 47%   
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Table C-11.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Japan 
For each variable of interest, 120, 165 and 165 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively. For each variable of interest, 220, 165 and 220 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.5762* -154.6346 0.0041 -0.5070* -169.6861 0.0038 100% 
 
-0.3862* -126.4238 0.0050 -0.3064* -96.6605 0.0066 100% 
 
-0.6648* -150.5313 0.0042 -0.5733* -130.8482 0.0049 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.3064* 217.0940 0.0029 0.4353* 298.7857 0.0021 100% 
 
0.3039* 152.5631 0.0042 0.5082* 238.9455 0.0027 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0801* -523.0854 0.0012 -0.0741* -503.8670 0.0013 100% 
 
-0.0537* -335.8745 0.0019 -0.0376* -259.2897 0.0025 100% 
 
-0.0780* -355.7904 0.0018 -0.0600* -289.5701 0.0022 100% 
 
POR b c -0.0281* -57.3683 0.0111 -0.0175* -49.4285 0.0129 100% 
 
-0.0167* -43.1633 0.0147 -0.0093* -24.7012 0.0258 100% 
 
-0.0302* -53.4441 0.0119 -0.0195* -37.8351 0.0168 100% 
 
DIO m d 
      
- 
 
0.0003* 32.3857 0.0197 0.0007* 111.7724 0.0057 100% 
 
0.0002* 18.3715 0.0346 0.0009* 98.2800 0.0065 100% 
 
ASUTI d 0.0251* 67.2473 0.0095 0.0688* 157.7317 0.0040 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
INF -0.0189 -23.9355 0.0266 0.0085 16.0438 0.0396 25.8%   
 
-0.0158 -22.0520 0.0288 -0.0057 -14.3026 0.0444 10%   
 
-0.0239 -23.6904 0.0269 -0.0120 -16.6820 0.0381 10% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -17.7843 0.0358 0.0000 34.0458 0.0187 45%   
 
-0.0000 -20.7581 0.0306 0.0000 28.0958 0.0226 28%   
 
-0.0000 -13.2212 0.0481 0.0000 31.0667 0.0205 32% 
 
GGDP -0.0000 -14.3417 0.0443 0.0000 16.6337 0.0382 13%   
 
-0.0000 -17.6430 0.0360 -0.0000 -12.7546 0.0498 24%   
 
-0.0000 -16.9612 0.0375 -0.0000 -12.9605 0.0490 12% 
 
SMS -0.1190 -28.7638 0.0221 0.0396 20.8371 0.0305 60%   
 
-0.1277 -34.7425 0.0183 -0.0228 -14.4859 0.0439 95%   
 
-0.1852 -35.8980 0.0177 -0.0297 -13.0996 0.0485 86% 
 
BMS -1.6573 -38.8894 0.0164 -0.4666 -12.8215 0.0496 81%   
 
-0.8129 -19.4826 0.0326 -0.4447 -13.0124 0.0488 30%   
 
-1.4748 -25.4257 0.0250 -0.6577 -14.2825 0.0445 61% 
 
GCF 0.0000 13.6060 0.0467 0.0001 26.5353 0.0240 63%   
 
-0.0000 -18.5597 0.0343 0.0001 17.4435 0.0365 32%   
 
-0.0000 -16.6010 0.0383 0.0001 20.4194 0.0312 35% 
 
SIR 0.0107 13.7001 0.0464 0.0494 31.4637 0.0202 71%     -0.0174 -18.9642 0.0335 0.0270 15.4469 0.0412 24%     -0.0171 -13.4314 0.0473 0.0473 25.1248 0.0253 43%   
 
Table C-11.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Japan 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -1.1762* -239.8076 0.0027 -0.6148* -187.5029 0.0034 100% 
 
-0.4859* -156.6382 0.0041 -0.3040* -94.0591 0.0068 100% 
 
-0.8475* -186.7088 0.0034 -0.5861* -130.7725 0.0049 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.3141* 216.8383 0.0029 0.4591* 337.9167 0.0019 100% 
 
0.3114* 149.3726 0.0043 0.5511* 276.6781 0.0023 100% 
 
RISK c -1.6241* -169.9115 0.0037 -0.1359* -13.5970 0.0467 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
LIQ a -0.0751* -421.3181 0.0015 -0.0644* -326.5219 0.0019 100% 
 
-0.0525* -326.5144 0.0019 -0.0360* -245.2349 0.0026 100% 
 
-0.0775* -347.3234 0.0018 -0.0580* -268.2937 0.0024 100% 
 
POR b c 
      
- 
       
- 
 
-0.0284* -46.7933 0.0136 -0.0124* -23.5449 0.0270 100% 
 
DIO m d 
      
- 
 
0.0004* 50.3834 0.0126 0.0009* 141.6071 0.0045 100% 
 
0.0004* 35.0526 0.0182 0.0012* 129.7379 0.0049 100% 
 
GOP m -0.1404* -304.4522 0.0021 -0.0945* -144.4642 0.0044 100%   -0.0477* -119.7342 0.0053 -0.0144* -33.7202 0.0189 100% 
 
-0.0845* -149.6085 0.0043 -0.0378* -60.5449 0.0105 100% 
 
UNPR c -0.4497* -209.4282 0.0030 -0.1026* -57.8990 0.0110 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
VAR c -0.0000* -133.4954 0.0048 -0.0000* -15.9342 0.0399 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
INF -0.0349 -76.2246 0.0084 0.0116 23.9400 0.0266 66% 
 
-0.0206 -26.7030 0.0238 -0.0051 -12.9940 0.0489 46% 
 
-0.0331 -30.2153 0.0211 0.0082 13.3421 0.0476 62% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -26.8768 0.0237 0.0000 21.3024 0.0299 84% 
 
-0.0000 -16.0592 0.0396 0.0000 25.0181 0.0254 67% 
 
-0.0000 -21.8761 0.0291 0.0000 24.9692 0.0255 80% 
 
GGDP -0.0001 -70.4854 0.0090 0.0001 24.1366 0.0264 52% 
 
-0.0000 -45.8852 0.0139 -0.0000 -13.2806 0.0478 53%   -0.0001 -53.6395 0.0119 0.0000 15.0227 0.0423 56%   
SMS c -0.3322* -76.9444 0.0083 -0.1071* -54.0410 0.0118 100% 
 
-0.1976* -54.3931 0.0117 -0.0736* -35.8800 0.0177 100%   -0.3278* -63.2889 0.0101 -0.1404* -48.3444 0.0132 100%   
BMS -3.5944 -61.8587 0.0103 -0.5821 -15.1204 0.0420 70% 
 
-1.5161 -40.4277 0.0157 -0.4137 -13.3063 0.0478 36%   -2.8940 -54.8087 0.0116 -0.7173 -12.9462 0.0491 47% 
 
GCF -0.0001 -124.5235 0.0051 0.0001 25.2639 0.0252 65% 
 
-0.0000 -65.5116 0.0097 0.0001 19.3379 0.0329 58% 
 
-0.0001 -83.4075 0.0076 0.0001 23.5995 0.0270 64% 
 
SIR -0.1354 -124.2769 0.0051 0.0282 18.5111 0.0344 71%   -0.0634 -67.6368 0.0094 -0.0124 -13.3654 0.0475 56%   -0.1137 -86.1929 0.0074 0.0254 13.2184 0.0481 68%   
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Table C-12.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Malaysia 
For each variable of interest, 84, 120 and 84 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively. For each variable of interest, 120, 165 and 165 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax T p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.6650* -88.3249 0.0072 -0.3882* -62.5654 0.0102 100% 
 
-0.5336* -84.2589 0.0076 -0.3207* -53.9218 0.0118 100% 
 
-0.7602* -94.3412 0.0067 -0.5152* -70.6644 0.0090 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0374* -202.1018 0.0031 -0.0335* -184.1397 0.0035 100% 
 
-0.0233* -136.4193 0.0047 -0.0203* -121.5586 0.0052 100% 
 
-0.0306* -141.3010 0.0045 -0.0262* -124.8534 0.0051 100% 
 
POR a -0.1218* -73.2850 0.0087 -0.0578* -43.4978 0.0146 100% 
 
-0.0906* -64.6285 0.0098 -0.0458* -37.0764 0.0172 100% 
 
-0.1239* -69.1661 0.0092 -0.0638* -41.0194 0.0155 100% 
 
DIO d c 
      
- 
 
0.0002* 29.8252 0.0213 0.0003* 40.1392 0.0159 100% 
       
- 
 
INF -0.0031 -3.3843 0.1829 0.0070 5.9537 0.1059 0.0%   
 
-0.0065 -8.2977 0.0764 0.0075 9.7265 0.0652 0.0% 
  
0.0069 13.0567 0.0487 0.0083 14.0815 0.0451 5.9% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -21.6814 0.0293 -0.0000 -14.2684 0.0445 73%   
 
-0.0000 -23.6437 0.0269 -0.0000 -10.8958 0.0583 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -24.1148 0.0264 -0.0000 -15.8760 0.0400 89% 
 
GGDP -0.0007 -3.6807 0.1689 0.0014 9.0960 0.0697 0.0%   
 
-0.0008 -7.0804 0.0893 0.0013 12.9983 0.0489 0.0%   
 
-0.0011 -7.9558 0.0796 0.0015 8.7995 0.0720 0.0% 
 
SMS -0.0318 -10.5171 0.0604 0.0281 5.9919 0.1053 0.0%   
 
-0.0360 -14.0875 0.0451 -0.0291 -12.7979 0.0496 7.5%   
 
-0.0423 -12.9481 0.0491 -0.0423 -12.9481 0.0491 1.1% 
 
BMS 0.2893 12.8262 0.0495 0.6987 16.2512 0.0391 14%   
 
0.2579 13.5368 0.0469 1.1382 13.1115 0.0485 48%   
 
0.3618 13.6165 0.0467 1.7299 13.6043 0.0467 45% 
 
GCF 0.0011 13.6988 0.0464 0.0011 13.6988 0.0464 1.1%   
 
0.0009 13.2357 0.0480 0.0022 17.6683 0.0360 20%   
 
0.0011 12.8641 0.0494 0.0028 17.5399 0.0363 19% 
 
SIR -0.0271 -9.0383 0.0702 0.0130 11.3652 0.0559 0.0%     0.0120 12.8610 0.0494 0.0159 16.6007 0.0383 9.1%     0.0147 12.7524 0.0498 0.0187 15.3401 0.0414 3.5%   
Table C-12.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Malaysia 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax T p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -1.0765* -113.1916 0.0056 -0.4768* -63.5474 0.0100 100% 
 
-0.7320* -92.0521 0.0069 -0.3539* -48.6034 0.0131 100% 
 
-1.0647* -102.3574 0.0062 -0.5460* -58.1770 0.0109 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0424* -176.2569 0.0036 -0.0351* -171.5405 0.0037 100% 
 
-0.0281* -133.9975 0.0048 -0.0232* -114.3642 0.0056 100% 
 
-0.0386* -139.6686 0.0046 -0.0314* -119.0175 0.0053 100% 
 
POR a -0.1883* -95.9994 0.0066 -0.0748* -49.0855 0.0130 100% 
 
-0.1270* -79.0798 0.0080 -0.0543* -36.7340 0.0173 100% 
 
-0.1832* -86.3785 0.0074 -0.0809* -42.4362 0.0150 100% 
 
DIO d c 
      
- 
 
0.0003 33.7550 0.0189 0.0005* 54.0504 0.0118 100% 
 
0.0003* 28.6133 0.0222 0.0007* 51.7639 0.0123 100% 
 
GOP m -0.2061* -129.6121 0.0049 -0.1711* -136.9133 0.0046 100% 
 
-0.1194* -86.8392 0.0073 -0.0880* -66.0790 0.0096 100% 
 
-0.1700* -93.9860 0.0068 -0.1263* -72.9514 0.0087 100% 
 
INF 0.0082 13.0176 0.0488 0.0083 12.7670 0.0498 1.6%   0.0062 13.0480 0.0487 0.0097 17.4109 0.0365 19%   0.0088 13.0528 0.0487 0.0117 15.9016 0.0400 9.6% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -18.2027 0.0349 -0.0000 -13.5696 0.0468 25%   -0.0000 -22.9780 0.0277 -0.0000 -12.8805 0.0493 7.9%   -0.0000 -22.9927 0.0277 -0.0000 -13.5517 0.0469 75% 
 
GGDP -0.0022 -21.4704 0.0296 -0.0013 -13.3762 0.0475 31%   -0.0014 -14.3391 0.0443 -0.0011 -13.0606 0.0486 4%   -0.0020 -15.9575 0.0398 -0.0012 -12.9828 0.0489 12% 
 
SMS -0.0935 -17.8525 0.0356 -0.0395 -14.2573 0.0446 20%   -0.0663 -14.9069 0.0426 -0.0323 -13.1529 0.0483 4.9%   -0.0890 -15.1791 0.0419 -0.0425 -12.7519 0.0498 32% 
 
BMS -0.8732 -18.7164 0.0340 0.7614 14.4312 0.0440 14%   -0.5523 -14.1757 0.0448 1.4978 13.9958 0.0454 22%   -0.7645 -14.9778 0.0424 2.0611 14.4962 0.0438 23% 
 
GCF -0.0062 -14.9558 0.0425 -0.0014 -13.5529 0.0469 35%   -0.0046 -13.8193 0.0460 0.0022 14.1636 0.0449 11%   -0.0066 -14.9794 0.0424 0.0028 14.0372 0.0453 16% 
 
SIR 0.0176 13.0993 0.0485 0.0235 15.3512 0.0414 3.3%   0.0151 13.4148 0.0474 0.0176 15.1028 0.0421 10%   0.0206 13.9446 0.0456 0.0247 14.5743 0.0436 10%   
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Table C-13.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), India 
For each variable of interest, 84, 84 and 120 regressions are carried out for LEVB1, LEVB2 and LEVB3 respectively. For each variable of interest, 120, 84 and 84 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. 
Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using 
market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable 
are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax T p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.9488* -166.1795 0.0038 -0.7206* -134.1550 0.0047 100% 
 
-0.8148* -159.2758 0.0040 -0.6860* -141.2477 0.0045 100% 
 
-1.2554* -173.4777 0.0037 -1.0188* -149.6210 0.0043 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.3884* 200.4057 0.0032 0.4199* 199.3217 0.0032 100% 
 
0.3632* 129.2266 0.0049 0.4859* 161.1207 0.0040 100% 
 
LIQ d c -0.0631* -224.0596 0.0028 -0.0562* -204.4006 0.0031 100% 
       
- 
 
-0.0537* -144.4436 0.0044 -0.0361* -102.1717 0.0062 100% 
 
DIO b c 0.0003* 36.4704 0.0175 0.0005* 64.4644 0.0099 100% 
 
0.0004* 60.8635 0.0105 0.0007* 103.0067 0.0062 100% 
 
0.0005* 51.2793 0.0124 0.0008* 93.0389 0.0068 100% 
 
INF -0.0082 -31.7433 0.0200 -0.0026 -13.4961 0.0471 29%   
 
-0.0064 -27.7339 0.0229 -0.0036 -20.8045 0.0306 25%   
 
-0.0104 -32.1224 0.0198 -0.0067 -19.4600 0.0327 23% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -35.1667 0.0181 -0.0000 -13.4956 0.0471 52%   
 
-0.0000 -29.9011 0.0213 -0.0000 -21.4075 0.0297 44%   
 
-0.0000 -33.1716 0.0192 -0.0000 -13.7982 0.0461 39% 
 
GGDP 0.0001 13.0922 0.0485 0.0001 21.9511 0.0290 10%   
 
0.0001 14.0467 0.0452 0.0001 15.1757 0.0419 3.5%   
 
0.0001 13.0019 0.0489 0.0001 15.0849 0.0421 8.3% 
 
SMS 0.0288 16.3721 0.0388 0.0288 16.3721 0.0388 1.1%   
 
-0.0197 -5.7650 0.1093 0.0181 6.7599 0.0935 0.0%   
 
0.0313 13.3408 0.0476 0.0313 13.3408 0.0476 0.08% 
 
BMS -2.7403 -20.8414 0.0305 -1.7375 -21.7657 0.0292 7.1%   
 
-1.4161 -9.4381 0.0672 1.5669 8.4533 0.0750 0.0%   
 
-2.5284 -15.3713 0.0414 -1.7871 -16.6109 0.0383 8.3% 
 
GCF -0.0001 -36.7822 0.0173 -0.0001 -13.5753 0.0468 22%   
 
-0.0001 -20.5018 0.0310 0.0001 15.2476 0.0417 28%   
 
-0.0001 -23.3273 0.0273 0.0002 13.5006 0.0471 18% 
 
SIR 0.0026 13.4705 0.0472 0.0063 18.7268 0.0340 19%     0.0020 12.8234 0.0495 0.0033 13.8142 0.0460 2%     0.0029 13.0757 0.0486 0.0058 13.6041 0.0467 11%   
Table C-13.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), India 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax T p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -1.0375* -176.9196 0.0036 -0.5520* -117.6519 0.0054 100% 
 
-0.7591* -146.4940 0.0043 -0.5755* -110.5151 0.0058 100% 
 
-1.1713* -172.0734 0.0037 -0.8286* -121.4721 0.0052 100% 
 
TAN d c 
      
- 
 
0.3452* 181.9488 0.0035 0.3915* 180.9797 0.0035 100% 
       
- 
 
LIQ d c -0.0538* -213.1763 0.0030 -0.0443* -143.6874 0.0044 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
DIO b c 0.0003* 47.6464 0.0134 0.0007* 89.6118 0.0071 100% 
       
- 
 
0.0005* 59.5655 0.0107 0.0009* 94.0953 0.0068 100% 
 
GOP m -0.2112* -339.9815 0.0019 -0.1883* -264.8742 0.0024 100% 
 
-0.1255* -185.6338 0.0034 -0.1054* -164.7692 0.0039 100% 
 
-0.1799* -200.4828 0.0032 -0.1629* -180.2017 0.0035 100% 
 
INF -0.0041 -16.1205 0.0394 0.0148 59.7035 0.0107 42%   -0.0029 -16.2752 0.0391 0.0081 38.7961 0.0164 19%   -0.0052 -16.2245 0.0392 0.0130 40.5294 0.0157 22% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -13.9048 0.0457 0.0000 45.9925 0.0138 50%   -0.0000 -19.7475 0.0322 0.0000 36.8458 0.0173 23%   -0.0000 -14.6470 0.0434 0.0000 37.4976 0.0170 34% 
 
GGDP -0.0007 -43.6611 0.0146 -0.0001 -13.2657 0.0479 60%   -0.0003 -23.5389 0.0270 -0.0001 -12.8591 0.0494 32%   -0.0006 -36.0902 0.0176 -0.0001 -12.9399 0.0491 51% 
 
SMS -0.1185 -48.7577 0.0131 -0.0206 -13.5979 0.0467 81%   -0.0609 -31.4637 0.0202 -0.0199 -12.7648 0.0498 48%   -0.1091 -39.0838 0.0163 -0.0279 -12.9341 0.0491 71% 
 
BMS -3.7479 -28.1544 0.0226 6.1072 38.2338 0.0166 34%   -1.7662 -15.5653 0.0408 3.4360 25.6519 0.0248 13%   -3.4392 -22.5353 0.0282 5.2754 27.4088 0.0232 29% 
 
GCF 0.0001 13.7892 0.0461 0.0002 41.0344 0.0155 45%   0.0000 12.9709 0.0490 0.0001 34.8303 0.0183 33%   0.0001 13.9287 0.0456 0.0002 30.7945 0.0207 28% 
 
SIR 0.0028 16.8693 0.0377 0.0201 44.8466 0.0142 70%   0.0023 13.0149 0.0488 0.0089 24.1984 0.0263 30%   0.0033 15.3592 0.0414 0.0190 36.8874 0.0173 66%   
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Table C-14.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Indonesia 
For each variable of interest, 56 regressions are carried out for leverage ratios at book value. For each variable of interest, 84 regressions are carried out for leverage ratios at market value. Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in 
all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a 
particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression 
models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax T p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.8074* -58.6246 0.0109 -0.5416* -43.5768 0.0146 100% 
 
-0.6370* -52.7232 0.0121 -0.4512* -36.0864 0.0176 100% 
 
-1.0004* -66.7358 0.0095 -0.7649* -50.5153 0.0126 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0894* -96.0299 0.0066 -0.0822* -101.9908 0.0062 100% 
 
-0.0625* -77.3730 0.0082 -0.0564* -74.6024 0.0085 100% 
 
-0.0782* -74.6008 0.0085 -0.0678* -73.8803 0.0086 100% 
 
INF -0.0019 -2.7948 0.2187 0.0069 11.6127 0.0547 0.0%   
 
0.0063 12.7256 0.0499 0.0063 12.7256 0.0499 1.7%   
 
0.0084 12.7584 0.0498 0.0084 12.7584 0.0498 1.7% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -13.2428 0.0480 -0.0000 -15.6731 0.0406 21%   
 
-0.0000 -12.7906 0.0497 -0.0000 -13.4778 0.0471 30%   
 
-0.0000 -14.3659 0.0442 -0.0000 -14.1003 0.0451 26% 
 
GGDP -0.0000 -15.0432 0.0423 -0.0000 -14.5641 0.0436 5.3%   
 
-0.0000 -19.7120 0.0323 -0.0000 -12.7268 0.0499 19%   
 
-0.0000 -16.6988 0.0381 -0.0000 -13.6533 0.0465 7.1% 
 
SMS -0.1670 -12.7305 0.0499 -0.1670 -12.7305 0.0499 1.7%   
 
-0.1879 -13.1647 0.0483 -0.1781 -14.3774 0.0442 3.5%   
 
-0.2176 -14.7367 0.0431 -0.2176 -14.7367 0.0431 1.7% 
 
BMS -2.6450 -16.0572 0.0396 -2.1317 -14.0798 0.0451 8.9%   
 
-2.1489 -14.7575 0.0431 -1.8743 -13.4839 0.0471 7.1%   
 
-2.5058 -15.7894 0.0403 -2.2583 -13.8327 0.0459 5.3% 
 
GCF -0.0000 -15.3593 0.0414 -0.0000 -14.0175 0.0453 7.1%   
 
-0.0000 -16.6205 0.0383 -0.0000 -15.4304 0.0412 8.9%   
 
-0.0000 -14.9828 0.0424 -0.0000 -15.0441 0.0423 5.3% 
 
SIR 0.0001 0.0823 0.9477 0.0090 10.8194 0.0587 0.0%     -0.0077 -8.9256 0.0710 0.0037 4.9304 0.1274 0.0%     -0.0050 -4.2956 0.1456 0.0073 8.3053 0.0763 0.0%   
 
Table C-14.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Indonesia 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -1.0807* -87.6317 0.0073 -0.5379* -48.9727 0.0130 100% 
 
-0.7482* -68.6126 0.0093 -0.4560* -40.1614 0.0158 100% 
 
-1.0579* -76.6420 0.0083 -0.6308* -45.0892 0.0141 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0728* -93.2631 0.0068 -0.0594* -76.1763 0.0084 100% 
 
-0.0499* -67.4184 0.0094 -0.0421* -61.0997 0.0104 100% 
 
-0.0714* -76.5178 0.0083 -0.0598* -69.5633 0.0092 100% 
 
GOP m -0.1470* -97.4295 0.0065 -0.1206* -72.8150 0.0087 100% 
 
-0.0723* -50.1740 0.0127 -0.0520* -32.4639 0.0196 100% 
 
-0.1101* -60.7816 0.0105 -0.0815* -40.4779 0.0157 100% 
 
INF 0.0066 12.7438 0.0499 0.0066 12.7438 0.0499 1.1%   -0.0051 -7.3963 0.0856 0.0060 11.2985 0.0562 0.00%   0.0078 13.1000 0.0485 0.0078 13.1000 0.0485 1.7% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -22.0511 0.0289 -0.0000 -13.0931 0.0485 80%   -0.0000 -16.7199 0.0380 -0.0000 -17.9816 0.0354 69%   -0.0000 -19.8114 0.0321 -0.0000 -14.8844 0.0427 79% 
 
GGDP -0.0000 -35.1705 0.0181 -0.0000 -13.2434 0.0480 57%   -0.0000 -29.6883 0.0214 -0.0000 -14.4316 0.0440 53%   -0.0000 -33.0602 0.0193 -0.0000 -14.0522 0.0452 63% 
 
SMS -0.3806 -20.0263 0.0318 -0.1587 -13.5653 0.0468 32%   -0.3020 -18.3484 0.0347 -0.1648 -13.4432 0.0473 32%   -0.4167 -19.7641 0.0322 -0.2115 -13.1667 0.0483 35% 
 
BMS -3.6190 -24.9482 0.0255 -1.9553 -16.8114 0.0378 11.9%   -2.4003 -18.5829 0.0342 -1.6347 -13.6704 0.0465 9.5%   -3.4913 -21.2896 0.0299 -2.0828 -13.7998 0.0461 11% 
 
GCF -0.0000 -16.9381 0.0375 -0.0000 -13.7443 0.0462 27%   -0.0000 -15.6070 0.0407 -0.0000 -13.1505 0.0483 33%   -0.0000 -17.2965 0.0368 -0.0000 -13.3884 0.0475 34% 
 
SIR 0.0089 13.5802 0.0468 0.0107 14.1945 0.0448 2.3%   -0.0070 -7.8398 0.0808 0.0056 8.2274 0.0770 0.0%   -0.0072 -6.2974 0.1003 0.0092 10.6795 0.0594 0.0%   
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Table C-15.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Brazil 
For each variable of interest, 56 regressions are carried out for leverage ratios at book value. For each variable of interest, 120, 56 and 84 regressions are carried out for LEVM1, LEVM2 and LEVM3 respectively. Notes: a indicate that a 
particular variable is robust in all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using market value measures of 
leverage; d indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable are significant at the 5% 
level in all 969 regression models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF d c -0.9999* -31.4892 0.0202 -0.6787* -22.9875 0.0277 100% 
 
-0.2393* -25.9935 0.0245 -0.1532* -16.0168 0.0397 100% 
       
- 
 
LIQ a -0.2176* -62.4196 0.0102 -0.1862* -64.7358 0.0098 100% 
 
-0.0407* -48.9179 0.0130 -0.0368* -42.9893 0.0148 100% 
 
-0.0399* -30.0918 0.0211 -0.0341* -26.9569 0.0236 100% 
 
ROE d 
      
- 
       
- 
 
-0.3034* -42.2240 0.0151 -0.2749* -35.8702 0.0177 100% 
 
INF -0.0151 -6.0599 0.1041 -0.0009 -0.4918 0.7090 0.0%   
 
-0.0026 -5.5711 0.1131 0.0053 8.8953 0.0713 0.0%   
 
-0.0017 -1.6617 0.3449 0.0035 3.9726 0.1570 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0001 -4.7434 0.1323 0.0000 3.0150 0.2039 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -5.6743 0.1111 0.0000 4.8946 0.1283 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -0.6945 0.6136 0.0000 1.4682 0.3807 0.0% 
 
GGDP -0.0051 -4.1862 0.1493 0.0038 4.7441 0.1323 0.0%   
 
-0.0024 -8.8107 0.0719 -0.0005 -1.6700 0.3435 0.0%   
 
-0.0009 -2.5212 0.2404 0.0011 3.3664 0.1838 0.0% 
 
SMS -0.1450 -4.4928 0.1394 0.0834 3.6428 0.1706 0.0%   
 
-0.0590 -8.7347 0.0726 -0.0216 -2.9999 0.2048 0.0%   
 
-0.0603 -5.3074 0.1186 -0.0182 -1.8459 0.3161 0.0% 
 
BMS -1.3298 -4.2691 0.1465 0.8722 4.7418 0.1323 0.0%   
 
-0.5840 -12.1121 0.0524 0.0243 0.6099 0.6514 0.0%   
 
0.0176 0.1755 0.8894 0.3649 4.0058 0.1557 0.0% 
 
GCF -0.0054 -3.6966 0.1682 0.0122 5.8097 0.1085 0.0%   
 
-0.0029 -11.1539 0.0569 0.0045 7.6866 0.0824 0.0%   
 
-0.0008 -0.8816 0.5400 0.0027 3.9870 0.1564 0.0% 
 
SIR -0.0363 -4.1803 0.1495 0.0104 3.2117 0.1922 0.0%     -0.0128 -6.5317 0.0967 0.0028 3.4017 0.1820 0.0%     -0.0024 -0.6434 0.6360 0.0053 2.4136 0.2501 0.0%   
Table C-15.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Brazil 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF d c -0.5419* -42.6450 0.0149 -0.2673* -23.3408 0.0273 100% 
       
- 
 
-0.5419* -42.6450 0.0149 -0.2673* -23.3408 0.0273 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.1047* -90.5214 0.0070 -0.0767* -69.4414 0.0092 100% 
 
-0.0354* -39.6362 0.0161 -0.0309* -31.7840 0.0200 100% 
 
-0.1047* -90.5214 0.0070 -0.0850* -72.8321 0.0087 100% 
 
AGE c 0.0100* 49.9033 0.0128 0.0157* 62.6827 0.0102 100% 
       
- 
       
- 
 
GOP m -0.0924* -76.2615 0.0083 -0.0514* -39.5380 0.0161 100% 
 
-0.0404* -42.0179 0.0151 -0.0292* -29.2681 0.0217 100% 
 
-0.0924* -76.2615 0.0083 -0.0620* -45.6798 0.0139 100% 
 
INF 0.0078 13.6765 0.0465 0.0187 24.7390 0.0257 34%   0.0018 2.3929 0.2520 0.0060 10.6334 0.0597 0.0% 
 
0.0078 13.6765 0.0465 0.0187 24.7390 0.0257 26% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -31.6407 0.0201 0.0000 13.4810 0.0471 30%   -0.0000 -1.0645 0.4801 0.0000 8.1342 0.0779 0.0% 
 
-0.0000 -31.6407 0.0201 0.0000 13.4810 0.0471 32% 
 
GGDP -0.0043 -15.5059 0.0410 -0.0036 -12.8033 0.0496 5.8%   -0.0026 -8.8123 0.0719 -0.0007 -2.7257 0.2239 0.0%   -0.0040 -13.0875 0.0485 -0.0040 -13.0014 0.0489 2.3% 
 
SMS -0.1628 -18.4066 0.0346 -0.1045 -13.7795 0.0461 22%   -0.0661 -9.7013 0.0654 -0.0324 -3.7792 0.1647 0.0%   -0.1618 -17.2570 0.0368 -0.1045 -13.7795 0.0461 15.4% 
 
BMS 0.8665 13.1642 0.0483 1.9458 25.5469 0.0249 79%   -0.0775 -0.9751 0.5080 0.4921 11.0131 0.0576 0.0%   0.9268 12.9612 0.0490 1.9458 25.5469 0.0249 75% 
 
GCF 0.0046 14.5698 0.0436 0.0130 34.3272 0.0185 50%   0.0039 13.2556 0.0479 0.0048 12.9582 0.0490 3.5%   0.0056 16.4233 0.0387 0.0130 34.3272 0.0185 47.6% 
 
SIR 0.0029 13.9951 0.0454 0.0351 16.7571 0.0379 40%   -0.0027 -10.6226 0.0598 0.0128 8.4624 0.0749 0.0%   0.0031 14.4705 0.0439 0.0351 16.7571 0.0379 41.6%   
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Table C-16.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), South Africa 
For each variable of interest, 56 regressions are carried out for leverage ratios at book value. For each variable of interest, 84 regressions are carried out for leverage ratios at market value. Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in 
all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a 
particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression 
models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.4390* -39.0360 0.0163 -0.2743* -27.4640 0.0232 100% 
 
-0.3245* -37.1961 0.0171 -0.2517* -29.0845 0.0219 100% 
 
-0.5326* -39.6550 0.0161 -0.4120* -31.5884 0.0201 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0806* -95.0879 0.0067 -0.0722* -89.4778 0.0071 100% 
 
-0.0380* -51.9065 0.0123 -0.0333* -48.2126 0.0132 100% 
 
-0.0635* -58.1111 0.0110 -0.0563* -54.0406 0.0118 100% 
 
INF -0.0166 -17.4776 0.0364 -0.0112 -12.9851 0.0489 5.3% 
  
-0.0063 -5.0404 0.1247 0.0054 7.7051 0.0822 0.0%   
 
-0.0086 -8.3606 0.0758 0.0062 4.1775 0.1496 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -20.8602 0.0305 -0.0000 -15.0943 0.0421 35%   
 
-0.0000 -3.8114 0.1633 0.0000 9.1729 0.0691 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -8.6329 0.0734 0.0000 4.7977 0.1308 0.0% 
 
GGDP -0.0015 -8.0064 0.0791 0.0012 11.0527 0.0574 0.0%   
 
-0.0007 -4.9965 0.1258 0.0002 2.3523 0.2559 0.0%   
 
-0.0006 -2.9934 0.2053 0.0007 6.0720 0.1039 0.0% 
 
SMS -0.0248 -6.4317 0.0982 0.0358 12.0484 0.0527 0.0%   
 
-0.0248 -7.6160 0.0831 -0.0046 -1.9134 0.3066 0.0%   
 
-0.0275 -5.5840 0.1128 0.0117 3.3159 0.1865 0.0% 
 
BMS -2.5798 -18.4974 0.0344 -1.3904 -13.5877 0.0468 8.9%   
 
-0.6337 -4.5381 0.1381 0.7862 7.7112 0.0821 0.0%   
 
-1.3219 -7.9506 0.0797 0.4390 2.8818 0.2126 0.0% 
 
GCF -0.0022 -15.8389 0.0401 -0.0007 -13.9114 0.0457 12.5%   
 
-0.0001 -1.7333 0.3331 0.0011 8.9015 0.0712 0.0%   
 
-0.0011 -6.1031 0.1034 0.0007 3.8907 0.1602 0.0% 
 
SIR -0.0200 -15.8253 0.0402 -0.0100 -13.0269 0.0488 10.7%     -0.0068 -4.1374 0.1510 0.0058 6.2859 0.1004 0.0%     -0.0123 -8.6523 0.0733 0.0039 2.1331 0.2791 0.0%   
 
 
 
Table C-16.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), South Africa 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.7412* -71.9781 0.0088 -0.2404* -26.8605 0.0237 100% 
 
-0.3924* -52.7589 0.0121 -0.2021* -25.7084 0.0248 100% 
 
-0.6086* -57.2645 0.0111 -0.2841* -25.5349 0.0249 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0615* -66.1037 0.0096 -0.0490* -57.8076 0.0110 100% 
 
-0.0340* -50.0727 0.0127 -0.0275* -43.0200 0.0148 100% 
 
-0.0513* -53.0019 0.0120 -0.0416* -46.2248 0.0138 100% 
 
GOP m -0.1865* -131.9113 0.0048 -0.1599* -86.1283 0.0074 100% 
 
-0.0775* -61.1460 0.0104 -0.0554* -37.4688 0.0170 100% 
 
-0.1310* -75.3887 0.0084 -0.1005* -48.9063 0.0130 100% 
 
INF -0.0136 -13.6409 0.0466 0.0160 17.6487 0.0360 5.9%   0.0070 14.9948 0.0424 0.0111 19.4035 0.0328 5.9%   0.0116 14.5161 0.0438 0.0155 19.1151 0.0333 4.7% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -16.7531 0.0380 0.0000 13.4615 0.0472 11%   0.0000 13.1865 0.0482 0.0000 18.5892 0.0342 10.7%   0.0000 12.7753 0.0497 0.0000 16.8554 0.0377 3.5% 
 
GGDP -0.0029 -16.4033 0.0388 -0.0012 -13.7437 0.0462 50%   -0.0013 -18.5201 0.0343 -0.0008 -12.8983 0.0493 32%   -0.0019 -20.0913 0.0317 -0.0011 -12.7359 0.0499 33% 
 
SMS -0.0683 -20.4838 0.0311 -0.0318 -13.4136 0.0474 45%   -0.0373 -19.4458 0.0327 -0.0230 -12.7666 0.0498 23%   -0.0542 -16.2977 0.0390 -0.0325 -12.7958 0.0497 30.9% 
 
BMS -2.3895 -16.6832 0.0381 -1.1333 -13.9828 0.0455 10.7%   -1.3838 -13.4173 0.0474 -1.3838 -13.4173 0.0474 1.1%   -2.1459 -14.7407 0.0431 -1.9025 -12.9602 0.0490 3.5% 
 
GCF -0.0012 -12.9500 0.0491 0.0024 18.0754 0.0352 8.3%   0.0006 14.8871 0.0427 0.0017 16.0808 0.0395 8.3%   0.0012 15.5254 0.0409 0.0023 15.4862 0.0411 5.9% 
 
SIR 0.0100 14.4599 0.0440 0.0275 22.1405 0.0287 23%   0.0075 12.8723 0.0494 0.0148 23.2858 0.0273 19%   0.0129 14.9472 0.0425 0.0215 23.8884 0.0266 16.6   
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Table C-17.1: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Chile 
For each variable of interest, 56 regressions are carried out for leverage ratios at book value. For each variable of interest, 56 regressions are carried out for leverage ratios at market value. Notes: a indicate that a particular variable is robust in 
all leverage measures; b indicate that a particular variable is robust in only when using book value measures of leverage; m indicate that a particular variable is robust only when using market value measures of leverage; d indicate that a 
particular variable is robust in at least one book measure ; c indicate that a particular variable is robust in at least one market measure.* Denotes that the coefficients of  a particular variable are significant at the 5% level in all 969 regression 
models.   
Variable 
 Leverage at Book value B1 (LEVB1)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B2 (LEVB2)  
 
 Leverage at Book value B3 (LEVB3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.5567* -47.3278 0.0134 -0.4710* -43.4514 0.0146 100% 
 
-0.1630* -22.0696 0.0288 -0.1289* -17.5718 0.0362 100% 
 
-0.2738* -27.9693 0.0228 -0.2210* -22.8538 0.0278 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.0723* -63.3788 0.0100 -0.0683* -61.0683 0.0104 100% 
 
-0.0401* -40.1094 0.0159 -0.0364* -39.8028 0.0160 100% 
 
-0.0595* -44.9958 0.0141 -0.0538* -44.9154 0.0142 100% 
 
INF -0.0032 -1.9208 0.3056 0.0130 6.2190 0.1015 0.0%   
 
-0.0053 -6.0582 0.1041 0.0057 3.4816 0.1781 0.0%   
 
-0.0043 -3.7145 0.1674 0.0071 3.8520 0.1617 0.0% 
 
CGDP -0.0000 -4.7520 0.1320 0.0000 9.5466 0.0664 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -2.6805 0.2273 0.0000 6.4029 0.0986 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -2.6041 0.2334 0.0000 4.4965 0.1393 0.0% 
 
GGDP -0.0000 -2.8292 0.2163 0.0000 7.0248 0.0900 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -3.1803 0.1939 0.0000 5.2148 0.1206 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -3.0240 0.2033 0.0000 3.9619 0.1574 0.0% 
 
SMS -0.0562 -3.7412 0.1663 0.0485 3.8563 0.1615 0.0%   
 
-0.0350 -2.9841 0.2059 0.0282 4.0961 0.1524 0.0%   
 
-0.0304 -2.0213 0.2925 0.0439 3.4846 0.1779 0.0% 
 
BMS -0.3797 -4.5274 0.1384 0.6582 7.7113 0.0821 0.0%   
 
0.0572 0.8653 0.5459 0.5283 8.1130 0.0781 0.0%   
 
-0.0156 -0.1839 0.8842 0.5481 6.5069 0.0971 0.0% 
 
GCF -0.0000 -5.0575 0.1243 0.0000 4.3163 0.1449 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -2.8131 0.2174 0.0000 6.5972 0.0958 0.0%   
 
-0.0000 -5.6481 0.1116 0.0000 4.1632 0.1501 0.0% 
 
SIR -0.0065 -4.3167 0.1449 0.0075 5.8104 0.1085 0.0%     -0.0019 -1.6641 0.3445 0.0060 5.5737 0.1130 0.0%     -0.0035 -2.3440 0.2567 0.0074 5.1963 0.1210 0.0%   
 
Table C-17.2: Results of Traditional Extreme Bound Analysis - Second Phase (Firm-Specific and Country-Specific Determinants), Chile 
Variable 
 Leverage at Market value M1 (LEVM1)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M2 (LEVM2)  
 
 Leverage at  Market value M3 (LEVM3)  
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
βmin t p-val βmax t p-val 
Significant 
β's at 5% 
PRF a -0.0645* -60.1725 0.0106 -0.0499* -37.8497 0.0168 100% 
 
-0.0419* -45.2030 0.0141 -0.0333* -34.6556 0.0184 100% 
 
-0.0561* -47.3467 0.0134 -0.0442* -34.7648 0.0183 100% 
 
LIQ a -0.1721* -86.0331 0.0074 -0.1483* -65.9501 0.0097 100% 
 
-0.1000* -56.3395 0.0113 -0.0843* -46.6164 0.0137 100% 
 
-0.1488* -67.0380 0.0095 -0.1268* -54.3385 0.0117 100% 
 
INF 0.0055 13.0141 0.0488 0.0061 15.4708 0.0411 7.1%   -0.0120 -6.6015 0.0957 0.0101 6.3630 0.0992 0.0%   -0.0141 -5.8921 0.1070 0.0149 7.0490 0.0897 0.0% 
 
CGDP 0.0000 12.8897 0.0493 0.0000 13.4615 0.0472 10%   -0.0000 -6.2161 0.1015 0.0000 7.2423 0.0874 0.0%   -0.0000 -6.6957 0.0944 0.0000 6.8071 0.0929 0.0% 
 
GGDP -0.0000 -11.7082 0.0542 0.0000 0.1120 0.9290 0.0%   -0.0000 -6.8021 0.0929 0.0000 3.1006 0.1986 0.0%   -0.0000 -8.5546 0.0741 0.0000 1.6533 0.3463 0.0% 
 
SMS -0.2164 -12.4634 0.0510 0.0665 6.6616 0.0949 0.0%   -0.1432 -11.0475 0.0575 0.0318 4.2679 0.1465 0.0%   -0.2000 -11.7161 0.0542 0.0520 5.3026 0.1187 0.0% 
 
BMS 0.9086 13.6611 0.0465 1.3485 13.7719 0.0461 12.5   0.7009 13.3899 0.0475 0.8485 12.7832 0.0497 5.3%   0.9214 13.3473 0.0476 1.2593 13.0832 0.0486 17% 
 
GCF 0.0000 12.9792 0.0490 0.0000 14.5389 0.0437 23%   0.0000 12.7798 0.0497 0.0000 12.9356 0.0491 10%   0.0000 12.7331 0.0499 0.0000 14.2205 0.0447 23% 
 
SIR 0.0182 13.5717 0.0468 0.0287 13.3171 0.0477 7.1%   -0.0044 -4.2965 0.1456 0.0182 11.2734 0.0563 0.0%   -0.0054 -3.9572 0.1576 0.0256 12.0614 0.0527 0.0%   
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